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ABSTRACT
My thesis is a relatively straight forward one. It is that the jurisprudence on the
topic ofcorporate criminal liability is underdeveloped in Scotland and that there are
many lessons to be learnt from the common law jurisdictions in the promulgation of
any future comprehensive, bespoke legal framework adopted in Scotland. Drawing
from literature from the Anglo-American systems, I have sought to offer a
comprehensive treatment of the subject and how it might be applied in a Scottish
context. At the same time, I have analysed the available jurisprudence both in
Scotland and elsewhere in an effort to identify all the relevant issues which require
to be addressed in developing a new Scottish framework. Corporate crime, as the
student all too readily becomes aware, is a complex subject. It is not just about
corporations and criminal law. A deeper understanding ofother issues is required to
appreciate the intricacies and complexities of a subject which is attracting ever
increasing attention. It is my hope that this thesis is testimony both to the breadth of
the subject and my efforts to master it. Indeed my opening chapter attempts to tease
out the diffuse preliminary issues which one confronts in addressing the subject. It is
difficult to know where to start. Does one start with the components of the subject-
corporations or criminal law or, does one explain the nature of the subject of
corporate crime ? I have attempted to bring together what I believe are crucial
preliminaries. Chapter 2 is altogether more unitary seeking to analyse the basis of
attribution of criminal liability to the corporation. The movement from atomistic
conceptions of liability to a holistic basis is discussed and indeed supported. In
chapter 3 I seek to cover one of the major controversies of corporate criminal
liability- the perceived dichotomy of individualism and collectivism. There are many
who believe that criminal liability is uniquely personal and as such corporations
should not attract criminal liability. However, in my thesis I lend support to those
writers who argue for a pluralist approach of criminalising corporations and/or
individuals operating within in them depending on the given circumstances. Chapter
4 attempts to draw from the large body ofpenological literature and in the process
discusses both the nature and variety ofmethods ofpunishing the corporation. Most
of these ideas have not been tried in a Scottish or British context. Hopefully, I
convince the reader that punishment of the corporate criminal can, and should, be
achieved beyond the limitations of the fine. Chapter 5 may stand out to those who
read this thesis. It is perhaps the only chapter which deals with the specific species
ofcriminal offence- homicide. Myjustificationfor including this topic is not that it is
the most severe of crimes, or the gravest of issues but, rather that the literature is
both rich and more importantly, it is the resurgent interest in corporate homicide
that has fuelled much of both public and academic interest in the topic ofcorporate
crime generally. The literature in both England and America hopefully presage any
debate that may occur in Scotland. Finally, in chapter 6 I seek to draw all of these
issues together and offer my own perspective on how corporate criminal liability may
operate in a Scottish context. Scotland is a small nation proud of its culture, its
people, and its legal system. Sometimes, particularly in respect of the legal system,
that pride is misplaced. Our system has contributed much and has much still to
contribute to the global legal environment. By the same token, we have much to
learn. The subject of corporate criminal liability is but one example. The lessons
from the Anglo-American jurisprudence are many. I hope that when the time
presents itself to develop a fulsome framework for the criminal liability of
corporations in Scotland those lessons will be learned. This thesis represents a




Received wisdom has it that one writes the preface and the introduction to any work
after one has completed the main body. One is able to offer an appropriate rationale
from a reflective and knowledgeable perspective. The difficulty in attempting such a
task in respect of an attenuated piece of work such as this, is that one readily forgets
why one embarked on the project in the first place. 'Why', after a while, appeared to
me, to became of somewhat lesser importance and all too readily, has been supplanted
with a simple determination to see it through. Whether my own experience of writing
a Ph.D. thesis is unique I will leave to others to assess.
I embarked on this course of study having just completed a Masters degree in
Commercial Law. The progression to Ph.D. studies seemed a logical one, as did the
choice of topic. I was interested in companies and company law. I harboured
misgiving about corporations' role and power within modem society and, in truth I
harboured fascination about their significance in the creation of wealth. In the 1990s
interest in the topic of corporate crime was beginning to stir. Those stirrings were in
the common law jurisdictions; the academic writings in Scottish journals were
minimal and as I was to find out the Scottish jurisprudence generally on this topic is
extremely limited. This only encouraged my fascination. I was interested in
developing a field of study that was relatively untouched in Scots law. My thesis
attempts to illustrate the poverty of Scottish jurisprudence on this topic and to offer, if
not a blueprint for the future, certainly an insight into how Scots law may treat the
subject henceforth and at the same time identify the issues that require to be addressed
by those developing a framework of corporate criminal liability. The choice of topic
offered an opportunity to blend my interest in company law and criminal law. The
benefit of hindsight has at least disabused me of the notion that corporate crime is an
issue pertaining simply to the interface between company law and criminal law. The
years of study have taken me into hitherto unexplored areas (for me at least) of
organisational behaviour, criminology, penology and organisational structure and
theory. I set out with one 10 page article on the topic of corporate criminal liability
and ended up with a room filled with box files.
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Although this thesis represents my own thoughts and work, it would be unfair of me
not to acknowledge the assistance given by various people throughout its
development. First, I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor McCall-Smith,
who spend the early years of study chasing after me and doubtless wondering if I
would ever submit anything worthwhile, and then the last 18 months inundated with
drafts, e-mails messages, letters, and requests for meetings. His supervision,
geniality, bonhomie, general confidence building, and constructive criticisms are
undoubted factors in my eventual submission of this thesis. I would also like to thank
my colleagues at the Robert Gordon University, Aberdeen for their tolerance of my
long periods of isolation (they would call it absenteeism) as I worked on this thesis,
the institution itself for funding 50% ofmy fees, and Vicki and Linda and the library
staff for gathering in my horrendous number of inter library loans and Lisa, for
helping with the presentation. Working in an academic institution offered me great
advantages over other part-time candidates and without the support of my employer
and my colleagues I could never have hoped to complete. I think it also appropriate to
thank my wife, Elaine, for her forbearance. Hers was a role reversal from that of
Professor McCall- Smith. In the first few years, if she wanted me out the way, she
would utilise the immortal line of' just how is that thesis coming along ?' Guilt often
forced me into the study. In the last 18 months she has been all but 'widowed' as I
confined myself to the computer while she assumed more than her fair share of
domesticity. My sole companion throughout this period was our dog, Sweep, who in
glowing testimony to the quality of the offering, slept through every word.
I have said very little of the thesis itself leaving that to the abstract. I hope I have
developed a reasonably comprehensive and coherent study of the topic. My research
took me into the four corners of the globe and with the support of my workplace
library I was able to lay my hands on nearly every article of significance written in
English on the subject of corporate crime. Corporate criminal liability is a fascinating
subject. It has prompted enormous discussion in the Anglo-American jurisdictions
and very little in Scotland. It is time for that to change. I hope this thesis will
stimulate interest, offer some solutions and, perhaps prompt some debate on how
Scotland should address the subject of corporate criminal liability. I have laid the text
3
out in Green's house style as one hopefully accepted as in common usage and I have




CORPORATIONS, CRIME, AND CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
1.0 Introduction
Once described as 'a curiously neglected area of scholarship'1, interest in the topic
of corporate crime continues to grow. This interest is taking place against a
3 • • i
changing social, political and economic landscape. Increasingly, attention has
been turning away from a myopic focus on 'street crime' towards white collar
crime generally and corporate crime in particular.4 This realignment of public and
jurisprudential focus is fuelled in part by liberal consensualism5 and in some part
by the pursuit of intellectualism.6 However, it would be wrong to view interest in
the topic as purely academic. There is strong evidence of the public, the media,
prosecutors as well as academic lawyers exhibiting interest in the subject.7 Whilst
1
L. Orland, Reflections On Corporate Crime: Law In Search Of Theory And Scholarship' 1980 17
American Journal ofCriminal Law 21-31.
2
R. Kramer, 'Corporate Criminality: The Development OfAn Idea'' in Corporations As Criminals,
(Hochstedler Ed., 1984) at p. 13.
3
L. Dunford and A. Riley, Corporate Manslaughter- Time For Reform? Paper presented at SLSA
conference Southampton (1996), p. 1; F. T. Cullen, Maakestad and Cavender, Corporate Crime
Under Attack: The Ford Pinto Case And Beyond, (1987) at p. 310
4
L. H. Leigh, ' The Criminal Liability OfCorporations And Other Groups: A Comparative View',
1982 80 Michigan Law Review 1508 - 1529 at p. 1508; Cullen et al., n. 3 at p. 5; see also Katz
'The Social Movement Against White Collar Crime' in Egoin Bittner and Sheldon Messinger (Eds.)
Criminology Review Year Book vol. 2 1980 162.
5
'Justice must be blind to rank, power and position' President Carter LA Bar Assoc. address
4/5/78. 'The failure to confront the societal problem presented by corporate crime presents a
double standard in law enforcement' J. R. Elkins, 'Corporations And The Criminal Law: An
Uneasy Alliance', 1976 65 Kentucky Law Journal 73-129 at p. 77; Wells, 'Corporations: Culture,
Risk And Criminal Liability', 1993 Criminal L. R. 551-566 at p. 566; Braithwaite, Corporate Crime
In The Pharmaceutical Industry, (1984), at p. 305. In New York Central RR v United States 212
US 481 (1909) the Supreme court said 'We see no valid objection in law, and every reason in
public policy why a corporation which profits by the transactions...shall be held punishable... While
the law should have regard to the rights of all, and to those of corporations no less than to those of
individuals, it cannot shut its eyes to the fact that the great majority of business transactions in
modern times are conducted by these bodies, and particularly that interstate commerce is almost
entirely in their hands, and, and to give them immunity from all punishment because of the old and
exploded doctrine that a corporation cannot commit a crime would virtually take away the only
means of effectively controlling the subject matter and correcting the abuses aimed at.'; G. Gordon,
Criminal Law, (2nd Ed., 1978) at p. 284; A. Chayes in, The Corporation In Modern Society, (1961,
E. Mason Ed.) at p. 31
6
Kramer, n. 2 at p. 13-4 argues that academics were responsible for the upsurge in public interest in
the topic in America in the 1980s; see also Coffee, 'Beyond The Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward A
Theoretical View Of Corporate Misconduct And An Effective Legal Response', 1977 63 Virginia
Law Review 1099 at p. 1110.
7
See M. Clinard and P. Yeager, Corporate Crime, (1980), at p. 301
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accepting that scholarship is often subject to vogue, the intellectual idiosyncrasies
of corporate crime are undoubtedly contributing to the sustained interest;9 the
literature is replete with many conflicting ideas and theories.10 Notwithstanding
significant problems, the heightened interest offers considerable optimism that
workable solutions to many of the key issues identified by academic commentators
can be found."
It is a self-evident truth that corporations are the dominant force in modern
commercial life. It is equally clear a great deal of crime is committed in the
12
context of corporate bodies. However, it is not only the known extent, but also
the perceived potential, of the problem which causes concern about corporate
criminality. Put simply, using the corporate form to engage in criminal activity
13
'poses an awesome risk of escalating breakdown of social control.' Corporate
crime is no new phenomenon; for as long as corporations have existed individuals
have used the corporate form to achieve illegal ends.14 Despite this, there is
evidence to suggest that courts have prevaricated15 in tackling what is admittedly a
difficult issue.16 In fairness, it must also be conceded that historically courts of all
jurisdictions, in addressing corporate criminal liability, were having to deal with
17economic and environmental phenomena previously not encountered. Gobert in
g
Stone, 'Corporate Vices And Corporate Virtues: Do Public/Private Distinctions Matter?', 1982
130 University of Pennsylvania L. R. 1441-1509 at p. 1441.
9
Andrews, 'Reform In The Law OfCorporate Liability' 1973 Criminal L. R. 91-97 at p. 91 claims
that the subject abounds with irrationality; Sullivan, 'Expressing Corporate Guilt' 1995 15 Oxford
Journal of Legal Studies 281-293 at p. 293 argues that corporate criminal liability is an 'area replete
with daunting problems of analysis and policy.'
L. Snider, ' The Regulatory Dance: Understanding Reform Process In Corporate Crime' 1991 19
International Journal of Sociology and the Law 209-236 at p. 217.
"
Kramer, n. 2 at p. 14.
12
McCall-Smith and Sheldon, Scots Criminal Law (1992) chap 4\ M. Clinard and P. Yeager, n. 7 at
p. 301; see also Gruner, Corporate Crime AndSentencing (1994) at p. 7
13
Fisse and Braithwaite 'Accountability And The Control OfCorporate Crime: Making The Buck
Stop' in Findlay and Hogg, Understanding Crime and Criminal Justice (1988), at p. 96.
14
Op cit. J. S. Coleman, 'Is Corporate Criminal Liability Really Necessary?', 1975-79 29 South
Western Law Journal 908.
15
D. S. Anderson, 'Corporate Homicide: The Stark Realities of Artificial Beings and Legal
Fictions', 1981 8 Pepperdine Law Review 367-417 at p. 384.
16
M. Clinard, 'Illegal Corporate Behaviour', October 1979, US Dept. of Justice at p. 15; Heerey
'Corporate Criminal Liability- A Reappraisal' 1962 1 University of Tasmania L. R 677-684 at p.
677.
17
G. Stessons, 'Corporate Criminal Liability: A Comparative Perspective' 1994 International and
Comparative Law Quarterly 493-520 at p. 493.
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the context of England contends that, ' [T]he problem of how to hold a company
criminally accountable for the harm produced in the course of its business activity
continues to vex the English judiciary. The attempt to apply conventional criminal
18
law to companies has not been a resounding success.' Despite, and perhaps
because of the apparent poverty of response so far, the case for development of the
law has been made by many writers. Stone, for example, suggests that control of
corporate misconduct has 'become one of the most significant challenges that
society faces.'19 Moreover, the requirement to face up to the challenge has attained
greater importance because of the growth in importance of corporations and
'increasing social concern about the serious forms of harm occasioned by corporate
20
activities.'
The complexity and relative confusion of corporate criminal liability in Britain has
historic origins. Criminal law and models of criminal liability are essentially
individualistic having primarily been developed before the advent of the modem
corporation. Stone explains that the
'pre-eminence of corporations in social activity is a state of affairs that the
law inherited, but unfortunately did not plan for. When much of the law
and political theory was taking shape, there were identifiable humans,
operating independently of complex institutional frameworks, who did the
things that it is the job of law to prevent. The law responded with rules
and concepts concerning what motivated people, and what was possible,
just, and appropriate towards them. There were, of course, all manner of
corporations- churches, municipalities, guilds, universities- during the
years the law was forming. But the courts were rarely pressed to consider
whether the rules they were developing might be inappropriate or
ineffective to deal with this new breed of social actor. Some of the
reasons were doctrinal: There were doubts whether a corporation, a
persona ficta, could be liable for wrongful acts. Others were practical:
The size and structure of the early corporations were so unprepossessing
that when a wrong was done, it was usually not hard to locate a
responsible individual- a culprit- and apply the sanctions to him. The
industrial revolution gave corporations a prominence, size and complexity
that made further disregard impossible. But only in a few ways did the
law account for the corporation a special sort of actor demanding the
attention of specially adapted laws. The exceptions were almost entirely
18
Gobert, 'Corporate Criminality: Four Models Of Fault', 1994 14 Legal Studies 393-410 at p.
393.
19
Stone, 'Controlling Corporate Misconduct1977 48 Public Interest 55-71 at p. 55.
20
Smith and Hogan, Criminal Law, (2nd ed., 1969) at p. 589.
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in shareholder-management relations, where the problems that arose were
unique to corporations and where there were thus no pre-existing rules to
accommodate each emerging situation...[B]ut such meddlings with the
corporations internal governance were almost always designed to protect
and define in advance the increasingly complex interests of the investor-
not those of the corporations customer, its neighbours, or its fellow
citizens. Where the corporation was performing acts that, in theory, the
ordinary person could perform- polluting the environment producing
harmful goods, committing crimes..-there already existed a network of
rules addressed to the "persons." The most economical solution was
21
simply to fit the corporation into this pre-existing body of law.'
It was not solely the cumbersome approach of fitting corporations into pre-existing
laws that resulted in laxity in the application of criminal law to corporations. There
was a pre-occupation with developing laws which sought to sustain, protect and
advance the corporate form which illustrated state paternalism and duplicity at its
22
worst. That pre-occupation stood in marked contrast to the expressed desire of
many to develop more stringent forms of control over corporations and their
23
agents. Indeed, one of the arguments in favour of developing corporate criminal
liability as a separate branch of jurisprudence is that 'While governmental
regulation has, to some degree, controlled corporate power, it neither prevented
serious social harm nor promoted a sense of corporate social responsibility.'24
There is however, an emerging consensus that not only does something need to be
25done to counter that failure but also a growing belief that something can be done.
Distilled to its most basic, this thesis endorses this belief and, in a Scottish context
seeks to identify what such legislative intrusions might reasonably achieve. What
seems obvious is that like individuals, companies have the power to make choices,
and like individuals, they should be responsible for the foreseeable results of those
choices. Corporate resources make those choices more informed or in any event,
the capability of being better informed.26 Accordingly, there is no moral, ethical,
21
Stone, n. 19 at p. 56.
22
Wells, n. 5 at p. 551 talks of the regulation of companies as 'assuming their beneficence.'
23
M. Clinard and P. Yeager, n. 7 at p. 301.
24
Elkins, n. 5 at p. 77.
25
Braithwaite, n. 5 at p. 310.
26
Gobert, ''Corporate Criminality: New Crimes For The Times', 1994 Criminal Law Review 722-
734 op cit. at p. 733.
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or practical reason why corporations should not conform to the criminal law. In
recognising the fairness of attaching criminal liability to the corporation it is also
important to understand that the desire is to control the body corporate as a
collective and that,
'When people blame corporations, they are not merely channelling
aggression against a deodand or some other symbolic object; they are
condemning the fact that people within an organization collectively failed
27
to avoid the offense to which corporate blame attaches.'
Fisse later expanded this view by noting that 'the traditional liberal concept of
corporations as mere conduits of individualism is vulnerable to displacement by
28
more corporate orientated visions of social control.' Nevertheless, that
individualism has been a significant inhibiting factor in the development of
corporate criminal liability so much so that, ' [cjontemporary preoccupation with
the notion that responsibility derives from and attaches to the autonomous
individual renders us bereft of conceptual tools with which to confront corporate
29
accountability.' There is often a dichotomised conflict between individualism
and enterprise liability; one that need not necessarily exist.
Cullen et al. point to a link between 'progress' and the increased threat of corporate
crime arguing that 'the risks posed increasingly by the nation's air, earth and water
are linked directly with our dependence on industrial processes and chemicals that
generate toxic pollutants but also, ironically, provide us with the products,
technological advances, cures and employment that sustain the quality of our
30lives.' It seems fairly obvious however, that there need not be any correlation
between progress and crime; one is not necessarily a consequence of the other.
Whilst every legitimate enterprise may be an invitation to criminal exploitation by
• 31*
insiders', it need not necessarily be so. It is perfectly possible to harness the
27
Fisse, 'Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault And Sanctions',
1982 56 Southern California Law Review 1141 at p. 1149.
28 •
Fisse, 'Corporate Compliance Programmes: The Trade Practices Act' 1989 17 Australian
Business Law Review 356 at p. 358.
29
Wells, n. 5 at p. 552.
30
Cullen et al., n. 3 at p. 75.
31
Cohen,' The Concept OfCriminal Organisation', 1977 17 British Journal ofCriminology 97-111
at p. 101.
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beneficence of corporations without falling victim to their criminal capacity and
that, ultimately, must be our aim. A scheme of corporate criminal liability will be
only one important facet of a strategy to achieve that objective of responsibility and
control.
Many commentators believe that the new weighted threat of corporate crime
32 • •
justifies the attachment of corporate criminal liability. As indicated earlier, the
impact and threat of corporate crime have been the subject of considerable world
media attention. Illustrative of this is an article in the New York Times in 1985
33which talks of a corporate crime wave exploding across America. Various
reasons for the new upsurge are canvassed in the article- moral breakdown in
society, new pressures on managers in intensely competitive environment, and
Government's laissez faire attitude being interpreted as a green light. Fortune in
1980 pointed to a picture of large scale violations going unrecorded. Their study
identifies 11% of the major American corporations having engaged in at least one
major delinquency. The article accepts that '[t]he big cases are often shockers.'
And in an article in The Nation it was claimed
'While the suffering exacted by violent crime should not be deprecated, it
is also true that the loss of lives and dollars from unsafe products,
pollution and price fixing greatly exceeds that from all the Saturday night
specials in America'...'Corporate malfeasance is a tax of several billion
dollars a years which cheats consumers and undermines the integrity of
the business system....Corporate illegality is a several hundred-billion-
dollar albatross around the economy's neck. It lowers productivity,
inhibits innovation, boosts prices, mis-allocates resources, increases
injuries and causes deaths. Not only does it squander economic growth
and transfer costs from producers to consumers, it also sabotages the trust
that binds businesses and the consumers together in a competitive market
economy.' 4
32
C. D. Stone, 'The Place OfEnterprise Liability In The Control OfCorporate Conduct', 1980 90
Yale L. J. 1; see also S. L. Hills, Corporate Violence: Injury And Death For Profit, (1987) at p.
201; see also Lederman, 'Criminal Law, Perpetrator And Corporation: Rethinking A Complex
Triangle' 1985 76 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 285-340
33
The New York Times 9/6/85
34
M. Green and J. F. Berry, ' White Collar Crime Is Big Business' 1985 The Nation 689-707 at p.
704
10
Media interest is important in the formulation of interest and concern about
35
corporate crime but, as Coffee explains, 'behind the black and white world of our
newspaper headlines, the colors of the surrounding landscape become increasingly
dominated by the muted greys of moral ambiguity and legal uncertainty.'36
Sutherland Burgess, Kadish and Tappin have all postulated at various times that
there is an absence of moral indignation about white collar crime in the community
and that in part explains weaknesses in the law and its enforcement relative to this
type of crime. Grabosky et al however, describe Sutherland's (and others)
37 •
perception of public tolerance of white collar crime as a 'myth'. They point to
studies around the world which offer empirical support for public indignation at the
38 •
nature and extent of white collar crime. According to them, the public view
many forms of white collar criminality as more serious than traditional common
crimes and that there is little evidence to support the thesis that the public are
"3Q m m
condoning white collar criminality. Webster believes that attitudes to white
collar crime vary form community to community.40 Clinard on the other hand
believes that society is still principally concerned with ordinary infractions rather
than corporate crime.41 Importantly, Tigar recognises that 'the debate over
corporate liability is influenced by one's personal views about corporations and
their power over economic life, and also by one's theory of the best means of
persuading corporate directors and management to enforce law compliance by
35
'Public concern over corporate accountability issues has since transformed the legal landscape...
Aided by a budding corporate governance movement [corporate crime] has come to enjoy
legitimacy alongside established criminal law doctrines..No mere survivor of the sceptic's scrutiny,
the doctrine of liability now thrives in a regulatory climate eager to affix responsibility for a
widening range of social and economic ills. The transformation is so complete that today, there is
little reason for optimism that this form of liability might vanish from the scene.' K. Brickey,
'Rethinking Corporate Liability Under The Model Penal Code' 1988 19 Rutgers L. R. 593-634 at
p.596
6
Coffee, n. 6 at p. 1118.
37
Grabosky, ' The Myth OfCommunity Tolerance Toward White-Collar Crime'' 1987 20 Australian
and New Zealand Journal ofCriminology' 33-44.
38
F. T Cullen, Link and Polanzi, 'The Seriousness Of Crime Revisited: Have Attitudes Towards
White-Collar Crime Changed?', 1982 20 American Society of Criminology 83-100; L. S. Shrager
and J. F.Short,'Towards A Sociology OfOrganizational Crime', 1980 25 Social Problems 407-419
39
Grabosky, n. 37 at pp. 42-3, see also Braithwaite, 'Challenging Just Deserts: Punishing White
Collar Criminals' 1982 73 Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science 723-763 at p.
733.
40
W. H. Webster, 'An Examination Of FBI Theory And Methodology Regarding White-Collar
Crime Investigation And Prevention', 1980 17 American Criminal L. R. 275-287 at p. 278.
41
Clinard, n. 16 at p. 14.
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employees. Management theory or macroeconomics arguably have more to tell us
about such issues than does legal history.'42 Growing concern about corporate
crime can be explained by noting the merging concern at malfeasance within
political and economic institutions and a sensitising of the public to the crimes of
the powerful.43 The notion of legitimisation deficit44 is also significant to the
growth of corporate crime.45 The public undoubtedly have a legitimate interest in
corporations.46 Concern about the modern corporation 'is intensified to the extent
that its activities have necessarily ramified beyond the economic sphere of
production of goods and service.'47 Cullen et al argue that there is significant
change in that 'people have come to think differently about corporations: about the
potential for executives to pursue profits at any cost, about the harm that
companies can inflict, about the social responsibility that business should exercise,
and about what constitutes a tolerable level of risk as corporate decisions affect the
welfare ofworkers, consumers and entire communities.'48 Swigert and Farrell talk
rather simply, but with the same conception, of corporate criminality having
entered 'scientific and popular vocabulary.'49
Many writers convey hostility to the notion of corporate criminal liability. Snider,
for example, offering a pseudo-Marxist perspective suggests that attempts at
criminalising the corporation an approach is merely wall paper dressing designed
to offer the appearance that the state is concerned enough to act against the
capitalist classes to retain the integrity of the liberal democratic system.50 Khanna
42
M. Tigar, 7/ Does The Crime But Not The Time: Corporate Criminal Liability In Federal Law\
1980 17 American Journal of Criminal Law 211-234 at p. 213.
43
Cullen et al., n. 3 at p. 2.
44
M. Clinard, Corporate Ethics And Crime- The Role OfMiddle Management, (1983), pp. 15-16.
45
See Cullen et al., n. 3 at p. 10.
46
Moll, 'In Search OfThe Corporate Private Figure' 1978 6 Hofstra Law Review 334 at p 339. S.
Wolf, 'Law And Moral Responsibility Of Organisations', in Pennock and Chapman Criminal
Justice, (1985), at p. 267. 'Organizations in our society do many things that we, as members of
society, have both the reason and the right to try to stop.'
47
Chayes in Mason, n. 5 at p. 26.
48
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for different reasons expresses some doubt as to whether corporate criminal
liability is the best way to influence corporate behaviour arguing that,
'citizens might find imposing criminal liability on fictional entities
farcical, and this response may decrease the criminal label's effect for
other types of crime.'5'..[but]..'some justification for corporate criminal
liability may have existed in the past, when civil enforcement techniques
were not well developed, but from a deterrence perspective, very little
now supports the continued imposition of criminal rather than civil
liability on corporations. Indeed the answer to the question ..'corporate
• • • 52
criminal liability: what purpose does it serve ?'- is "almost none".'
Smith and Hogan claim that 'the necessity for corporate criminal liability awaits
53
demonstration' whereas Leigh suggests that the relevance and desirability of •
corporate criminal liability remains largely unexplored.54 Professor Glanville
Williams was also critical of the expansion of corporate criminal liability when
commenting on the American Draft Model Penal Code in 1956. His view was that
'the cases are not well -reasoned on fundamental policy, and it seems to me that
judges have not always looked where they are going.'55 It is difficult to know if
these historic views represent the current attitude of these particular writers. Much
has changed since their comments. Irrespective there is in the minds of some
jurists a current uneasiness about the nature and scope of corporate criminal
liability.56 An illustration of this is to be found in the comments of Tigar who
claims that,
'It is no universal solvent to declare that a corporation should be a
criminal defendant because the aggregation of capital it represents poses a
• • 57
greater risk of harm if that power is used for criminal purposes.'
Francis argues that the principles of the laws of agency, crime and corporations
58
point away from corporate liability. McVisk meanwhile claims that not enough
51
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time has been spend on determining the theoretical basis of liability for corporate
criminal wrongdoing.59 Conversely, controlling unlawful organisations has been
described as an issue of 'increasing relevance.'60 There is also conflict in the
modern era between those who want more criminalisation and those who prefer a
more co-operative strategy. According to the latter view '[criminalization
strategies are rigid techniques which alienate potentially co-operative individuals
and corporations.'61 The two strategies are not necessarily exclusive. However, it
remains the case that, 'Changing the old consensus and determining the rights and
62
responsibilities of business, State and citizens is still in the early stages.'
The utilitarian desire for control stand in contrast to free market philosophy which
dictates that '[i]n a democratic society, freedom means the ability to pursue
economic gain, to acquire property, and to seek happiness as the individual pleases.
The social good generally encompasses the same ideals and yet recognises that
• 63
unrestrained individual freedom may cause social harm.' For some society has
not developed enough of a consensus to tackle corporate wrongdoing. It is a moot
point whether
'Many of the beliefs held within the corporate world about laws and
government are nourished in a climate in which there is a lack of
consensus about the values society is trying to advance. On the one hand,
people do not want to deplete natural resources too rapidly or to pollute
the air, land, and water, but on the other, they want abundant consumer
goods at the lowest possible level.'64
Moreover, there must be recognition that the law and its rigorous enforcement
might only be part of the whole picture of corporate crime control.65 The position
can be summed up by accepting that 'asymmetries of power in relationships have
59
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led to extensive attempts by persons to redress the balance using as their instrument
the State'66 but that the State is only one avenue of control.
This thesis attempts to explore not just the legal mechanisms for control but also
offers, as a paradigm, a pluralistic system which both enables and encourages
internal private mechanism and, at the same time, side by side has as an integral
feature external control in the form of criminal liability and punishment. In
seeking to develop an appropriate model of corporate criminal liability in a
Scottish context it is necessary not just to reflect upon the problems the subject
matter inevitably throws up, but to comprehend the vibrancy of the debate which
corporate criminal liability engenders, and the issues that fuel that debate. There is
a need to explore some of these fragmentary issues which contribute much to the
complexity of the subject. Were corporate criminal liability simply a symbiosis of
the law of corporations and the indigenous criminal law, the task of understanding
the subject would be rendered much simpler. However, to understand the essence
of the subject it is necessary to understand its core components- corporations and
criminal law- but also to look beyond them to the almost theological debates on the
issues of corporate personality and corporate offending. In addition very few
introductory chapters would be complete without at least some reference to the
historical perspective. Historical study often reveals much. The instruction of the
history of corporate criminal liability in the Anglo-American jurisdictions lies in its
illustration of the tensions of the subject matter. However, it is an incomplete
history; one which awaits a modern chapter resonating with the triumph of
corporate criminal liability. It is a history important for all that. What follows is a
brief overview of these core issues in an attempt to contextualise corporate criminal
liability and the key polemics it engenders.
1.1 Corporations
It is trite to assert that corporations play a pervasive part in modern life. The
• • * 67business corporation dominates most fields of economic activity, to a point where
66
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68
many of them exceed the power and wealth of nation states. Of course, this state
of affairs was not always so. Historically corporations, though significantly
influential, did not exhibit the power evident in today's corporation. As an entity,
the corporation appears to have its genesis in the Roman Empire69 The early
Roman 'corporation' exhibited only limited similarities to the modern corporation
including the right to sue/be sued and the right to hold property. Limited liability
was not evident in the early Roman corporations. Indeed the origins of limited
• • 70
liability are somewhat more opaque. Timberg, ignoring claims of the earlier
lineage of the corporation per se, argues that the modem corporation originates in
the thirteenth century. He contends that,
'During the incubation period of four centuries, the corporate concept was
in large measure the handmaiden of institutionalised religion. It was the
legal device whereby a small collective enterprise devoted to God,
learning or charity, such as an abbey or university, could preserve its
continued existence, its legal rights, and its properties, even though the
71
original human members of the group enterprise had all died.'
The Development OfCorporations In Britain
Whatever the true origins, all writers (including Timberg) note the change of
emphasis following the Industrial Revolution. The early British corporation was a
72device for mobilising private resources in the King's business. From the
Industrial Revolution onwards the primary function of corporateness was the
73creation of economic wealth. According to Stone, the original corporations were
so 'unpresupposing' that it was easy to locate the individual actor who was the
'true' culprit individualism could be sustained without any problems.74 However,
68
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75the Industrial Revolution put an end to low visibility of corporations ~ and, as a
consequence the modern era is one marked by the fact that the corporation has
become the generally accepted method of conducting of all private business
76
enterprises. Following this dramatic transition, Goldschmidt argues that
government 'surrendered early and easily' power over the size structure and
77
managerial responsibilities of corporations.
In England the development of the modern corporation is often traced to the
70 #
medieval guilds. In the feudal period prior to this, emphasis was on the
individual as a natural person. Cullen et al. explain that,
'[T]he concept of the person was simple and limited during the feudal
period. It denoted the rights and responsibilities of an individual as a
natural person, and was rarely applicable to a collective entity.
Partnerships existed but merely as assemblages of individuals, each with
his or her own rights and responsibilities, not as Juristic persons.
79
Corporations thus did not exist.'
The Merchant Guilds formed part of the structure of the Local Boroughs which
'represented a closed economic group of sole traders characterised by corporate
80 • • 1*1
monopoly and privilege.' These guilds were essentially cartels which sought to
regulate trade so that even the poorest of them maintained an adequate level of
profit. The linkage to Local Government was significant. Local Boroughs
represented a manifestation of the growth of the State and its influence over
society. That influence had both a civil and criminal law dimension. Some of the
very earliest corporate crime cases evolved from municipal services. Importantly,
the English Boroughs were brought under the ambit of 'juristic persons' further
recognising the concept of the collective entity as distinct from the natural person.
Cullen et al. observe that,
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'[T]he corporation emerged as the transition from feudalism to capitalism
generated demands for new business forms, collective entities that could
accommodate the combined resources of individuals and facilitate
business on a grand scale. The State, a collective entity itself, responded
to these demands by creating such forms, which it then recognised as
juristic persons, thus it gained political support from these entities while
maintaining control over them.'
The only means of incorporation at this time was through Royal Charter or
82
Statute. The original ethos behind the granting of incorporation through Royal
Charter was to confer a measure of protection and status.83 The concept was
84
invariably linked to colonialisation. However, usage of incorporation by Royal
Charter developed to a point where its principal purpose was to regulate trade. The
similarities between these incorporated bodies and the modern corporation are
negligible. Burrows, for example, notes that until the 19th century corporations
85
were relatively unimportant. These early collectives were umbrella organisations
in which individual entrepreneurs could combine under the auspices of the
incorporated association. These individuals continued to survive on their own
merits and represented individual units in their own right. Incorporation was
essentially based on patronage. Corporations were children of the State and in
86
many instances performed the duties of the State.
From these early, loose incorporations developed the concept of joint-stock.
Individuals joined together in combinations for the exploitation of a monopoly
trading position granted to them. Of these, the East India Company was the first to
combine incorporation, overseas trade, and joint-stock raised from the general
87
public. These joint-stock companies offer greater similarities to modern
companies. Writing in 1776, Adam Smith claimed that '[T]he only trades which it
seems possible for a joint stock company to carry on successfully...are those of
81
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88which all the operations are capable of being reduced to what is called a routine.'
It was generally believed that joint-stock companies were unsuited to manufacture,
89
agriculture or commerce and indeed, even by the middle of the 19th century there
were few joint-stock companies engaged in manufacturing.90
Following considerable public scandal over the South Sea Company, the Bubble
91
Act attempted to suppress the formation of companies which sought to act under
92
obsolete charters and other charters previously granted by the Crown. Only those
granted under 'genuine charter' would be permissible. The others were to be
punished as common nuisances and liable to the ancient punishment of
93
praemunire. Injured parties could sue for treble damages and brokers dealing in
such company shares were liable to a fine of £500. It was subsequently claimed of
the Act that 'it had more of temporary malice and revenge than of permanent
wisdom and policy.'94 The Bubble Act and the related corporate collapse were
instrumental in retarding the development of joint stock companies for a
considerable period of time.95 According to Hunt, the Act exercised,
'a determent psychological effect upon company formation even after its
repeal under the pressure of a rising industrialisation a century later. In
fact, the history of the business corporation or joint-stock company in
England during the one hundred and fifty years following the statute of
1720 is the story of an economic necessity forcing its way slowly and
painfully to legal recognition against strong commercial prejudice in
favour of "individual" enterprise, and in the face of determined attempts
of both the legislature and the courts to deny it. Several eruptions of
company promotion and speculation in defiance of the law, and new
industries, the development ofwhich was beyond the limited resources of
the individual capitalist, were forces which operated finally to break down
opposition and cause Parliament, retracing its steps, gradually to erect the
legal framework of the new form of business organisation.'96
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The years 1824 and 1825 saw a massive expansion of company formation. This
was so because 'capital was abundant and rapidly increasing, no longer taxed and
absorbed by war expenditure.' In April 1824 there were 250 private bills before
Parliament for incorporation.97 Despite parliamentary objections,98 corporate
formation continued apace. In 1825 June, in response to mounting criticism of the
draconian nature of the Bubble Act, it was repealed. The common law was now
deemed to be sufficient to deal with fraudulent formations. Despite the repeal of
the Act the courts continued to take a dim view of unincorporated joint-stock
associations.99 Gradually, the courts modified their position and declined to hold
joint-stock associations illegal at common law.100
The emergence and growth of the railway companies are attributed with having a
major impact on the development of corporate crime itself. Railways required
considerable capital investment. The obvious way of doing so was to raise capital
from the public. The existing methods of incorporation proved far too
cumbersome. Royal Charter seemed inappropriate and Act of Parliament was both
difficult and expensive.101 A Select Committee under the chairmanship of William
Gladstone reported in 1844 the need for registration of deeds of settlement. The
102resultant legislation is generally considered the first of the Companies Acts.
Companies so registered were imbued with the qualities of corporations. The
ability to register meant that incorporation was no longer determined by privilege,
though privilege undoubtedly continued. In the twelve years after the passage of
the 1844 Act some 910 companies registered. On application they were
provisionally registered and some time thereafter were granted full registration.
The 1844 Act did not offer limited liability. This was available by contracts
between shareholders and creditors. Limited Liability was formally introduced by
the Limited Liability Act 18 5 5.103 This ensured that henceforth the concept of
97
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limited liability did not have to be developed on the basis of contract.104 In the
process it supplanted individual liability with the collective liability of the separate
capital of the company. With the advent of limited liability the growth of
incorporated companies was quite dramatic.
In the modern era registration has predominated as the method of State sanction.105
According to Hunt, 'freedom of incorporation was achieved only after a protracted
and bitter struggle against deeply rooted prejudice, widespread misconception, and
even fear.'106 By the 1860s joint-stock companies were well established. In the
period 1863-66 over 3500 companies were registered of which 900 offered shares
107
to the public. The Times was able to claim that the world was growing into 'one
108
vast mass of impersonalities.' The growth was marked not only by the
formation of new companies but by the conversion of hitherto private firms into
limited companies.109 Reflecting on these developments, Hunt was moved to say
that,
'After more than a century of struggle against deeply rooted prejudice and
widespread misconception, and having weathered the storm of the sixties,
freedom of incorporation was a definitely accomplished fact. The joint
stock company and the indispensable incident of limited liability, both at
first prohibited except under special and rare Parliamentary discretion to
favour had later become a carefully guarded bureaucratic concession.
Henceforth, they were privileges to be recognized as of common right.'110
As Farrar suggests, the development of the modern company has been a
combination of utility and responsibility.111 Modern corporations are
112
fundamentally different from their counterparts in the 19th century. Limited
liability and incorporation were both recognition of the benefits that companies
could bestow on the wider community. The wealth they created, the opportunities
104
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they presented, were arguably of singular importance in the modern economic
landscape. That fact remains equally true in the modern era; it is a fact that
i n
corporations have contributed enormously to the development of civilisation.
Despite their invaluableness, the modern era has been dominated by a desire for
greater responsibility by corporations. The balance between unbridled wealth
creation and greater social responsibility has moved steadily in favour of the latter.
The development of responsibility is manifested in the tighter regulation of the
modern company, the increasing disclosure provisions and importantly, in the
context of this study- the desire to append criminal responsibility to companies for
their wrongdoing.
Developments in America followed a similar pattern to those in England. Three
decades after the American Revolution, incorporation was expanding at an
accelerating rate.114 Indeed expansion in America was greater than the more
advanced economies of England and Europe. In part this is explained by the
relative ease of incorporation and the fact that other organisational structures
(partnerships) were utilised more fully in England and Europe. Limited liability
was supposed to be an important early feature of American companies but there is
little evidence for this supposition.115 Nor could it be claimed that the American
corporation was free from State interference.116
It was estimated that in America at the end of 1968 there was one corporation for
117
every 126 persons. The modem growth rate in numbers is quite spectacular and
118has outstripped proportionate human expansion. In 1980 there were roughly 2
million corporations in USA alone.119 Growth in each category large, medium, and
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120
small has been similarly spectacular. Jacoby estimated that corporations owned
28% of the tangible wealth in the USA in 1973.121 In America it also the case that
there is wider diffusion of share ownership with one in four of the population
122
owning shares. Despite the wider diffusion there is nonetheless a high
p-i
concentration of ownership amongst the wealthier members of society.
Modern Corporations
In recent times, the global trend has been towards enlargement of corporations and
the creation of multi-national enterprises. They have become central to corporate
activity.124 Blumberg says of the large corporation '[I]n addition to its
predominant economic role in providing goods, services and employment, the
mega-corporation has developed into a social and political organization of
profound significance. In fact, it has become a basic social institution and a center
125
of power resembling governmental structures.' Grygier meanwhile notes the
irony that the larger the corporation the greater its capacity for harm but also the
greater its contribution to economics, employment technology and other beneficial
126 * *
consequences. According to Kobrin, many corporations have 'transcended the
• 127limitations of the market and have accumulated economic and political power.'
It is true that '[F]or a large portion of the ...population the corporation may be the
single most important factor in determining the nature of the individual's working
128
and non-working environment.' Certainly, it seems clear that 'the global
corporation negates the assumptions of classical and neo-classical economic theory
and transcends the boundaries of the nation-state in its values, interests and
120
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129
concerns.' In this period there has also been an emergence of multinational
130
corporations 'as a powerful agent of social and economic change.' Jacoby
claims 'the multinational corporation is, among other things, a private
"government" often richer in assets and more populous in stockholders and
employees than some nation States in which it carries on business.'131
Also in the typology of modem corporation there is an emergence of large
endocratic organisations- large publicly held corporations whose stock is scattered
132
in small fractions amongst thousands of stockholders. One of the problems of
such corporations is that,
'Not only is the number of stockholders large, but many of them are not
biological persons- instead they are banks, pension funds, insurance
companies, and mutual funds. The paradox is that most of these persons
and institutions have very little interest in the conduct of "their"
corporation: What they want is a good return on their money, better than
133
they can get from any other corporation.'
It is projected that soon 75% of world trade will be controlled by only 300
corporations.134 Corporate business is outgrowing national boundaries.135 There is
also a process of diffusion evident in modem corporate activity whereby
corporations create holding companies with constellations of related
136 137
corporations. Viewed as a repository of both economic and political power,
the modem corporation is often seen as a threat to individual autonomy rather than
138
a simple servant of economic progress. The powerful can and do use their
139
power to avoid detection and scrutiny. Large corporations are repositories of
financial wealth which can be made available to politicians who support corporate
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interests generally or those of that corporation specifically.140 Generally speaking
there is often a direct, and at times insidious relationship between large
corporations and the process of State policy formulation.141
The Nature Of The Corporation
Turner claims that the essential ingredient of any organisation is that it should have
some capacity to act as a single entity, to act in an integrated manner and as a
consequence, '[E]very organization therefore, must seek to establish some internal
discipline, some internal set of constraints to ensure that its members do act as a
unit.'142 An organisation will establish a hierarchy and a process of
communication to ensure continuity of outlook, practice and organisation.143
Tombs doubts whether corporations despite the fact that they present themselves as
such, act as unified rational entities.144 Blackstone in his commentaries identified
five characteristics of corporations perpetual succession, capacity to sue and be
sued in corporate name, the right to hold property, the possession of a common seal
by which the corporation could oblige itself in law, and the power to make rules for
the better government of its members.145 Dan Cohen in contrast claims that
organisations have eight essential properties- structure, permanence, decision¬
making, size, formality, complexity, functionality and goal orientation.146 Drucker
argues that institutions need to be analysed in the context of the conflicts that 'exist
between the purpose of the corporation as an autonomous body and the needs of
society in which it lives.'147 Arguably, corporations should not be free from social
obligations but social obligations should be harmonious with corporate
• 148 •
objectives. Despite this, it is a truism that well intentioned corporations often
fail to meet moral and legal standards.149 Even though a corporation may have
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other goals,150 profitability is often suggested as the litmus test of corporate
responsibility151 Levitt argues that corporations are not designed to promote social
152
issues nor are they good at handling them. Generally speaking, there are
extensive historical roots to the challenge of the idea of corporate responsibility.'53
Interest in social responsibility of corporations has developed in response to a crisis
of confidence in corporate operations.154 Indeed, it has been suggested that
corporations have been coerced into adopting a greater public interest approach.155
Despite the fact that the development of the corporation was predicated on the
advancement of societal good, it remains the case that 'the acts done on behalf of
business enterprises are of course done primarily for private gain.'156
157
Maitland's view is that the corporation is a right and duty bearing unit.
However, Oleck recognises that 'The general tendency..has been to enlarge the
authority of the corporation with little consideration of the responsibility aspect vis
158 •
a vis the general community.' Caroline also notes the transition from societal
good to private good and the conflict now engendered by that transition. Her view
is that,
'the corporation is itself a neutral tool that can fulfil a legitimate role in
society by providing opportunities to maximise profit and thus maximise
gain for investors. The conscience of the corporation is geared not to
societal goals but to achieving economic ends and thus legislative
regulation is imperative. In attempting to manage its environment
conscious and deliberate actions result in conflict with legislation.'159
History then points to an increasing and alarmingly dangerous, positioning of
corporations within society. The criminal law represents only one avenue which
might check abuse of their dominant position. The law of corporations has served
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to promote the corporation as a wealth creating entity. The original benevolence
which corporations exhibited towards society generally has been supplanted by the
self interest of the corporation, its members and its agents. The historical
perspective at least offers us an insight into how we have arrived at a position
where there are legitimate concerns that the power of corporations can challenge
the State, the law it promulgates, and the societal interests which it embodies. The
development of modern corporations took place almost oblivious to the operation
of the criminal law. The belated attempts to establish congruence between the two
are undoubtedly hampered by the passage of time. As the Anglo-American
jurisprudence illustrates it is nevertheless possible.
1.2 Criminal Law
Any system of corporate criminal liability must stand on all fours with the
fundamentals of criminal law itself. Premised on current social needs and notions
of morality, law structures and limits our business, social, and familial activity.160
The imagery of 'crime' is powerful and often results in stereotypical
assumptions.161 In addition criminal law is primarily individualistic in nature.
This inherent individualism of criminal law which challenges the collectivism of
corporate criminal liability is outlined by Cullen et al. who explain that,
'While crime is easily defined as a violation of social norms and
(arguably) as socially harmful, our understanding of unlawful conduct
tends to be fixated at the individual level. In fact the entire crime
punishment nexus is highly individualistic. In the traditional model one
person harms another and receives punishment. Criminal activity at a
more complex level- such as a collective entity harming great numbers of
scattered victims and receiving punishment- simply does not suggest itself
and was inconceivable at common law. The early law was designed to
regulate the behaviour of individuals as natural persons, not a juristic
162
person like the corporation.'
Criminal law is also flexible. Cullen et al. point to its fluidity and its link to social
values and public morality prevailing at any given time. They state,
160
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'
[If] an act is not a crime, either it does not transcend the boundaries or the
law has temporarily lagged behind the moral sentiments. But boundaries
are not permanent, and they change, though often with some lag, as
society changes. Thus a behaviour may be considered within society's
moral boundaries at one time but outside it at another. Therefore certain
actions of corporations may not have been considered harmful enough to
violate the moral boundaries at common law but were viewed later as
• 163
sufficiently serious to deserve the label "criminal." '
Sayre pointed to an expansion of the criminal law as part of the process of fluidity.
His concern was that the criminal law was expanding into areas of social concern
hitherto not considered criminal and that the criminal law now embraced morally
neutral offences.164 Sayre talked of a conflict of interest in the criminal law
between the right of the individual liberty from conviction in the absence ofmoral
blameworthiness and the social interest in the security and well-being of society.
This particular conflict was supposedly resolved by the development of the concept
of mens rea. Packer argues that 'Crime is a socio-political artefact, not a natural
phenomenon. We can have as much or as little of it as we please, depending on
what we choose to count as criminal.'165 The trend in the modern era has been to
criminalise a greater and greater number of activities. Criminalising certain
activities of the corporation is a feature of this trend and despite the evident
problems, prosecution of corporate crime in the common law jurisdictions around
the world has become commonplace.166 This fact sits ill at ease with many
commentators. Caroline, for example, is critical of the expansion of criminal
liability to corporations arguing that,
'The traditional theories of the criminal law have been bent and strained
by the judiciary in an attempt to make them adapt to the economic
I f\1
realities and organizations of the market-place. The clothes do not fit.'
One clear raison d'etre of criminal law is to protect society against special and
168
specific harms. According to McVisk, the most fundamental purpose of any
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criminal law is to induce external conformity with its rules.169 Integral, to that is
170the recognition that vengeance was an early source of criminal law but this has
subsequently been displaced by deterrence.171 The function of criminal law is to
preserve public order and decency, to protect the citizen from what is offensive and
injurious, and to provide sufficient safeguards against exploitation and corruption
172of others. There are those who believe that the criminal law also plays an
• 173 •
important part in the socialisation process which deters crime. Edgerton claims
that,
'The chief civilized purpose of criminal law is deterrence- the prevention
of acts which are conceived to injure one social interest or another. The
question is not whose mind is "guilty" but whose responsibility will serve
the deterrent purpose. It seems evident that this purpose is further served
if corporate criminal responsibility is added to criminal responsibility of
the corporations representatives. If the corporation itself is immune, it
often stands to gain rather than to lose by the commission of crime in its
business, and directors, stockholders and agents, from loyalty to it or in
the hope of bettering their position in it or through it, may take a chance
ofpersonal responsibility for the sake of corporate advantage.'174
Crime hurts community or public interests175 but the myth of crime automatically
involving public harm should be dispelled.176 Criminal law's purpose is to protect
those interests which are most central to life in society177 and to establish an
178authoritative framework for the official response to lawbreaking.
Notwithstanding this 'The outer boundaries of the criminal law must be set with
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• 179due respect for individual rights as well as crime prevention.' Sutherland
suggests two elements of crime- socially injurious conduct and legal provision of a
180
penalty for the act. Hart meanwhile defines crime as conduct which will incur a
formal and solemn pronouncement of the moral condemnation of the
181
community. It has further been suggested that although the criminal law may be
seen as society's primary mechanism for showing disapproval of harmful conduct,
the dividing line between criminal activity and other forms of wrongdoing has
1 87
become increasingly blurred. Criminal law may also be viewed as an attempt to
183
protect the powerless from the depredations of the powerful.
The Marxist perspective is that law simply reflects 'the basic constellation of
184
power in a society.' Engels claimed 'In a modem state, law must not only
correspond to the general economic position and be its expression, but must also be
an expression which is consistent in itself, and which does not, owing to inner
contradictions, look glaringly inconsistent. And in order to achieve this, the
faithful reflection of economic conditions is more and more infringed upon. All
the more so, the more rarely it happens that a code of law is the bold, unmitigated,
unadulterated expression of the domination of a class- this in itself would already
i or
offend the "conception of justice".' Cullen et al. recognise that 'historically, for
a variety of reasons, many questionable activities that are relatively common to the
powerful have seldom been defined as crime, and hence have not mobilised the
186
state machinery that redresses criminal behaviour.' However, things have
changed and are continuing to change.187 More and more corporations are facing
the wrath of the criminal law including subjection to traditional criminal offences.
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Ball and Friedman suggest that the criminal law is, 'more than a set of
propositions, more than a moral code, more than a catalogue of rights and
188
wrongs.' One needs to look to the institutions, techniques and mechanisms as
well as the assembly of legal rules to appreciate the real essence of the criminal
law. It is in those realms that many, not just the Marxist philosophers, find succour
for their theories of differential treatment.
Finally, no discussion of criminal law (even the limited one here) can ignore the
impact of morality on notions and the development of criminal law. It has been
argued that 'criminal law reifies our morality.'189 It is those perceptions of
morality which often underpin or undermine, depending on one's standpoint, the
application of the criminal law to corporations. It is the very sense ofwhat is right
and what is wrong which dictates in the minds of many that the corporation is a
legitimate subject of criminal law. The question whether a corporation can be a
moral agent is further addressed below.
The application of the criminal law to corporations though controversial190 is
almost certainly predicated on the basis that it is the unethical behaviour of
corporations and a demonstrable inability to regulate themselves that has led to
state intervention.191 Glasbeek talks of the (liberal) consensus theory whereby
there is a need to punish even-handedly those crimes identified by society as
meritorious of the attention of the criminal law. He explains that,
'Sutherland made visible, a kind of actor, the corporation, whose deviant
conduct could not be attributed to any of the casual theories the
behavioural sciences had spawned. Once it became recognized that both
the incidence and the consequences of corporate deviance were large, the
problem for maintaining the appearance of neutrality of the law was real.
The possibility had to be faced that a Marxian conflict model of criminal
law (positing that it is the coercive force used by the state to suppress
188
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class struggle in order to serve the ruling classes) would become a more
plausible analytical framework than a functional/consensus model.'192
Despite the stereotypical nature of criminal law with its inherent individualism,
there is a genuine debate as to whether corporate criminal liability can be
accommodated within the confines of the existing law or whether there requires to
be developed an entirely new body of law. Andrews recognises that,
'here as elsewhere in the reform of general principles of the criminal law
the difficulty is to decide between a refashioned logical system which will
not fit ideally into the existing legislative structure or to go for a system
better related to the present legislative structure, which will prolong
193
complexities and illogicalities.'
Scots criminal law, like most others, makes no pretensions to be anything other
than individualistic in conception. Instinctively, because of the relative absence of
indigenous jurisprudence, one supposes that in approaching corporate criminal
liability one may adopt an entirely revolutionary approach. It would nonetheless
be naive to make such a supposition. The legitimacy which the criminal law
derives from tradition should not be overlooked. Nor can the tangible positive
benefits of several hundred years of operation of our criminal law be pushed to one
side. The challenge for those seeking a properly developed framework of corporate
criminal liability is to develop a framework which is harmonious with the
traditions and fundamentals of our criminal law. To do otherwise defeats liberal
consensualism and does violation to the principled basis upon which much of the
claim for a properly constructed system of corporate criminal liability must rest.
1.3 What Is 'Corporate Crime' ?
It has been suggested that corporate crime is an unholy marriage of the law of
crime and law of corporations and part of the problem of full understanding of the
subject of corporate criminal liability lies in the teaching of both subjects.194 There
is often confusion which of the criminal law goals is being deployed in corporate
192
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criminal liability.195 However, in the view of the writer, corporate criminal
liability is somewhat more than a synergy of these two areas of law. Real
understanding of its nature requires a sprinkling of psychology, philosophy,
penology, criminology and organisational theory. As one commentator has noted
'sensitivity to the relationship between cause and effect is crucial to understanding
the phenomenon of organisational illegality.'196 If understanding the nature of
corporate criminal liability is fraught with complexity, there is somewhat more
clarity as to its typicality and extent but even these are not limpid clear.
What then is 'corporate crime' ? There is an obvious link between corporate crime
and 'white-collar crime.' Clinard and Yeager considered that when Sutherland
197
spoke of 'white-collar crime' he actually meant corporate crime. Sutherland's
seminal view ofwhite collar crime was that,
'it generally refers to the illegal and/or socially harmful acts [of omission
and commission] engaged in by corporations themselves as legal entities.
This definition is not restricted to violations of the criminal law only, but
includes any corporate action that could be punished by the state,
regardless of whether it is punished under administrative, civil or criminal
law.'198
Social scientists have since sought to redefine white-collar criminality.199 There
have been attempts to distinguish individual and organisational crimes on the basis
of benefit200 and on the basis of the furtherance of organisational goals.201 The
intrinsic need to benefit the corporation is often emphasised by commentators.
Snider defines corporate crime as 'offences committed by corporate officials for
• • 202their corporation, and offences of the corporation itself,' whereas Hopkins
describes it as 'crimes committed by the corporation itself or on behalf of the
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corporation by its employees in furtherance of the corporate interest.' Kramer
offers the following definition of corporate crime which seeks to blend the
concepts of benefit and organisational goal-,
'criminal acts (of omission or commission) which are the result of
deliberate decision making (or culpable negligence) by persons who
occupy structural positions within the organisation as corporate executives
or managers. These decisions are organizationally based- made in
accordance with the operative goals (primarily corporate profit) standard
operating procedures and cultural norms of the organization- and are
intended to benefit the corporation itself.'204
Adopting Sutherland's theme, Clinard and Yeager adopt a definition which says
more about the extent of corporate crime rather than the nature of that crime. Their
view is that,
'A corporate crime is any act committed by corporations that is punished
by the State, regardless of whether it is punished under administrative,
civil or criminal law. This broadens the definition of crime beyond the
criminal law, which is the only governmental action for ordinary
offenders.'205
Braithwaite's similar formulation is 'conduct of a corporation or of individuals
• • 206
acting on behalf of a corporation that is proscribed and punishable by law.'
Cullen et al. offer a definition of corporate crime as 'illegal acts potentially
punishable by criminal sanction and committed to advance the interests of the
207
corporate organization.'
Sutherland accepted that the essential characteristic of crime is that it is behaviour
which is prohibited by the State, injurious to the State and against which the State
208
may react, at least as a last resort, by punishment. However, he also suggests
that to view only as crime those acts which the courts have determined as criminal
has limitations. Tappan, was severely critical of Sutherland's wide view of white-
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collar criminality and adopts a more legalistic view of what amounted to corporate
crime arguing
'Only those are criminals who have been adjudicated as such by the
courts. Crime is an intentional act in violation of the criminal law..,
committed without defence of excuse, and penalized by the state as a
felony or misdemeanour.'209
Box defines corporate criminal liability as 'illegal acts of omission or commission
of an individual or group of individuals in a legitimate formal organization, in
accordance with the goals of that organisation, which have a serious physical or
economic impact on employees, consumers..the general public and other
• • 210
organizations.' Most corporate crimes it would seem are those associated with
their own businesses.211 Naturally, there is a symbiotic relationship between
objectives and action. The aims and objectives of the corporation might logically
offer correlation between the objective desire of the corporation and the criminal
act. It is nonetheless difficult to distinguish if the pre-occupation with goals is
predicated on the notion of understanding the true nature of corporate crime or,
whether the connection is rather with the criminal mind of the organisation.
Barnett argues that 'Corporate crime will occur when management chooses to
pursue corporate goals through circumvention of market constraints in a manner
212
prohibited by the state.' Clinard also emphasises the importance of corporate
goals in identifying what is corporate crime saying that 'organizational crime
occurs as part of working on behalf of an organization to achieve its goals; it takes
place in the course of work by those who participate in the organisation.'213
Alternatively, it might be claimed that corporate crime amounts to 'illegal and/or
socially harmful behaviours that result from deliberate decision making by
corporate executives in accordance with the operative goals of their
organizations.'214
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• •215There is often a clear link between corporate crime and organised crime.
Nonetheless, Calavita and Pontell emphasise that it is important to differentiate
'organised crime' from 'organisational crime'; that differentiation is on the basis of
216the purpose and methods and not on the social status of the actors. One can
contrast Calavita and Pontell's method of distinction with that of Clinard and
Yeager who assert that the distinction is one where crime is committed by the
organisation and on the other where crime is committed for personal gain against
217the corporation. One essential point made by Calavita and Pontell is that 'the
line between organized crime and legitimate business is increasingly blurred as
organized crime groups "diversify" by entering legitimate businesses and joining
218the ranks of white collar executives.' Parker whilst distinguishing
organizational crime from organised crime recognises there can be something of an
219
overlap. Calavita and Pontell settle on the following distinction defining
corporate crime as- 'an illegal act perpetrated by corporate employees on behalf of
220the corporation' where as 'in organised crime the purpose of the organisation
• • 221itself is illegal activity for personal gain.'
Attitudes To Corporate Crime
Several commentators argue that the whole ambit of white-collar crime suffers
• • • 222 • • •from public indifference. The extent to which this is true in modem society
must be debatable. Naturally, relativity dictates that the public concern for
individualised crimes of violence is more acute than their concern for white-collar
crime. As has been noted,
215
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'corporate offenses ..do not have biblical proscription- they lack..the
"brimstone smell". But the havoc such offenses produce, the malevolence
with which they are undertaken, and the disdain with which they are
continued, are all anti-ethical to principles we as citizens are expected to
observe.'223
Sutherland's earlier thesis that white-collar crime flourishes 'because the
community is not organised solidly against that behaviour'224 may still have some
relevance but the lack of organisation cannot be equated with the lack of concern.
Other factors are also relevant in the context of the failure to properly respond to
corporate crime particularly the policing of white collar crime and the attitudes of
the judiciary and juries in dealing with the issue. Rising concern, about white
• • • 225collar crime generally and corporate criminality in particular, is undoubtedly
stimulating interest in the legal complexities of the subject. The attempts to
develop juristic models, the very public prosecutions and the upsurge in academic
writings are stimulating in themselves. Regardless of this there must be
recognition that they are reflective of growing public awareness of the nature and
extent of corporate wrongdoing. Yoder in the context of America has argued that,
'
[Increasing numbers of Americans have become aware that crime exists in the
suites of many corporations just as surely as it exists in the streets of their cities
226and suburbs.' Kramer notes that even if there was once a belief that the public
were not overly concerned with corporate crime that view point is now no longer
227sustainable. Earlier American literature and research supports the view that the
228
public are increasingly concerned with corporate crime. Cullen et al. claim
however that whilst the public exhibit concern they do not exhibit full
understanding.229
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Consideration of the subject is undoubtedly hampered by the absence of empirical
230
data. In particular, there is a dearth of information about business crimes in
231
Britain. Clinard claims that the paucity of research on corporate illegalities has
been due to a number of factors-the lack of experience and appropriate training, in
the past it was thought to be difficult to gain access to regulatory enforcement
agency data, or to court cases related to corporations, thirdly only limited funds
232
have been available for research in this area. In truth the evidence of corporate
233crime is extensive but uncollated. It is perhaps impossible to know its real
scale.234 Kelly notes that there is no agency keeping a record of crime committed
by corporations and as such, there is 'no indication of the extent of corporate crime
235 • t*that goes unreported or unprocessed. Fisse similarly notes that empirical studies
are in short supply but casts doubt on the what contribution empiricism might
236make. The absence of large-scale detection of corporate criminal offenders may
lie in the earlier explanation by Sutherland who points out that corporation often
commit criminal acts which are hard to detect, they victimise weaker groups in
237 •
society and proofofmisconduct is invariably difficult. What we do know is that
• • 23 8
corporate crime is increasingly global and its scale and nature dwarf individual
239crime. Those facts alone should give rise to concern.
The Nature And Impact OfCorporate Crime
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The social harm created by corporations takes various forms.240 Obvious examples
are air and water pollution, manufacture and distribution of dangerous consumer
products such as mislabelled drugs and contaminated food, and consumer frauds.
Less obvious, but no less injurious, are economic crimes such as monopolistic
practices, restraint of trade, unfair trade practices, and the improper use of
corporate funds. Here the social harm is of less direct social impact, but injurious
in both the economic and political sense. Clinard and Yeager categorise 6 types of
illegal behaviour- administrative, environmental, financial, labour, manufacturing
and unfair trade practices.241 Other major examples of corporate offending include
corporate bribery,242 illegal restraint of trade, such as illegal price fixing, fraud in
government contracts, submitting fraudulent data to government agencies, unfair
labour practices, false advertising, bribery, illegal kickbacks, unsafe working
conditions, violations of laws protecting consumers, violations of laws protecting
the environment, and income tax evasion.243 According to one study by Parker,
70-75% of offences in the American federal courts are for anti trust fraud or other
property crimes; 20-25 % are for regulatory crimes predominantly environmental
offences; organisational crimes of violence 'are virtually non-existent.'244 The
veracity or accuracy of this statement must be doubted as a simple misconception
or misdiagnosis of the concept of crimes of violence, Elkins explains that,
'Corporate criminal activities and individual criminal conduct are alike in
that each creates an endangerment to safety, health, and financial well-
being. Corporate crimes are distinguishable from individual criminal
conduct chiefly in terms of social impact. Higher consumer costs,
increased pollution, and more frequent physical injuries emanating from
corporate activities result in societal harm far in excess of the harm caused
by individuals criminals.'245
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Conyers notes that the victims of such crime are public, government and business
and that the costs cannot be simply measured in financial figures. The figures that
are available are 'staggering.'246 It is estimated that in 1991 the total cost ofwhite-
collar crime in America was $261.06 Billion.247 Kramer talks of the infliction of
enormous economic costs 'and death and injury for thousands' through corporate
248
wrongdoing. He divides the costs of corporate crime into three groupings- the
economic costs, the physical costs, and the social and moral costs. An American
Senate Sub-committee put the cost of corporate crime at somewhere between
$174b and $23 lb while the American Chamber of Commerce estimates the cost in
region of some $40b per year.249 Conklin simply states that 'the costs of business
crime are pervasive and exorbitant.'250
The physical costs are equally obvious; thousands are killed each year by acts of
251
corporate crime. Physical harm may be acute or chronic. (See chapter 5 of this
thesis) As Kramer points out these physical costs far outweigh the physical costs of
252what he calls the street crimes of the poor. The most obvious evidence of
physical costs arising out of corporate crime are to be found in the statistics for
workplace deaths and injuries but the workplace clearly is not the only place where
physical harm is occasioned. Environmental damage by corporations represents a
significant contribution to the overall physical costs. Incidents such as Bhopal
on India are striking examples of the physical damage that can occur. Kramer also
highlights the damage done to consumers. His statistics for America point to a
staggering 20 million serious injuries being caused by defective consumer
246
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products.254 It was estimated in America that there are 28,000 deaths and 130,000
serious injuries to consumers arising from dangerous products. Naturally, such
figures cannot be directly attributed to illegality. Probably more significant than
the two large societal groupings of workers and consumers, is the threat to the
general public. Cullen says that 'Participants in a corporate society need not
produce or consume goods to risk victimisation by corporate violence. Each day,
255
business practices occur that endanger the lives of the general public.' In a
similar graphic depiction of the impact of one form of corporate crime, a Time
Magazine editorial noted that,
'Natural disasters and wars do their damage spectacularly and quickly-
shaking, crushing, burning, ripping, smothering, drowning. The
devastation is plain; victims and survivors are clearly distinguished,
causes and effects easily connected. With the unnatural disasters caused
by environmental toxins, however, the devastation is seldom certain or
clear or quick. Broken chromosomes are unseen; carcinogens can be slow
and sneaky. People wait for years to find out if they or their children are
victims. The fear, the uncertainties, and the conjectures have a corrosive
256
quality that becomes inextricably mingled with the toxic realities.'
Cullen et al. note the response to a 1980 Fortune survey which disclosed that a
surprising number of American corporations had been involved in 'blatant
257 • •
illegalities' and that 'The most distinctive feature of corporate crime is that it is
258 •
organised, not individualistic.' As Sutherland recognises, the thesis that
corporate crime is organised does not preclude the contention that corporations
259
never commit crimes inadvertently. In fact there is every reason for
presupposing that much of corporate crime is rooted in negligence and
inadvertence. Sutherland's seminal work challenged the notion that criminality
was essentially a lower class phenomenon. In Sutherland's sample 60% of
corporations had been convicted in the criminal courts and had an average of four
• • 260convictions each. The other major empirical study is that undertaken by Clinard
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255
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and Yeager which points to an equally high incidence of criminal activity amongst
American corporations. They concluded that their figures were 'only the tip of the
iceberg of total violations.'261 There are naturally inherent dangers on relying on
available statistics not least in the fact that they do not reveal the "hidden
262
delinquency" of corporations.' Cullen et al. argue that subsequent studies,
though more limited in scope [than Clinard and Yeager's, and Sutherland's]
reinforce the view that law and order have yet to be established in the business
263
community. The tabulation of recorded crime should perhaps be the starting
point for determining the actual extent of crime.264 They recognise that the
increased media attention for the subject may be distorting the perception of the
265 • •
problem's prevalence. The problem may not be escalating but rather it is being
highlighted more than previously. For all this, Cullen et al still offer the crie de
coeur that 'We cannot afford to neglect the capacity of corporations, the most
266
powerful actors in society, to victimize society.' Like other writers, Cullen et al.
sub-divide the costs of corporate crime into economic, social and physical costs.
Obsession with the economic cost of corporate crime must be tempered with the
realisation that 'The tremendous impact of corporate lawlessness results in part
from the extensive involvement of business in unlawful activities, but it is also due
to the reality that the costs of even a single corporate offense are often
267 • •
immense.' Wheeler and Mitchell similarly point out that,
'just as the organizational form has facilitated economic and technological
development on a scale far beyond that achieved by individuals, so that
form has permitted illegal gains on a magnitude that men and women
268
acting alone would find hard to attain.'
Another, almost intangible 'cost' of corporate crime is the damaging impact it has
on the capitalist system which inexorably relies on public confidence. Corporate
crime can readily and perceptibly undermine the very foundation of the system.
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The social and moral costs identified by Kramer essentially revolve round the
corrosive impact that corporate crime has in public confidence in the commercial
world. Conklin postulates that this impact is more significant than the physical and
'j/rq
economic costs but such a view must of course be subjective. Sutherland
himself argued that 'The financial cost from white collar crime, great as it is, is less
270
important than the damage to social relations.' There is every reason to support
• • 271
the proposition that corporate crime impacts upon the moral climate of society.
Cullen et al. also counsel against focusing in on purely economic costs of corporate
272
crime. Their concern is for social fabric of society rather than capitalism per se.
Whilst such criminality has the capacity to erode public confidence in the
economic system and to threaten the moral foundations of our society, arguably, it
might also act as a justifications for engaging in crime for lower social orders or
273
indeed individuals generally.
Wheeler and Rothman suggest that the corporation is to the white collar criminal
what the knife or gun is to the common criminal- a toll to obtain money from
victims.274 Those who commit crime under the 'aegis of an organisation are able
275
thereby to commit crimes of greater sophistication, complexity, and magnitude.'
Clinard and Yeager's study referred to supra, inter alia found that consequences of
a single corporate violation can be enormous and can be far more significant than
an ordinary crime. In their view, the undercount of corporate crime may be as high
276 277
as a quarter or a third; Incidences of multiple violations and recidivism, and
278 •that violations are more likely by large corporations. The capacity for harm by
279
corporation cannot be 'overstated.' The power of large corporations is awesome
to the extent that it can be said,
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'far too many giant corporations have abused this power in their relations
with their workers, their stockholders, their consumers, and the public at
large. They have also abused our environment, defrauded the
government, and exploited the developing nations of the Third World. In
their actions, they have even abused the very democratic process that has
280
given them the opportunity to achieve this power.'
We need no more justification than this to implore the application of criminal law
to corporations as an essential control mechanism on their malevolent power.
Is The Corporation Capable Of Committing Any Crime ?
There is a view amongst many jurists that corporation cannot commit certain
crimes which they believe are the sole preserve of human actors. For example, one
281
commentator has argued that, 'corporations cannot be bigamists or rapists, but
the fact that they do not have the capacities needed to commit those crimes has no
;282
general effect on their status vis a vis the criminal lawper se.' Leigh argues that
there are some exceptions to the list of crimes with which a company can be
283
charged. Whilst Tigar suggests the limitations on types of crimes attributable to
284
a corporation are 'arguable', Elkins posits that 'The imposition of criminal
liability has no inherent limitations once the conceptual barriers are surmounted.
As a juristic person a company is capable of committing almost any criminal
285
offence.' But for all that it is widely held that certain crimes are outside the
• 286 ... .ambit of corporate crime. Writing in 1966, Mr Justice Gowans claimed that 'It
is clear that a company is not immune from criminal liability, and it is now clear
that it may commit an offence involving mens rea. It cannot commit crimes of
certain kinds, as is obvious. It cannot commit the crime of perjury or of bigamy or
287of murder.' Meuller notices that the offences which a corporation could not be
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288
guilty of have declined whilst suggesting that there is no good reason why a
289
corporation should not be guilty of murder. Whilst the theoretical basis of the
assertion that corporations cannot commit certain crimes may be thin, on a
practical level those who exclude certain crimes from the sphere of corporate
criminal liability indicate a common-sense approach. Accordingly, we should
accept that bigamy cannot be committed by a corporation290 and that a corporation
9Q1
cannot be guilty of incest. Leigh suggests that a corporation may be an
accessory to those crimes thought theoretically impossible to attribute to the
292 • • •
company. There is a view that holds that convicting companies of the same
offences, established in the same way as those committed by individuals, is the best
route to emphasising the seriousness of the crime and expressing the appropriate
293 •
degree of censure. Even the holder of that view accepts that there is a rapidly
diminishing category- rape, bigamy and peijury- which should be excluded.294 It is
in this respect that the liberal consensualist argument partially comes unstuck.
Equality of treatment sits at the heart of the desire to arraign all criminal offences
against the corporation. However it does no real violence to the case for corporate
criminal liability to concede that equality of treatment need not mean identical
treatment. Criminal law in various instances excludes certain social actors from
particular crimes. The exclusion of the corporation from particular crimes should,
on that basis, pose us little concern. Indeed the outline model I seek to develop in
chapter 6 concedes this very point.
1.4 History OfCorporate Criminal Liability
It has been suggested that the concept of corporate criminal liability developed in
the common law countries from small and obscure beginnings and that the
development lacked any conscious or overall direction. Most academic
commentators point to a historical reluctance to prosecute corporations. Wells, for
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example, suggests that, '[S]trong resistance within the legal system to the notion of
corporations as criminals has resulted in an under-developed jurisprudence of
295
corporate liability for crime.' Because of this, the history of corporate liability is
haphazard and incoherent.296 Much of the peripathethic development can naturally
be viewed as integral to the development of the modem corporation. In truth the
historical development of corporate criminal liability in the Anglo-American
jurisdictions involves a chronology not just of changing times but a see-sawing
back and forth across continents.297
Maitland argued that the early corporations could neither commit civil or criminal
298 •
wrongs. Other commentators however, argue that it was always recognised that
corporations could be criminally liable for their employees wrondoings.299 What
seems beyond doubt is the link between civil liability and criminal liability for
wrongdoing. Despite this link, criminal liability was much slower to gain
recognition and acceptability than civil liability.300 Certainly, before the advent of
corporations employers were invariably liable for the actions of their servants
though, this vicarious liability (both civil and criminal) eroded in the medieval
301
period. Initially corporations were not thought to have any criminal liability due
to the absence of recognition of their juristic personality and, a belief that because
they were inanimate entities they could not give commands or consent. The first
known form of corporate criminal liability related to local government being held
criminally liable for creating a public nuisance where their officials had failed to
maintain highways. That these early developments should take place in England,
as the seat of the Industrial Revolution, is of little surprise. Equally, unsurprising
is the fact, given the exportation of culture, concepts, and people, that
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302
developments in corporate criminal liability should also take place in America.
Bernard reveals instances at the turn of the 18th Century of prosecutions against
• • 303
private business corporations charged with undertaking public functions. The
linear chain from the earlier imputation of criminal liability to public corporations
in England is relatively obvious. It was hardly a quantum leap for the American
courts to attach criminal liability for public nuisance when hitherto, in England,
public corporations had faced similar prosecutions. Both were carrying out similar
functions; both entities were corporate in form. Some one hundred and forty years
on from these American prosecutions, analogous prosecutions of private
corporations in England took place. Bernard explains the delay in following the
American experience on the continued reliance of the public sector municipalities
to provide the services that private concerns had supplied in America and, secondly
in the growth of the attribution of individual blame to particular officials.304
In England the development of corporate criminal liability into the private sector is
IrtC
often attributed to advent of the railroad. Private railway companies were
chartered to construct and operate railway services. They represented the first
instances of private enterprises operating what had been hitherto public function.
Inevitably there was comparison with the early American private organisations
providing municipal services. In R v Birmingham and Gloucester Railway
306 •
Company, the railway company had been incorporated by statute with a view to
providing railway facilities. The statute obliged the company to build bridges over
land divided by railway track. This obligation in the statute was placed upon the
corporation rather than any individual. The prosecution argued that, whilst the
company might not be liable for 'misfeasance' (an action violating the statute),
they could be liable under the statute for 'non-feasance.' This view appears to have
been supported by the court.
302
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The distinction between 'non-feasance' and 'mis-feasance' was displaced only four
307
years later in a prosecution of the Great North Eastern Railway Company who
were charged with the offence of laying their tracks over a public highway to the
destruction of that highway. The defence sought to argue that a corporation could
not be criminally liable for a positive action (presumably on the basis that only
individuals could). This contention was rejected and in the process the decision in
R v GNER disapplied the distinction between misfeasance and non-feasance. The
position in England and America harmonised following the decision in the State v
JflQ
Morris and Essex Railroad Co. Both countries thereafter prosecuted companies
for positive acts as well as omissions.309 Bernard suggests that there was a certain
• • 310
inevitability about these developments in corporate criminal liability.
Essentially, he argues that it was no longer tenable to maintain a spurious
distinction between the public corporation providing public services and the private
corporation providing essentially the same services. Equally, he argues that the
distinction of liability for positive actions and negative actions was similarly
untenable. These early cases operated to assert that the company was 'a primary
311
repository of legal rights and duties' and, 'The English courts, in imposing
liability for nuisance, plainly desired to curb giant repositories of economic
,312
power.
The absence of the ability to attach intention to corporations clearly had an
extremely limiting effect on the extent of corporate criminal liability. It was not
until the early 1900s that the courts finally accepted that corporations were capable
of intent. In America the first such case was New York Central and Hudson River
Railroad Co. v United States3,3 where the company were charged with a breach of
the Elkins Act which sought to ban the giving of rebates to sugar companies for
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shipping their goods on particular railroads. The Act had a provision which in
effect made the company liable for the actions of the employee. In determining the
case the court clearly saw the inconsistency of simply punishing the individual for
something of direct benefit to the company. There was clear legislative intent to
punish the company and the court argued that they could see
'no valid objection in law, and every reason in public policy, why the
corporation which profits by the transaction and can only act through its
agents and officers, shall be held punishable by fine because of the
knowledge and intent of its agents to whom it has instructed authority to
act in the subject matter of making and fixing rates of transportation, and
whose knowledge and purposes may well be attributed to the corporation
for which the agents act.'
Some four years after New York and Hudson River Railroad v United States, a case
in England similarly held that a corporation could have intention. As Bernard
contends 'Once it was accepted that criminal intention could be attributed to a
corporation through the intent of its agents, it was only a question of working out
precisely which agents could be considered to act and to intend for the
corporation.'314 Moussell Bros. Ltd v London and North-Western Railway
315
Company was in all respects a landmark decision in the development of
corporate criminal liability. In this case Atkin LJ argued that,
'..while prima facie a principal is not to be made criminally responsible
for the acts of his servants, yet the Legislature may prohibit an act or
enforce a duty in such terms as to make the prohibition or duty absolute;
in which case the principal is liable if the act is in fact done by his
servants. To ascertain whether a particular Act of Parliament has that
effect or not regard must be had to the object of the statute, the words
used, the nature of the duty laid down, the person upon whom it is
imposed, the person by whom in ordinary circumstances it would be
performed, and the person upon whom the penalty is imposed.'
This statement offered a test to determine whether corporate criminal liability
would exist but it was not this test which was applied in subsequent cases to imply
intent to the corporation. In Chuter v Freeth and Pocock Ltd., Alverstone CJ
accepted that the company could 'believe' or 'not believe' certain statements in the
Bernard, n. 297 at p. 10.
315
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warranty. As Heerey suggests implicit in such a recognition is the fact that the
317*
company has a state ofmind and, if it could have a state of mind it could have a
similar state of mind to individual actors. Wells suggests that in the period
1870-1930 that mens rea was not regarded as particularly problematic and that the
key issue was whether the offence fell into the category of 'real' crime.319 Post-
1930 the criminal mind has become a predominant issue. An issue of such
relevance that the problems it creates has led to 'solutions' which have 'trailed' the
subject, certainly in Britain, into the mire of further inconsistency and incoherence.
This potted chronology of the development of corporate crime is almost entirely
rooted in the common law jurisdictions. The absence of similar developments in
the civil law jurisdictions is explained by Bernard in various ways. First, he argues
that the nuisance offences which represented the starting points of corporate crime
had no direct parallel in civil law jurisdictions. The decentralisation of government
functions is also identified as a contributing factor. Moreover, the civil law
countries had not embraced the concept of the juristic person but rather saw
companies as combinations of individuals. Finally, he points to a tradition of
judicial interpretation in the common law countries. The absence of written or
codified law in the common law countries offered the judiciary considerable scope
for judicial activism. The development of vicarious liability and its cross
fertilisation into criminal law undoubtedly was also a major contributing factor in
the development of corporate criminal liability. In the Anglo-American
jurisdictions where liability did attach to the corporation it was invariably based on
the premise of vicarious liability for the wrongdoing of servants of the
organisation. Leigh offers the view that 'until the advent of vicarious liability there
321
was no basis upon which the positive acts could be imputed to corporations.' In
the early days of corporate enterprise such a model of corporate liability had both
intellectual appeal and merit. Corporations were smaller; the control mechanisms
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were stronger. In the early corporations linear command structures were more
evident whereas today's corporations exhibit a far greater degree of bureaucracy.
The size and scale the early corporate entities is also significant in this regard.
Entrepreneurs exhibited a greater degree of control over their organisations and
indeed, were often an integral part of the operations that the organisations
undertook. The modern phenomenon of the distant, remote director influencing
matters from afar was hardly the widespread practice that it is now.
The developments evoked by the Industrial Revolution in Britain may have had a
cathartic effect on the development of corporate criminal liability but, as becomes
apparent from any study of the subject, developments in other parts of the world
also have much significance. Despite the limitations and perceived reluctance of
the legal response to the issue of corporate crime, one can trace a succession of
cases where prosecuting authorities and courts have sought to respond to corporate
wrongdoing by applying the criminal law. Despite the principle that corporations
322
were not criminally liable, being "whittled down" throughout the 19th century,
the application of 'conventional' crimes to corporations continued and indeed
continues to prove troublesome. Gobert rails that,
'[T]he attempt to apply conventional criminal law to companies has not
been a resounding success. This was perhaps predictable, as the relevant
rules and doctrines had been developed in cases involving human
defendants. Their transportation to an inanimate organisational entity
such as a company was never going to be easy. Not only did the judges
fail to rise to the challenge, however, they managed to construe the
relevant law in a regressive manner that has all but insulated large
companies from criminal liability.'
Gobert also suggests that the failure of the judiciary to respond to the problem had
resulted in Parliament responding by 'filling gaps' with regulatory offences (but
with limited impact).324 The growth in size, nature and number of corporations
meant that inevitably corporate criminal liability 'was destined to be reconsidered
325
by the courts.' There was a dichotomy between the law's commitment to
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individual responsibility and the emergence of the corporate entity. Whilst
companies were dominated by one person the problem was not that acute. The
T77
expansion and proliferation of corporations created a significant problem. As a
consequence, one finds repeated and diverse attempts to expand the criminal law to
embrace the new corporations. That dynamic evolutionary process continued to
evince difficulties throughout the 20th century and indeed continues to do so until
the present date.328
In America the development followed similar, if distinct, lines. The early
corporate forms were the public corporations. By the 18th Century private
corporations were evident and co-existing with the public corporations. As in
England it was neglect of statutory duty which led to the development of criminal
liability for corporations. In America they proceeded beyond liability for public
corporations to private enterprise. Elkins explains why this is so when he points
out the American position,
'appeared before the English courts had firmly established the liability of
English corporations beyond public nuisance and the American courts did
not, therefore, have benefit of a settled rule ofEnglish common law.'
Even in America at this time there were a number of early decisions which pointed
to the absence of criminal liability for corporations but Elkins claims that this
329
approach was never adopted by a majority of jurisdictions. The common law
was not the only cathartic force; legislative enactments in both jurisdictions
provided opportunities for expansion of criminal liability to corporations. America
also adopted the original schism of non-feasance and mis-feasance and, in similar
• 330fashion to England, both became merged. Elkins points out that like the English
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Nothing has so far been said of corporate formation in Scotland essentially because
little material is available and because development of the corporation has been a
universal phenomenon. Walker notes statutory provision for incorporation in
1856.332 St Clair and Drummond Young explain that prior to this commercial
333
activity was confined to solitary entrepreneurialism and partnerships. The
convergence of English and Scottish company law render separate treatment
superfluous. Scottish law has shown a remarkable propensity to follow rather than
lead. A situation that prevails until the present day. It is only in how the criminal
law responds to corporations that Scots law displays any cultural lag. Our common
law history is bereft of any real chronology of development. The issue has simply
been ignored until relatively recent times. A fuller treatment of the limited
authorities is attempted in chapter 6.
1.5 Corporate Personality
One of the attendant problems of corporate criminal liability lies in the fact that in
endeavouring to ascribe criminal liability jurists have approached the task with the
intent to ascribing criminal liability to the corporation as a juristic person. The
personification of the corporation has satisfied the individualistic thirst of the
criminal law and has rationalised the application of laws developed for the
individual to the corporate form. For some the extent of that problem has been
overstated. One commentator has been moved to say,
'We find over and over again that the problems which have given rise to
the greatest controversies attain front rank in their particular science
simply through having been the object of so much learned thought even if
their intrinsic merit does not justify the importance attached to them. It
331
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may be that the question of the nature of juristic persons is among
these.'334
There are three approaches to the juristic personality issue- firstly, only single
individual citizens can have rights and duties; secondly, the realist theory, and
335
finally, the fiction theory. Those who eschew all attempts to confer personhood
on corporations view the corporation as ,
'a shorthand term for groups ofmen, physical properties and the manifold
investor, employee, supplier, manager, banker, etc. relations which untie
these men and properties for certain ends. To think of the men or
properties as abstractions apart from the attributes implicit in these
relationships is to postulate an attributeless substance, and to conjure up a
corporate entity that, being no aid to edification, has no real case for
336existence.'
Moreover, they adopt the view that 'it is implausible to treat a corporation as a
member of the human community, a member with personality, intentions,
337
relationships responsibility but no conscience, and susceptibility to punishment.'
This nominalist approach views corporate personality as nothing more than
338collectivities of individuals. Corporate personality is accordingly derivative and
as such liability should be individualistic. In modern era there has been a tendency
to identify personhood with the possession of will and equate it with a single
human life.339
The Realist Perspective
The 'realist' perspective was most cogently advanced by Gierke who viewed
incorporation as declaratory. Gierke's work is based on the old Germanic reality
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theory- Genossenschaftstheorie- which views the corporate body as a real person.
According to Gierke, the corporation is a real living force of historical and social
action.340 The State function is to recognise its existence not create it. Teubrier is
critical ofGeirke's approach to the collective claiming that,
'Geirke's cardinal error was to conceive of the Components of the
association as flesh and blood people. When he called associations
"organisms whose parts are human beings" he programmed the errors of
organicist collectivism. Not only does this entail difficulties for the
treatment of institutions, foundations and one man companies, but by
taking actual human beings as essential elements of an association, it bars
access to the social reality of associations, for collectivises can only then
I- U . 99 9 341be seen as supermen .
In support of the realist approach it is argued that 'Groups possessing the attributes
of corporations existed before their 'creation' by charter or statute. Corporations,
instead of being creations of the law, actually compelled the law to recognize
them.'342 A realist perspective would assert that rejection of the fiction theory is
simply a rejection of 'an untrue account of the reality with which the practical
lawyer has to deal with.'343 Anderson claims that,
'Corporations are indeed as real as their impact on society demonstrates.
They are a composition of individuals working as a finely-tuned group,
the conduct of which can be vastly different when acting in a collective
capacity than in the capacity of individuals.'344
Realists perceive that groups are natural but not biological entities.345 Moreover,
the reality theory views corporations as pre-legal existing sociological persons; the
law cannot create but can determine which entities it recognises. This conferment
of personhood on corporation was not a simple matter particularly when one
considers that even to give a natural person personhood in the legal sense involves
the conferment of 'a new, additive, and distinctive meaning.'346 Laski offering a
realist perspective claims we personalise the corporation 'because we feel in these
340
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things the red blood of a living personality. Here is no mere abstractions of an
over-exuberant imagination. The need is so apparent as to make plain the reality
beneath.' 347 Support for realism is also evident in the comments of Blackstone
who claims 'When they are consolidated and united into a corporation, they and
their successors are then considered as one person in law: as one person they have
T4R
one will, which is collected from the sense of the majority of the individuals.'
Critics of the reality theory argue 'The doctrine of real, extra juridical personality
of a corporation appears to be somewhat insecurely founded seen from a
sociological view. It takes verbal imagery for reality. It adopts romantic
conceptions, the most typical quality of romanticism being perhaps the tendency to
endow inanimate things with life.'349 It is dissatisfaction with this perceived
'romanticism' which has led many to reject realism in favour of the fiction theory.
The Fiction Theory
There is some dispute as to the origins of the fiction theory. There was a Roman
350law tradition of treating corporate persons as fictions. Hunt contends 'that
brilliant intellectual achievement of the Roman; lawyers, the juristic person, a
subject of rights and liabilities as is a natural person, seeped into the law ofmodern
351nations by way of canon law.' Roman tradition was that all persons (including
human persons) were creations of law. The fiction theory has a two-fold approach.
Firstly, that all juristic persons were creations; and secondly, that juristic persons
were not composites and as such irreducible. The Romanist fiction theory was
352
arguably the logical outcome of an individualistic view of society. The Romans
essentially viewed persons as human beings but at the same time recognised other
353
legal persons namely Collegia, Municipia, Churches, Charities and the State. In
Roman times persona was the mask that actors in the Roman theatre wore; it did
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not refer to the human being or any of the humans qualities.354 The Roman concept
of person was then individualistic in nature and as such all organic associations
355
were excluded. Individuals had legal caput (status) and played out the role of
persona. All societal production was undertaken in societas (a purely contractual
relationship) Gierke claims,
'the idea was a stranger to the Roman private law that legal rights and
duties could attach to a group of persons connected or associated in such
and such a form, as a group of joint and several obligation, as a
company.'356
357
Only the State and its sub units under ius publicum enjoyed corporate status
However, from the time of Caesar and Augustus it was a rule of the ius publicum
358that every association needed State authorisation; juristic persons emanated
from the public law with the unitary body (corpus) developed from associations.
The juristic person was a Corpus Juris Civilis and was of essence an artificial
person. Gierke challenges the Roman approach and deploying a realist stance
claims,
'The juristic person, however, derives the positive content of its being not
from the association law but entirely from individual law. The concept of
the person experiences no enrichment of its content by the extension of
the sphere of its applicability. First and last it remains gauged to the
human unit and takes the sum of its characteristics from the nature of the
individual. If it is carried over artificially to impersonal things, it cannot
359absorb anything which it did not implicitly have.'
The Romanist school of Savigny360 was a strict adherent of the fiction theory but
• • 361 •others contend that the theory was an invention of the modern era. It is probably
354
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avoids controversy to talk of the theory as Romanist rather than necessarily
362Roman. Savigny stated,
'All law exists for the sake of the moral freedom indwelling in man.
Therefore the original idea of a person or of the subject of a right, must
coincide with the idea ofman, and this original identity of both ideas may
be expressed by the following formula: every individual man, and only
• 363the individual man, is jurally capable.'
Under the concept ofpersona ficta 'The juristic person is a fiction and its author is
the State.'364 Its personality is not inherent in it but conceded to it by the State, and
therefore the foundations of its existence in the eyes of the law lie, not in the sphere
of private law, but in the sphere of public law where the State creates those
relations which it considers desirable and forbids those relations which it deems
365harmful.' According to the fiction theory, the corporation is simply a mental
366 •
construct. Further it has been said 'the fiction theory is a methodological
approach; the real entity doctrine is a proposition in metaphysics designed to give
comfort to those who feel that analysis not concerned with real existence is
unfruitful. Conflict arises only between those who assume that fictions are
unnecessary phantoms, and those who try to transmute the "real entity" of a
367
corporation into a quasi-biological organism.' There is a supposition that under
the Fiction theory only human beings can be persons and therefor the subject of
368
rights. However, Savigny has argued 'that the subject of right does not exist in
• • 369the individual members thereof but in the ideal whole.'
The fiction theory dominated the United States of America at beginning of 19th
370
century but, Pollock denies that the fiction theory was ever adopted in English
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371law. Leigh also argues that the English common law did not receive the fiction
theory and in fact received no theory of corporate personality at all.372 The word
fiction applied in the context of corporations was used simply to denote that the
corporation was an abstraction.
Anthropomorphism by way of the fiction or realist theory of the corporate form has
been criticised by many writers not least because 'by fitting organizations into an
existing, individualistic legal framework, the metaphor of person offers a simple
solution to the problem of corporate legal personality. It thereby diverts attention
from the distinctive features of organizations..and from the normative implications
of these features.'373 This linkage between anthropomorphism and the
complexities of corporate crime have been explained in the following terms,
'The theories [of corporate criminal liability] are extant in an institutional
setting only because the genius of the common law ultimately accorded
corporations anthropomorphic treatment and thus recognized them as
persons under the law. That in turn inspired the idea that a body of
doctrines pertaining to natural persons might be applied with equal force
to the juristic persons into which corporations has been transformed.'374
Given the controversy engendered by the dichotomised position of the two main
theories it is inevitable that there will be those who seek to offer further theories or
variants of the existing theories in an attempt to explain the nature of corporate
personality. For example, Anderson concedes that Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence has
• 375
long recognized the existence of two types of persons: 'juristic and natural.' He
even perpetuates the idea that juristic persons are artificial and created by the State.
However in so doing, he supports Machen who asserts that a corporation cannot be
pronouncements in Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston Railroad Co. v Letson 43 US (2 How.) 497
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at the same time 'created by the State' and fictitious. Arguably, it has been the
growth of western individualism that has been problematic in developing coherent
concept of legal personality. It has necessitated the creation of the fiction of
juristic personality and secondly it has impeded the development of the concept of
377the multiple personality.
There are commentators who concede that corporations have personality but that
that personality is not the same as that dwelling in individuals. According to
Vincent 'to refer to a group as a person is not necessarily the same as referring to it
as either organic or an individual...each term- organic, individual, and person- must
378be carefully unpacked and analysed.' Vincent asserts that if the group is an
379individual person then it must be an organism. Vincent states that 'the concept
of the individual should be kept distinct from the idea of individualism.
Individualism can be formally defined as a political and moral doctrine which
• 380extols the value of the individual human being.' The concept of the individual
emphasises a distinct, separate, rational human agent or a separate, distinct being.
Additionally, the word individual derives from individuus which identifies
something indivisible. Accordingly, it is not confined to individual human beings
instead it implies 'a comprehensive unity, completeness, wholeness and
381coherence.'
Pollock drawing on classical interpretation disputes that persona ficta equates with
382artificial person. Artificial in his view is not fictitious. Moreover, Austin
383
distinguishes physical and natural person from fictitious or legal persons. Others
see the similarities between corporations and natural persons sufficient for the law
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to treat them as persons. Gruner draws several distinctions between corporations
and humans- they are instrumentalities, they have limited social obligations, and
385
they do not have emotive and reflective capacities. All of these matters can be
disputed and indeed have been.
Dubbing a corporation as a juristic person implies a capacity to have rights and
• 386duties. Hallis asserts that for a corporation to have personality at law it must
have three constituent elements; it must be organised collectively acting as a whole
in furtherance on an interest that the State will protect; there must be a legal right
and duty bearing unit and a directing idea or aim; and it must have a social value
which calls for legal protection because it has a meaning for human life and can be
387realised. Wells, meanwhile, contends that a corporation is a group of individuals
deemed in law to be a single legal entity. It is legally distinct from the individuals
who compose it, has legal personality in itself and can accordingly sue and be sued,
388hold property and transact, and incur liability. Dan Cohen is careful to
distinguish individuality and collectivity in saying that 'the relationship between
the organization and various individuals may allow the organization to invoke
those individuals rights, though the organization is neither bearer nor beneficiary of
389those rights.' In then context of adherence to the law, the subject of
responsibility and duty is of signal importance. Despite the widespread recognition
of the corporation as a juristic person 'Business has not even been able to compose
a meaningful articulation of its social responsibility.'390 Indeed there has been a
tension between according citizenship to corporations but not the liability that
391would normally attend such citizens. The challenge must be to induce a greater
sense of responsibility whether that is through the concept of personification or not.
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Corporate Morality
The supposition of corporate responsibility and personality undoubtedly has a
correlation with the concept of morality. Reference has already been made to the
significance ofmorality in attaching criminal liability. By developing the idea of
social expectation and standard we can begin to build a paradigm of corporate
morality. In the process the question is posed 'can corporations be treated as 'full-
fledged members of the moral community, of equal standing with the traditionally
392 • • • i
acknowledged residents: human beings?' For French the answer is quite simple-
'
Corporations are not only intentional agents, moral persons, they are proper
393
subjects of the criminal law and all of its fury.' Even more simply, it might be
argued that criminal and moral responsibility do not require personhood.394 All
that is required is that the corporation is an intentional actor. As Dan-Cohen
explains,
'To portray organisations as "intentional systems" possessed of
"organizational intelligence" may be a cogent way to express the dual
message that organizations make decisions infused with cogent content,
which are, at the same time, the product of widely dispersed informational
sources and diffused individual interests and attitudes, all mediated by
structures, processes and chance in ways that defy translating or tracing
395the organisational decision into its individual sources.'
Field and Jorg accept that there is a strong argument for recognising reasoning and
understanding and control of conduct as the essence of moral personality and the
• • • 396 •basis of moral responsibility. According to Rafalko, the major problem in
contending that corporations are moral persons is the fact that corporations are
• • • . . • 397
designed to limit liability. In French's view, the distinction between the fiction
and reality theories turns out to be of no real importance in regard to the issue of
the moral personhood of the corporation. Admittedly the reality theory
encapsulates a view at least superficially more amenable to arguing for discrete
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corporate moral personhood than does the fiction theory just because it does
-7QO
acknowledge de facto personhood.'
Historically, Kant and Locke did not argue that groups had moral philosophy399
and more recently, Vincent has suggested caution in adopting French's idea of
corporate moral personality.400 It betrays understandable and ingenious attempts to
further anthropomorphise the corporation. Should we be looking to locate the
capacity to display the criminal mind in the corporation as a basis for the
attribution of criminal fault ? Fisse and Braithwaite clearly believe that corporate
responsibility does not require moral personhood or human agency.401 Despite
their view, the attraction of the moral culpability paradigm of criminal law, there is
intuitive appeal in attempting to conceive of the corporation as a moral actor.
The patent, and at times painful, desire to anthropomorphise the corporate form to
fit it into an inherently individualistic criminal law as a complete strategy, is
doomed to falter. If a coherent and intellectually sound basis is to be found for
corporate criminal liability one must recognise that corporations and individuals
are different. We can in the same breath note the differences and at the same time
argue for appropriate parity of treatment. It remains the case that 'that there is no
clear cut line, logical or practical, through the different theories which have been
advanced and which are still advanced on behalf of the "real" personality of either
"natural" or associated persons.'40 No one theory has dominated and the
underlying philosophical basis of corporate criminal liability remains insecure.
The absence of a received or accepted wisdom as to the nature of corporate
personality does not leave us bereft of a foundation on which to base either the case
for corporate criminal liability or its mode of application. The nature of corporate
-1QO
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personhood is in the view of some commentators, in any event superfluous to the
issue of liability. Fisse for example, argues that
'Juristic personality merely equates corporate and individual persons for
the purposes of practical convenience and is neutral as regards underlying
considerations of policy. Viewed more realistically, the equation it
produces tends to be biased towards individual persons, who are taken to
provide a natural starting point for the design of rules or principles
applicable to other species of Juristic person. This bias is patent in the
present law of corporate criminal responsibility, the development of
which has often been motivated by "little more than a crude
personification of the group.'403
As far as Walt and Laufer are concerned 'Determining the ontological status of the
corporation is unnecessary. For the assignment of corporate criminal liability does
not require that determination. Corporations can be held criminally liable without
deciding whether they are persons.'404 This is patently true. One may almost
adopt a positivist stance and simply declare the corporation criminally liable. For
simplicity's sake this may be preferable to perpetuation of the angst occasioned by
attempting to justify the attachment of criminal liability to the corporation by
anthropomorphic juxtapositioning. Sustaining the realist and fiction dichotomy
represents a recipe for factionalised irrelevancy. Just because collectives are
human creations, it does not necessarily flow that they must be governed by law
derivable from propositions about individuals.
1.6 Regulatory Crime And True Crime
A further major polemic of corporate criminal liability is whether corporations
should be liable for true crimes or simply regulatory crimes. The inter-relationship
between crime and regulation is undoubtedly problematic.405 The jurisprudence
has much to say on the expansion of regulatory offences in the modern era, the
perception of such offences and, in addition the approach taken by authorities in
enforcing this branch of criminal law. There naturally requires to be an assessment
as to whether regulatory offences can properly address the problem of corporate
crime and more cogently, whether liberal consensualism is defeated by the failure
403
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to apply the whole ambit of the criminal law to corporations. Regulatory offences
have a considerable attraction for those determined to regulate and control
corporations. They represent an attempt by the criminal law to attach directly to
the corporation avoiding the complications of mens rea. They also represent an
attempt to define crimes without reference to harm.406 For both those reasons, the
expansion of regulation is controversial.407 Often these regulatory offences are
viewed as something other than truly criminal.408 Ball and Friedman contend that'
the word "crime" has symbolic meaning for the public, and the criminal law is
stained so deeply with notions of morality and immorality, public censure and
punishment, that labelling an act criminal often has consequences that go far
beyond mere administrative effectiveness.'409 There are several obvious problems
with reliance on a regulatory regime. According to Gobert, one of the principal
problems associated 'with regulatory laws in practice, is not simply that they
appear to undervalue the harm which has occurred.410 Sometimes that harm is the
result of fortuitous circumstances, and a prosecution would exaggerate the degree
of the company's fault. The greater problem is that regulatory laws may not exert
sufficient deterrent force to prevent violations.' The clear concomitant of this is
that regulatory offences alone may not serve the purpose of prevention of criminal
law violations.411
According to Leigh, liability for public welfare offences arose because corporations
were introduced into fields where regulatory legislation existed.412 In Morisette v
US413the US supreme court offered a rationale for strict liability 'public welfare
offenses.' They contended that in spite of the,
'central thought that wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal' the
Industrial Revolution had resulted in dangers requiring "increasingly
numerous and detailed regulations which heighten the duties of those in
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control of particular industries..or activities that affect public health,
safety or welfare...called 'public welfare offences'...Legislation applicable
to such offences as a matter of policy, does not specify intent as a
necessary element'.'many violations of such regulations result in no direct
or immediate injury to person or property but merely create the danger or
probability of it which the law seeks to minimize..[Wjhatever the intent of
the violator, the injury is the same and the consequences are injurious or
not according to fortuity...The accused, if he does not will the violation,
usually is in a position to prevent it with no more care than society might
reasonably expect and no more exertion than it might reasonably exact
from one who assumed his responsibilities.'414
The distinction between regulatory offences and 'true crime' is often distilled to the
distinction between mala in se (offences wrong in themselves) and those mala
prohibita (offences wrong because the law proscribes it so).415 McVisk explains
and reaffirms the notion that true crime should be based on personal moral guilt
whereas regulatory offences do not 'involve questions of moral guilt.'416 Snider
also expresses a widely held view that 'the State is reluctant to pass-or enforce-
stringent laws against pollution, worker health and safety, or monopolies. Such
measures frighten off the much sought- after investment, and engender the equally
dreaded loss of confidence.'417 In my own model regulatory offences are retained
and common law crimes activated. I can see no legitimate rationale for only
applying regulatory offences to the corporation. Where they have proved
beneficial is that the statutory enactments which implement them offer relatively
clarity in what constitutes the offence. All parties know what the law is and have
an approximate understanding of how it will be applied and how they must
respond. There is no such clarity in respect of 'true' common law crimes. An
414
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integral argument for my proposed approach outlined in chapter 6 is that it will
introduce considerable clarity into an otherwise confused situation. The proposal
calls for the optimal blend of regulatory offences and common law crimes to be
fashioned into a new framework.
1.7 Theories OfCorporate Offending
Theorists often pose the question 'why does crime exist ?' If we can attain the
answer then the simplistic supposition is that we can solve the problem. The
capacity and potential of crime by corporations seems self evident but this does not
explain why corporations commit crime. There are those who believe that such
• 418
criminality arises from criminogenic culture within the organisation. Why and
how that criminogenic culture should arise is also the subject of much comment.
One view is that,
'The problem at the core of such conduct is not simply that corporations
have no conscience, but that they have been endowed by law with rights
beyond those allowed to individuals. Corporations too often act without
compassion and, no matter what damage they cause, without remorse.'419
Mintz similarly believes that the corporate structure with its orientation towards
profit and away from liability invites corporate criminality and that 'all the
deterrents and restraints that normally govern our lives- religion, conscience,
criminal codes, economic competition, press exposure, social ostracism have been
overwhelmed.'420 Gross posits that all organisations are inherently criminal421 but
perhaps it is fairer to say that 'Crime ..is an ever-present possibility, perhaps
endemic to the structure itself.'422 Criminogenic culture may be developed from
external sources particularly other corporations. Vaughan notes 'co-operation
between organizations is known to be encouraged by corresponding ideologies, as
well as by domain consensus- a set of stable expectations about what an
organisation will or will not do. Furthermore evidence suggests that emergent
group tend to develop around previous interaction patterns, which provide the basis
Colvin, n 339 at p. 4.
419
Mintz in Hills, n. 32 at p. 30.
420
Mintz in Hills, n. 32 at p. 38.
421
Wilson and Braithwaite, n. 139 at p. 199.
422
Gross, in Geis and Stotland, n. 129 at p. 74.
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for further structural differentiation and organizational development.'423 It is not,
however, simply the collective criminogenic culture and how it impacts on the
individual which is significant in this context but also the capacity the collective
form offers the errant individual. There is a view that organisations provide a
heightened sense of legitimacy to individuals which allows them to perpetrate
damaging criminal acts.424
Cressey argues that corporate criminality cannot be explained by reference to the
reasons why ordinary citizens commit crimes.425 According to Cressey, this
blurring of corporate crimes committed by corporations and corporate crimes
committed by individuals is confusing and does not lend itself to one causal
theory.426 Sutherland viewed corporate crime as no different from other crime in
that it is learned behaviour.427 Sutherland's theory of differential association
presupposed that
'criminal behaviour is learned in association with those who define such
criminal behaviour favorably and in isolation from those who define it
unfavourably, and that a person in an appropriate situation engages in
such criminal behaviour if, and only if, the weight of the favorable
428
definitions exceeds the weight of the unfavourable definitions.'
Linked to the notion of differential association is Sutherland's thesis of social
disorganisation which he splits into two types -anomie and the organisation within
society of groups. In respect of variation in the crimes of corporations, Sutherland
suggest four types of factors- the age of the corporation, the size of the corporation,
the position of the corporation in the economic structure, and the personal traits of
the executives of corporations 429 Coleman offers further analysis by saying that,
'[Tjhose who are employed in these businesses are often isolated from
businesses where illegal behaviour is not common; therefor their values
and attitudes become permeated with the idea that criminal behaviour is
normal. Through their associations with others in the same business who
Vaughan, n. 60 at p. 21.
424
Wheeler and Rothman, n. 267 at p. 1424.
425
Cressey, 'The Poverty OfTheory In Corporate Crime Research' 1988 1 Advances in Theoretical
Criminology 31 at p. 37.
426
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justify their offenses as being normal, these people learn to accept these
practices.'430
Whilst such an approach offers almost a pastiche of the unscrupulous businessman
it remains nonetheless valid in several respects. Some sociologists have
accentuated the individualism of those involved and pointed to personality
disorders and the "exploitative nature of society" generally.431
Clinard and Yeager argue that illegal corporate behaviour cannot be fully explored
within the framework of theories of deviance and crime that are applicable to
individuals.432 They argue for analysis on the basis of the complexity of the
organisation. Their view is that 'The immensity, the diffusion of responsibility,
and the hierarchical structure of the large corporations foster conditions conducive
to organizational deviance.'433 Clinard and Yeager also note that,
'firms may be possessed ofmultiple goals rather than simply high profits,
and these other goals may also be important in the genesis of corporate
crime...Nonetheless, the desire to increase or maintain current profits is
the critical factor in a wide range of corporate deviance.'434
Kramer identifies three factors which have significant relationship with corporate
crime -organisational goals435 (these are distilled from individuals and the
environment and internal pressures), organisational structure436 (may impact on
organisational goals),437 organizational environment438 (economic conditions state
of the economy, market conditions). As an alternative, Kreisberg argues for legal
policy to be determined on the basis of an understanding of the decision making
process underlying corporate action439 Kreisberg seeks to establish that criminal
Coleman, n. 14 at p. 918.
431
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432
Clinard and Yeager, n. 7 at p. 43.; 'The key to understanding this fundamental human enigma
lies not in the pathology of evil individuals but in the culture and structure of large scale
bureaucratic organizations within a particular political economy ( Hills, n. 32 at p. 190)
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responsibility emerges from decision making models and that, 'responsibility lies
with whichever corporate decision-makers were capable of preventing the
corporate offense that occurred.'440 Kreisberg's three models all imply the identity
of the decision-maker varies according to the character of the corporate decision¬
making.441 Staw and Szwajkowski attempt in a very basic study to assess the
correlation between the commission of illegal acts and the 'scarcity-munificence'
environment in which the organisation is located. Implicit in their research is the
notion that corporations resort to crime when confronted with austere economic
circumstances.442 Utilising the Fortune 500 article in Time Magazine on corporate
violations the writers concluded that those companies were performing less well at
the time of commission of the violations. Such extrapolation must be viewed with
some caution. As Staw and Szwajkowski themselves note,
'The industries in which the cited firms operated were low performing and
may have been beset with industry wide problems such as poor demand
for a given class of products, shortages of raw materials, or widespread
strikes. Although it is difficult to ascertain the exact problem facing each
of these industries, it is clear that the industrial environments of the
companies cited for illegal acts were less munificent than those of the
other companies in the Fortune 500.'443
The size of the corporation is something that jurists have looked to as a
determinant factor in the commission of crime. Unfortunately, no real consensus
emerges from the literature. Kreisberg suggested in his study that illegal behaviour
was found in newer smaller less profitable businesses.444 Whereas Croall forms the
view that corporate crime is committed by large and small companies.445
Organizational theory and decision-making processes within organisations remain
of singular importance in the study of corporate crime. There must be congruence
between the law and the way organisations decide. Only in that way can we hope
Kreisberg, n. 439 at p. 1099.
441
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to activate internal policing mechanisms and at the same time develop laws which
touch upon the nerve centre of the organisation.446
1.8 Conclusion
It is difficult to summarise the contents of this chapter. The diffuse nature of the
issues canvassed has been alluded to in the abstract. Several key issues shape the
landscape upon which we wish to establish corporate criminal liability. We have a
starting point of several key legacies. The criminal law developed before the
advent of the corporate form. The early principles were not developed with the
corporation in mind. Progressively, there has been recognition that corporations
possess the capacity to damage society and that the criminal law might operate as a
tool, in the same way that it applies to individuals, to regulate harmful conduct.
The history of corporate criminal liability is a tortuous one beset by polarised
debates as to the true nature of corporations, why offending occurs, and the
criminal law itself. All of these have fashioned views on the subject of corporate
criminal liability. As Winn explains,
'Even today the gradual process of emancipation of legal thinking about
the nature of corporations has not entirely thrown of all the shackles of
Blackstonain anthropomorphism. Intellectual difficulty is still felt in
giving corporate significance to certain kinds of acts, and a tendency is
still perceptible to regard certain actions as in the nature of things
incompatible with the intangible non physical nature of corporations...The
whole history of the legal treatment of corporations illustrates the steady
trend away from primitive anthropomorphism to a broad conception of a
very wide field of potential corporate responsibility. Public policy
demands that corporations be held to a higher degree of responsibility
than individuals, in proportion as they are more powerful and equipped
materially to work much greater harm.'447
Despite the substance of the literature and the debates it has engendered, we are no
nearer reaching a consensus. Some of the arguments are simply incapable of being
compromised. Increasingly, greater numbers of jurists and jurisdictions are being
convinced of the merits of corporate criminal liability. The arguments are now
being realigned to assess what form that liability will take and to what extent it will
See Fisse and Braithwaite, n. 401 at p. 131
447
Winn, n. 328 at pp. 414-5.
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be recognised. Subscription to the view that corporate liability should be promoted
and that there should be an effective system of corporate criminal liability
operating in Scotland should not ignore that, 'The development of appropriate
defined legal rules does not ensure effective legal regulation of a particular area of
social life.'448 Davids outlines four principle strategies to control white collar
crime449 - the development of better private house-keeping by corporations;
secondly individualistic punishment and deterrence, thirdly a structural and
preventive approach, and finally a deterrent and punitive approach to corporate
deviants. In the course of this thesis I hope to lend support to this four-cornered
strategy in a Scottish context. The case for corporate liability is beyond doubt. It
is both efficacious and necessary. The impact of corporate criminality necessitates
intervention. In certain circumstances the liability that ensues should be corporate
in nature rather than transplanted individualism. Society has all too often become
victims of its own creation. What started as a mechanism for societal good has
become a metaphysical entity which all too often places self-interest and the
interests of the few above the general interest.450 In corporate criminal liability we
posses a mechanism which will permit that self interest but within certain confines;
self interest which also promotes collective interest. In a liberal democratic society
that is as much as we can hope for. Corporate criminal liability as a credo cannot
hope to prosper if it remains 'constrained by principles developed to deal with
individual crime.'451 One method might be to create a specific legislative
framework.452 In developing such a system there are obvious and real benefits in
looking to the Anglo-American jurisprudence for guidance and solutions. They
have grappled with the conundrums of corporate crime more than any others. It is
their jurisprudence which has sought solutions to the apparently insoluble; and it is
their jurists who have exhibited a willingness to develop imaginative possibilities
inherent in attaching criminal liability to the corporation. It is stark testimony to
Field and Jorg, n. 327 at p. 171.
449
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obsolescence of our own jurisprudence that we in Scotland start from a desolate
'tapestry' devoid of any substantial utterances on the subject of corporate crime. In
reviewing that state of affairs it is difficult to conclude whether one should bemoan
the absence of indigenous jurisprudence or, simply welcome the opportunity to
develop a system anew, bereft of any significant past 'baggage.' On balance the
optimism of the latter commends itself; maintenance of the status quo is no longer
tenable in a society having to face the stark realities of corporate crime.
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CHAPTER 2
ATTRIBUTION OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
2.0 Introduction
One of the enduring controversies of corporate criminal liability surrounds the
basis of ascription of liability itself. The importance of finding the most
appropriate method of ascribing liability cannot be over-stated. Not only does it
represent the intellectual foundation of corporate criminal liability, it also may, in
some part, determine whether or not any system of corporate criminal liability
engenders support from the wider community. Only in circumstances where the
basis of liability is seen to be fair and justifiable can broad support be expected.
Consensus on the issue of the appropriate basis of liability has so far eluded even
the Anglo-American jurists. The absence of global consensus is not in itself
concerning. There is, it would seem, often an absence of consensus within
particular jurisdictions as to how liability should be attached to the corporations.
The situation is such that it is relatively easy to support the proposition that,
'One of the most pressing tasks facing contemporary ethical and legal
thought is the development of intellectually sound and effective
approaches for assessing the moral and legal implication of individuals
acting within the context of collectivities such as corporations and of the
actions and policies of these collective entities themselves.'1
The process of refinement of the basis of ascription of criminal liability is clearly a
dialectical process. That there has been much geographic and temporal cross-
fertilisation of ideas and approaches is beyond doubt. Indeed if any sort of broad
consensus is ever to be achieved that process ofmutuality must continue.
Gobert offers four models of corporate criminal liability. These four 'models', or
methods of ascribing liability, can be variously described as vicarious liability, the
'identification' model, the 'aggregation' model and, the corporate fault model.
1
J. Surber, 'Individual And Corporate Responsibility: Two Alternative Approaches' 1983 2
Business and Professional Ethics Journal 67-88 at p. 67.
2
Gobert, 'Corporate Criminality: Four Models OfFault' 1994 14 Legal Studies 393-410 at p. 395
et seq.
3
'Developments In The Law. Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behaviour Through
Criminal Sanctions' 1979 Harvard Law Review 1229-1375, at pp. 1242-3.
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Each has attained a measure of support at various times and in different
jurisdictions. By way of amplification, Dan-Cohen offers (without necessarily
supporting them) two paradigms in the legal treatment of corporations- the holistic
view and the atomistic. Imputing intent from individuals to the corporation is in
his view atomistic in conception.4 The modern academic trend has been away from
such atomistic conceptions to a holistic approach. The atomistic conceptions
nonetheless have strong roots in the common law jurisdictions and in different
guises represent the approach that they all take to the ascription of liability. The
imputation of liability from corporate agents at what ever level within the
organisation betrays the continued philosophical commitment to the inherent
individualism of the criminal law. Only when one is prepared to concede that the
corporation as a collectivity can be liable for its own criminal wrongs, does one
veer towards an altogether more holistic basis for the ascription of criminal
liability. The sustained support for those approaches which attach liability to the
corporation through corporate actors ensures that in any discussion of the subject of
corporate crime, that they are given respectful consideration. Gobert's four models
and Dan Cohen's paradigms offer a useful template in which to discuss the subject.
In Scotland, there has been a perceptible reluctance to adduce on what basis
criminal liability attaches to the corporation for common law crimes (see chapter
6). Here again we may learn much in the gyrations of the Anglo-American systems
rather than our own sparse indigenous jurisprudence.
2.1 Vicarious Liability
The first obvious attempts at ascribing criminal liability to corporations were done
on the back of the established civil law doctrine of vicarious liability. Criminal
vicarious liability has its origins in the civil law agency concept.5 It is often
4
See Foerschler, 'Corporate Criminal Intent: Toward A Better Understanding Of Corporate
Misconduct' 1990 78 California L. R. 1287 at p. 1298.
5
See Kreisberg, 'Decision-Making Models And The Control OfCorporate Crime' 1976 85 Yale L.
J. 1091 at p. 1095; see O. W. Holmes,'Agency' 1891 6 8 Harvard L. R. 345-64; Wolfenden Report,
Chap II pp. 9-10 quoted in J. H. E. Williams, 'The Proper Scope And Function OfCriminal Law'
1958 74 Law Quarterly R. 76-81 at p. 76; Sayre,'Criminal Responsibility For The Acts OfAnother'
1930 43 Harvard L. R. 689-723 at pp. 689-694; Khanna, 'Corporate Criminal Liability: What
Purpose Does It ServeV 1996 109 Harvard L. R. 1477-1532 at pp. 1482; Lederman, 'Criminal
Law, Perpetrator And Corporation: Rethinking A Complex Triangle' 1985 76 Journal of Criminal
Law and Criminology 285-340 at p. 288; T. Baty, 'Criminal Vicarious Liability' in Vicarious
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rationalised on the basis of the proximity of relationship between the corporation
and its individual human actor. Gobert, for example, argues that,
'[A]s an employer is responsible for selecting, training and supervising the
employee, not to mention placing the employee in a position where the
offence can be committed, should not the employer also be responsible for
the employee's crime? the case for liability becomes even more
compelling when the employee has acted to benefit the company and the
company has retained the profits generated by the wrongdoing.'6
Similarly, it has been claimed, 'Criminal responsibility on the part of the principal,
for the act of his servant in the course of his employment, implies some degree of
moral guilt or delinquency, manifested either by direct participation in or assent to
the act, or by want of proper care and oversight, or other negligence in reference to
the business which he has thus intrusted to another.' Fisse points out that there
must be limitations of such an approach in that the aims of civil and criminal law
do not coincide. Meuller in recognising the link with tort notes nonetheless that
'many courts simply failed to appreciate any material difference between the two
bodies of law.'9 Ashworth adopting a stance founded on public policy explains
that vicarious liability as a foundation of criminal liability has its basis on
'pragmatism' and the requirements of society. 10 Laski (in slightly more colourful
language) argues that,
'The meaning of the sword of Damocles forged for [corporations]
penalization is rightly to be found, not in the particular relation they bear
to their charge, but in the general relation to society into which their
occupation brings them.'11
Liability, (1916); Winn, ' The Criminal Responsibility Of Organisations'1 1929 3 Cambridge L. J.
398-415 at p. 398.
6
Gobert, n. 2 at p. 396.
7
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Mueller,'Mens ReaAnd The Corporation' 1957 19 University of Pittsburgh L. R. 21-48 at p. 39.
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Sayre traces the development of respondeat superior and maintains that the
doctrine as it is applied is relatively modern in origin. The historic origins of
respondeat superior dictated that someone would be liable for the acts of another
12where they commanded it or procured it. The problem was that procuring or
commanding of a crime led to guilt through doctrines of aiding and abetting in any
13
case. The enshrinement of aiding and abetting as a criminal concept blocked the
development of criminal vicarious liability. Nonetheless, Sayre identified three
exceptions to the rule that there can be no criminal vicarious liability- nuisance,
libel and where statute expressly provides for it.14 The third departure from the
basic principle remains of singular importance in the area of corporate crime in the
modern era. Where statute expressly provides for vicarious criminal liability the
common law rule will be displaced. Sayre draws a sharp distinction between what
he calls 'true' crime and petty misdemeanours.15 He does so on the basis that
respondeat superior offends our deep seated notion that guilt is personal and
individual where the crime involves moral delinquency. This argument that all
regulatory crime does not involve moral obliquacy remains overly simplistic and as
such an unreliable basis on which to exclude vicarious liability from 'true crime.'
Sayre, nevertheless captures the essence of our disinclination to embrace vicarious
liability. Ultimately, the ordinary citizen's perception of crime remains of signal
importance and the offence that the proposition that criminal liability may attach
through the actions of another gives ensures that it can only be justified in certain
circumstances. It cannot provide a universal basis for the ascription of criminal
liability.
12
Sayre, n. 5 at pp. 690-1.
13
Sayre, n. 5 at p. 649; see NCB v Gamble [1959] 1 QB 11 cf. R v Daily Mirror Newspapers Ltd.
[1922] KBD 530
14
Sayre, n. 5; see also Welsh, n. 10 at pp. 348 et seq.; see also R v St Lawrence Corp. (1969) 2 OR
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and statutory offences of strict liability criminal liability is not attached to a corporation for the
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Sayre, n. 5 at pp. 710-12; see Triplex Glass Co. Ltd. v Lancegay Safety Glass (1934) Ltd. 1939 2
KB 394; Finburgh v Moss Empire Ltd. 1908 SC 928
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In respect of corporations, vicarious liability may be justified because it is directed
to ensuring more internal policing.16 The deterrence inherent in vicarious liability
revolves round greater shareholder and corporate officer attention to the selection
of officers and subordinates.17 As a model of liability, it certainly has utilitarian
value in obviating problems of ascribing liability where the wrong is committed by
the lower level official.18 Because liability transmits through the wrongdoer to the
corporation, individuals need not be prosecuted.19 That may not be a good precept
on which to operate in all circumstances; there will be many instances where the
individual should rightly be prosecuted in addition to the corporation. Vicarious
liability may also be justified on the basis of criminal law's chief aim of prevention
• 20and on the legitimate criminal goal of compensation.
Notwithstanding its positive attributes, vicarious liability has been the subject of
criticism based primarily on the injustice of vicarious liability and its inefficiency
in respect of corporate criminal liability.21 There are many who find vicarious
liability as a basis of ascription of liability anathema to the proper notion of
criminal liability. Sayre, for example, has stated that, 'Vicarious liability is a
22 • •
conception repugnant to every instinct of the criminal jurist.' Edwards similarly
takes the view that,
15
Sayre, n. 5 at p. 717.
16
L. H. Leigh, The Criminal Liability OfCorporations In English Law, (1969), at p. 75; see also
James and Sons Ltd. v Smee [1954] 1 QBD 273 per Lord Parker at p. 279
17
Cf. Welsh n. 10 at p. 286 believes, 'While an additional deterrent effect might be gained by
applying respondeat superior to all crimes of corporate agents, no characteristic peculiar to
corporations demands exceptional measures. Large corporate assets combined with the possible
financial irresponsibility of the agent- in cases where a fine is imposed- are not legitimate reason
for straining established criminal concepts.'
18
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Trade Practices Act' 1977 5 Australian Business L. R. 221-247 at p. 222.
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at p. 523.
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'So long as modern legislation continues to intrude itself into every sphere
of trading, business, health and social welfare activities, laying down
elaborate codes of conduct to be observed by responsible officials so, too,
the doctrine of vicarious liability will continue to be an evil necessity. But
each gesture on the part of the judiciary and of the legislature which
refuses to extend the obnoxious principle is to be applauded.'23
Another major objection to respondeat superior as the basis for corporate criminal
liability is adduced in a Harvard Law Review note which points out that,
'Once respondeat superior is applied to crimes, however, the stigma of
conviction becomes weakened as the public begins to recognize that
criminal liability may not signify lack of good faith on the part of
corporate management. If such a trend were extensive, the economic loss
from corporate punishment might be passed on to the consumer as in the
case of torts, and the whole purpose of recognising corporate
responsibility for crimes would thus be vitiated.'24
Gobert offers some understanding of the difficulty in using vicarious liability as a
model for criminal liability.25 The practical difficulty in supervising what may be
thousands of employees represents an enormous burden on an employer. In
Gobert's view supervision can be supplanted by policy formulation designed to
ensure that employees and the company remain within the confines of the law.
Vicariously liability as a fault attribution model retains the problem that a company
may become criminally liable in circumstances where the majority of its employees
have not broken the law and the company has taken reasonable (or indeed
exemplary) steps to prevent criminal conduct. According to Leigh, respondeat
• • • • 26 •
superior cannot be considered to be a satisfactory general basis of liability. It is
inherently unfair in that liability might ensue even in circumstances where the
company have expressly forbidden the act. One of the other key deficiencies of
vicarious liability as the basis on which to ascribe corporate criminal liability is the
fact that it only impacts on the actus reus of the crime. As Gobert explains, 'courts
that are prepared to attribute an employee's act to the company may balk at
attributing the employee's mental state as well.'27 Writing in 1978, Fisse argued
23
Edwards, n. 10 at p. 243.
24
Note: 'Criminal Liability OfCorporations For Acts OfTheir Agents' 1946 60 Harvard L. R. 83-
289 at p. 286
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27
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that '[Although states of mind are now attributable personally to corporations
under the identification principle, the results of applying that principle are so
• • 28
dysfunctional that vicarious liability retains much vitality.' This may in part
explain the continued recourse to vicarious liability as a model of corporate
liability in certain spheres. For all its truth, it represents a somewhat impoverished
rationale for the retention of vicarious liability as a universal basis of corporate
criminal liability.
How far is the imputation of knowledge to the corporation to be taken ? Should the
corporation be at fault where the corporate agent's wrongdoing is directed against
29the company. In Belmont Finance Corp. Ltd v Williams Furniture Ltd Buckley J
argued that 'if an agent is acting in fraud of his principal and the matter ofwhich he
has notice is relevant to the fraud, that knowledge is not to be imputed to the
30
principal.' Von Nessen suggests that it is the very nature of the dichotomy of the
corporate form and those who control it being essentially at one which throws up
31nonsensical problems in corporate crime. Equating the individual mind with that
of the company might lead to a situation where theft from the company by those
self same minds goes unpunished because the courts consider that the company
through its officers has consented to the transfer. In America, vicarious liability
evidently does not preclude corporate employers from being liable for employees
• • 32
exceeding their authority. In US VBeusch the court argued that,
'
[A] corporation may be liable for the acts of its employees done contrary
to express instructions and policies, but ..the existence of such instructions
and policies may be considered in determining whether the employee in
fact acted to benefit the corporation. Merely stating or publishing such
instructions and policies without diligently enforcing them is not enough
to place the acts of the employee who violates them outside the scope of
employment.'33
28
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Vicarious criminal liability continues to be found in many of the statutory criminal
offences. In the United Kingdom the position in respect of these regulatory
offences is well settled; vicarious liability applies in respect of strict liability
offences and now also to offences of negligence or hybrid offences (those
providing due diligence or reasonable knowledge test).34 Despite several early
cases where vicarious liability was used as the underpinning model of criminal
fault, other than in strict liability statutory offences there appears to be little current
enthusiasm for pursuing this as a basis of corporate criminal liability. An
illustration of such reluctance is to be found in the relatively recent case of
SeaboardMarine Offshore Ltd v Secretary ofState for Transport.35 Following the
breakdown of the ship's engine three times in twenty-four hours, the defendant
company were charged under section 31 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1988 of
failing to take all reasonable steps to secure that the ship was being operated in a
safe manner. The Chief Engineer had failed to board the ship until three hours
before it was set to sail. It was conceded in evidence that the requisite time for an
engineer to acquaint himself with the operations of the ship would have been three
days. In concluding that the duty imposed by the statute was a personal one to the
owner charterer or manager, the House of Lords took the view that if these
individuals or any other who were entrusted with the exercise of power had acted
reasonably, then that would satisfy the test of the statute. A strict construction of
the section ensured that liability would not be attributed to the company through
the acts or omissions of employees. Lord Keith's judgment in Seaboard Marine
Offshore Ltd equiperated the duty in section 31(4) with the setting of procedures
and parameters under which operatives would work. He argued that a duty to
secure that the ship is operated in a safe manner, 'conveys the idea of laying down
a safe manner of operating the ship by those involved in the actual operation of it
and taking appropriate measures to bring it about that such safe manner of
employment, even though their conduct may be contrary to their actual instructions or contrary to
the corporation's stated policies.'
34
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operation is adhered to.' In the opinion of Lord Keith, the owner, charterer or
manager is criminally liable if he fails in his duty personally and not criminally
liable through the operation of the doctrine of vicarious liability of his employees.
Despite this lack of enthusiasm, there is evidence that the courts have not entirely
ruled out the application of the concept of vicarious liability in corporate criminal
37
liability. In National Rivers Authority v Alfred McAlpine Homes East Ltd, the
court held that the company was vicariously liable for the actions of two specific
employees. The company's site agent and site manager had admitted responsibility
for the pollution caused by the ingress of wet cement into controlled waters. A
river downstream from a building site was inspected by the National Rivers
Authority and found to be cloudy. It transpired that cement had been washed into
the stream during construction of a water feature. There was a concession that the
employees could not be the 'alter ego' of the company as they were not sufficiently
senior. Morland J in taking a fairly purposive view of the statute indicated that he
could not see why Parliament had not intended to impose liability on the company
to control pollution as they were best placed to ensure that it did not take place. He
also thought it sufficient that those immediately responsible on site were
employees. Moreover, Wells suggests that vicarious liability was applied in the
38
mens rea case of Re Supply ofReady Mixed Concrete (No2). However, that case
must be contrasted with the approach in SeaboardMarine Offshore Ltd v Secretary
39
ofState for Transport where the House of Lords made it clear that a company
could not be vicariously liable for breach of duty for the acts of its servants or
agents. How does one reconcile these decisions? It appears that it may turn on the
interpretation of the particular statute. Writers look to the more recent case of
Median Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v Securities Commission 40 where the
Privy Council again rejected vicarious liability holding that a person had to be
found within the company whose acts and knowledge can be attributed to the
36
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company. However, in illustration of how confusing the situation is, Lord
Hoffman was of the opinion that directing mind theory was only appropriate in
certain cases and that in other situations,
'the court must fashion a special rule of attribution for the particular
substantive rule. This is always a matter of interpretation given that it was
intended to apply to a company, how was it intended to apply ? Whose
act (or knowledge or state ofmind) was for this purpose intended to count
as the act etc. of the company ?'...'their Lordships would wish to guard
themselves against being understood to mean that whenever a servant of a
company has authority to do an act on its behalf, knowledge of that act
will for all purposes be attributed to the company. It is a question of
construction in each case as to whether the particular rule requires that the
knowledge that an act has been done, or the state of mind with which it
was done, should be attributed to the company.'41
Vicarious liability remains a vital part of the corporate criminal liability equation
whether it be clearly required in specific statutory offences or in the brief hints
offered by some recent judicial pronouncements.42 The expansion of regulatory
offences has in this context significant importance. The trend in both United
Kingdom and America is illustrative of two themes- the move from the protection
of individual interests to societal interests and, secondly, the growing utilisation of
criminal law to enforce not just true crimes but regulatory offences.43 Moreover,
the modern trend towards strict liability is cliche.44 Strict liability like vicarious
liability generally can be justified on utilitarianism45 In addition, Nemerson
claims that 'strict liability may be justified by a pluralist theory of sanctions.'46
The key benefit of strict liability is that 'by imposing a burden on the regulated
accused to establish due diligence, the strict-liability offence requires people to put
41
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proactive, preventive systems in place that tend to minimize the likelihood of
offences arising.'47 Notwithstanding that there are perceived benefits, there are
those only too willing to criticise the concept of strict liability.48 Frank steering a
middle course argues that there is a need to revisit strict liability as a basis for
criminal liability with perhaps the substitution of civil penalties rather than
criminal sanctions 49 That approach, however, only offers a flinched compromise
which fails to address fundamental questions as to the appropriateness of vicarious
criminal liability.
Leigh acknowledges the common law jurisdictions' contribution in devising
different ways of attribution of liability to overcome the fact that corporations
cannot act for themselves. However, attribution brings with it a problem of
distinguishing from the corporation's direct liability and its vicarious liability for
the acts of agents or employees in the scope of their employment. The real
problem in adopting an expansive approach, utilising a broad range of corporate
agents is that 'it may be difficult to rebut the accusation that an enterprise is in
effect being subjected to vicarious liability. But vicarious liability for serious
crime is at variance with fundamental values embedded in both common law and
civil systems.'50 For all this it remains useful in respect of certain statutory
offences and as such might well be retained in respect of those crimes as part of our
system of corporate criminal liability on the basis of pragmatism and efficacy. In
chapter 6 my outline model aspires to continue with existing statutory crimes and
implicit in this is the acceptance that vicarious liability will remain for many of
those offences.
47
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2.2 The Identification Doctrine
The second 'model' of criminal liability identified by Gobert and discussed in a
plethora of writings is what is known as the 'identification theory.' The essence of
this theory is that the corporation attains criminal liability through a direct
connection between the company and the person responsible for the criminal harm.
An individual or individuals are of sufficient standing that they are 'identified' with
the company. This model of criminal liability is often referred to as the
'controlling mind theory' or the 'alter ego' doctrine.51 As a method of ascribing
criminal liability it is most famously expounded in Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v
52
Natrass. However, development of the concept can be traced to earlier cases.
Lord Denning argued in HL Bolton Co. Ltd v TJGraham andSons Ltd53, that,
'[A] company may in many ways be likened to the human body. It has a
brain and nerve centre which controls what it does. It also has hands
which holds the tools and act in accordance with directions from the
centre. Some of the people in the company are mere servants and agents
who are nothing more than hands to do the work and cannot be said to
represent the mind or will. Others are directors and managers who
represent the directing mind and will of the company and control what it
does. The state of mind of those managers is the state of mind of the
company and is treated by law as such.'
Wells54 pinpoints three earlier cases as being significant in the adoption of the alter
ego doctrine- DPP v Kent and Sussex Contractors,55 R v ICR Haulage,56 and
57
Moore v Bresler. In DPP v Kent and Sussex Contractors Ltd the company was
charged with an offence under a war time rationing regulation- Defence (General)
Regulations 1939- with making a false mileage return to the petrol licensing
authority. The offence required the imputation to the company of an intention to
deceive. At the trial Justices had dismissed the case on the basis that the company
was incapable of having the criminal mind necessary for this charge. On appeal it
51
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was contended by Counsel that companies were separate legal persona from their
employees. They could only commit crimes through their employees and it was
from them that the necessary criminal mind could be imputed. This argument was
upheld by the court and in the process Viscount Caldecote CJ said 'it is
unnecessary, in any view, to inquire whether it is proved that the company's
58officers acted on its behalf. The officers are the company for this purpose.' In R
v ICR Haulage Co. Ltd the company faced a common law charge of conspiracy to
defraud. Following conviction the company appealed arguing that a company was
incapable of committing such an offence. Again the court had to address the issue
of whether a company could have the necessary mens rea for the commission in
this instance of a common law offence. The opinion of the court was that it could.
Macnaghten J said,
'
[I]f the responsible agent of the company, acting within the scope of his
authority, puts forward on its behalf a document which he knows to be
false and by which he intends to deceive, I apprehend according to the
authorities...his knowledge and intention must be imputed to the
company.'
The third of the 1944 cases, Moore v Bresler, provides further illustration of
judicial support for the proposition that the actings of officers of a company could
confer criminal liability on their company through the operation of the 'alter ego'
doctrine. In this case the crime involved a breach of the Finance Act 1940 which,
like Kent and Sussex Contractors, necessitated an intention to deceive. The
General Manager and the Sales Manager of a branch of the company sold, with the
intention of defrauding the company, some of the company's goods. They then
made a return in respect of purchase tax contrary to section 35 of the Finance (No2)
Act 1940. Though it appears rather unfair it was determined that the company was
no less liable for the actions of the employee's despite the fact that the wrong of the
individuals concerned was directed as much against the company as against the
State.59
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One can go back further to an even earlier authority to see both the formulation of
the idea of an 'alter ego' doctrine and its relationship with vicarious liability. In
Lennard's Carrying Company Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Company Ltcf'{) Viscount
Haldane said,
'[A] company is an abstraction. It has no mind of its own any more than it
has a body of its own; its active and directing will must consequently be
sought in the person of somebody who for some purpose may be called an
agent, but who is really the directing mind and will of the corporation, the
very ego and centre of the personality of the corporation. That person
may be under the direction of shareholders in general meeting; that person
may be the board of directors itself, or it may be, and in some companies
it may be so, that the person has an authority to co-ordinate with the board
of directors given to him to co-ordinate under the articles of association.
It must be upon true construction of that section in such a case as the
present one that the fault or privity of somebody who is not merely a
servant or agent for whom the company is liable because his action is the
very action of the company itself.'
The modem authority generally accepted as the leading case in the United
Kingdom on the 'alter ego' doctrine is Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v. Natrass. In this
case the company was charged with an offence under section 11(2) of the Trades
Description Act 1968. the substance of the offence was that the company had
advertised goods for sale at a price less than the price on the goods actually for
sale. Evidence disclosed that a branch of the company had run out of specially
priced items and they had been replaced with similar items at their normal price
and that the company's branch manager had authorised the action taken. As a
consequence the goods on display were more expensive than the advertised price of
the goods. Section 24 of the 1968 Act offers a defence to a section 11(2) charge. It
states,
'In any proceedings for an offence under this Act it shall...be a defence for
the person charged to prove- (a) that the commission of the offence was
due to...the act or default of another person...and (b) that he took all
reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the
commission of such an offence.' Section 20 of the same Act states that
'where an offence under this Act which has been committed by a body
corporate is proved to have been committed with the consent and




the body corporate... he as well as the body corporate shall be guilty of
that offence.'
The company sought to rely upon the defence in the statute arguing that it had
exercised due diligence and that the manager was 'another' for the purposes of the
Act. In accepting the company's contention the House of Lords held that the
manager was not sufficiently senior to constitute the 'controlling' mind of the
company.61 The decision in Tesco Supermarkets v Natrass has attracted
considerable criticism. For example Gobert claims that,
'
[T]he test ofNatrass is under inclusive in that the range of persons within
a large company who will possess the relevant characteristics to render the
company liable will inevitably be a rather small percentage of those who
work for the company. The consequence is that the company will be able
to escape criminal liability for most acts of its employees. In large
companies such as Tesco there will be many layers of management. No
one person or persons at the centre can be expected to oversee the daily
affairs of the hundreds of supermarkets which the company operates. Day
to day decisions will perforce have to be entrusted to local managers. Yet
this discretion, because it relates to the implementation of policy rather to
its formulation, will not be sufficient to bring the branch manager within
the test ofNatrass. Under Natrass a business is inevitably converted into
a legal defence. Further, by their decision their Lordships encourage a
management structure which favours devolved decision-making- not for
the theoretical merit, but because it will help to insulate the company from
criminal liability.'62
Natrass represents a crude distinction between the 'hands' and 'brains' of the
company. The distinction is a simple one and, for some commentators, one ill-
suited to modern complex command structures. Gobert explains that the actus reus
of the crime is more likely to be committed a much lower level than director level.
Trying to match the actus reus committed by a lower level employee with the mens
rea of higher level employees has a certain inconsistency of approach. Gobert
again argues,
61
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'One of the prime ironies of Natrass is that it propounds a theory of
corporate liability which works best in cases where it is needed least and
works least in cases where it is needed most. The directors and managers
of small companies who are most likely to satisfy the Natrass test are also
likely to be directly involved in carrying out of the company's affairs and
thus criminally liable in their own right; vicarious and corporate liability
are largely superfluous for deterrent purposes. In large companies, on the
other hand, there is far less likelihood of personal involvement by senior
management in day-to-day activities. As a result, the possibility of
personal criminal liability is not much of a deterrent while the Natrass test
63frustrates efforts to impose corporate liability.'
Gobert cites the Clapham railway disaster as an illustration where the Natrass ratio
is ineffective. In this incident the immediate fault of the accident was traced to
faulty wiring. However, the technician's failure had been replicated by many other
technicians. None of them had been warned of their conduct or received any
notification that their work patterns were in direct violation of the company's stated
policy. It became apparent in the course of the investigation that neither the
technician nor his supervisor had seen the company's policies. Despite an
underlying picture of a company lacking in commitment to health and safety, or
one simply paying Tip service' to it, no prosecutions were forthcoming (despite a
finding of unlawful killing at the inquest). This failure to prosecute may, in part,
be explained by the difficulty in satisfying the ratio of Natrass. On the basis of
that decision it was likely that the technician would not be viewed as the
controlling mind of the organisation but rather merely a servant.
Muir notes that Natrass creates a discriminatory rule in favour of the larger
employer.64 In addition he notes one of another of the unfortunate consequences of
Natrass and that is 'If the corporation can expect to escape liability on proof of a
servant's fault it may be less inclined to do no more than maintain an adequate
"paper" system for presentation to the court as evidence of due diligence on its part
or perhaps of the defendant being "another person".'65 Field and Jorg criticise the
identification doctrine on the basis that it does not adequately reflect the limits of
63
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corporate moral responsibility.66 In their view to limit it to high ranking corporate
actors is unduly restrictive and that, 'priorities in hierarchical organisations like
corporations are set predominately from above. It is those priorities that determine
the social context within which a corporation's shop-floor workers and the like
make decisions about working practices. A climate of safety or unsafety may
permeate the entire organisation but be created at the highest level. Thus, if
criminal law is to reflect this moral responsibility, in appropriate cases legal
responsibility ought to extend to acts done by the "hands" of the corporation.'
Fisse is also critical of the identification theory describing it as a,
'vision which is blind to organizational theory and practice
[amounting]., to an anthropomorphic illusion...The truth is that
corporations are materially different from human persons both in
constitution and being. To rely upon anthropomorphic assumptions at the
expense of corporate reality is simply to succumb to the myth of the
metaphor.'67
One of the perceived problems of the identification theory is that following the
Natrass decision there is clear authority for suggesting that only those at the very
f-Q
core of the corporation may impute guilt to it. So far, as one writer has pointed
out' [n]o indication is apparent for what criteria are to be employed in determining
who falls within the "inner circle".'69 Plausibly each situation may turn on its
merits but there is no authority to that effect from the House of Lords or, the
Scottish Court of Criminal Appeal. What then might be the criteria for
'identification'? How might one develop a blueprint for determining whose
criminal mind will attach liability to the company? Stern offers several criteria for
defining the 'organ' which will attach liability. First, rather unhelpfully Stern
offers 'vague description' as one means of identifying the appropriate individuals.
There is little difficulty in finding support for this vague rather haphazard
approach. The case law, particularly English case law, points to the court offering
66
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up such nebulous concepts as "the very ego and centre", "the directing mind and
will" or "control centre" or corporate "brains" or the "primary organs." As Stem
suggests there is frustration in defining the organ as something more than other
70
employees of the corporation. It has been suggested that the primary organs test
dictates that the criminal mind is to be located in the minds of 'those agents who
can act under the direct authority of the constitutional document and regulations of
71
the corporation without the intervention of any further human act.' Such a test
was advanced by Lord Diplock in Natrass. The test itself suffers from the same
issues which Natrass generally raises. Primary organs may have very little direct
input into the actings of the company. They may exercise nothing more than mere
approval. Others within the organisation may exercise considerable power and
indeed may be considered organs of the company without being primary organs of
the company. Conversely, lower order officials may have significant powers in
modem bureaucracies. Such officials might not be named in corporate documents
but may, nonetheless exercise considerable power. It seems fairly obvious that
primary organs are not the sole organs particularly in complex modem
bureaucracies. Fisse criticises Lord Diplock's confinement of corporate officers to
the formal constitution as resting on the patently false assumption that a
72
corporation's constitution reflects the true nature of its managerial functions. The
major appeal of such a test is the certainty that it offers in identification. Only
those expressly named in company documents would have the power to attach
criminal liability to the company. The limitations of this approach are self-evident;
a company could evade liability by being economical with the number of named
officials. Equally objectionable is the notion the company alone may determine
who can create criminal liability. Policy considerations in criminal law dictate that
the State should determine the parameters of criminal liability and it clearly offends
70
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that concept were the corporation to self-regulate its liability by narrowing the
numbers of individuals who may be identified with the corporation.
73An alternative test offered by Stern is the delegation test. This test retains a
linkage to company documentation. The nexus with the company documents
conveys an image of certainty and express identification. In this instance
identification with the company would be through those thought to have delegated
from the company documents. The flaw in such a test is the lack of precision. The
flexibility it introduces permits courts to deduce in the given circumstances who
has the delegated authority. The lack of precision reduces the test to little more
value than the vague description approach currently adopted by the courts.
Stern thirdly, offers the 'authorised acts test.'74 Here one inevitably observes the
language of vicarious liability rooted in the law of agency. Identification is with
the acts authorised by the primary representatives rather than those carried out by
them. As a consequence any employee of the organisation might be identified as
the mind of the company. Unlike the other tests this one has its affinity to the acts
perpetrated rather than the individuals. In this sense it is less anthropomorphic in
conception. The authorised acts test's primary flaw lies in the fact that only
directly authorised acts attach criminal liability; generally authorised acts will not
attach liability. Even if the test had some merit it would nonetheless raise
questions as to the mode of authorisation and more importantly, unauthorised acts.
Another of Stern's tests -'corporate selection test'- is in many respects similar to
the primary organs test in that it permits the corporation to determine who the
organs are. The approach entails the corporation filing with State authorities
(obviously Companies House in the UK) documents identifying the organs by
name or position. The poverty of this as a basis of identification is obvious; the
criticisms which pertain to some of the earlier tests are apposite. This approach
73
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would amount to nothing more than self-regulation and would in the opinion of the
writer prove so ineffectual as to be meaningless.
75Stern also offers what he calls 'a pragmatic approach.' Arguably, the current
approach of the British courts is one based on pragmatism. The strength and
weakness of such an approach is adequately described by Stern who contends 'its
strategy might give more substance to the abstract descriptions of the organ, while
softening the formal criteria's intransigence.' The pursuit of a suitable test
however is premised on the premise of greater certainty. Abstraction clearly
cannot achieve this and for that reason alone this test must be of limited value for
those in pursuit of definition. Stern suggests that in adopting a pragmatic
approach,
'
[T]he criterion must enable the courts to identify the organs on a case by
case basis, by engaging in a factual analysis and careful investigation of
the structure and the functions of the corporation in question.
Nevertheless, the criterion must not be so abstract that it allows too much
judicial discretion.'
Pragmatism as a test, if such a test exists, may require certain constraining features
which for the purposes of this study may be described as sub-tests. Stern
concludes that,
'
[T]he common goal of all the criteria analysing the hierarchy of the legal
body is to identify those individuals who are sufficiently important in the
corporate hierarchy that their will and acts might be considered those of
the corporations itself. The complex task is to draw the exact line in the
hierarchy which separates individuals who are the ego of the corporation
76from those who are merely its representative.'
This may be so for those supportive of the identification theory. Stem's approach
is to find a test which works within that context. Others have sought a different
formulation entirely for the ascription of criminal liability and have rejected the
identification theory as inherently inappropriate and unworkable. Stem in an effort
to make the pragmatic test work offers two constraining reference points: analysis
of hierarchy and analysis of function. Illustration of the pragmatic approach in
75
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respect of hierarchy can be found in the Model Penal Code in America which states
that,
'A corporation may be convicted of the commission of an offence if and
only if...(c) the commission of the offense was authorized, requested,
commanded, or performed by the board of directors, or by an agent having
responsibility for formation of corporate policy, or by a high managerial
agent having supervisory responsibility over the subject matter of the
offence and acting within the scope of his employment in behalf of the
corporation.'
Like most hierarchical analysis the Code fails to differentiate the real
policymakers.77 There are inherent contradictions in the conception of hierarchy
and pragmatism. Another major criticism is the inequality in merely ascribing
liability on the basis of function.78 Welsh contends that there are some actions of
those within the hierarchy which should not attach criminal liability to the
corporation despite the fact that the functionary is acting within the scope of his
employment. Nonetheless analysis by function may ironically be more utilitarian
than pragmatism.79 Here we consider not who the individual is but what he does
regardless of his position in the hierarchy. This seems more truly a pragmatic
approach. Of equal importance is whether the function performed is of the
corporation or for the corporation. In the spirit of true pragmatism Stem offers a
solution to the inherent deficiencies of the hierarchical and function tests and that is
OA
to combine both. He argues for an approach to this vexed question whereby 'an
analysis of the corporation's function will eliminate from the sphere of corporate
personal liability not only ultra vires acts or acts outside the scope of an actor's
employment, but also intra vires acts which are not attributable to the corporation'
and,
'..because common sense and practical economic necessity sometimes
require rejection of the results reached by the function test alone., and
because the criminal law's deterrent goal will not be achieved by
expanding corporate liability to case where low-ranking employees are the
actual criminals, an additional hierarchy test should be applied...[T]he two
criteria complement each other because each of them alone is too broad
77
Stern, n. 69 at p. 136.
7R
Advanced by Welsh, n. 10 at p. 360.
79
The function test was developed by Professor Barak, 'The Status OfThe Entity In Torts' 1966 22
Hapraklit 198 at pp. 204-7.
80
Stern, n. 69 at p. 140.
94
and inflexible to accommodate the complex and diverse structure of the
modern corporation.'81
Kelly notes the difficulty of identifying individuals to attach corporate liability
under alter ego doctrine. His solution is a definition in terms of control and
management which he believes would address the differential that exists between
82different corporations. Leigh recognises the organs of the company as,
'those persons who, by the constitutional documents of the corporation,
are entitled to the primary management of its affairs' but equally "[T]he
difficulty with this formula is that it does not fit the case of the large
decentralised corporation in which decisions of importance may well be
taken by middle-range managerial officers who are answerable only in
83
some ultimate sense to board members.'
What about persons who manipulate the company without occupying a formal
position in it? Will they be liable under the identification theory. Leigh following
the line in R v St Lawrence Corp. adopts the view that it is correct to restrict the
identification theory to employees acting within the scope of their employment or
his authority. However, he goes on to say that the real question is 'whether a
corporation should be held liable simply because the agent was acting within the
scope of his authority or in the course of his employment.'84 Leigh's argument is
that,
'The doctrine of identification originated as a device to ascribe personal
liability to corporations where this was necessary in order to hold them
civilly liable. In criminal law, however, it tends to be assumed that the
doctrine means that for all purposes of criminal liability a corporation
possess a mind- that of its controllers. But a court could return to the
original root and hold that the doctrine of identification should apply only
where for policy reasons it is necessary to hold a corporation liable.'
The distinction between vicarious liability and primary liability is both significant
and important. Writing before the landmark case ofNatrass, Fisse indicated that
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'[o]nce a distinction is drawn between primary and vicarious liability it
clearly follows that the conduct of some servants or agents cannot be
imputed to a corporation where primary liability is imposed. Authority is
to the effect that primary ( as opposed to vicarious) liability may be
imposed in respect of the conduct of a managing director, a general
manager, and even a secretary. Obviously primary liability would be
imposed in respect of the conduct of either the general meeting or the
board of directors. However, no clear discrimination between superior
and inferior agents or servants emerges from the case law.'
Fisse appeared supportive of the distinction between vicarious liability and primary
liability on the basis that it would prevent the 'wider imposition of vicarious
86
liability upon individuals.' Edgerton had earlier offered a rationale in favour of
primary liability. In his view it would enhance the notion of deterrence if the
corporation was held directly criminally liable. Moreover, it would operate to
influence shareholders and higher officials to subordinate lower ranking officials.
Finally, Edgerton saw the advantage in primary liability in the fact that it would
87
overcome the need to identify the person who commits the actus reus. Fisse is
critical ofEdgerton's view on the basis that the latter's position offered no thesis as
to why corporate criminal liability should be expanded more widely than individual
88
liability. In respect of Edgerton's third point, it is interesting to note that Fisse
was critical on the basis that it may lead to the elimination of mens rea from
offences simply because it is difficult. The experience since Fisse's early thesis
has not borne out his criticism. Indeed, deeper analysis points to the fact that
identification with all corporate agents and servants need not of necessity result in
the dispensing of the requirement of mens rea where the alleged crime has such a
requirement. The attribution of primary liability in the modern era has been
indicative of a desire to root out the criminal mind within the corporation and not
to eliminate mens rea as a requirement altogether. Fisse's conclusion in 1967 was
that 'primary liability..should be imposed only in respect of the conduct of the
general meeting, the board of directors and less clearly the managing director.'
That conclusion represented a prognosis which the House of Lords in Natrass
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seemed relatively eager to adopt. Leigh argues that 'The reasons for differing
between personal and vicarious liability are partly dialectical and partly founded on
policy i.e. the desire to impose personal corporate liability rather than vicarious
liability in a situation stemming essentially from a failure to supervise officers,
agents and employees. A broad test is in part dictated by the view that ignorance
by top management of the criminal activities of subordinates is often founded on
• 89
expediency.' According to Leigh 'The question is not whether the relevant
human actor occupies a particular place within the corporation, but whether,
whatever his title, he exercises substantially autonomous powers in respect of a
significant aspect of the corporation's activities.'90
It has been suggested that 'The simplest and most sensible explanation is that the
identification liability is a modified form of vicarious liability under which the
liability of a restricted range of personnel is imputed to the corporation.'91 The
Law Commission's Working paper No 44 argued for an extension to the
identification theory so that corporate actors other than board members would be
included. Their formulation was to include those managers where the management
92function delegated was substantial They also wished to overturn the Moore v
Bresler doctrine so that where the individual actor seeks to harm the corporation
then their actions could not be attributed to the corporation.
In New Zealand there are authorities which offer an interesting contrast with Tesco
Supermarkets v Natrass. In Meulens Hair Stylists v Commissioner for Inland
93
Revenue the court adopted a test of 'responsible servant' (in this case the
company secretary). Similarly, in Upper Hutt Motor Bodies Ltd v CIR94 McGregor
J. emphasised the notion of empowerment rather than the corporate brain idea.95
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See also Morris v Wellington City [1969] NZLR 1038; Sweetman v Industries and Commerce
dept [1970] NZLR 139 where Richmond J held that the internal arrangements between the hands
and the brains were irrelevant and that directors could not hide behind ignorance.
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Contrast this with the UK decision in R v Redfern and Dunlop Ltd96 where it was
held that the European Sales Manger of Dunlop (Aviation) Ltd was not sufficiently
senior to be the alter ego of the company. However, two recent cases have
accepted the attribution of knowledge to lower level officials . In Tesco v London
97 98
Borough of Brent and El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings Pic. In Tesco
Supermarkets Ltd v London Borough ofBrent the company was charged with an
offence contrary to section 11(11) of the Video Recordings Act 1984 whereby one
of their employees sold a video classed ' 18' to a 14 year old. Saughten L.J. offered
the view that it was 'absurd to suppose that those who manage a vast company
would have any knowledge or any information as to the age of a casual purchaser
of a video film. It is the employee that sells the film at the check out point who
will have knowledge or reasonable grounds for belief. It is her knowledge or
reasonable grounds that are relevant.' Such a view is difficult to reconcile with the
Natrass doctrine and illustrates the incoherence of adopting the Natrass approach.
In El Ajou, Nourse L.J. adopted a practical view of a complex financial fraud and
in the process held that it was not the board of directors that was the controlling
mind but the person who had de facto management. According to Nourse 'the
authorities show clearly that different persons may for different purposes satisfy the
requirements of being the company's directing mind and will.' In Camden London
Borough Council v Fine Fare Ltd a slightly different approach was adopted. The
case essentially endorsed the Natrass view that it was the directors who were the
controlling mind but Glidewell J suggested that officers below the rank of director
might be in a position to indicate what the state of mind of the directors was. In R
v Redfern and Dunlop Ltd "the court re-emphasised the notion of control claiming
that 'administrative or executive functions which did not confer true power of
management and control would be insufficient.' These most recent cases illustrate
the clear problems that a strict interpretation of the Natrass doctrine creates. There
is no certainty in just who the controlling mind of the corporation is. In the process
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(1993) Crim. L. R. 43 at p. 45
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of seeking accommodations with the Natrass philosophy the case law is becoming
confused and confusing. In respect of the Natrass doctrine Wells claims that,
'The idea that only certain people act as the company presents a problem
over and above the difficulties attending any such line-drawing exercise.
While the company is at one level a "fiction" it is at another real. Once
individuals in the company do anything which is part of the greater
enterprise of which they are a part, then they contribute to the corporate
effect. Whatever the branch manager of Tesco did with special offers..he
was only able to do so because the company had invested and maintained
the shop, the supplies to it, the posters advertising the offer and so on.
When the Assistant Bosun on the Herald of Free Enterprise slept instead
of doing his job, he was caught up in a past, present and future, a network
of obligations and implications, which the corporation for which he
worked provided not only the equipment and the raison d'etre but also the
operating rules and procedures. The notion that some working within that
structure act as that corporation while others do not is flawed and requires
re-examination in the context of imposing criminal liability.'100
Quite simply the identification theory ignores the reality of modem corporate
decision-making which is often the product of corporate policies and procedures
rather than individual decisions.101 Both the Hidden Report into the Clapham
Junction railway disaster and Fennell Report into the Kings Cross Fire as well as
the Shehan Report in the Zeebrugge ferry disaster illustrate how processes for
decision making at the highest level contributed to failures of subordinates which
led to major incidents.102 It seems trite to suggest that organisational contexts and
collective processes considerably influence the actions of minor individuals within
those organisations. All of those disasters displayed a measure of acceptance
primarily through ignorance and indifference and casualness. In all the situations
there was no question that the corporations had the power to influence or control
what the subordinates were doing.
Wells, n. 54 at p. 560.
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Whilst the identification theory is not without its supporters,103 it has attracted
considerable criticism. In Britain it retains a pivotal position as the main method of
ascribing liability for common law crimes. As a doctrine it has undergone little
modification since it was first mooted in 1915.104 For all that, it should not
'occasion surprise that scholars elsewhere refuse to treat liability ascribed through
identification or high managerial agent as truly personal'...'To many European
scholars..the common-law systems seem to have set the theoretical problems aside
rather than to have solved them.'105 Fisse, in response, argues that identification
should be abandoned as not coinciding with the possible justifications of corporate
criminal responsibility.106 Natrass prevents imposition of liability where it is
107
justified and allows imposition where it is unnecessary. More significantly, the
Natrass principle fails to reflect the concept of organisational blameworthiness so
inherent in much of corporation's criminal conduct.108
2.3 The Aggregation Model
The aggregation model represents an extension to the identification model whereby
the criminal mind is identified in the collectivity of corporate personnel. Stone
explains the essence of aggregation claiming,
'All that is needed..is the stipulation that some critical mass of members
of any aggregate collectivity has collective power with respect to most
outcomes of the matters in which the collectivity has collective
power...each member of that critical mass subgroup has some individual
power as well with respect to those matters..in actual cases group
dynamics and the personal power over others of individual members may
serve to exclude certain members from ever being in the critical
mass..Allowing that we may have to exclude certain members who are
notably weak or under the influence of others, we may say that if an
aggregate collectivity has collective power with respect to some matter,
each member of the aggregate has some individual power with respect to
that matter; that is, none are powerless.'109
103
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The aggregation theory has American ancestry.110 The leading American case is US
v TIME-DC Inc. '"where the court said,
'
[K]knowledge acquired by employees within the scope of their
employment is imputed to the corporation. In consequence, a corporation
cannot plead innocence by asserting that the information obtained by
several employees was not acquired by any one individual employee who
then should have comprehended its full import. Rather the corporation is
considered to have acquired the collective knowledge of its employees
and is held responsible for their failure to act accordingly.'
The doctrine continues to find favour in some modern American case law. In the
case of United States v Bank of New England"2 the company had organised its
operations in such a way that individual employees were responsible for different
operations in respect of matters which required to be reported under the Currency
Transaction Reporting Act. In finding the Bank guilty, the court imputed
knowledge to the bank by aggregating the knowledge of the employees. The court
said,
'[I]f employee A knows one facet of the currency reporting requirement,
and B knows another facet of it, and C a third facet of it, the bank knows
them all'... 'A collective knowledge is entirely appropriate in the context
of corporate criminal liability...Corporations compartmentalise
knowledge, subdividing the elements of specific duties and operations
into smaller components. The aggregate of those components constitutes
the corporation's knowledge of a particular operation.'1 3
In Britain there has been no judicial support for the aggregation theory in criminal
cases.114 The one major case where the circumstances seemed most appropriate for
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its adoption was in the cases that followed the Zeebrugge Ferry disaster. However
in R v HMCoronerfor East Kent ex.p. Spooner 15 Bingham J. said,
'Whether a defendant is a corporation or a personal defendant, the
ingredients ofmanslaughter must be established by proving the necessary
mens rea and actus reus of manslaughter against it or him by evidence
properly to be relied on against it or him. A case against a personal
defendant cannot be fortified by evidence against another defendant. The
case against a corporation can only be made by evidence properly
addressed to showing guilt on the part of the corporation as such.'
Gobert argues that aggregation provides an alternative and more intellectually
satisfying basis than the alter ego doctrine for attributing the knowledge of a
corporate official to the company.116 He does so on the basis of the obvious
limitations of the Natrass decision where the controlling mind is equiperated with
seniority of position. Under the aggregation theory more junior officials and other
servants of the company can from part of the collective knowledge or mind of the
company. Secondly, the aggregation theory has appeal where no single individual
117within the company is in possession of all the facts or information. Only by
aggregating knowledge does the fuller picture emerge. One of the consequences of
this approach may be that the sum of the knowledge may be greater than the
118
parts. Clearly, there are dangers in such an approach and undoubtedly, the
dangers have been a contributory factor in judges such as Bingham J. not accepting
the concept of aggregation.119 Smith and Hogan oppose the doctrine of
aggregation in offences requiring intention, recklessness or knowledge whilst
120
conceding it may be applicable in negligence. Likewise, the Model Criminal
Code prepared by Criminal Law Officers Committee in Canada hinted at
• • • 121
aggregation in negligence. There are other features of aggregation which are
1,5
(1989) 88 Cr. AppR 10
116
Gobert, n. 2 at p. 405.
117
Gruner, Corporate Crime AndSentencing (1994) at pp. 36-7
118
Gobert, n. 2 at p. 405
119
See Armstrong v Strain [1952] 1 KB 232 at p. 246
190
Smith and Hogan, Criminal Law (1992) at p. 184.
121
Proposals to Amend the Criminal Code (General Principles) 1993 'if the conduct of the body
corporate when viewed as a whole (that is by aggregating the conduct of a number of servants,
employees or officers) is negligent' clause 22 however it goes on a corporation is negligent when
'one or more of it s representatives, having an express or implied authority to direct, manage or
control its activity in the area concerned, and in take execution of that authority, fail, individually
102
troublesome. A primary question is whose knowledge should be aggregated ?
Would courts adopt the Natrass approach and simply view senior executives as the
individuals whose minds could be aggregated to form the necessary mens rea. In
many respects such an approach diminishes the perceived benefit of aggregation as
a model of criminal liability. The 'brains' of the company are in a position to put
in place the necessary accounting procedures and policies whereby practices can be
brought to their attention of senior executives. If the aggregation model did not
concede the possibility of aggregating knowledge from outside the small coterie of
senior executive those self same executives could 'insulate a company from
liability by isolating themselves from their employees and the dangers ofwhich the
122 •
latter would be aware.' It seems only fair that where a company through its
senior officers puts in place appropriate systems and procedures that they should
where the occasion merits it, be able to rely upon the defence of due diligence.
Aggregation reflects 'the "atomistic" element in our common-sense conception of
organisations. It correctly 'insists on the critical dependence of organizations both
phenomenally and normatively, on the actions and interrelations of individual
human being. However, by equating organizations to a homogeneous group of
individuals, aggregation vastly understates the extent and the significance of the
123
complexity and inscrutability of that dependence.' In the prosecution resulting
from the Zeebrugge Ferry disaster one finds an illustration where the court rejected
the notion of aggregation of knowledge to the company and dismissed the
prosecution in part because the court was not convinced that senior management
ought to have known that there was a serious risk of the shipping sailing with its
bow doors open. Despite the fact that some ship masters had been concerned about
sailings with the bow doors open, there was no evidence that this had been brought
to the attention of the senior executives of P & O. The ability to defend on the
basis of an absence of mens rea essentially on the basis of 'blissful ignorance' has
been extensively criticised. Gobert for example argues, that 'the court converted a
or collectively, to the degree applicable to that offence, to exercise reasonable care to prevent an
occurrence.'(cl 22(2)(b))
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mens rea bordering on 'wilful blindness' into an affirmative defence, and rewarded
culpable ignorance in a situation where it should have been structuring the law to
encourage corporate diligence.'124
Lederman is critical of the aggregation theory on the basis that it 'might lead to the
conviction of legal bodies under far-reaching and absurd circumstances..The trend
that allows the conviction of a corporation of a corporation by piecing together the
conduct of different agents so as to form the elements of one offence is the result of
125
over-personification of corporate bodies.' Lederman is also critical of
aggregation because of the lack of concurrence in the integral components of the
crime. There must in her opinion be a causal relationship between the mens rea
and the actus reus. She argues,
'The artificial process of "piecing together" whereby the mens rea and
actus reus of an offense are attributed to the corporation cannot satisfy the
demands of the principle of concurrence. Even the proponents of
corporate criminal liability concede that the corporate entity cannot by
itself produce the elements necessary to consummate the crime. These
elements must first evolve in the minds and actions of the perpetrators and
only then, by way of legal fiction of identification or imputation, are they
attributed to the corporation. Hence, the link required by the concurrence
principle must also be supplied first by the organ or agent and only then
can it be ascribed to the corporation. However, when the knowledge vital
to formation of the link is obviously not manufactured by any human
consciousness and it cannot, therefore be claimed that the criminal mind
stimulated the forbidden act.'
Where aggregation is not possible Field and Jorg argue that 'Collective
responsibility becomes lost in the crevices between the responsibilities of
• • 126 i . .individuals.' There is also merit in the proposition that aggregation is more
extensive than vicarious liability because it does not require an offence to be
127
perpetrated by an individual. Its real merit lies in the somewhat more
collectivist approach than either vicarious liability or the identification doctrine.
Nevertheless, in common with those approaches, it suffers from the fact that it is
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but another search for the essence of corporate liability rooted in, and routed
through, the individuals within that organisation.
2.4 Corporate Fault
All of the foregoing three theories suffer from limitations; they are atomistic rather
than holistic. They rest on the premise on designation of individuals whose acts
and mental states can be attributed to the company. Corporate criminal liability is
128
in all three a derivative form of liability. All three theories suffer from the
linkage of individual liability to corporate liability through the concept of juristic
person. It is because of these limitations and from the desire to have an equitable
premise for corporate criminal liability extendible to all forms of corporate
129
criminal activity that scholars have considered a corporate fault model. The
perception is that the attribution of fault or blame in corporate crime more properly
requires to focus on collective corporate blame rather than via the blameworthiness
of individuals. If fault underlines individual liability, why should it not precede
130 •
corporate liability ? The nexus between the corporations and the individuals
within it needs to be broken or, in any event redefined. The preoccupation of
fitting individualised liability to the corporate form is fraught with difficulty.
History points to problems with all three of the foregoing 'atomistic' models of
corporate liability. These models have had limited success in providing a juristic
basis of liability for corporations criminal acts. It is dissatisfaction with all three
that has led commentators to offer a fourth basis on which criminal liability can be
attributed to the corporate form. Fisse argues that,
'[I]n the case of corporate criminal responsibility, too little attention has
been paid to the possibility of improving the efficacy and justice of its
operation. To begin with, our existing ideas upon criteria of ascription of
responsibility are fragmentary and primitive. This is true of the central
issue of primary vs. vicarious responsibility, as well as the subsidiary
problems raised by the agency relationship between a corporate accused
and the individual person or persons whose conduct or fault is the subject
of attribution, fault concepts and defences in their application to
Gobert, n. 2 at p. 407.
129
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corporations, offences in their application to corporations and the criminal
capacity of various types of organisations.'131
The theory of corporate fault is one essentially based on collective fault. The
company as a whole has liability not by the actions or intentions of individuals
within but rather through expressions of the collective will of the company. The
most obvious place for such expressions of intent to be found are in company
policies and procedures. The development of company policy invariably requires
the passage of that policy through an amalgam of individuals and sub-groups
within the organisation. Any policy so arrived at may represent either a synthesis
132
of views or a compromise of views. Where the company's mind is equated with
the policies of the company, such policies represent expressions of corporate
intention. If through their operation, a criminal act ensues, the theory says that the
company will be liable. Clearly, such a model of corporate fault can apply in a
whole range of circumstances and can be applied to both common law crimes and
statutory crimes. The obvious lacuna is where the company does not have
formalised policies at all or does not have policies pertaining to particular aspects
of its activities. The great benefit of moving towards to a corporate fault model of
corporate crime lies in the fact that it will loosen corporate criminal liability from
its 'anthropomorphic moorings.' Gobert argues that,
'[CJompanies should bear responsibility for crimes occurring in the course
of their business without the need for the Crown to attach fault to specific
persons within the company. It should be the company's responsibility to
collect information regarding potential dangers possessed by employees,
collate the data, and implement policies which will prevent reasonably
foreseeable risks from occurring. If the company is derelict in this duty
and a crime has resulted, it must share in the responsibility of the resulting
harm. "The shift of judicial attention from individual to corporate fault
would have several side benefits. It would avoid the evidentiary problem
of tracing the strands of responsibility to particular individuals, with its
inherent dangers of scapegoating...[S]hifting the onus of responsibility to
the company would also avoid the conundrum of aggregating a number of
negligent acts into a sum which is claimed to warrant a finding of
recklessness or gross negligence. If there is fault to be attributed to the
company, it is to be found in the way that the company organises or
operates its business affairs. It is often argued that a company cannot act
Fisse, n. 8 at p. 410.
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except through real persons-directors, officers and employees. This may
be so, but it need not control the law's approach to corporate
criminality.'133
The trend towards corporate blameworthiness which Wells argues is evident, is
primarily a response to the inefficiency and unsatisfactory nature of the Natrass
philosophy and vicarious liability.134 Whilst recognising a subtle drift from the
Natrass philosophy towards a newer model of corporate fault Wells offers a
cautionary note. She contends that there has been,
'a subtle transformation of traditional judicial attitudes based on the
notion of director and officer control to a modern understanding of the
power of corporations to produce economic and personal harm and the
consequent importance of seeking to control them through effective
mechanisms of criminal law. This appears to be more than an accident of
statutory construction, given the second observable trend towards a new
version of corporate blameworthiness. It would, however, be a mistake to
assume that courts address themselves to general principles or theories of
responsibility. Most corporate cases are brought under specialised
legislation and determined accordingly. Courts are reflecting the general
mood of reduced tolerance of corporate risk-taking in their decision¬
making.'135
Corporate fault is a conceptually different approach to corporate criminality. The
company is treated as a collective entity itself without reference to individual
liability. 'The company is treated as a distinct organic entity whose "mind" is
embodied in the policies it has adopted. Corporate policy is often different from
the sum of the inputs of those who helped to formulate the policy, and typically is
the product of either synthesis of views or a compromise among competing
positions. Policy may also reflect the company's corporate ethos. This ethos
which is often unwritten, may have been forged by founders of the company who
are no longer actively involved in its day to day affairs. When company policy or
corporate ethos leads to the commission of a crime, the company should be liable
in its own right and not derivatively.' The attraction of such an approach is that
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it takes one away from the actus reus/mens rea polemic. Individualism is
supplanted by what Gobert calls a more expansive view of causation. It also has
appeal in the fact that it moves away from the application of conventional criminal
liability to the corporate form.137 Gobert sees distinct advantages in this in that it
will take away the problems associated with the 'courts attempts to squeeze
corporate square pegs into the round holes of criminal law doctrines which were
138devised with individuals in mind.'
Gobert also believes that corporate criminality requires systematic review by
Parliament. His proposed model of corporate fault has underlying it a belief that 'a
company should be criminally liable where a crime is authorised, permitted or
139tolerated as a matter of company policy or de facto practice.' According to
Gobert's corporate fault model, the 'focus would be on the creation of risks likely
to lead to the occurrence of serious harm. If the harm in fact materialised, the
company's liability would be for the failure to prevent the harm rather than for the
substantive crime itself.' The company has an obligation to prevent crime under
this model. In practice this means their development of polices and their
implementation and the establishment of corporate ethos. This approach moves
away from focus ofmens rea. As Gobert argues 'Mens rea is one way, but not the
only way, of getting at the issue of blameworthiness.'140 The defence for a
company facing criminal liability under a corporate fault model would be that of
due diligence. Gobert argues that the burden of proving due diligence should fall
upon the corporation. In his scheme the overall burden of proof in corporate crime
cases should be that of balance of probabilities.141 This, at best, is controversial.
The adaptation of a civil standard of proof into criminal proceeding must be
debatable.142 In satisfying the test of due diligence Gobert suggests that the courts
should adopt a test which clearly has its origins in health and safety law with a
balance being struck between the risk created against the social utility of the
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activity weighed against the cost and practicability of eliminating the risk. Gobert
is unclear whether due diligence should be delineated by Parliament or by the
judiciary. What he is clear about is that due diligence should be evidenced not just
by senior management but rather by the organizational structure.143
Whilst recognising the importance of the relationship between individual liability
and corporate liability, what is required is a distinction of both and for autonomous
corporate culpability disassociated from culpability transmitted through corporate
officials. Those who argue strogly for corporate fault draw support from the work
of French and Dan Cohen. Their approach is that corporations are capable of
forming their own intention and mental state. It presupposes that 'companies of
sufficient organizational complexity develop over time an intentionality and
reasons for acting which exist in a realm separate from the individual intentions
and motivations of the individuals currently connected with the company.'144
Policies contain basic belief and goal statements145 and as such, intent can be fixed
to policies rules and practices.146 A problem with corporate fault is that
organisations inhere as 'much in its informal practices as in its official
decisions.'147 Moreover, one of the evident problems in deducing corporate
attitudes and culpability from policies is that 'companies may by the setting of their
institutional priorities, create a climate which discourages obedience to known
rules'148 Fisse suggests a pragmatic approach to the whole question of corporate
criminal liability arguing that,
'the adoption of a multi-aim, multi-fault approach to corporate
responsibility..essentially an approach in which relevant fault
requirements are defined in fairly precise accordance with policy aims, the
Gobert, n. 136 at p. 732.
144
Sullivan, n. 127 at p. 284. French suggests the following method of determining whether a
corporation is sufficiently organised
1- internal organisation and/or decision procedures by which courses of concerted action an be
chosen
2-enforced standards of conduct different and more stringent than those applying in the wider
community
3- members filing differing defined roles by virtue of which they exercise power over other
members
145
P. French, Collective And Corporate Responsibility, (1979) at p. 58 op cit.
146
Colvin, n. 91 at p. 33.
147
Colvin, n. 91 at p. 36
148
Field and Jorg, n. 66 at p. 166.
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emphasis being upon the functions of corporate responsibility, not
anthropomorphic attribution or rule of slipshod attachment to guiding
purposes....It is futile to expect justice to be done to such disparate aims
by the enactment of an offence to which only one species of fault is
applicable.'149
Colvin argues that mere evidence of criminogenic corporate culture should provide
a sufficient fault element for those offences that can ordinarily be committed
recklessly.150 Such a proposition requires clarification of how one will establish
criminogenic culture. If it involves a pre-trial view of past convictions it may
wreak too much of the sins of the past being visited upon the corporation. There
will require to be a clear understanding that in looking to past indiscretions we are
merely seeking evidence of practices which exhibit corporate philosophy. We
view the essence of individual criminal law as one where the accused faces trial
with a 'clean slate.' Only after a finding of guilt are past misdemeanours revealed.
To approach the corporation in an entirely different way may be far too much to
swallow. Fisse and Braithwaite claim that the notion of corporate blameworthiness
has been accepted and now the real challenge is to find a workable concept of
corporate fault.151 With their support of reactive corporate fault (see chapter 4)
they very much endorse post hoc assessment. In a British context, instinctively one
feels that assessment of corporate fault will require to be a contemporary
assessment of corporations' policies practices procedures, ethos or culture but that
corporations should be afforded the protection from revisitation of past offences as
149 •
Fisse, 'Responsibility, Prevention And Corporate Crime' 1973 5 New Zealand Law Review pp.
250-279 at p. 265.
150
Colvin, n. 91 at p. 38; A suggestion by Colvin for a model of corporate fault liability based on
recklessness is
7 Ifrecklessness is a requiredfault element ofan offense, that fault element may be established by
proof that the culture of a corporation caused or encouraged non-compliance with the relevant
provision
2. (a) Ifpurpose is a requiredfault element ofan offense, that fault element may be established by
proofthat it was the policy ofa corporation not to comply with the relevantprovision
(b) A policy may be attributed to a corporation where it provides the most reasonable explanation
ofthe conduct ofthat corporation
3. (a) Ifknowledge is a requiredfault element ofan offense, thatfault element may be established by
proofthat the relevant knowledge was possessed by a corporation
(b) Knowledge may be attributed to a corporation where it was possessed within the corporation
and the culture ofthe corporation caused or encouraged knowing non-compliance with the relevant
provision' Colvin, n. 91 at p. 41
151
Fisse and Braithwaite, Corporations, Crime AndAccountability (1993), at p. 47
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a basis of identifying corporate fault. Bucy offers a variation on French's idea
arguing that corporate fault might be founded upon the basis of corporate ethos
which she suggests might be deduced from the amount of compliance education the
company gives its employees, its attitudes to compensation and indemnification
152 • •and its practices. Systems analysis also offers interesting possibilities. In
SeaboardMarine Offshore there was a clear suggestion that the company might be
153liable for not establishing a safe operating system British courts are reasonably
well versed in dealing with offences under section 2 of the Health and Safety at
Work Act 1974 where employers can be found guilty of not operating a safe
system.
According to Clarkson, there are two main theories of responsibility- the capacity
theory and the character theory. Capacity theory adopts a simplistic formula that
dictates that someone is responsible if they are capable of reason and capable of
exercising control over their actions and choosing whether to comply with the law.
In the realms of corporate capacity such an approach has intellectual appeal
primarily because it introduces corporate criminal liability for negligence. As
Clarkson explains,
'in making choices we expect actors to take reasonable steps to avoid
causing harm or exposing others to risk. The character theory dictates that
we hold persons liable for those actions which express their character.
Intentionality, recklessness and negligence display character traits of
indifference or malevolence.'
Even to the uninitiated it is obvious that both theories might be applicable to
corporate organisations irrespective of the culpability of the human actors who
operate within the structure of the organisation. Clarkson's view is that companies
should be subject to the same normal principles of criminal liability.154 Whilst the
issue of causation should not prove problematic for corporate crime, the real
problem may well be in the location of the guilty mind or the requisite mens rea.
152 i
Bucy Corporate Ethos: A Standard For Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability' 75 Minn L R
1095 (1991); see also Sigler and Murphy, Interactive Corporate Compliance; An Alternative To
Regulatory Compulsion (1988)
153
See Wells, 'Corporate Manslaughter: A Cultural And Legal Form'
http://camlaw.rutgers.edu/crimlawforum/wells.html. at p. 13.
154
Clarkson., n. 101 at p. 570.
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Policies and ethos may be significant in this regard. As far as crimes requiring
mens rea Clarkson adopts the views of others that corporate policies and
procedures would evidence the criminal mind. The Council of Europe has
proposed that when the actions of a company or its employees lead to a prohibited
harm, the company would prima facie be liable and it would be incumbent on the
company to dislodge an evidential burden to prove otherwise and that it operated a
safe system. Ashworth alluding to the enormous power and privilege of the
corporate form argues that there is no injustice in requiring corporations to adopt
what is a higher standard or burden of criminal liability especially if they are given
advance warning of implementation.
According to Wells, Seaboard and Tesco v London Borough of Brent supra
demonstrate a realism in the courts155 that society appears to need the concept of
organisational blame.156 Wells suggests that some of the recent cases display
judicial perception as to the irrelevance of the identification theory to corporate risk
157
taking. She argues that,
'legal ideas in this sphere have matured from reliance on the agency
identification dyad (represented by the vicarious and direct routes to
liability) to the faint tremors of an emerging recognition that company
policies and systems might form the basis for the ascription of criminal
responsibility.'158
Colvin similarly adopts the view that criminal law should be made to focus directly
on the issue of organisational culpability 'if the shackles of derivative liability were
removed, corporations would face substantial exposure to liability for their
ommissions..it might be appropriate to increase this exposure through the
imposition of a general duty upon corporations to guard against their operations
causing harm and their structures and resources being used to cause harm.159
Interestingly, the new proposal for an offence of corporate killing (see chap 5)
seeks to develop the concept of organisational blameworthiness. Whilst this is a
Wells, n. 153 at p. 13.
156
L. Dunford and A. Ridley, 'Corporate Manslaughter- Time For Reform' 1996 Paper at p. 5.
157
Wells, n. 153 at p. 5.
158
Wells, n. 153 at p. 6.
159
Colvin, n. 91 at p. 25.
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welcome development, it still requires definition and elucidation. One danger may
be the desire to equate this simply with managerial failings. In the process we may
simply be reinventing the Natrass philosophy by the back door. The organisation
as a collectivity is more than its mangers. Corporate fault must look to collective
failing rather than the failings on one section of the organisation.
2.5 Conclusion
It does appear that 'There is clearly dissatisfaction with the traditional derivative
models of corporate liability and interest in exploring alternatives. As yet, the
direction forward remains unsettled.'160 Clarkson in common with other writers
suggests that a new approach might be better than working through the various
current models of attribution. The normal route of criminal attribution through
moral fault is fraught with difficulty but surmountable for all that. The concepts of
power and acceptance form the basis of a model of liability in the United Kingdom.
Power and acceptance carry with them hierarchical connotations. As we have seen
in several recent English cases reference to the hierarchy provides nonsensical
results. An approach based on responsibility is more concerned with prescribing
courses of action or modes of behaviour rather than locating blame.161 For that
reason, whilst it may form part of the strategy to combat corporate crime, it offers
no solution to activating certain common law criminal offences which represent
necessary controls on the corporate form. For all the criticisms of vicarious
liability and the identification doctrine they have endured because we have not as
yet formulated an intellectually satisfying basis on which to attach liability.
Corporate fault seemingly represents the solution but it too requires some
refinement. Foerschler summarises the nature of the dilemma by saying 'the
atomistic view, while recognizing that a corporation is an aggregate of individuals,
underestimates the added "complexity and inscrutability" of the corporate structure
itself. At the same time, a strict holistic approach exaggerates the unity of the
i ^2 m
corporation.' Identification warts and all continues to hold primacy in the
United Kingdom courts but our attachment to identification as a doctrine should
160
Colvin, n. 91 at p. 3.
161
Surber, n. 1 at p. 81.
162
Foerschler, n. 4 at p. 1299.
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not be complete. The recent attempts to develop a more holistic approach to
liability reflecting corporate culpability are to be welcomed as a more satisfactory
basis on which to ascribe liability. Eser has claimed that 'it is ..a permanent
obligation of criminal jurisprudence to refine the principles of criminal liability.'163
In reconstructing corporate criminal liability the task is slightly more challenging
and that is to devise an altogether more satisfactory basis for the ascription of
liability to the corporation.
163
Eser, 'The Principle Of Harm In The Concept Of Crime: A Comparative Analysis Of The
Criminally Protected 1965-6 Legal Interests 4 Duquesne L Rev 345 at p. 365; quoted in Seney, 'A
Pond As Deep As Hell- Harm, Danger And Dangerousness In Our Criminal Law' 1971 17 Wayne
L. R. at p. 1117.
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CHAPTER 3
CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITYAND THEDICHOTOMYOF
INDIVIDUALISM OR CORPORATISM
3.0 Introduction
Despite the undoubted contribution of entrepreneurs in the creation of wealth1, it is
also true as CS Lewis once observed that crimes are often 'conceived and ordered
(moved, seconded, carried and minuted) in clean, carpeted, warmed and well-
lighted offices, by quiet men with white collars and cut fingernails, and smooth
shaven cheeks who do not need to raise their voices.' The recognition of human
agency in the commission of corporate crime exacerbates one of the major
dilemmas of corporate criminal liability. Is the crime committed that of the
individuals or is it the crime of the corporation in whose name, or under whose
auspices they act ? The dichotomy of individualism and enterprise liability is a
classical polemic of corporate crime and one which has been resolved in different
ways in different jurisdictions around the world. In the Anglo-American systems
corporate guilt does not eliminate the personal guilt of the natural person to whom
the offense may be attributed whereas in the European civil law systems the
individual is primarily responsible. Britain universally adopts a common law
position albeit that the jurisprudence in Scotland does little more than concede the
existence of corporate criminal liability for common law crimes as well as statutory
crimes.4 Geis and Dimento have suggested in prosaic terminology that,
'Only dim echoes linger today in the jurisprudence of the United States,
England and Canada of the once intense debate about whether it is proper-
ethically, juridically, and in terms of effectiveness- to punish a corporation
criminally rather than, or in addition to, punishing individuals within it.'5
Despite this claim, the issue continues to be debated with some vibrancy. Many of
those who adopt a collectivist perspective do so on the basis that it is the
1
R. A. Gordon, Business Leadership In The Large Corporation, (1945) at p. 3.
2
Quoted in G. Slapper,' Where The Buck Stops' 1992 142 New L.J. 1037-38 at p. 1038.
3
L. H. Leigh, ' The Criminal Liability Of Corporations And Other Groups: A Comparative View'
1982 80 Michigan L. R. 1508-29 at p.1518; Muir, 'Tesco Supermarkets, Corporate Liability And
Fault' 1973 5 New Zealand Universities L. R. 357-72 at p. 359; Stessons, 'Corporate Criminal
Liability: A Comparative Perspective' 1994 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 493-520
4
See Leigh n. 3 at p. 1524; see Chapter 6 of this thesis
5
F. Pearce and L. Snider, Corporate Crime: Contemporary Debates,(1995), at p. 72.
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organisation which creates the circumstances which result in corporate crime. Not
only is the crime perpetrated by the collective entity but, even the circumstances
which result in the individual human agent bringing about the corporate crime are
wrought by the influence that the corporation has over his or her activities.
Moreover, crime may be committed for organisational reasons or gain irrespective
ofwhether individuals within the organisation benefit.
Many commentators believe that most businesses fall foul of the law for economic
reasons.6 Certainly, manager perception is that violation was more likely to occur
7 . ...
in such situations. The success of the organisational goal attainment imperative
predicts that an organisation will engage in criminal activity to attain those goals.
As such we should have little surprise at the level of corporate crime in society.
However, criminal violation cannot be solely attributed to economic pressure.9
Corporate loyalty, obedience and the desire for advancement are all cited as
reasons for unethical and illegal behaviour by individuals within the corporation.10
Notwithstanding that there may often be individual gain, Harris claims that, 'the
question is one of institutional structure, not individual morals tactics.'11 The
significance of the corporate influence and the adoption of corporate goals is also
emphasised by other writers. For example, it is claimed that,
'The immensity, the diffusion of responsibility, and the hierarchical
structure of large corporations all foster conditions conducive to
organizational deviance. In addition, the nature of corporate goals may
promote unethical and illegal behaviour. Using this orientation,
organizational theory can provide valuable insights into how the unique
6
Lane in Geis and Meir (Eds.), White Collar Crime, (1977), at p. 103; cf. Clinard, Corporate Ethics
And Crime- The Role OfMiddle-Management (1983) at p. 144 whose study found no such support
for this argument; Wilson and Braithwaite, Two Faces OfDeviance: Crimes Of The Powerless And
The Powerful (1978,) at p. 207.
7
Clinard, n. 6 at p. 145.
8
Wilson and Braithwaite, n. 6 at p. 200.
9
Clinard and Yeager, Corporate Crime (1980) at p. 299. Ambiguity and complexity of law are also
advanced as reasons why businessmen violate the law. However, Lane disputes this saying,
'although ambiguous provisions of the law and factually contested situations often lead to
'violation'..ignorance of the law and incapacity to respond seem, in most cases, to be relatively
unimportant causes of violation.' Lane, n. 6 at p. 108
10
Clinard and Yeager, n. 9 at p. 275.
'1
R. Nader and M. Green (Eds.), Corporate Power In America, (1973), at p. 35.
116
nature of corporations as large-scale organisations relates to the unethical
12and illegal behaviour that does occur.'
Lane suggests, that in the larger corporations there may be a tendency toward
impersonalisation through frequent group consultation and socialisation.13
Moreover, Kemper claims, in his concept of parallel deviance, that the aetiology of
individual corporate deviance is to be found in the justification which employees
derive from the greater and more extensive deviance perpetrated by their
superiors.14 Inevitably, managers caught in the dilemma of societal good and
corporate good must decide to whom they owe the greater duty.15 So we confront
a major problem- should we punish those who gain from the wrongdoing or the
actual agents of that wrongdoing ? Do we pursue the corporation because its ethos,
goals and criminogenic pressures compelled the human actor to commit the crime
on its behalf or for its benefit ? Whatever the motivation, or rationale, for the
criminal activity, it is trite to assert that 'society has a right to demand a certain
standard of performance and a level of accountability from corporate executives
and to require that executives be held responsible for the actions of their
subordinates and the corporations they manage.'16
Whilst there is strong support for enterprise liability among common law jurists,
there is also voluminous jurisprudential literature supporting philosophical
individualism. The essence of that individualism is that,
'Society is composed of individuals. It has no reality independent of its
members. What appear to be the accomplishments of the whole are in fact
the sum of works of individuals. Groups exist; but they reflect a
convergence of separate interests. And the group is not a source of value
in its own right. For the good is relative to the wants of distinct persons.
12
Clinard, n. 6 at p. 17; see also D. Vaughan, Controlling Unlawful Organisational Behaviour:
Social Structure And Corporate Misconduct, (1983) at p. 55.
13
Lane in Geis and Meir (Eds.), n. 6 at p. 111.
14
Kemper 'Representative Roles And The Legitimisation OfDeviance' 1966 13 Soc. Problems 288-
298.
15
Koprowicz, 'Corporate Criminal Liability For Workplace Hazards: A Viable Option For
Enforcing Workplace Safety' 1986 52 Brooklyn L. R. 183-227 at p. 184; M. Clinard and P. Yeager,
n. 9 at p. 273
16
S. Sethi, 'Liability Without Fault: The Corporate Executive As An Unwitting Criminal' 1978 4
Employee Relations L. R. 185 at p. 212.
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The immediate measure of conduct lies within the individual rather than
in the group to which it belongs.'17
Fisse and Braithwaite contend that,
'Four prime assumptions underlie Individualism, old and new. The first is
a philosophical position, namely methodological individualism.
Methodological individualism holds that only individuals act, that only
individuals are responsible, and that corporate action or corporate
responsibility is no more than the sum of its individual parts. Secondly,
individualism supposes that the theory of deterrent punishment implies
the need for, or the sufficiency of, individual liability. Thirdly, it is
assumed that retribution postulates the punishment of individual persons
but not corporate entities. Fourth the supposition is that individuals are
best safeguarded against injustice by focusing on individual criminal
responsibility and the substantive or procedural constraints that govern the
imposition of criminal responsibility.'18
Underlying support for individualism is the belief that the 'accumulation of
corporate wrongs is..a manifestation of individual sin.'19 Such support is based on
criminological assertion that only individuals can be moral agents and, on tacit
support for the notion that a corporation will be looked upon as a legal entity until
it is used as a device to defeat public convenience or commit crime in which case it
20should be regarded as an association of persons. Individualism accordingly
21
dictates that morality is by definition a peculiarly personal experience.
According to Fisse, the real strategy of individualism is to abolish corporate
• • • 22
criminality and rely entirely on individual liability. Bush draws out the
antagonism that individualists have towards corporatists explaining that
corporatism entails,
17
Murphy, Liberalism, And Political Society 26 American Journal of Jurisprudence 125 at p. 153
(1981) quoted in Bush, 'Between Two Worlds: The Shift From Individual To Group Responsibility
In The Law OfCausation' 1986 33 University of California Law Review 1473 -1569 at p. 1521;
see also HD Lewis in May and Hoffman (Eds.), Collective Responsibility at p. 17
18
Fisse and Braithwaite, Corporations, Crime And Accountability (1993) at p 18; Fisse 'The
Allocation OfResponsibility For Corporate Crime: Individualism, Collectivism and Accountability'
1988 Vol. 11 Sydney Law Review 468-513 at p. 475.
19
Judge Miles W Lord in Hills, Corporate Violence: Injury And Death For Profit (1987) at p. 41.
20
Judge Sanborn in US v Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co. 142 F 247, at 255 quoted in Oleck,
'Remedies For Abuses OfCorporate Status' 1973 9 Wake Forest L. R. 463-502 at p. 484.
21
Rosen in Pennock and Chapman, Criminal Justice, (1985) at pp. 69-70.
22
Fisse n. 18 at p. 473.; Bush, n. 17 at p. 1527
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'Ignoring the unique identity and value of the individual..[submerging] the
individual in a group or class of 'similar' parties and penalises or
23
compensates him not as an individual but as a member of a class.'
Bush seeks to develop the communitarian theory which views the self as joined and
attached to others and, views the community as constitutive of an expanded self,24
as a middle ground which she believes 'shows that the dichotomy world of
liberalism and social welfarism, with its Hobson's choice between arid
individualism and oppressive collectivism does not exhaust the field of
possibilities.'25 The antagonism that individualists have to collective liability does
not appear to be reciprocated by collectivists towards individual liability. Fisse a
staunch supporter of enterprise liability contends that,
'Individual accountability has long been regarded as indispensable to
social control, at least in Western societies but today is more the exception
than the rule in the context of offences committed on behalf of larger scale
organisations. Given the gravity with which corporate crime is
increasingly perceived, this is a remarkable state of affairs and one which
awaits responsive solutions.'26
Fisse and Braithwaite do, however, argue that the simplicity of a reductionist
perspective is fallacious. Corporations are not just the sum of the individuals
which comprise it. Nor are individuals just part of the whole. Corporations as
27entities often appear more systemic than organic. McAdams and Tower see the
move from individualism to collectivism as one premised on the belief that,
'The just allocation of fault is an essential ingredient in building a
credible, healthy society. The growth of giant corporations with their
multiple layers of bureaucratic responsibility has significantly
complicated the critical process of fixing blame. The faceless quality of
contemporary bureaucracies has had an important, though largely
28
unexplored, impact on law enforcement.'
23
Bush, n. 17 at p. 1524-5.
24
Bush, n. 17 at p. 1536.
25
Bush, n. 17 at p. 1563.
26
Fisse, n. 18 at p. 473.
27
Fisse and Braithwaite, n. 18 at pp. 19-22
28
Quoted in Fisse and Braithwaite, 'Accountability And The Control Of Corporate Crime:Making
The Buck Stop', in M. Findlay and Hogg (Eds.), Understanding Crime And Criminal Justice,
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Individualism and collectivism often appear contradictory and irreconcilable
philosophies. Despite this most of the Anglo-American jurisdictions have sought
to strike a balance between the two strands of theory incorporating both collective
guilt and individual guilt into their systems. They have justified this approach on
the basis of plurality and efficacy. Surveying the literature in those jurisdictions
reveals that the confrontation between these two underpinning philosophies still
resonates. With the establishment of corporate criminal liability in the Anglo-
American jurisdictions one might presuppose that the debate was sterile and that
any dispute had been resolved in favour of enterprise liability. Yet all the signs are
that individualism may be re-emerging.
3.1 Individualism
In relatively recent times, there has been an intensification for the call to return to
29the early notion of purely individualistic liability. Donaldson, for example,
argues for restoration of individual accountability, enhancement of professional
• • • 30
accountability and improvement of bureaucratic decision making. McAdams and
Tower likewise endorse the 'zest for penetrating the bureaucratic fog to impose
31
personal accountability.' There is evidence that support for an individualistic
drive is not confined to academics. In all common law jurisdictions, there are
many new offences applicable to individual corporate wrongdoers. This trend is
but one aspect of the demand for greater accountability which has been explained
in the following terms,
'At the heart of the movement towards holding managers personally
responsible for corporate law violations lies the struggle of individuals
and societies to come to grips with the reality of the corporation and to
subject it to effective societal controls. It reflects the failure of more
traditional means of correcting corporate abuses, both conventional and
unconventional. '32
29
Fisse, n. 18 at p. 474; Glasbeek in Pearce and Snider (Eds.), n. 5; J. L. J. Edwards, Mens Rea In
Statutory Offenses, (1955) at p. 243
30
Donaldson, Corporations AndMorality (1982) at pp. 109-28.
31
T. McAdams and C. B. Tower, 'Personal Accountability In The Corporate Sector' 1978 16
American Business L. J. 67-82 at p. 67; Sethi, n. 16 at p. 186
32
Sethi, n. 16 at p. 199.
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The individualist drive is premised on the erroneous conception that only
33individuals can be deterred. Fisse and Braithwaite suggest that from their study
that there has been an absence of prosecution of individuals but that this should not
obscure the fact that amongst government agencies there has been a policy to
proceed against individuals.34 Director's liability clauses prevalent in many British
statutes represents a determined attempt to target individuals rather than the
corporation. Prosecution of the corporation alone is usually a direct result of the
35
difficulties in identifying the individual perpetrator. Where the individuals can
be readily identified, there is a supposition that prosecutors will elect to pursue
those persons. The problem of identification is often proportional to the size and
36
complexity of the corporation itself. Any unwillingness to redouble efforts to
'ferret out' individual perpetrators is often viewed as a serious shortcoming in most
37
legal systems. However, some believe it disingenuous to impose corporate
liability on the basis of difficulty in attaching individual liability and that there may
be another more appropriate route. Fisse and French suggest that 'If it is
unworkable to make corporate criminal liability contingent on the impossibility,
impracticability, or injustice of recourse to individual criminal liability, why not
reform individual criminal liability so as substantially to lower the hurdles which
38
now hinder enforcement against corporate officers and executives?' Such an
approach doubtless takes pragmatism too far. Meuller also rejects the argument
that corporate liability should be imposed where individual liability is difficult to
prove. His view is that,
'It is a poor legal system indeed which is unable to differentiate between
the law breaker and the innocent victim of circumstances so that it must
punish both alike. Where profit to the corporation as the result of the
unauthorised act of an operative is concerned, principles of equity can
easily be applied to provide for restitution of the ill-gotten gain to the
33
Fisse and Braithwaite, n. 18 at p 31
34
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parties actually entitled thereto, or for forfeiture in lieu thereof. But when
we talk about the imposition of punishment, then rather than punish the
corporation in such cases, why not punish the operative for his own
39
independent act.'
Individual liability is ultimately important in respect for the incentive that it
provides to individual corporate agents not to commit violations40 There are
several reasons why individual liability of officers may have advantages over
corporate criminal liability. According to Finch,
'The principal limitations to enterprise liability are: asset insufficiency-
when firms lack the assets that would be required to make good the
damage caused by wrongdoing; sanction insufficiency- when the legal
system cannot impose, or judges are unwilling to impose, costs on the
firm that are sufficiently high to deter wrongdoing...; and enforcement
insufficiency- which occurs when a legal system is unable to detect or
prosecute a significant proportion of offences..Personal liability may
provide high levels of deterrence and may overcome some of the
problems that are encountered in prosecuting corporations. Potential
personal liability may, moreover, encourage directors to provide
information to those investigating company failings In the hope of
offsetting their own liability.'4
Another clear rationale for punishing the individual corporate agent of course is
that they may engage in the corporate wrongdoing because they perceive it to be in
their own interest rather than that of the corporation. Finch also claims that
'without the stimulus of personal liability, directors will not act independently from
management and will not act as detached scrutineers of their colleagues.'42 What is
required is the creation of what Sethi calls a 'climate ofmoral revulsion.'43 Finch
argues that prosecution of personal liability is cheaper and has the added advantage
of providing a lever for information on other corporate wrongdoing.44 Personal
liability of corporate agents may also be beneficial where the company is
insolvent.45 Levitske however, notes the problem of transience of workers in
39
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tackling corporate crime on an individualistic basis.46 Finch also recognises certain
pitfalls of personal liability claiming that,
'Laws based on individual liability may, however, be difficult to enforce
because of organisational secrecy, numbers of suspects and evidential
problems associated with attempts to isolate culprits and prove cases. In
many instances of corporate misconduct, collective action will constitute
the root problem and it may be right to seek retribution against the
enterprise itself.'47
Ashworth supports the notion that 'in appropriate cases' individuals within the
corporation should bear responsibility and consequent liability for criminal
48 • •
wrongdoing. Indeed, for some commentators the very fact that one is a director is
sufficient to attract liability where wrongdoing occurs. Business leadership is the
function of organising and directing business enterprises, and of making the
decisions which determine the course of the firms activities 49 In so far as business
leadership means decision making then it encompasses initiation and approval and
one of the key factors which distinguishes the executive from the operative is the
ability to determine objectives for the corporation as a whole.50 Accordingly, there
are those who believe that 'The directors of a company ought to be individually
accountable for every case of misconduct of which the company receives the
benefit, for the very preventable deficiency or cause that regularly goes on in the
course of business.'51 Taking this idea up, Spiegelhoff suggests the imposition of
two standards of liability for directors; one based on negligent supervision and the
other on reckless supervision.52 In respect of the negligent supervision, an accused
director would be criminally liable whenever he knew or should have known of a
substantial risk that an illegal act was occurring or would occur within his realm of
authority. In respect of reckless liability, a defendant would incur liability if he
46
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'knew of facts creating a substantial likelihood of illegal conduct and did not
enquire further, or if a corporate manager knew of a hazardous condition and
failed to take remedial action.' If the intent requirements of "true" crimes are
loosened to accommodate the societal desire to punish responsible corporate
officers, the moral stigma attached to such crimes may also be relaxed.53
Spiegelhoff is nonetheless critical of the achievement of individual liability. He
argues that it 'has not generally been an effective means of deterring illegal
corporate conduct.' In support of his thesis, he cites a lack of public moral
indignation towards profit motivated conduct in a capitalist society, and the
imposition of light penalties on individual offenders.54 These failings are all the
more acute because the real 'need today is to stop individuals who run corporations
from inflicting harm.'55 It is not only those who run corporations who are in the
individualist's sights. Hamilton, for example, argues that every individual
regardless of their place in the corporate structure should be prosecuted where his
or her conduct is immoral or wrongful.56
The problem of identification of the individual wrongdoer has been highlighted
previously. An obvious way round identifying appropriate individuals would be
for companies to prepare and file organisational accountability plans. There are
however logistical difficulties with this approach which will ensure, that as an idea,
• • • S7
it is resisted by corporations. As an alternative, Weinfeld suggests the following
general formulation for individual responsibility which might assist the process of
identification 'A person responsible for supervising particular activities on behalf
of an organisation who, in failing to supervise adequately those activities,
knowingly permits or contributes to the creation of a substantial and unjustifiable
risk of serious physical injury or death to another and such injury or death occurs is
guilty [of a class E felony.] It is an affirmative defence to this section that the
person took steps to prevent the continuing existence of the risk before death or
53
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injury was imminent.' In Weinfeld's view 'Directing criminal liability toward
the individual who helped to create or allowed the creation of a risk, rather than
toward an individual who merely was aware that the risk existed and disregarded it,
more effectively identifies the level of corporate supervisor that should be held
accountable.'59 Weinfeld's formulation posits that one should not direct liability at
a particular structural level simply because of its position but at the appropriate
level that is able to prevent the death or injury.60
One of the principal reasons advanced for individual prosecution is one based on
deterrence. There is a belief shared by many commentators that individuals are
more responsive to prosecution and therefore more likely to be deterred by the
attachment of criminal liability. Moreover, there is a suggestion that business
executives are different from conventional offenders and that they are more likely
to be deterred by criminal prosecution.61 It has been suggested that the fear of
62
indictment in the absence of prosecution may deter individuals. Corporate
executives do appear extremely sensitive to imprisonment and status deprivation.63
Exposure to individual prosecution clearly has an impact on others.64 However,
according to Cullen, 'Most commentators have missed this point. Although they
realize that an individual prosecution can inflict a range of disabilities on an
executive and scare other straight, they have assumed implicitly that sanctions
directed at corporate entities leave executives personally unaffected.'65 Moreover,
corporate criminal liability acts as an incentive to senior managers to influence the
conduct of subordinates.66 Individual liability puts corporate actors on guard
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against doing an individually culpable act, but it gives no incentives for the
67
prevention of collective wrongs. As Sethi explains 'The assumption here is that
imposing penalties on managers will divert the same ingenuity and resourcefulness
that has previously been employed to further corporate growth and subvert legal
68
requirements toward directions considered socially more desirable.' There is,
accordingly, a view that if you take care of the individuals, corporations will take
care of themselves.69 This view represents a limited strategy; the real need is
ultimately to take care of both.
According to McAdams and Tower the criminal law is a focal point in the
70
movement for enhanced personal accountability but that may be problematic in
that
'Highly capable individuals may be discouraged from assuming
managerial roles. In the short term, the capital needs of corporations may
become more difficult to satisfy as the risks of doing business expand.
And in the long term, the private enterprise system may require alteration
as its social and economic effectiveness is severely tested. From the
businessman's point of view the personal accountability trend may appear
to be inimical to corporate interests, but we believe that the long term self
interest of the business community calls for support of the movement
toward increased liability...The robust success of the business community
is dependent upon building substantial congruence between executive
behaviour and the values and aspirations of the larger society. Active
pursuit of enhanced personal accountability would constitute an important
ingredient in restoring public approval of the business sector.'71
72 73Coleman and Geis, have both argued that pursuing individual corporate officers
is better than pursuing the entity.74 Remedial procedures and punishment of
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individuals it is argued are sufficient to control corporate crime.75 Caroline
• • 76
meanwhile adopts a fundamentalist position that criminal law is personal.
Lederman also contends that expanding criminal liability to corporations can only
be justified on the basis that it encourages increased obedience to the law but even
77she gravitates towards the fundamentalism of individual liability. She also takes
the view that assessment of whether corporate criminal liability has a
corresponding impact on individual liability can only be assessed theoretically
because of the lack of empirical data. The human actors within the corporation and
comprising it (shareholders) absorb the sanction. Accordingly, the impact of
retribution is minimised because the retribution is not directed against the actual
78 •offender. Lederman similarly rejects deterrence as basis for the imposition of
corporate criminal liability on the basis that 'Deterrence ..becomes discredited
because often the corporate liability does not supplement the liability of the
perpetrators but rather replaces it.'79 According to Lederman, 'Some jurists have
defended imposing liability on the corporation alone on grounds of justice,
convenience and economic considerations exclusively, and see no flaw in such
• 80 •
reasoning even when the identity of the perpetrator is known.' Lederman views
concentration on corporate criminal liability in the face of difficulties of individual
liability as 'capitulation.'81 Lederman's rationale is simple- 'the penal system is
designed to protect the public order by directing its commands to individuals and
threatening them with punishment in case of violation. It should strive to achieve
its goal in a similar manner where human activity within the framework of the
75
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82
corporate bodies is concerned.' Such a view represents a policy view devoid of
pragmatism and is based on the notion that corporation is merely a tool for the
advancement of the criminal act. However, Lederman proposes that such liability
should attach to particular functionaries within the corporate hierarchy who, to
avoid liability, will be required to establish that they were not involved in the
83 •
commission of the offence or, in respect of omissions that they took all necessary
precautions. Clearly, such an approach countenances increased managerial and
supervisory involvement of officers of a corporation. This will involve attempting
to prevent criminal acts of subordinates. The power to control and supervise, must
84
inevitably also entail duties. Lederman's model envisages a duty to prevent
transgressions but not a proactive reporting role. Those directors or managers who
fail to fulfil their duty will be embroiled in criminal liability by way of complicity.
She argues,
'The duty of the senior officers to act derives from their relationship with
their subordinates as well as from obligations imposed by public interest.
Therefore, in terms of the actus reus, any director, manager or other
supervisor who is aware of the employee's criminal design and is able to
take preventive measures but does nothing contributes to the performance
of the offense. With respect to the mens rea, such a conscious failure to
take preventive measures is an omission which reflects that person's intent
• 85
to aid in the commission of the offense.'
The concept of reductionism whereby the corporation is reduced to its constituent
parts is overly simplistic. Individuals influence others; they might influence the
corporate entity as a whole. Reductionism fails according to Fisse because, 'the
86whole is always more than the sum of the individual parts.' The interaction of
the collective and the individual raises a real dilemma which pressurise an
unnecessary choice whereas the correct
'task is to explore how wholes are created out of purposive individual
action, and how individual action is constituted and constrained by the
87structural realities of the wholes'
82
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Even some zealous individualists concede that there may be circumstances in
which corporate liability is appropriate. On the basis of reciprocity, it seems
incumbent for corporatists to concede that there are often situations where
punishing the individual is highly appropriate. Indeed one could go further and
support individualism as an integral element of any system of corporate criminal
liability. Selection of the best elements of individualism and rejection of its
attempts at supremacy over corporate liability remain central to my own model
outlined in chapter 6.
3.2 Some Problems Of An Individualistic Strategy
One of the most obvious problems of pursuing an individualistic strategy concerns
the identification of the individual within the organisation who will become the
law's target. Organisational structure often masks the guilty individual. Sethi, for
example, suggests that there is an impossible burden on society to isolate
• • • 88individual offender within the corporate form. There is confusion among many
of the commentators as to the true seat of the individual instigators of corporate
criminal action. Leigh concluded that the commission of crime is not resolved upon
in the boardroom89 and that most reported cases relate to middle management.90
Clinard on the other hand has described managers as the 'oppressed middle.'91
There is genuine concern that sanctions might fall capriciously on innocent
92
parties. It has been suggested that one way to enhance the clarity of the
responsible official is to specify the level of manager liable and as such the
• Q-l
managerial level of liability. Ironically though, even where the specific
wrongdoer is identified, a policy of individualism further confronts the problem
88
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that individuals located within the organisation may be beyond the jurisdiction of
the courts.94
It is the very mechanics of the operation of the complex organisational structures
and the human behaviour within them which create most problems. Often the first
impression is that there has been some individual failing but on examination it
becomes apparent that there has been a collective failing on the part of the
organisation.95 The pursuit of individual perpetrators within the corporate
organisation while potentially fruitful should not obscure the fact that,
'While organisations cannot act independently of the people that
constitute them, it does not follow that determination of the culpability of
individuals should be the primary focus of sociological investigations.
Pre-occupation with individuals can lead us to underestimate the pressures
within society and organizational structures which impel those individuals
to commit illegal acts.'96
Even in situation where individuals are the protagonists, identification may prove
particularly difficult because the perpetrator has utilised his or her position within
the company to insulate him or her from liability. Coffee offers the image of the
'shut-eyed sentry' who deliberately averts his glance to avoid witnessing
97misconduct. McVisk argues that corporate executives should not be allowed to
hide behind 'a veil of claimed ignorance' but equally that they should not be
98
subjected to unrealistic expectations.' Ignorance and insulation could
conceivably be cured by rotation.99
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Whilst it is obvious that individuals within the organisation hope to evade
apprehension,100 the mechanisms by which they hope to evade prosecution are not
so obvious. According to Katz, strategic ignorance insulates the individual from
the group's culpability. What makes strategic ignorance of 'particular interest to
sociologists is that it is not an individual achievement. Both superordinates and
subordinates and insiders and outsiders have common interests in limiting the
knowledge each obtains about the other.'101 Also, there is evidence that were the
relationship between the directors and management replaced by an adversarial
102
atmosphere then that would increase secrecy rather than reduce it. Ermann and
Lundman see the failure as emanating from the top of the organisation. They argue
'Once corporate crime is set in motion by top-level executives, the nature of social
roles in large organisations limits the information and responsibilities of other
103
participants.' No one has complete information and none have complete
responsibility,104 but despite this the sum may amount to criminality.105 Collective
forms of deviance, it would seem derive significantly from routine expectations of
ignorance. Subordinates are expected to carry out their orders without
understanding the implications.106 They defer to supposedly superior expert
opinion and as a consequence fail to resist certain orders irrespective of how
107
visibly damaging they are. Naturally it is appropriate,
'to know what a person's power was with respect to some event for which
he is being held to account' 'Persons who can be shown to have been
impotent with respect to an outcome caused by a group ofwhich they just
happen to be members are usually excused from bearing responsibility for
the outcome, though they may bear the blemish of guilt by
association...Questions of whether a member of a group knew he had
some power to bring about a different outcome or whether he should have
known that he did, must be settled before ascription of legal and moral
108
responsibility are justly laid upon him.'
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Clinard and Yeager suggest that some corporate executives by virtue of their power
constitute 'a small government unto themselves.'109 Despite this it must also be
recognised that 'The power that attaches to the executive or managerial office, by
and large, is not purely derivative, if at all, of an agency transfer from the aggregate
stockholders or aggregate board of directors or from any other collectivity.'110
Brickey recognises that many corporate operatives who regularly exercise decision
making authority hold no title or office, high ranking officers may exercise little or
no involvement whilst junior ranking officers may exercise considerable authority
and a wide range of functions.111 She goes on to record the absurdity of
expectation that all corporate misdeeds will be recorded in resolutions of the Board
of Directors.112 Schaff like others argues that 'evidence of his [the actor] indirect
participation in the criminal activity is often hidden beneath multiple layers of
113
corporate decision making. A manager can directly or indirectly participate in
the commission of a crime. Direct participation in the commission would be
evidenced by authorisation or consent whereas, indirect participation would be
evidenced by knowledge and acquiescence.114 Need there be a link between the
concepts of power and responsibility? In US v Park the court argued that 'the
defendant had, by reason of his position in the corporation, responsibility and
authority either to prevent in the first instance, or promptly to correct, the violation
complained of, and that he failed to do so.' Whereas in United States v Laffal the
court supported the notion that the directing heads of the corporation may be held
criminally liable for the acts of subordinates done in the normal course of business,
regardless of whether or not those directing heads personally supervised the
particular acts done or were personally present at the time and place of commission
of these acts. In US v Andreadis"5 the court was prepared to hold a manager guilty
of an intent crime where he had failed to exercise a duty to supervise. The question
109
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is one of disentangling delegated authority, managerial discretion and ultimate
responsibility.116 However, it is important, in the view of the writer, to accept that
'if the crime is truly a corporate one, it will also be an affront to justice to punish
any individual employee or manager or director when such persons usually can
demonstrate that they did not have the relevant intention nor the required capacities
117
to constitute the mens rea required by the law for successful prosecution.'
Assuming that certain individuals are to be pursued, the obvious individuals to be
prosecuted are company directors who retain both a pivotal role in the control and
direction of the corporation. Given our pre-occupation with hierarchical
118
connotations, (evident in our attachment to the identification doctrine) it is
inevitable that we should look to those who have power to also have responsibility.
Punishing Company Directors
As I have noted, directors are increasingly being looked to when things go wrong
in corporate affairs.119 A feature of the enhanced burden of responsibility is that
120
statutes have increased the scope for criminal liability of directors and officers.
There are those who are strongly supportive of such an approach and indeed wish
to go further. Davids, for example, suggests that a specific legal duty of
supervision may be imposed upon top management so that they would be liable for
not informing themselves of subordinates' activities where these prove to be
121unlawful. Finch poses the question why these corporate agents should be liable
when the law should encourage wealth creation and at the same time discourage
122
corporate wrongdoing. Where 'the behaviour at issue is not highly blameworthy
individual misconduct but actions that are either less obviously reprehensible or
less within the control of the individual...the case for individual liability weakens.'
116
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Whatever else may be said, there has been an evolution of the director from simply
a figurehead to a modern fiduciary.123
Whilst it has been argued that the board's primary role is to actively check
management,124 the real power of directors in running the company has been
• ■ • 125criticised. Finch, for example, suggests that the reality is directors are kept in
126the dark. Coffee devised the idea of the crow's nest analogy. However, as
Braithwaite has noted 'The point about Coffee's use of the crow's nest analogy is
that communications from both the crow's nest and the boiler room run to the
bridge, where top management holds the helm.'127 Riley meanwhile describes the
realism that the Board is influential as 'unrealistic.'128 Empirical observers of
corporate reality note that the Board's influence is feeble.129
In the corporate hierarchy it is not only the directors and the CEOs who come
under scrutiny. Executives within the hierarchies are also appropriate targets for
criminal liability. No easy caricature of business executives is possible.130 As a
consequence, assessing the criminal pathology of the individual criminal operating
within the corporate form is often difficult. Many see the malevolent caricature as
simply not reflective of most businessmen. For example Bremner and Mollander
argue that 'Those critics who continue to characterize the American business
executive as a power hungry, profit bound individualist, indifferent to the need s of
society should be put on notice that they are now dealing with a straw man of their
own making.'131
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What about the role of non -executive directors?132 Finch observes their problem;
as one where,
'The outsider faces severe obstacles in monitoring board activity and the
prospect of being held personally liable for failing in such monitoring
functions may prove an excessive deterrent to non-executive direction,
notably when the economic benefits of non-executive direction are seen to
133be dwarfed by potential liabilities for damages.'
The White Paper on conduct of directors134 suggested that NEDs should offer
independent supervision of company's management but that to do so he or she will
require access to company information. In America, the use of non-executive
directors is pervasive.135 Kesner, Victor and Lamont have examined whether
• 136
outside representation on company boards impacts on the level of illegality.
However, despite prima facie objections and underlying perceptions that
independence of outsiders would restrict corporate illegality, they found that there
was no correlation between the number of outsiders and offences. One way that
might be explained is that previous illegal acts resulted in changes to the board of
directors. Superficially, it might also suggest that illegality occurs at a lower level
than officer level.
In larger organisations the role of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is likely to be of
great importance. It is he, or she, who will wield most power, and he, or she, who
117
will be most influential. However, to simply pursue the CEO in every case
138would be to place him or her in an absurd position of sacrifice. Irrespective of
132
The issue of governance has been of some importance in Anglo-American Jurisprudence. In
United States the American Law Institute commissioned a Corporate Governance Project in 1978;
whilst in the UK the Cadbury Committee reported in 1991. The Corporate Governance Project
emphasised the monitoring role of the board but Cadbury was less enthusiastic. The Corporate
Governance project wanted independent directors not NEDs and in large publicly held corporations
they should be in the majority. Cadbury wanted NEDs and independent directors but was less
specific about numbers, see Riley n. 128.
1 3
Finch, n. 41 at p. 885.
134
Cmnd 7037 (1977) paras 19-21.
I •><
Riley, n. 128 at p. 247; Braithwaite, n. 61 at p. 362.
136
I. Kesner, B. Victor and B. Lamont, 'Board Composition And The Commission Of Illegal Acts:
An Investigation OfFortune 500 Companies' 1986 29 Academy ofManagement Journal 789-799.
137
In US v Laffal 83 Ad 871 (DC Mun Ct of App 1951) it was suggested that a chief executive is
acquainted with all the business affairs of the corporations
138
Lee,'Corporate Criminal Responsibility' 1928 28 Columbia L. R 181, at p. 194.
135
this it does seem clear that there must be a strong personal commitment on the part
of Chief Executives to corporate responsibility if corporate criminality is to be
139
avoided. In Clinard's study the CEO's attitude was found to be a very important
reason for violations according to executives within corporations.140
Generally corporate directors are endowed with immense discretion though
sometimes 'the board is simply a fictional project of the president himself.'141
Rafalko poses the thought that one has no way of knowing whether an executive
dissented from the decision of the senior organ of corporate government.142 Many
believe that 'the power of corporate management is becoming practically absolute,
while social controls upon this power remain almost embryonic';143 in the process
any hope of corporate democracy is fallacious.144 Stockholders obey the
management not the other way around and as has been suggested,
'it is almost hopeless to expect that the electoral process can ever become
anything more significant than an empty ritual. No amount of disclosure
can make corporate democracy effective where the corporate vote belongs
to weak, scattered individual investors or to institutional investors who
cannot or will not take effective part in the corporate electoral process for
the endocratic corporation the corporate election is frequently not a partial
but a total farce.'1 5
There are those who believe that the significance of the board should be
discounted146 and that 'the "fiduciary ideology" of corporate law has resulted in a
tunnel vision that has led reformers to frame issues of corporate accountability in
terms of how a fiduciary would behave if guided by "the punctilio of an honor the
most sensitive". Unfortunately not all problems reduce themselves neatly to such
questions of honorable conduct or are resolvable simply by exercising other
admirable virtues, such as diligence and foresight. Some problems ...seem to
require structural reform, a possibility that fiduciary ideology inherently
Goldschmid, n. 124 at p. 30.
140
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ignores.'147 Coffee suggests creating miniboards as satellites of the main boards at
the apex of each division of the corporation; the main board would have heightened
monitoring capacity over satellite boards.148 The principal criticisms of miniboards
are that they would spy on divisional officers and they would create adversarial
relationships.149 Under Coffee's scheme mini board chairmen would be on the
main board providing an interlocking presence. One of the principal aims of the
mini board is that it seeks to place monitoring closer to the locus of problems
within the corporate structure.150 Meuller argues for a different approach with the
appointment of one public director by the agency incorporating the company.151
Yet again though the arid choice of solution seems unnecessary. We can have the
best of all worlds by retaining the notion of fiduciary care and more overt
intrusiveness. It is simply a question of working out the most efficacious process
of reconciling both.
The Impact Of Insurance And Indemnification
Stone argues that 'Indemnification and its surrogates have the power not only to
undo the law's judgments against executives who have been caught; they also lend
152
themselves to undermining prosecutorial efforts against others.' Directors &
Officers insurance may impact on the retributive effect of personal liability in that
it will spread the risk for the director. Because of that, there is a seasoned view that
holds that criminal liability should be uninsurable.153 Finch offers a damning
critique of such insurance; she points out that 'insurance could be said to subvert
public policy, encourage unscrupulous directors to pursue questionable activities
and dull the incentives of honest directors to be attentive to their duties and act in
the best interests of their company.154 On the other hand it might directly influence
the monitoring of wrongdoing within the corporation either through the company,
its directors or through its insurers. Indeed Insurers may offer incentives by way of
147
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148
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reduced premiums and the disincentive of not re-insuring. Finch notes that 'where
insurers fail to identify potential risk avoidance techniques or do not discriminate
between risks and link premiums to performance, companies may be afflicted with
a culture in which misdemeanours and resultant costs come to be seen as normal
business expense to be met in the first instance by insurers and thereafter by
shareholders or consumers.'155 Where courts are made aware of the presence of
insurance cover, they may depart from considerations of directorial fault and move
towards objectives of compensation and loss spreading.156
Yoder argues for a prohibition on indemnification for criminal violations.157 The
policy objection comes into play when indemnification takes the form of
reimbursing agents for fines and penalties, a practice that amounts to little more
than permitting the parties 'by private agreement, to undo society's judgment as to
158
the appropriate deterrent strategy.' Anderson contends that the use of indemnity
insurance subverts (at least in part) the notion of deterrence by shifting the burden
to a third party.159 Corporations might seek to recover losses from officers who
involve their companies in corporate crime.160 However, one of the problems is
that company may be prima facie a party to the crime under the identification
doctrine.161 Fisse says 'although it is true that indemnification of sentences is
contrary to public policy and subject to explicit prohibition both under the doctrine
of ultra vires and under specific statutory provisions, in practice these legal
• • • 162obstacles are surmountable by means of suitably disguised payments.'
Restriction of indemnification of criminal penalties whilst viewed as important is
not a central feature of this thesis.
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The punishment of an individual is often fraught with difficulty not least because
of the accused's standing. Spiegelhoff offering a caricature of the individual
offender points out that 'Pre-sentence reports often reveal that the corporate
defendant is married and has children, that he is reported to be a good parent, that
he is active in the church and local charities, and that he is a professional person
• *163 •
with clients who are dependant on him.' Clinard and Yeager also note the
limitations of the law and its sanctions when dealing with the offending
executive.164 According to them, such offenders are not viewed in the same
manner as other criminals despite the harm they may cause. Most white-collar
criminals are treated as if they are first offenders;165 community service orders are
frequently imposed on corporate actors individually prosecuted.166 The arguments
marshalled in appeals for leniency of sentence for white-collar offenders are age
and poor health, personal and family reasons, extent of punishment by simply
being indicted, offence is not immoral, prior record of the accused, incarceration
would accomplish nothing, contrition of the defendant, and victimisation of the
167
defendant in prison because of his status. Often individuals prosecuted for
corporate crimes will be acquitted. According to Goodwin,
'This phenomenon[of acquittal of individuals] perhaps reflects an intuitive
feeling by jurors that individuals acting within the pressures of a
bureaucratic and sometimes highly diffuse corporate structure are often
168
unwitting or even unwilling participants in an illegal transaction.'
Davids offers an insight into how judges often approach disposal of individual
corporate defendants by explaining that,
'Imprisoning particular individuals whose malfeasance involved the
participation of the collectivity in which they formed but a small part
appears very inequitable and therefore discourages the imposition of
punishment by judges and juries imbued with Anglo-American concepts
of fair play.'1 9
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The drafters of the American Model Penal Code also noted the tendency of courts
to acquit individual actors where the corporation also stands accused. They
commented that
'This may reflect more than a faulty or capricious judgment on the part of
juries. It may represent a recognition that the social consequences of a
criminal conviction may fall with a disproportionately heavy import on
the individual defendants where the conduct involved is not of a highly
immoral character. It may also reflect a shrewd belief that the violation
may have been produced by pressures on the subordinate officers created
by corporate managerial officials even though the latter may not have
intended or desired the criminal behaviour and even though the pressures
170
can only be sensed rather than demonstrated.'
The reluctance to punish may emanate from the judge's own discretion. He may
recognise that punishing the individual may lead to damage in professional
171
standing. There may also be judicial reluctance to punish the offender when the
judge feels that the individual has been punished enough through the process of
172
trial and conviction. Judges are often influenced by professional standing of
white collar criminals173 and their ability to make restitution to victims.174
According to Yohay and Dodge, where individuals are charged along with
175
corporations prosecutions will often direct their attention to the corporation. In
US v Nearing. it was explained,
'In indictments for crime, where human beings are jointly tried with
corporations, the human interest naturally centres around the living
individual. During the trial the corporation is a sort of abstraction, and
seems rather a secondary figure. The human being may lose his liberty if
convicted, whilst the worst that can happen to the corporation is the
imposition of a fine. Their purpose in prosecuting the individual may be to
'provide an additional pocket from which the fines may eventually be
170
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recovered but more importantly to create added pressure for a favourable
plea.'176
Individuals are often acquitted when corporation and individual both stand trial.177
In some economic crimes juries have tended to empathise with the individual and
178
convict the corporation. Contrary to the orthodox line of prosecutors that their
priority is to proceed against individuals and that corporations are only secondary
targets, the statistics which have been compiled reveal a high incidence of cases
where individuals have not been prosecuted or, in the event of prosecution, have
not been held liable.179
The perception is that in their treatment of white-collar criminals, the courts have
failed. They are however not the only ones to have failed. No great faith can be
placed in the marketplace to limit officer behaviour. Individual managers may be
considered fungible;180 imprisoned officers might simply be replaced.181 Boulding
says the corporation 'marches on in its elephantine way almost indifferent to its
182
succession of riders.' Liability may of course be evaded by dispensing with
expendable officers/employees perhaps at considerable financial gain to that
employee. Such an approach clearly subverts the true intention of enforcement
agencies and the criminal courts. Finch points out that 'Market based constraints
on directorial wrongdoing may be ineffective not merely because of problems of
information, collusion within the firm and fluctuations within the market, but
through a focus of aggregate performance rather than individual acts and toleration
• • 183of wrongdoing in the face of other 'successful' actions.' According to Finch,
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'Judging the level of deterrence that results from personal liability may...be
problematic. Whilst it is true that careers of individual executives may be
damaged, in some circumstances, over-deterrence may result in so far as suitable
men and women decline to enter company direction for fear of personal
184
liability.' Does extension of the duty of care result in effective deterrence ?
Will it make directors less entrepreneurial ? Will risks be externalised to sub¬
contractors or consultants ? Finch says 'In either event, inefficiencies may result in
so far as managers shy away from decisions, fail to assume responsibilities, desist
from establishing effective lines of control and delegate decisions to parties less
185well positioned to decide.'
Naturally, there is enormous difficulty in policing large numbers of individuals
• • 186 • • ...within corporations. Fisse identifies the undermining of individual liability as
one of the two major problems associated with attempts to punish the corporate
187criminal. In his view prosecutors will take a 'short cut' and that individual,
liability is frequently displaced by corporate liability which now serves as a rough
188and ready catch-all device.' There are of course some individuals who might
justly evade prosecution and,
'Although the criminal law applies most readily to the individual actors
performing the criminal conduct, effective deterrence of corporate crime
often requires imposing liability upon supervisory and managerial
corporate officials, but not upon subordinate agents who, although
committing a proscribed activity, were in fact powerless to realize the
189results of or to prevent the blameworthy corporate conduct.'
It remains axiomatic however that corporations create, and perpetuate the proper
environment whereby individuals within their organisation do not engage in
criminal activity.190
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3.3 Enterprise Liability
The arguments in support of attaching corporate criminal liability to the enterprise
are fairly extensive and represent an integral part of this thesis. Support for
enterprise liability can be extended on the positive features of corporatism itself
and also failings on the part of a purely individualist strategy. As well as rejection
on a philosophical basis,191 the imperialism of individualism can be attacked on a
pragmatic basis. According to Ashworth, reliance solely on individual prosecution
is unlikely to work because individuals are dispensable 'allowing the company to
continue on its course with minimal disruption; or it might be difficult to identify
the individual responsible, not least because the lines of accountability within
192
companies are somewhat unclear.' It has also been suggested that individualism
193'lacks sophistication in tackling the question of corporate risk-taking.'
Baysinger, for example, claims that the current level of organisational crime
exceeds the socially efficient level, and that individual liability has demonstrably
lacked the desired deterrent effect.194 Fisse further suggests that
'The response of the present law to the difficulties of enforcement
overload and opacity of organisational lines of accountability is to extend
criminal liability to corporate entities in the hope of spurring companies to
undertake internal disciplinary action and impose individual
accountability as a matter of private policing.'195
It is a simple premise which underlies enterprise liability. The supposition that
punishment of the entity will lead to a reactive response ensuring compliance with
the law.196 It is deterrent claim which stands comparison with similar claims for
individual liability. Fisse explains that,
'The more acute deterrent angle of individualism is the claim that
deterrence of corporate crime can be sufficiently achieved by punishing
the individual persons responsible for offences. This claim which is
difficult to square with the development of corporate criminal liability at
191
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common law or to the use ofmonetary penalties against companies under
statute, under-estimates the difficulties of enforcing individual liability.
These difficulties include: enforcement overload; opacity of internal lines
of corporate accountability; expandability of individuals with
organisations; corporate separation of those responsible for the
commission of past offences from those responsible for the prevention of
• 197future offences; and corporate safe-harbouring of individual suspects.'
The traditional value of individual liability can be displaced by the utilisation of
corporate liability as a 'catch all' device.198 Individualism wrongly presumes that
accountability within companies can be readily determined but that corporations all
too easily conceal bureaucracies and hierarchies.199 So much so that the
corporation must be prosecuted per se to counteract the veil of anonymity.200
Iseman nonetheless clearly disapproves of the situation where the corporation
201
serves as a sacrificial scapegoat whilst the individual goes free. At the other end
of the spectrum, pursuit of individuals is often seen as impractical. Fisse argues
that 'nothing short of martial law is likely to enable effective enforcement against
the numbers of individual suspects involved.' He goes on to say 'individual
criminal liability cannot be expected to take over the work of corporate criminal
liability unless we are prepared to sacrifice the very traditions of justice and
202freedom for which individualism stands.' Individual liability is, accordingly,
incapable of expressing corporate fault because 'corporate standards and corporate
decision-making processes are essential features which transcend the relevance of
individual atoms of behaviour.' Corporate liability need not be corporate in
impact; the consequences of corporate fault may be internalised. The punishment
imposed on the corporation may well impact upon the individuals within that
organisation.
197
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Fisse is surely also correct to note that problem with individual liability in that,
'The deterrent efficacy of individual criminal liability for corporate crime
is further limited by the organisational divorce of responsibility for past
offences from the responsibility for future compliance. Deterrence of
unlawful behaviour on behalf of organisations depends not merely upon
threat induced abstinence from illegality but upon threat-induced catalysis
of preventive controls. The personnel held responsible for a past offence,
however, are not necessarily in a position to institute effective preventive
action within an organisation...Accordingly, there is reason to doubt the
wisdom of a deterrent strategy which focuses merely upon individuals
responsible for commission of offences in the past. By contrast corporate
liability provides an incentive for the management of the day to undertake
responsive organisational change whatever the proximity or remoteness of
that management's connection with the events giving rise to
>204
prosecution.
Fisse claims that the assumptions which underpin individualism 'rest on
quicksand.'205 Desert need not be individual but may be corporate as well.206
Fisse notes that,
'The classic interpretation of retribution stressed the need for vindication
or social amends for the evil done, the core idea being justice as fairness.
When one moral agent breaks the law while another moral agent bears the
burdens of self-restraint, fairness requires the imposition of an off-setting
burden on the law breaker. This off-setting burden is punishment. If we
accept that corporations are moral agents and that organisations bear
burdens of self restraint in complying with the law, then this form of
207
retribution applies to corporate as well as individual persons.'
Corporate criminal liability not only derives its intellectual credence from
individualism's failings; there is an altogether positive rationale for the imposition
of criminal liability on corporations. Because of the diversification of the
corporate form the argument runs that corporate liability will create incentives for
208internal corrective action. It is arguably a more efficient means of ensuring
deterrence not least because, if the corporation is a closely held corporation
punishing the corporation will have a greater impact on the individuals than in a
/u*
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larger organisation with more diverse shareholdings.209 Fisse also notes an
unfairness in pursuing the individual where the benefit invariably is derived by the
corporation. A further reason for corporate liability lies in the necessity that
corporations bear the social costs of actions perpetrated on their behalf. If
deterrence is to be achieved it is necessary that the illicit profit of corporations does
210
not go untouched. Significantly, it is the recognition of the collectivity which
gives enterprise liability its greatest intellectual credence on the basis that,
'When people blame corporations, they are not merely channelling
aggression against the ox that gored or some symbolic object. Nor are
they pointing the finger at the individuals behind the corporate mantle.
They are condemning the fact that the organisation either implemented a
policy of non compliance or failed to exercise its collective capacity to
211
avoid the offence for which blame attaches.'
Corporate blameworthiness has two components- the ability to make decisions and
212
the inexcusable failure to perform an assigned task. Fisse's balanced perspective
is to,
'hold organisations responsible for a decision when and because that
decision instantiates an organisational policy and instantiates an
organisational decision-making process which the organisation has chosen
for itself. A decision made by a rogue individual in defiance of corporate
policy (including unwritten corporate policy), to undermine corporate
goals, or in flagrant disregard of corporate decision making rules, is not a
decision for which the organisation is morally responsible. That is not to
say, however, that we cannot hold the organisation responsible if the
intention of individuals is other than to promote corporate goals and
policies.'213
Donaldson points out that corporations can and should have access to practical and
theoretical knowledge which dwarfs that of individuals.214 As such, implicitly
there is a greater onus on them to behave properly. Punishment of the corporation
can often have the dual benefit of punishing the responsible entity and at the same
215time punishing an amalgam of individuals. Stone claims that 'From a moral
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perspective, it may seem fairer to make the enterprise bear the burden in preference
either to the outsider who has been harmed or to the particular agents whose acts
were the most closely linked with the injury, but which were performed under the
216
direction, and for the benefit, of the corporation.' Edgerton, rather negatively,
offers three reasons for preferring corporate criminal liability over individual
liability- individuals may not be readily identifiable, the sheer volume of potential
217
guilty individuals and the opacity of the corporate financial assets. Lederman
focuses on the moral responsibility of the corporation and the effectiveness of
218
corporate liability but concludes that individualism is to be preferred. Meuller
meanwhile argues that the rationale for corporate crime is anything but clear and
'simply rests on an assumption that such liability is a necessary and useful
219
thing.' Geis and Dimento balancing positive and negative dimensions, suggest
the following reasons for preferring corporate criminal liability: (1) a corporation is
a distinct sum from those persons who make up the organisation (2) punishing
individuals only is not an effective strategy because for employees the risks will be
generally less compelling than those related to failure to meet organisational goals
(3) shame will be greater on corporations rather than individuals (4) corporations
can be redesigned by court sanctions (5) much easier for prosecutors to establish
individual guilt (6) corporations have greater assets and as such a greater
220
opportunity for redress of harm. Similarly, Leigh offers a checklist of reasons
for corporate criminal liability which can be summarised as-(l) the difficulty in
locating the actual offender (2) transference of the policing function to employers
(3) the difficulty in implicating top management (4) reluctance on the part of juries
to convict individuals facing corporate pressure (5) obtaining compensation from
entities (6) convenience and fairness (7) convenience and necessity (8) fairness and
social justice- corporations should not be above the law.
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Even where individuals are blameless we may need to account for the moral sense
221
of indignation against the corporation. Corporate liability may be appropriate
where crime arise from corporate criminal negligence rather than the cumulative
222
accrual of liability. According to Fisse 'Where this is so, corporate criminal
responsibility complements the deterrent operation of individual criminal
responsibility by inducing the corporation sentenced (and others similarly placed)
to take greater care, as by adopting further preventative measures, or initiating
internal discipline proceedings in respect of those who may have violated the
corporation's existing internal precautionary rules.' Fisse outlines three
223
circumstances of corporate negligence- communication breakdown tacit
operation of authority224 and group pressure to conform.225 In respect of tacit
operation of authority Fisse explains that 'Subordinates, instead of acting on
explicit instructions, often anticipate the reactions of their superiors by asking
themselves what their superiors would wish of them, act accordingly, and then
await the superior's retrospective judgment. Where such anticipated reactions
occur, not uncommonly they stem from cumulative impressions acquired through
• • 226 •
experience of corporate attitudes over a lengthy period.' Complex organisations
227
create opportunities by providing diversity of settings and masking behaviour.
In determining whether the imposition of corporate liability is socially desirable
Khanna argues that 'one must compare the net benefits of imposing corporate
c • ... • 228criminal liability with the net benefit of imposing alternative liability strategies.'
He lists four alternatives corporate civil liability, civil liability on 'managers',
criminal liability imposed on 'managers' or imposing civil or criminal liability on a
third party. Khanna argues that, 'Corporate criminal liability has stronger
procedural protections, more powerful enforcements devices; more severe and,
221
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arguably, unique sanctions (such as stigma); and a greater message- sending role
229
than corporate civil liability.' Elsewhere in this thesis, I have criticised the
evident desire of many commentators to downgrade the seriousness of the
corporate criminality and their spurious attempts to substitute civil sanction for
criminal sanction. The procedural standards which the criminal law insists upon
are meant to be exacting; liability should not be easily attached to the corporation.
Where there are problems we should work to solve them rather than subvert them.
In any enterprise liability scheme, punishment hopes to be catalytic as well as
inhibitory; at present corporations need to do more than simply engage in self
230
restraint or exert inhibition as individuals need do. The law should seek to
catalyse compliance policies and disciplinary controls as well as modify standard
231
operating procedures. The mere threat of the imposition of corporate liability
may achieve that catalytic conversion. If it does not enterprise liability remains
232
nevertheless necessary as a means of imposing changes directly. In stark
contrast to rampant individualism, there is nothing imperialist in the strategy of
those who argue for enterprise liability. In adopting such liability wholesale, we do
nothing to preclude the retention of individual liability.
Collectivism And Corporate Reality
In developing corporate criminal liability there is a clear need to develop an
233
organizational understanding. Organisational theory helps us understands the
tools available to management to control subordinates and also how the
organisation affects the behaviour of the individual.234 There is a need to ensure
congruity of sanction and the organisational dynamics and decision-making
processes. Only in understanding how and why they operate can we hope to
develop a system of liability which can be influential upon them. March and
Khanna, n. 228 at p. 1492
230
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Simon in their study of corporations basically found that corporations were
controlled by elites who determined the premises of decision-making and setting
235
priorities for the organisation and subordinates. Workers exercise limited power
over corporations.236 Drucker argues that corporations discourage individual
237
initiative and engineer conformity. Meier similarly suggests that individuals can
238
be socialised into the corporate ethos. Weber had earlier argued that the very
239
nature of a bureaucracy is to make the individual dispensable. Socialization of
employees may be both structural and cultural.240 None of this should be of any
surprise; it is trite to suggest that 'man is so essentially an associative animal that
his nature is largely determined by the relationships thus formed.'241 The pressure
on subordinates may be immense. So much so that the corporation can be viewed
as 'dynamic system of interacting processes, with an internal "life" that can exert a
dramatic influence on its personnel.'242 Clinard and Yeager point out that the goals
set for subordinates may be 'perceived as absolute requirements that may justify
almost any means to fulfil them.'243 Hills poses the question as to how men
ordinarily humane and decent in their own family setting can in the corporate
context commit crimes of inhumane consequences.244 The answer does not lie in
'the pathology of evil individuals but in the culture and structure of large-scale
bureaucratic organizations within a particular political economy.' Meier suggests
that 'If operative goals take on the qualities of normative requirements for
organisational behaviour, and if these norms conflict with those of the legal order,
then corporate crime may be indigenous to organizational processes.'245 If that is
so, the case for purely individual liability is done some violence.
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Indictment of the distinct lack of ethical considerations in corporate decision¬
making inherent in many companies is advanced by Gioia who claims,
'ethical dimensions are not usually a central feature of the cognitive
structures that drive decision-making. Obviously, they should be, but it
would take substantial concentration on the ethical dimension of the
corporate culture, as well as overt attempts to emphasize ethics in
education, training, and decision making before typical organizational
scripts are likely to be modified to include the crucial ethical
. ,246
component.
Anderson suggests that the economic pressures within the corporation may lead
individuals to take risks on the corporation's behalf.247 Stone posits that when
individuals are placed in an organisational structure some of the internalised
248
restraints seem to lose their hold. There are various reasons why individuals
succumb to group pressure to conform- exposure to beliefs of a peer group,
immersion in a similar environment both in and out of work, compliance with
standardised qualifications for membership, self sacrifice for group aims, relaxation
of critical faculties in expectation of collective acuity, absorption of attitudes and
subjection of common constraints as a matter of discipline.249 Economic goals of
the organisation drive out social goals of both the organisation and individuals
250within it. An organisation's internal control system can subtly shape an
individual's opportunities so that organisational crimes are committed virtually out
251 'of necessity. Naturally there are exceptions to this general proposition;
252lawbreakers may have own goals and may not be under corporate pressure. The
moral dilemma that confronts individuals when corporate pressure is brought to
253bear to violate the law may be great. They may try to evade feelings of shame or
guilt by rationalising their conduct. Hills explains,
'There are many justifications and rationalisations that enable corporate
functionaries to accomplish this social- psychological task and avoid any
246
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definition of themselves as criminal. Indeed the very availability of these
shared "vocabularies of rationalization" already existing within the
corporate occupational culture is precisely what permits many managers
to violate the law without any great burden of guilt or threat to their self-
, ,254
respect.
e\ • ... . 255Often employees don't tell superiors for fear of disciplinary action. Even where
the employee voices concern about what they are expected to do their concerns are
256
simply swept aside. Clinard suggests that managers would prefer to work in
environments where they are not pressurised to violate legal standards and that
influencing the executive elite will set the moral tone for the rest of the
257
organisation. " Jackall offers some real politick by suggesting one must make
258moral accommodations in organisations to get one's way. Vaughan claims that,
'to describe properly the behaviour- lawful or unlawful- of organizations
..we need an explanation that goes beyond the goals and actions of the
organisations and the goals and actions of its members. This necessity
draws attention to the internal processes of organizations and to the
259normative environment of results.' ...."Organizational processes..create
an internal moral and intellectual world in which the individual identifies
with the organization and the organization's goals. The survival of the
one becomes linked to the other, and a normative environment evolves
that, given difficulty in attaining scarce resources, encourages illegal
260 "behaviour to attain them.'
There must be 'recognition that organisational responsibility has both group and
individual facets. Where UK principles have been lacking in sophistication is in
their failure to comprehend the complexities of organisational attitudes and
261 ... • •
practices.' Many commentators support the imposition of corporate criminal
liability on the basis that it is the corporate form which creates the climate for
262
individual wrongdoing within the corporate form. Such an approach defeats the
view 'while men do not make their own history under circumstances chosen by
Hills, n. 19 at p. 194
255
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263themselves ...they do nonetheless make it.' Speaking of individual managers
and officers, Winn claims that 'Mutually stimulated they will go to excesses which
alone they would have shrunk. It is inexplicable but plainly demonstrable
phenomenon of the human mind that men do not think their own thoughts when in
groups; each mind contributes something to the group, and is influenced by the
thought impulses which are in play around it.'264 Westin also argues that
'explaining corporate misconduct in terms of the personal morality or immorality
of individual corporate managers represents a limited perspective..The real problem
has been the frame of reference for business decisions and the reward structure of
265
companies.' Hills likewise argues 'In the hierarchical labyrinth of specialised
tasks and segmented organizational units, employees can easily evade any sense of
• 266
personal responsibility for the ultimate consequences of their actions.' Whilst
believing that socialisation in the corporate form can have detrimental effects on
certain individuals it is important to offer some balance as Cullen et al. do when
they criticises 'an over -socialized conception of the corporate manager- the notion
that the criminogenic conditions of organizational life turn even the most moral
267individuals into profit seeking sociopaths.' However, identifying the system as
268 • •
responsible also identifies the need for reform therein. It is in that simple
recognition that we find the case for enterprise liability overwhelming. Enterprise
liability can most readily be defended on the unity of the whole. Without
diminishing the contribution of individuals within the organisation, it is also
necessary to recognise that
'corporate policies and acts are often the results of more than a simple
aggregation of individual choices. Frequently, corporate behaviour
depends on a complex interplay among individual choices, standard
procedures, and the organisational structure itself. Consequently,
corporate policies and acts should be attributed to the corporate structure
as a whole and considered as conceptually independent from the intents of
the individuals within the corporation...The law should consider the
corporate structure as an intentional agent in and of itself....a corporation
should be considered neither a 'black box' nor a mere aggregation of
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264
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individuals. Instead the subjects of inquiry should be the corporation's
269internal structure and decision-making processes.'
3.4 Individualism And The American Approach
It is America that one finds the clearest illustration of the co-existence of enterprise
and individual liability. The fact that corporate criminal liability has its strongest
roots on that continent has not diminished the pursuit of individualistic liability. In
America there are a number of cases where the courts have been prepared to infer
actual knowledge on the part of corporate officers or directors based on their
actings.270 This inference may derive from mere acquiescence.271 It has been said
that,
'Outside the context of a corporation, the law has been reluctant to impose
criminal liability for knowing of a crime and failing to prevent it. But
when a corporate official knows that subordinates within his realm of
authority are engaged in illegal activity, his toleration of the conduct is
more than a failure to act. By not controlling his subordinates, the official
knowingly permits his authority to be used in the commission of a
,272
crime.
It seems to be the case that an officer will incur personal liability if he retains a
responsible relation to the situation even though he may not have participated
273
personally. The rationale for such an approach is supported in the Supreme
Court's statement in US v Park where they said 'The requirements of foresight and
vigilance imposed on responsible corporate agents are beyond question demanding,
and perhaps onerous, but they are no more stringent than the public has a right to
expect of those who voluntarily assume positions of authority in business
enterprises whose services and products affect the health and well-being of the
Foerschler, n. 177 at p. 1303.
270
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public that supports them.'274 In US v Park the court held that causation was not
shown by wrongful conduct but rather by responsibility within the corporation for
the act. It was not necessary for the prosecution to prove that the corporate officer
had direct supervisory responsibility over those immediately responsible for the
275
prohibited act. In US V Andreadis there is support for the proposition that a
corporate manager may be criminally liable for an intentional crime by failing to
fulfil an affirmative duty to supervise. However, the force of the Andreadis
decision is weakened by the fact that there have been no convictions for omissions.
Can acquiescence result in liability for crime? Schaff suggests that in America
there is authority for the proposition that courts are willing to infer actual
276 ... •
knowledge. However, such a doctrine may be limited to the smaller enterprise
where the entrepreneur is very much in control of the organisation and the
bureaucracy is not over-developed. What about liability for omissions in the
absence of a positive duties ? Schaff argues that the Andreadis decision is
diminished by the 'failure of any court to impose criminal liability on an individual
277
corporate defendant for an omission of duty.'
In America, Federal law bases individual liability on participation, actual or
278
constructive knowledge and failure to control corporate misconduct. The key
cases are those of Dotterwiech and Park. Dotterwiech lays down a standard of a
'responsible share in the furtherance of the transaction'. In respect of mens rea
offences the Federal courts seemingly require some affirmative act, participation
279
authorisation or acquiescence before imposing individual liability In US V
Wise280 'responsible share' was restricted to those who actively promoted and
participated in effecting the illegality. Goodwin suggests that,
'The authority of executive officials to devise measures necessary to
insure corporate compliance with regulatory statutes and their failure to
US v Park supra at p. 672.
275
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276
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277
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implement adequate safeguards are further grounds for establishing a
281
'responsible share" in corporate violations of the law.'
US v Park modified Dotterwiech to the extend that it determined that the corporate
officer's position was not the determining feature of his liability. Goodwin argues
that US v Park suggests that Dotterwieich's applicability may be limited to strict
liability statutes where specific duties are imposed. According to Braithwaite, the
decision is objectionable on the basis that it punishes persons without knowledge
but its strength is that it punishes those that can make a difference.
The Proposed Federal Criminal Code suggested the following approach to
individual liability within the corporation:-
Section 403(a) -A person is criminally liable for an offense based upon
conduct that he engages in or causes in the name ofan organisation or on
behalfofan organisation to the same extent as ifhe engaged in or caused
the conduct in his own name or on his own behalf'
Section 403(b) - 'Except as otherwise expressly provided, whenever a duty
to act is imposed upon an organization by a statute, or by a regulation,
rule, or order issued pursuant thereto, an agent of the organisation
having significant responsibility for the subject matter to which the duty
relates is criminally liable for an offense based upon an omission to
perform the duty, ifhe has the state ofmind requiredfor the commission
of the offense, to the same extent as if the duty was imposed upon him
directly
Section 403(c) - A person responsible for supervisingparticular activities
on behalf of an organisation who, by his reckless failure to supervise
adequately those activities, permits or contributes to the commission ofan
offense by the organization is criminally liable for the offense, except that
ifthe offense committed by the organization is afelony the person is liable
under this subsection onlyfor a class A misdemeanour.'
One of the key features of the study draft of the proposed Federal Criminal Code
was the imposition of the duty on corporate officers to allocate responsibility for
compliance as well as the normal supervisory and managerial duties. Leigh
believes this to be difficult unless 'rigid management structures were required by
corporate law.' Goodwin argues that the individual defendant should be allowed to
present evidence of his inability to effect corporate changes or to fully control all
281
Goodwin, n. 168 at p. 988
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corporate activity. In Texas liability is singularly attributed to the individual. In
283
Guild v State it was said 'It is the general principle of law in this State that the
person who actually commits a crime shall be punished therefor, whether he be
acting on his own initiative or is an agent for a principal...in order to enforce the
law, it is essential that the agent who commits the crime shall be punished therefor
284
instead of his principal, a corporation.' Generally, courts throughout America
285
have shown a greater predilection to jail corporate offenders. It is evident from
analysis of American jurisprudence that the pursuit of corporate liability need not
deflect from individual liability. In developing our own model this point may be
singularly reassuring. Indeed in some respects it answers the question with which
this chapter concludes.
3.5 Can Corporate And Individual Liability Co-Exist?
So far debate has centred around two alternative forms of criminal liability-
individual or enterprise (or 'non-reductionist'). The potency of that debate and the
seemingly irreconcilable standpoints of various academic commentators should not
be allowed to obscure the fact that there exists a rich body of literature that
suggests the two may mutually co-exist and indeed the combination of individual
and collective liability represent the best way to tackle corporate crime. It has been
said that 'in the eyes ofmany, corporate criminal liability is a dubious development
which could and should have been avoided by suitably adapting and enforcing the
existing individual criminal law. Enduring as this dubiety has been, there are many
reasons for the coexistence of corporate and individual criminal liability. Once
those reasons are understood, the idea of a single-minded commitment to
individual criminal liability seems short-sighted and forlorn. A dual focus is
needed, for such is the individualistic and corporate duality of the modern world of
286 287crime.' It seems we can 'hedge our theoretical bets.'
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Spiegelhoff talks of 'A new zeal' emerging 'for penetrating the multiple layers of
hierarchy to hold not only the corporation, but also high level corporate managers,
288
responsible for crimes committed on behalf of the corporation.' Stone argues
that neither enterprise liability nor individual liability 'is adequate to produce the
• 289desired behaviour-modifying correction in all circumstances.' There is an
argument that posits that 'Liability should be cumulative, not substitutory.'290
Another contribution argues corporate and individual liability are complimentary
291
not mutually exclusive and that 'Emphasizing corporate liability does not
. . 292
necessarily preclude all individual liability.'
Fisse lists nine reasons for the co-existence of individual liability and corporate
liability- organisational secrecy, number of suspects, corporate profit motive,
expandability of personnel, personnel beyond jurisdiction, offences defined by
reference to corporate status, corporate negligence, corporate intentionally and
293
surrogate liability. In respect of the first he says,
'Corporate criminal liability works to minimize the problem of
Organizational secrecy in several ways. First, punishing a corporation
may lead to a reduction in the intracorporate prestige of individual
personnel to blame. Second, a corporation may be prompted to initiate
internal disciplinary prodding and impose its own formal sanctions.
Third, precautionary measures, including improved training and
supervision, may be induced through fear of sanctions being imposed
upon the enterprise should further offenses be committed.'294
Another concern for Fisse is the transference of enforcement resources needed to
target individuals 'the overall effect is likely to be a relaxation of the social control
295of corporate crime.' Indeed his concern goes a little further;
'Even if there were enough enforcement resources to implement a crime
control strategy of Individualism, it would not follow that those resources
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289
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should be used exclusively in the pursuit of individual criminal liability.
The potential gain would be a minimal increase in the numbers of
individuals brought to justice at the expense of losing the indirect but
multiple sanctioning effects of corporate liability'....'A more
commendable approach is to adopt a mixed strategy, retaining corporate
as well as individual liability, and improving the capacity of corporate
296
liability to achieve accountability at the level of internal discipline.'
Reliance solely on individual criminal liability it would seem is beset with
problems. Coffee nevertheless recognises that 'the case for such an individual
focus to corporate law enforcement is strong but it is not unqualified..enforcement
officials cannot afford to ignore either the individual or the firm in choosing their
targets, but can realize important economies of scale by simultaneously pursuing
297both.' One of the problems of individual liability is that,
'To criminalize behaviour that is essentially beyond the actor's control
undermines the moral basis of the entire criminal justice system. Even at
this higher price, we are more likely to realize only a marginal diminution
in misconduct, for the more the conduct is unpremeditated, or is a joint
product of many agents' acts over which the targeted agent has limited
control, the more inelastic its "supply" will be to changes in expected
penalty levels.'298
There is a need for fair attribution of criminal liability. French argues that 'if the
act is genuinely the result of individual actions taken by the appropriate people in
accord with the established procedures of the company, then the culprit will truly
be said to be the corporation, and it will be the corporation not because the CEO
says it is, but because the criteria for the incorporation of individual actions have
been satisfied.'299 That sense of fairness is also implicit in Wilson and
Braithwaite's comment that 'we need a notion of group responsibility as well as a
notion of individual responsibility, and there must be a dialectical interplay
between the two.'300 One idea floated by Leigh is to create overlap in the legal
system so that the natural person could be convicted of a crime, while the
Fisse, n. 18 at p. 499.
297
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301
corporation is held liable only for an administrative offense. However, I have
already counselled against a differential approach.
Fisse and Braithwaite reject putting all the eggs in the basket of pursuing individual
offenders on three bases- the capacity of organisations to cover up internal
accountability; the collectivist nature of corporate decision making; the
302
inegalitarian bias of trying to put all the effort into prosecuting individuals. The
argument is that by pursuing the corporation, it is more likely to achieve individual
accountability; the activation of private justice systems within corporations are
303
likely to be more effective. Fisse and Braithwaite have declared that
'individuals have individual responsibilities for corporate crime and that
collectivities have collective responsibilities for corporate crime.'304 Both
messages might well be conveyed by imposing corporate liability mostly through
public enforcement and individual responsibility mostly through private justice
305
systems.' Kraakman also supports 'a dual liability regime that joins absolute
personal liability with enterprise liability [which] offers two sanctioning tools, each
providing a different marginal deterrent. Together, they may provide far more
• • 306effective deterrence than comparable levels of either could alone.' The agency
notion of corporate affairs should dictate dual liability of individuals and the
corporate entity but as Kraakman explains
'in practice much of this dual structure collapses..regardless of the dictates
of formal doctrine, the actual distribution of legal risks more closely
approximates to a unitary regime of enterprise liability than a dual regime
of firm and personal liability. The corporation typically bears the brunt of
tort damages or criminal penalties arising out of the activities of its agents
or employees.'307
Walt and Laufer argue that individuals and corporations should be liable to the
same mix of sanctions and that corporate and individual penalties should be
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308
complementary. A key question is how individual and corporate sentencing
should be co-ordinated.309 Edgerton recognises the duality argument in saying that
'Whatever social purpose..tends to be served by punishing or threatening to punish
the individual who does a given act, tends also to be served by punishing or
threatening to punish the corporation in the course ofwhose business he does it.'310
Goodwin has argued that the proper allocation of criminal responsibility between
the corporation and its individual agents has proven to be an elusive goal.311 If that
is the case, there is every reason for us to redouble our efforts to promote a
balanced system which directly hits the appropriate target. As Fisse and
Braithwaite contend 'the challenge ahead is to devise an approach which as a
matter of law reflects the commonplace principle that everyone responsible in some
312
way for an offence should be held responsible accordingly.' A strategy based on
313individualism alone represents simplistic targeting. It cannot be expected to
provide an adequate approach to the prevention of corporate crime but nor can
individual liability be ignored because of the individual agency in the commission
of corporate crime.314 The lesson from Anglo-American jurisprudence is clear-
individualism and corporatism can sensibly co-exist within the confines of one
system. More importantly, if we are serious about tackling corporate crime then
they must.
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CHAPTER 4
PUNISHING THE CORPORATE CRIMINAL
4.0 Introduction
As Slapper notes no sooner do we confront the criminological issues in corporate
crime than we face the penological ones.1 There is an obvious and inherent
difficulty in punishing inanimate objects by means ordinarily applied to individual
human actors. Moreover, because organisations have different interests and
.... 2
objectives from individuals sentencing corporations presents distinct problems.
Whether we can develop proper sentencing strategy to counteract endemic
3 • .
corporate delinquency is undoubtedly a question to be addressed. Fisse and
French detect 3 general developments in modern sentencing of corporations in
Anglo-American jurisprudence- a non interventionist sanctions bias; unsupported
assessments of quantum of sentence, and a mindset against development of full
range of sanctions.4 Goff and Reasons are equally pessimistic claiming that, so far,
the sentencing of corporations provides little encouragement in terms of deterrent,
symbolic and retributive effects of criminal law.5 Because corporations appear
beyond the control of current legal sanctions6 simply deploying existing sentencing
mechanisms may be unnecessarily restrictive. Arguably, there has been
■y
insufficient attention to non-legal forms of control of corporate crime. Indeed our
whole approach suffers from inherent limitations. Seney claims we operate on a
nuisance theory whereby we balance the benefits on the continued functioning of
the corporation against the harm done,
'We don't close down the corporation and remove all functions from
society. We either fine it- asking it to operate for X hours to pretend to
pay the social debt and thus compensate the public- or, in exceptional
cases, we send a few minor officers to jail while the corporation
'
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continues operation. When an individual commits a crime we label the
entire person criminal and suspend all his social functions by removing
f • 8him entirely from society.'
Several uniquely organisational factors may also be relevant in the context of
punishment. First, the size of the corporation may be significant. Elkins points out
that whilst the size of the corporation may help to shield the individual offender
there is a corresponding focusing of public attention on the larger corporations.9
Moreover, the impact of a finding of guilt may have greater impact on the larger
organization than on the smaller less well known entity. Conversely, the
importance of the removal of illegally gained profits is especially important in
smaller corporations where there may be proximity between the owners and the
directors.10
Another issue which presents itself in modern day corporate life is the distinction
between public and private corporations. Of course, such distinctions are no longer
well-defined." The private/public differential might be explained by reference in
the different organisational goals. Stone explains one of the consequence of this as
being 'A different quality or depth of indignation might be aroused by the company
that hazards health 'for profit' than by the public laboratory that does so in the
pursuit of science and whose successes would be rateably shared among the whole
population, rather than a group of investors.' Stone himself challenges this
particular sentiment. Public authorities may be equally blameworthy and
reprehensible. Is it fair that their sanction should be any the less because they are
• 12
public entities ?
A further problem ensues from the complex organisational and financial devices
which companies deploy. Parent companies and group formation are now common
8
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place. Applying sanctions to a subsidiary also has problems particularly where its
• c 13
assets might be significantly less than the punishment thought suitable. One
possible solution may be to hold the parent company and the subsidiary to be a
solitary entity.14 However 'In doing so the court will be actively intervening in the
corporate relations of the firm and thereby restricting the scope of limited liability
that a shareholder usually enjoys.'15 There are, it is submitted, substantial public
policy reasons why, in this instance, the concept of limited liability rule should be
circumvented.
Recognition that greater responsibility to society must accompany the awesome
power that corporations have amassed, has prompted a body of literature calling for
punishment of the corporate offender.16 One reason for dissatisfaction is the
17
perceived failure of corporations themselves, to self-regulate their behaviour.
Implicit in the promotion of corporate criminal liability is generally promotion of
18the notion of corporate social responsibility. Donaldson has proposed that there
be a contractual relationship between business and the community that creates
responsibility.19 Certainly, as a basic premise, it seems reasonable to expect a
20
company to devote resources to prevention of harm but, real corporate social
responsibility undoubtedly requires much more. According to Stone, there are two
wings to the corporate social responsibility movement- voluntarist and
interventionist; the latter wants the law to nudge corporations towards greater
social responsibility whereas voluntarism entails the corporation undertaking
13
See P. Muchlinski, 'The Bhopal Case: Controlling Ultra Hazardous Industrial Activities
Undertaken By Foreign Investors' 1987 50 Modern L. R. 545-587 at p. 568.
14
Muchlinski, n. 13 at p. 573.
15
Muchlinski, n. 13 at p. 581.
16
M. Clinard, Corporate Corruption: The Abuse OfPower, (1990), at p. 186; Henning in R. Nader
and M. Green, Corporate Power In America, (1973), at p. 170
17
H. M. Freidman, 'Some Reflections On The Corporation As Criminal Defendant' 1979 55 Notre
Dame Lawyer 173-202 at p. 178.
18
M. Clinard and P. Yeager, Corporate Crime, (1980), at p. 207.
19
T. Donaldson, Corporations And Morality, (1982) at p. 42; Grygier attempts to develop the
reasonable man test into the corporate responsibility concept. In his scheme the standards of
reasonable behaviour are flexible and depending on time, place, the functions of the corporation,
and other factors T. Grygier, 'Corporate Crime: Legal And Administrative Sanctions' 1992 4
Eurocriminology at p. 23 op cit.
20
E. Colvin, 'Corporate Personality And Criminal Liability' 1995 6 Criminal Law Forum 25.
164
reforms on the basis of perceived self-advantage or an intuitive appeal to
21
altruism. Stone offers the view that,
'What is missing in our corporate/social relations today, and needs to
be restored, is a measure ofmutual trust and respect. As things stand,
we are settling into to a self defeating cycle in which the anti-corporate
sentiment is increasingly shrill and ill-informed, and the corporate
response is too often self defensive, unheeding and unconstructive. In
these circumstances, some systematic integration of the 'inside' with
the 'outside', some further exhortation of corporate social
responsibility could lead- and may be the only way to lead- to new,
22
more productive patterns of co-operation and growth.'
What Stone appears to neglect is that the relationship between the law and trust is
circuitous. Before trust can flow, there must be substantial and sustained
observance of the criminal law.
As I have observed in Chapter 1 of this thesis, the concepts of liability and
punishment are entwined with moral fault. Morality 'implies conformity with the
23
generally accepted standards of goodness or Tightness in conduct or character.'
According to Oleck, morality must be measured by current standards.24 Sutherland
explains that 'the relation between the law and the mores tends to be circular. The
mores are crystallized in the law, and each act of enforcement of the laws tends to
25re-enforce the mores.' Packer also believes that moral obliquacy should be the
determinant for the imposition of criminal sanctions saying that 'So long as that
[community condemnation] sanction is resorted to, moral blameworthiness should
21
C. D. Stone in Fisse and French (Eds.), n.4 at p 30
22
Stone, n. 21 at p. 34.
23
Oleck, 'Remedies For Abuses Of Corporate Status' 1973 9 Wake Forest L. R. at p. 474.;
Nemerson defines moral fault utilising certain constructs
1 engagement in voluntary act or omission
2 an intended or foreseen aspect of that conduct violates a moral rule
3 the actor believes that there is an unreasonable risk of that aspect exists or that a consequence of
the conduct will occur and that either violates the moral rule
4 the actor is not aware that there is an unreasonable risk that either an aspect of the conduct exists
or a that a consequence of the conduct will occur but possesses the physical and mental capacities
necessary to foresee such a risk
5 the actor knows the moral rule, (see Nemerson, 'Criminal Liability Without Fault: A
Philosophical Perspective' 1975 75 Columbia L. R at p. 1518).
24
Oleck, n. 23 at p. 474.
25
E. H. Sutherland, On Analyzing Crime, (1973), at p. 77.
165
26
be the indisputable condition precedent to its application.' Put another way '[t]he
punishment of less than immoral behaviour weakens the force of the criminal
27
law.' The liberal paradigm of moral culpability requires that moral actors have
some form of knowledge, reason, and control of their actions before they can be
28
blamed for what they have done. Rationality then is central to the issue of
morality. So much so that it is argued,
'[I]n the liberal view of morality, reason is privileged...There is also a
tendency to regard rationality as value free, universal concept...This
view of rationality at the core of human nature is well reflected both in
the utilitarian view of persons as rational calculators and somewhat
differently, in the Kantian vision of the rational agent..Closely related
to the liberal vision of rational persons is the notion of humans as free
and responsible agents, capable of understanding and controlling their
own actions... for the purpose of model building... a centrally important
feature of liberalism [is] the vision of the individual as an autonomous
agent capable of choice and control, aware of her environment and, at
least in some respects, capable of shaping it to her own ends. Both
rationality and the capacity for responsible action are thus for
liberalism at once factual features of human nature and sources of
normative limits on the ways in which human beings maybe treated,
particularly by political and other institutions. These features above all
others seem to entail the distinctly liberal focus upon the moral value of
freedom.'29
According to Aranella there are four aspects to the liberal theory ofmorality- moral
agency; breach of moral norm; fair obligation of agent to comply; breach can be
30
fairly attributed to agent's conduct. A moral agent will not deserve moral blame
when the breach occurs under circumstances that deprive him of a fair opportunity
to avoid the breach.31 Arenella articulates a normative, character-based, conception
of moral agency claiming, 'Our accounts of moral evil presuppose that the
wrongdoer has the capacity for moral concern, judgement and action. We view
26
Packer, 'Mens Rea And The Supreme Court' 1962 Sup Crt Rev 107 at pp. 147-8 quoted in S. S.
Nemerson, n. 23 at p. 1517.
27
Spurgeon and Fagan, 'Criminal Liability For Life-Endangering Corporate Conduct' 1981 72
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 400 at p. 413.
28
See Arenella, 'Convicting The Morally Blameless: Reassessing The Relationship Between Legal
AndMoralAccountability' 1992 39 UCLA L. R. 1511 at p. 1517.
29
N. Lacey, State Punishment, Political Principles and Community Values (1988) at p. 146 quoted
in Arenella, n. 28.
30
Arenella, n. 28 at p. 1518
31
Arenella, n. 28 at p. 1520
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32
moral evil as a corruption of this moral potential.' Arenella argues that moral
agents must possess the following character based abilities and attributes- 'the
capacity to care for the interests of other human beings, the internalization of others
normative expectations, the capacity to respond to moral norms as a motivation
for one's choices, and the power to manage those firmly entrenched aspects of
character that impair one's ability to make an appropriate moral evaluation of the
33
situation one is in and the choices open to one.'
So far, these precepts of morality are advanced in the context of human beings. To
what extent, as general principles, are they applicable to corporations ? Kaplan
outlines the extent of our problem in seeking to apply morality to the corporate
form by explaining that,
'In our Judaeo- Christian tradition, we have long been accustomed to
viewing morality as essentially a matter of the individual's obligations
and responsibilities...Although only the individual can be a moral
agent, most significant action today is performed not by individuals but
by collectivities..How moral responsibility is to be assigned to those
engaged in collective action remains a real problem.'34
Strictly following an agency approach, Lewis formulates the following dilemma.
'It is a central feature of our moral discourse that we hold individuals
morally responsible for those actions and only for those actions for
which (1) they were casually (that is non morally) responsible, and (2)
which they intended to perform. Suppose that someone wishes to
ascribe responsibility to a collective or group for a certain action. Then
either this ascription of responsibility employs this term merely in a
non-moral sense that a certain group of individuals together caused a
certain resulting state of affairs, and their individual moral
responsibility must be decided strictly according to the particular
actions each individual performed; or this ascription to the collective is
used in the moral sense of responsibility, in which we have rendered
the ascription of moral responsibility to individuals vacuous or
meaningless.'35
32
Arenella, n. 28 at p. 1609.
33
Arenella, n. 28 at p. 1609.
34
Kaplan, Perspectives On The Theme In Individuality And The New Society, (1970) at pp. 18-19.
35
Lewis, 'The Non-Moral Notion OfCollective Responsibility'. quoted in J. Surber, 'Individual And
Corporate Responsibility: Two Alternative Approaches' 1983 2 Business and Professional Ethics
Journal 67-88.
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Such petulant posturing surely misrepresents the true nature of the argument for the
ascription of moral responsibility to corporations. Individual morality is not
rendered meaningless by collective moral responsibility. Moreover, personhood
need not be a precondition of moral agency. French claims that 'the fact that
something is a legal person is no grounds for including it among the members of
the moral community, and an argument that would defend the proposition that
because something is a moral person it must be a legal one fails to grasp the
institutionality of the law..moral personhood is a metaphysical matter: legal
personality is a matter of institutional rules and may be of a purely practical
36 • •
origin.' In his view, only corporations that have corporate internal decision-
• 37
making structures (CIDs) can meet the conditions of moral personhood. In
contrast, Wolf accepts that organisations policies and actions do express values and
38
goals but he argues that these are properly those of the individuals.
The essence of the moral person contention is that one needs to show that the
corporation can exhibit rationality and intention.39 Donaldson rejects corporate
moral agency on the basis of difficulty in establishing the locus of intention within
the corporation and, on the fact that some things behave intentionally without being
moral agents (e.g. animals). To qualify as a moral agent according to Donaldson
there is a need to have a process of moral decision-making including the capacity
to use moral reasons in decision making and secondly, the capacity of the decision
making process to control not only overt corporate acts, but also the structure of
policies and rules. In marked contrast Surber explains why there is no conflict
between individual morality and collective morality by arguing that,
'we should not lose sight of the fact that the concept of moral
responsibility itself is not equivocal when applied to the two
[individual and collective moral responsibility]. Just as corporate
responsibility must be assessed against the backdrop of the complex set
of relationships in which it stands in virtue of the sort of entity it is and
in the interests it can affect. So too must the responsibility of the
individual. One of the primary deficiencies of the agency approach is
to view individual moral responsibility as somehow diminished when
36
P. French, Collective And Corporate Responsibility, (1979), at p. 173.
37
French, n. 36 at p. 168.
38
Wolf in Pennock and Chapman (Eds.), Criminal Justice, (1985), at p. 280.
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the individual acts as a member of a group. It is as if acknowledging
that a group rather than an individual is responsible for a certain state
of affairs implies that this group responsibility somehow represents a
sort of fixed quantum of responsibility that is to be divided among the
members of the group. In fact, however, our concept of moral
responsibility, once freed from the agency approach, does not function
like this at all. Rather, being a member of a conglomerate like a
corporation, acting as its agent, and playing a role within its decision¬
making process constitutes a set of relations in part defining the moral
life of the individual. The very status the individual occupies as part of
a corporation carries with it a degree of responsibility not only beyond
and different from that which the individual would have merely as an
abstract agent, but also over and above what the corporation itselfmay
or may not succeed in accomplishing. This is not to deny the relatively
limited degrees of influence that an individual may exercise, on a large
corporation, but it is also to affirm that individual and corporate moral
responsibility cannot exclude one another but must be understood as a
broader network of moral relations. It no more exculpates an
individual from his moral responsibility as a member of a corporation
to claim that it is merely an input-output mechanism for maximising
profit and minimizing loss. The responsibility approach affirms that
corporate and individual responsibility stand or fall together.'40
A cursory survey of the literature reveals a polarised view amongst philosophers as
to the capacity of corporations to exude morality. Those who believe that
corporations cannot be moral agents reject corporate criminal liability. However,
French has shown one way to retain the integrity of the nexus between morality
and criminality in relation to corporations. Yet again though, we confront the need
to be anthropomorphic in our attitude to corporations. We feel compelled to justify
the punishment of corporations on the same basis as individuals. Here though the
conceptual barriers are not insurmountable as French has shown. Locating the
mind of corporation in its policies and practices seems a sensible and logical step.
It takes us away from applying fault to the corporation through the mental state of
individuals within towards a more intrinsically corporate approach. In accepting
collective morality, it is axiomatic that we demand the same standards of morality
from corporations as we can from individuals.41 Even in surmounting the
seemingly fundamental problem of morality, we happen upon further policy
40
Surber, n. 35 at p. 85.
41
Donaldson, n. 19 at p. 18.
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problems which are unique to corporations. This chapter attempts to identify and
analyse the problems which punishing the corporate criminal entails and to suggest
a number of alternative possibilities. The limitations of our approach so far can be
transcended by not only a pluralist approach punishing both the corporation and the
individual wrongdoer within it but, also a system where the options are far more
extensive than simply fining the corporation.
4.1 Punishment Of The Corporation And The Problem Of Overspill Of The
Sanction
One of the primary concerns of criminologists, and jurists generally, has been the
desire to avoid overspill of the punishment to innocent parties. This is particularly
pertinent in respect of corporate crime. Lederman is hugely critical of the
imposition of corporate criminal liability both in principle and because it 'imposes
the burden of the sanction on individuals whose involvement in the transgression
has not been proven and whose sole fault lies in their being part of a group
connected to the offender.'42 Potential recipients undeserving of punishment can
be said to include shareholders, employees and fellow corporations.
Different viewpoints emerge as to the true nature of the shareholders' involvement
in the corporation. Whilst shareholder control is the orthodox view of the
controlling corporations,43 there is a considerable consensus emerging that
corporate democracy is 'phoney'44 or at any rate that there are considerable
limitations on shareholder influence.45 Berle and Means classically viewed control
and ownership of the corporation as being divorced and that 'the 'owner' of
industrial wealth is left with a mere symbol of ownership while the power, the
responsibility and the substance which have been an integral part of ownership in
the past are being transferred to a separate group in whose hands lie control.'46
42
E. Lederman, 'Criminal Law, Perpetrator and Corporation: Rethinking A Complex Triangle'
1985 76 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 285-340 at p. 324.
43
C. A. Riley, 'Controlling Corporate Management: UK And US Initiatives' 1994 14 2 Legal
Studies 244-265 at p. 244.
44
Henning in Nader and Green, n. 16 at pp. 162-3.
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Lee,'Corporate Criminal Responsibility' 1928 28 Columbia L. R. 181-200 at p. 187.
46
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Flynn claims that most shareholders are merely speculators trading shares.47 There
is however a strand of opinion that suggests that Berle and Means' model is largely
48
inapplicable in modern society with the growth of institutional shareholders,
though there is some debate as to whether these investors are interested in acting as
monitors or able to operate fully under their own regulatory regimes. Certainly,
there is limited evidence of growing activism on the part of institutional
shareholders. For the most part the view is that they leave unreformed and
unscathed those who produce profits for their investments.49
Winn suggests that our concern for overspill to shareholders is somewhat
overstated. He argues that,
'Too much weight has been given in the discussion of public policy in
relation to the imposition of corporate liability for crime, to the
argument that since the law has prescribed certain definitive penalties
which are to be incurred only by offenders having guilty knowledge
and guilty intent, the innocent members of offending corporations
ought not to be amenable to those penalties. They are not in fact
subjected to such penalties in their personal but only in their corporate
capacity; on the criminal conviction of a corporation no stockholder
goes to prison unless he has abetted or otherwise involved himself in
the criminal act, no individual pays the fine imposed. The sanction is
borne distributively, in the same proportion as the fruits of the
illegitimate enterprise have, or might have, been enjoyed. Nor does the
penalty fall any harder on shareholders than on the innocent families of
convicts who are not corporations.'50
Lederman rejects the similarities of the stockholder to the family member. She
does so on the basis that the suffering of the family member is peripheral whereas
on the stockholder the punishment is direct. The devotion of a family member may
make them ready and willing to share the punishment, shareholders by definition
sustain a higher sense of injustice because they are not.51 Lederman also argues
that only a few policy decisions on which the criminal liability may be based
47
Nader and Green, n. 16 at p. 98.
48
Geis and Dimento in Pearce and Snider (Eds.), Corporate Crime: Contemporary Debates,
(1995), at p. 125.
49
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50
Winn, 'The Criminal Responsibility OfOrganisations' 1929 3 Cambridge L. J. 398-415 at p. 412.
51
Lederman, n. 42 at p. 322; One can ameliorate overspill by collecting in instalments (Kennedy,
'Criminal Sentences For Corporations: Alternative Fining Mechanisms' 1985 73 California L. R.
443-482 at p. 455).
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require shareholder approval. Her arguments are twofold; first she contends that
the stockholders should not be burdened with liability for the reckless or
52
intentional conduct of the directors or the managers and secondly,
'that individual stockholders of small amounts in large corporations
lack the power to control or supervise-directly or indirectly- the
activities of the entity. Stockholders have only scanty knowledge of
the corporate structure, the flow of daily transactions, the process of
decision making and the [performance of those who fulfil the directive
or managerial positions. The physical separation of the stockholders
from each other and from the corporation, their inability to
communicate with one another, the complexity of business
transactions, and their minimal amount of knowledge offered by the
entity to the stockholders has caused stockholders' power to be merely
theoretical and has made the argument concerning their ability to
53control the corporation fictional.'
According to Lederman, there is no reason to punish those who did not participate
in the prohibited act and who, in most cases, did not even have power to prevent
it.54 Others too see little merit in punishing shareholders. Leigh, for example,
claims that 'any system of sanctions which depends for its efficacy upon
stimulating shareholder control as a means of ensuring that managerial officers will
suffer detriment as a result of criminal conduct is unlikely to prove satisfactory'55
Shareholders simply cannot be relied upon to bring about reform after conviction.56
According to Kennedy, 'the average shareholder is nearly powerless to monitor or
control management. Many such enterprises can be described as management
controlled, without a single stockholder of sufficient stature to form the nucleus of
a vote that could challenge management. Even close corporations may have a
number of powerless stockholders, while the major stockholders in closely held
firms ordinarily hold positions in management and could as easily be coerced
through sanctions aimed directly at individual managers.'57 Others naturally hope
that the corporate gadfly- a minority shareholder who utilises his position to
influence a more ethical approach- may operate to constrain illegal conduct.
52
Lederman, n. 42 at p. 319.
53
Lederman, n. 42 at p. 320.
54
Lederman, op cit. n. 42 at p. 321.
55
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Spillover of the sanction to the shareholder may be acceptable because it is
believed that investors view stockholding as a risk including risk of criminal
58
liability but as Glasbeek notes 'limited liability obviously encourages people to
invest who do not wish to be directly responsible for the operation of the
enterprise.'59 Vaughan cautiously argues for a balance of stockholders' interests
and the public interest but offers little in the way how that may be achieved.60
Slapper draws the parallel with municipal corporations paying fines with
taxpayers' money and argues that it is only fair that those who own the company
should pay the penalty.61 Certainly, if stockholders are made more aware of fines
62
they can be a useful deterrent. However, any system of corporate liability must
have as its principal target the collectivity. The constituent members of that
collectivity undoubtedly share the punishment. Such punishment may act as an
additional incentive for shareholders to take a more active interest in the conduct of
the enterprise but realistically, in the larger organisations only major shareholders,
or institutions can be expected to have any real influence over the conduct of the
corporation. There may even be a case for additional direct prosecution of
individual shareholders who have controlling interests in large corporations.63
Concern for the shareholder in all the circumstances appears misplaced. There can
be no escaping the fact that ownership confers responsibilities as well as rights.64
Overspill of the sanction to the shareholder, if it is any problem at all, is simply an
inevitable consequence of association and in some circumstances a beneficial by¬
product of punishing the corporation.
58
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Overspill of sanction may not simply be an issue pertinent to shareholders but may
also impinge upon employees, senior executives and officers of the company.
Conversely, Fisse argues that the imposition of corporate criminal liability may
avoid the imposition of unfair managerial liability and in that sense is 'may uphold
the distributive principle of desert.'65 Fisse nevertheless accepts that the criminal
law 'is capable of operating very harshly in several areas of direct relevance to the
position of corporate officers and employees.'66 Lower level employees may be
67
the tools rather than the responsible originators of the violate conduct. It seems
only fitting in those circumstances that enforcement efforts should be directed at a
68
more senior level. In respect of individual managers/officers, Kraakman argues
for 'gatekeeper liability' which imposes some of the burden upon executives to
prevent wrongdoing.69 Our concern should be to ensure that only those truly
'innocent' are spared sanction. Elsewhere in this thesis, I have argued for the
retention of individual liability and punishment where that is appropriate. Those
who assume high managerial office or directorship must do so in the knowledge
that with the 'territory' comes considerable responsibility. Their actions and
failings may ultimately lead to criminal sanction. This however is not the
argument of overspill. That argument is rooted in the notion that in punishing the
corporation others are harmed. In my opinion that should occasion us little concern
where those who suffer indirectly are senior executives, directors and shareholders.
It is simply an inevitable consequence of being attached to, or identified with, the
collectivity.
65
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4.2 Some Elementary Problems Of Corporate Punishment
Various procedural issues arise in respect of punishment. For example, Bergman
notes the absence of court reports on the circumstances of the corporate offender
70
and contrasts this with the position of the individual offender. The absence of
accurate information is not conducive to the imposition of a just punishment. In
addition the sanction must seek to strike a very fine balance. As Wickham
explains,
'The legal constraint, then, must achieve two often contradictory goals.
On the one hand, it must be severe enough to maintain the legitimacy
of the State. On the other, it must not be too severe as to diminish
substantially the contribution of large corporations to growth in output
and employment..Thus whereas corporations attempt to maximise
profits subject to market and state constraints, the state must pursue
objectives subject to the options and trade-offs that are created through
the historical development of productive relationships and the need to
71
satisfy diverse economic interests.'
There is also the question as to whether corporations and individual corporate
actors should be prosecuted at the same trial. In addition the standard of jurors'
72
knowledge has also been criticised in white collar crime trials. Prosecutors face a
73
great deal of complexity in confronting corporate crime, and there are undoubted
problems in presenting complex cases to jurors.74 Prosecutors may be deterred
75from enforcement because of the costs involved though Cullen et al. suggest that
prosecutors are more likely to be affected by the pragmatic considerations as to
• 76
whether they can win. Further problems can be confronted within the courtroom
following resolution of the question of guilt. Judicial sentencing is often a tension
7ft
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between the judge's sense of duty to society and his concern for the individual
77defendant. Judges sympathetic to the positioning of the corporation recognise
78
that one error can ruin companies. Conversely, judges antagonistic to
corporations might also be a problem.79 Irrespective of all this it is fairly well
established that 'Sentencing judgements respond to a broad array of considerations
whose relative weights and underlying justifications are rarely spelled out.'80
Kovel views criminal penalties as too 'blunt' a weapon; juries are too reluctant to
impose heavy penalties on first offenders 'because of misapplied criminality, the
81
apparatus of apprehension and proof is complicated and pointlessly burdensome.'
Bergman claims that corporate criminals responsible for death and injury in the
workplace benefit from a threefold immunity in the system. First there is
inadequacy in the investigation and policing, secondly there is an advisory style of
enforcement which fails to punish many and finally there is the 'failure of the
system to develop sentencing procedures and a wider option of sanctions so that
the courts can punish, rehabilitate or deter corporate offenders. Whilst courts have
a wealth of sentencing options for individual offenders the only penalty that can be
imposed against company is a fine. In addition there appears to be no rational
method, indeed no method at all, by which the courts come to determine the level
82
of fine.' Poor sentencing may be a continuum of poor policing and poor
83
prosecution. Carson also believes that it is at the practical level of the law in
action that the white collar criminal enjoys substantial immunity.84 The corporate
criminal 'can often mobilise highly effective resources to protect his moral and
• • • 85
legal propriety in the event of action being taken against him in the courts.'
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86
Private prosecution is difficult and costly and as such limited reliance can be
placed upon the public to enforce the law or instigate complaints. The State must
87
take a central role, but even where it does so, there is an almost inegalitarian fight
of Government with finite resources in individual prosecutions and corporations
88
prepared to fight to the death. Corporations usually have advantages over all
89
potential legal adversaries. Braithwaite's conception of further inegalitarian
consequences is predicated on the notion in an attempt to capture corporate
criminals the whole web of law is expanded and as a consequence more loopholes
are created. The corporation is most able to benefit because they 'can turn the web
of law to their advantage and to the disadvantage of 'irrational' consumers and
workers.90 Corporations can also exploit transnational differences in law.91
Accordingly, one recognises a number of preliminary problems which may require
to be addressed. Tackling them however is not central to this thesis or the outline
model in chapter 6. Recognition of them as problems is important for all that.
4.3 Corporations And The Theory Of Punishment
Just Deserts Or Utilitarianism
It is generally accepted that criminal law engenders several often contradictory
goals. Those differing objectives undoubtedly exercise much influence over both
the nature and extent of criminal sanctions to be applied to the corporate form.
Any penological framework requires to evidence those goals thought desirable.
The theory of just deserts dictates that criminal should be punished because they
deserve to be punished and that the quantum of their suffering should be in
92
proportion to the seriousness of their crime. Kantian desert dictates that,
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'Judicial punishment can never be used merely as a means to promote
some other good for the criminal himself or for civil society, but instead it
must in all cases be imposed on him only on the ground that he has
committed a crime; for a human being can never be manipulated merely as
a means to the purposes of someone else and can never be confused with
the objects of the law of things. His innate personality (that is his rights as
a person) protects him against such treatment, even though he may be
condemned to lose his civil personality. He must first be found deserving
of punishment for himself or for his fellow citizens. The law concerning
punishment is a categorical imperative, and woe to him who rummages
around in the winding paths of theory of happiness looking for some
advantage to be gained by releasing the criminal from punishment or by
reducing the amount of it.'93
Proportionality of punishment has three elements- choice, blameworthiness, and
proportionality of individual punishments to each other and to the underlying
severity of the offence.94 According to Von Hirsch, desert theory relies upon the
idea of a fair distribution of benefits and burdens.95 He argues that,
'When the principle of proportionality is disregarded, offenders are
unfairly visited, through the penalties imposed on them, with more
implicit blame (or less) than the actual blameworthiness of their
conduct warrants.'96
The Kantian just deserts philosophy is attacked by Bentham's utilitarian theory of
punishment. Davis has also argued that we should adopt a utilitarian approach to
97 98
punishment without doing so 'retributivism is at best vacuous.' Utilitarianism
is predicated on the actual or probable consequences of the punishment. Davis
contends that 'the criminal law would have no use where people were not more or
less rational where, that is, people did not adjust their acts to take into account
possible consequences.'99 However, it has been argued that, 'Neither the
179. The benefits/burdens theory of desert is attributed to Kant and 'focuses on the unjust
advantage the offender has obtained in failing to refrain to restrain himself while benefiting from
the restraint of others, the magnitude of the punishment should reflect the extent of the advantage'
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retributive theory of punishment nor the utilitarian theory entails as such any
specific principles of criminal liability. So far as the retributive theory is
concerned, the question that arises is whether it seeks to pay back the individual for
the harm he has done, for the consequences of his conduct, or whether it seeks in
some way to redress his moral guilt, where this is conceived as something
independent of the outward consequences of his actions.'100
Braithwaite argues that approximate even handedness in the way the powerful and
the powerless are punished can be approached but only if just deserts is rejected as
the rationale for punishment.101 In his view utilitarian policies can achieve greater
even-handedness. According to Braithwaite, utilitarianism offers the possibility of
redressing such a situation on the basis that the corporation alone can correct the
standard operating procedure and as such where the impact of the sanction can be
most effective. Alternatively, utilitarian principles may dictate that punishment
might be best directed at the individual because to sanction the corporation might
be overly harmful. In certain circumstances deterrence might be better achieved by
punishing the individual wrongdoer. In contrast, just deserts dictates that it would
not be fair to blame just the corporation when there are guilty individuals and
similarly it would be unfair simply to blame individuals where additionally there
102
was corporate fault. Such analysis inevitably leads to attempting to determining
the apportionment of punishment between the individual and the corporation. Who
deserves punishment more? Unlike deserts, utilitarianism can cater for situations
where the penalty is likely to bankrupt the company.103 Moreover just deserts can
lead to the imposition of a penalty which simply does not deter. Braithwaite
concludes that, 'The difference is that whereas our attainment of utilitarian goals is
very imperfect, the quest for just deserts is worse than imperfect; it is
counterproductive. Social structured realities allow us to impose desert only when
desert is least deserved. Through adopting justice as a goal, we increase
100
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injustice.'104 In the process he rejects a dual system and argues that utilitarianism
should be adopted for both common crime and white collar crime. Braithwaite
canvasses three options- utilitarian goals with desert as the constraint, desert as the
goal with utilitarianism as the constraint, or alternatively both being weighed
conjointly without either acting as a constraint on the other. He is critical of them
all. Braithwaite claims a total commitment to uniformity and consistency in the
treatment of corporate offenders should be eschewed on the basis that it is
financially inexpedient.106 Instead he proposes that just deserts be forgotten in
order to get some corporations to co-operate with regulatory agencies.107
Braithwaite challenges the just deserts philosophy of Von Hirsh which advocates
primacy to equality and uniformity of sentencing with crime prevention as a
secondary goal. He is equally critical of the theorists who argue for primacy to be
accorded to crime prevention with a secondary goal being uniformity of
sentencing. In Braithwaite's view primacy should be accorded to reduction of risk
to human health and that equity considerations should never constrain that primary
108
goal. Desert as a basis for punishment throws up several conundrums. Not least
among them is, in respect of individuals, how much punishment is due to the senior
corporate actor oblivious to the wrongdoing but nonetheless accountable for it.
Utilitarianism of course is straightforward; punishment should be meted out
because it will deter others. Parker explains that,
'The perceived conflict between deterrence and proportionality arises
from the idea that deterrence-based penalties are determined solely by
their deterrent effect on persons other than the offender. Hence, the
philosophical objection is that the individuals punished are being
treated merely as the means to some other objective, rather than as
moral ends in themselves. There is no objective to organizational
penalties, as organizations are not moral ends, but simply instruments
for the achievement of other objectives...109 'the gain-based penalties of
classical deterrence will eventually conflict with the competing goal of
'proportionality' among penalties. Due to the basic disconnection
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between the gain measure for penalties and the underlying differences
(or similarities) in offence severity.'110
Deterrence or retribution ?
Corporate criminal punishment may also be premised on the basis of retribution.
Woolfson, Foster and Beck argue for appropriateness of sanction and that
considerable harm should be met with considerable sanctions. According to them,
'Ultimately the punishment of a corporation misconduct is necessary, not because
it is a deterrent, but because it is the emphatic denunciation of a crime..it is critical
for a society to state that the negligent treatment of employees, the endangering of
the workforce, is unacceptable.'111 Stoner argues that 'Legal theorists must stop
ignoring the real value of retribution, which is a balancing influence in our
112
system.' Despite the recognition of retribution as legitimate goal of criminal
punishment, deterrence dominates as the rationale for punishing corporations.
Fisse explains why deterrence rather than retribution lies at the root of much of the
jurisprudence of corporate crime. He notes that,
'retribution has been widely criticised as a justification for punishment,
but to accept this as an explanation would be to underrate the
theoretical and popular support which retributive theories of
punishment still command. A more plausible explanation is that the
general justifying aims of retribution are inapposite in the case of
corporations and, more significantly, that retribution requires desert in
distribution, whereas punishment applied to a corporation almost
invariably harms numerous shareholders and other persons who are not
113
responsible and hence do not deserved to be punished.'
It has been claimed that 'while the primary aim of corporate criminal sanctions is
deterrence, there may also be some retributive limitations on the pursuit of this
goal, and the courts as well as legislatures will likely continue to require some
'10
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blameworthiness on the part of the defendant in the vast majority of cases.'"4
Byam argues that only deterrence is appropriate to corporate entities.1"
Retributive justice require corporations to be punished because of the unfair
advantage that they would otherwise accumulate through corporate crime."6 Is
retribution incompatible with deterrence ?"7 According to Fisse, the general
preventive aims of corporate criminal responsibility are broadly the same as for
individual criminal responsibility -socialisation, maintenance of respect for the law,
118
habit -building and provision of a rationale for conformity. Fisse says that 'The
most important aim served by corporate criminal responsibility is probably
deterrence...whether upon the particular offender subject to sentence ('special
deterrence') or prospective offenders generally ('general deterrence').'"9 He goes
on to explain the particular, but indirect, deterrent effects desired by corporate
punishment claiming that
'Coercive force is applied indirectly to officers, employees,
shareholders and others as a result of lower corporate profits(as though
less generous salaries, bonuses or perquisites), reduced corporate
prestige, or internal discipline ..Perhaps more importantly, there is also
the threat of detection and conviction per se, whether of the corporate
employer or, in the event of internal discipline, the employee
himself.'120
Bergman claims that 'Offending companies should be subject to sentences that are
commensurate with the seriousness of the crime, likely to deter others and to
prevent recidivism. At present the penalties imposed by the courts completely fail
• 121
to achieve these aims.' However, it has been argued that
'It is by no means generally accepted that deterrence alone is sufficient
to justify regulating corporate activities through criminal sanctions.
The common imposition of an intent requirement ..and the ..recognition
114
'Developments In The Law: Corporate Crime, Regulating Corporate Behaviour Through
Criminal Sanction', 1979 Harvard Law Review 1229-1375, at p. 1241
115
Byam, n. 100 at p. 582.
116
Fisse, 'Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault And Sanctions'
1982 56 Southern California L. R. 1141-1246 at p. 1171.
117
See Fisse, n. 116 at pp. 1180-1.
118
Fisse, n. 66 at p. 391.
119
Fisse, n. 66 at pp. 370
120
Fisse, n. 66 at p. 370-1; cf. B. D. Baysinger, 'Organisation Theory And The Criminal Liability
OfCorporations' 1991 71 Boston University L. R. 341-376 at p. 355
121
Bergman, n. 70 at p. 1313.
182
of the dichotomy between regularity aims and the criminal law, all
indicate the preference for some retributive element in statutes
imposing corporate criminal liability. Thus while the primary aim of
corporate criminal sanctions is deterrence, there may be some
retributive limitations on the pursuit of this goal, and courts as well as
legislatures will likely continue to require some blameworthiness on
122
the part of the defendant in the vast majority of cases.'
Fisse rehearses various reasons why corporate criminal liability is necessary for the
purposes of deterrence of criminal conduct:- organisational secrecy; the number of
suspects; corporate negligence; corporate profits; corporate surrogacy of
responsibility; distinct corporate offences; and the fact that some corporate
123
personnel are beyond the jurisdiction of the prosecuting authorities. Deterrence
is most likely when sanctions are congruent with values they are intended to have
an impact on.124 It is argued that deterrence can be effected by fines because the
125
corporation is a profit maximisation unit. Fisse explains his rationale by saying
'In bureaucratic practice, if not in classical economic theory, corporations are
• • 126 •
agencies having non-monetary as well as monetary goals' 'This is not to say
that the values ofmoney power and prestige are not disjoined, in practice, pursuit
127of any one tends to promote the others.' Fisse explains the relationship between
deterrence and rehabilitation and incapacitation suggesting that,
'if deterrence is a goal distinct from rehabilitation and incapacitation- a
concept which now appears prevalent- then rehabilitation and
incapacitation are discrete civil goals that provide no foundation for
corporate criminal law. But to treat rehabilitation and incapacitation as
distinct from deterrence when applied to corporate criminal law is to
entertain a misconception. Policy revision, internal disciplinary
control, and procedural action- the forms of rehabilitation and
incapacitation that are most practical and useful in preventing corporate
128crime - are sub-goals of deterrence.'
Restitution
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129
Restitution is increasingly being advanced as a objective of criminal justice.
Restitution, compensation and restoration may also be important in the context of
corporate criminal liability.130 Zedner explains the transition from the traditional
perspective by noting that,
'We are accustomed to seeing criminal justice as the repressive arm of
the state, but might it not better be conceived as one end of a
continuum of practices by which social order is maintained ?
Punishment has a very limited ability to control crime and to the extent
that it is disintegrative, it inflicts further damage on society. Given that
the high profile 'law and order policies' of the past decade have done
little to stem spiralling crime figures, perhaps it is time to explore
131
integrative potential of reparative justice on its own terms.' The use
of corporate criminal responsibility to achieve remedial as well as penal
aims has its roots principally in the major development of regulatory
offences.'132
Zedner points a the paradoxical simultaneous renaissance of retributive and
133
reparative models of justice. She welcomes the attempts to bridge the gap
between the two in the process questioning 'the usefulness of this dichotomised
approach to penal theory.'134 The re-emergence of reparative justice represents a
're-assertion of populist right of participation' linked to a perception of failure on
the part of punishment within the criminal justice system.135 As Zedner recognises,
reparative justice demands,
'the abandonment of culpability of the offender as the central focus of
sentencing and in its place...much closer attention to harm. It would
reconceive crimes less as the willed contraventions of an abstract moral
code enshrined in law but, more importantly, as signals of social
136
dysfunction inflicting harm on victims..as well as society.'
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It is desirable that reparation should involve both material and symbolic
elements.137 Despite its re-emergence there are various criticism of reparative
justice- primarily based on the premise that it is not overtly punitive, and also the
expense on victim in asserting rights. There are further problems with reparative
justice- the ability of the rich to buy themselves out of punishment and also that it
allows the victim to influence sentencing and in so doing would damage
138
consistency.
What are we to make of theory of sanctions and how it influences our approach to
the corporate form ? Like so many of the theories endemic to corporate criminal
liability one is drawn inexorably by the strident articulation of commentators into a
position where one considers that one must make a choice. It is only by standing
back a little that one realises that no such choice is necessary. Our system already
seeks to strike an equilibrium between competing theories of criminal sanction.
All we need do is recognise that these theories exist, the tensions they create, and
resolve that in our scheme of corporate criminal liability we will recognise
retribution, deterrence and reparation as features of our newly invigorated
sanctioning regime.
4.4 Punishing The Corporate Criminal- A Brief American Perspective
The defining statute relative to corporate punishment in America of Federal
offences is the Sentencing Reform Act 1984. The Objectives of the 1984 Act are
'(1) the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote
respectfor the law, and to provide justpunishment
(2) the need to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct
(3) the need to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant;
and
(4) the need to provide the defendant with educational treatment in the
most efficient manner.'139
Under the Sentencing Reform Act 1984, the US Sentencing Commission was
required to prepare guidelines for the punishment of corporations (and individuals).
Zedner, n. 131 at p. 238.
138
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The process began in 1986. Both its first draft (published in 1989) and a revisal
published in 1990 were severely criticised as was its final adopted proposals in
1991.140 The United States Sentencing Commission's guiding principles for
corporate offences include the following -order the organisation to remedy any
harm caused by the offence; if the organisation operated primarily for a criminal
purpose, the fine should be set high enough to divest the organisation of all its
assets; the fine should be based on the seriousness of the offence and the
culpability of the organisation; corporate probation is an appropriate sanction if it
will ensure another sanction will be fully implemented or that steps will be taken
within the organisation to prevent repetition.141 The guidelines developed by the
Commission are now enshrined in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. In the
United States corporate fines can be up to $500,000 for misdemeanour resulting in
loss of life, and $200,000 for other offences (Class A misdemeanours) and $10,000
for other offences.142 In USA Federal sentencing procedures require a pre-
sentencing investigation into corporate offenders.143 The Act rejects publicity and
corporate imprisonment as sanctions but supports fines, forfeiture, notice to victims
and restitution and probation.144 Moreover, under the 1984 Act probation is seen
as a distinct sentence rather than a conditional suspension of some other sentence.
Equally importantly, it can be imposed along with another sentence.145 The Act
provides mandatory probation in certain circumstances and discretionary in others.
Discretionary probation must bear a reasonable relationship to the nature and
circumstances of the offence, the history and characteristics of the defendant and
the four goals of sentencing.146 Pre-sentence reports are prepared unless the court
renounces the need for such a report. There is scope for professional consultants to
be brought in if the courts need further information. Probation conditions can be
140
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reduced or enlarges and the court has the power to terminate probation before its
expiry. Likewise the court can extend the probation period. In addition
probationers must pay a fine, pay restitution or engage in community service. Both
the foregoing conditions are mandatory in all cases.147 The requirement to abide by
the law may be particularly problematic for corporate offenders, especially large
corporations 'this may result in a significant uncertainty on the part of firm
managers about the significance of other probation terms, and a corresponding
148
apathy about complying with those terms.' Gruner suggests it would be better to
insist on lawful compliance with a part of the enterprise or the prevention of crimes
of a similar nature.149
Civil penalties are applied in respect of health and safety law in America because
of the adoption of strict liability in relation to such offences.150 Treble damages
suits are also possible in USA.151 In America quo warranto actions can be raised
to revoke the corporate charter or restrict corporate activities. This amounts to
corporate death penalty. The action is brought by the State government. Morris
also notes the more aggressive enforcement of pollution control through what are
known as qui tarn action. Essentially, individuals bring private prosecutions
because under the particular pollution statute anyone providing information leading
to conviction may at the courts' discretion be awarded half the fine imposed as a
reward.153
The American Bar Association's own view of punishment is that,
'the sentence imposed should be no more severe than necessary to
achieve the societal purpose or purposes for which it is authorized. The
sentence imposed in each case should be the minimum sanction that is
consistent with the gravity of the offense, the culpability of the
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offender, the offender's criminal history, and his personal
characteristics.'134
Within those parameters, there is limited evidence of a more diversified strategy for
the punishment of the corporate criminal but perhaps not as one might imagine.
The foregoing provisions on probation are particularly instructive. Moreover, The
American Bar Association 'Standards for Criminal Justice' recognise the
possibility of judicial monitoring of corporations.153 The options in America still
do not show enormous enlightenment. The range of sanctions available though
more expansive than anywhere else in the world, do not include many other
possibilities proffered by commentators in the Anglo-American jurisdictions.
Consideration of those possibilities may open up a more efficacious and expansive
system of sanctions applicable to the corporate criminal.
4.5 Corporate Fines
The fine has been the obvious and preponderant sanction for corporate crime in all
jurisdictions.156 Its usage has been supported as the logical sanction given both the
organisational goals of corporations and perhaps given that most corporate crimes
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice Sentencing, (1994, 3rd Ed) Standard 18-6.1 at p. 219.
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18.2.8(a)(v) 'Continuing Judicial Oversight. Although courts lack the competence or capacity to
manage organisations, the preventative goals of the criminal law can in special cases justify a
limitedperiod ofjudicial monitoring ofthe Activities ofa convicted organization. Such oversight is
best implemented through the use of recognised reporting, record keeping, and auditing controls
designed to increase internal accountability-for example, audit committees, improved staffsystems
for the board ofdirectors, or the use ofspecial counsel-but it should not extend to judicial review of
the legitimate 'business judgment' decisions of the organization's management or its stockholders
or delay such decisions. Use of such special remedy should also be limited by the following
principle:
(A) As a precondition, the court could find either (1) that the criminal behaviour was serious,
repetitive, and facilitated by inadequate internal accounting or monitoring controls or (2) that a
clear andpresent danger exists to the public health or safety;
(B) The duration of such oversight should not exceed the five and two year limits specified in
standard 18.2.3 for probation conditions generally; and
(C) Judicial oversight should not be misused as a means for disguised imposition ofpenalties or
affirmative duties in excess ofthose authorised by the legislature.'
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Kennedy, n. 51 at p. 445. Fines developed as an alternative to physical punishment towards the
end of the 19th Century (D. W. Elliot, 'The Criminal Company' 1966 at p. 11). Fines are most
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are economic crimes.1:17 Fines are designed to inflict economic punishment rather
158
than extract profit making gain. Braithwaite offers one suggestion as to their
attraction in claiming that, 'Fines have a seducing mathematical attraction to those
who are concerned with equity in sentencing because of their quantitative
adjustability to the offenders means and the gravity of the offence.' For all that
'proponents of fines often succumb too readily to a national economic conception
of corporate crime. While a great deal of crime is committed for the sake of
corporate profit, a great deal is not.'159
Freiberg claims that though the fine is a common penalty it is subject to few
decisions which define the principles of its use.160 Having said this, she goes on to
note that conduct which seeks to make unfair profit is likely to incur harsher
penalties.161 Parker simply asserts that fines are scaled inconsistently in law and in
162
practice. Heilbroner goes further by suggesting that fines often have little
163
impact. There is a dilemma that if fines are too small they are easily absorbed, if
moderate they may simply be reflected in consumer prices, and if excessive the
corporation may suspend or transfer its activities.164
The three principle reasons for fines advanced by commentators are-that they are
cheaper to society, they can be used to compensate victim and, essentially that they
are a transfer payment involving no dead loss to society. The arguments often
arraigned against fines are that- they may be passed on,165 they do not incapacitate
the dangerous offender, they are difficult to define in a trade-offwith incarceration,
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and that reliance on fines is discriminatory against the poor.166 There are also those
who adopt a reverential attitude to the corporation and who argue that 'A system of
corporate penalties should avoid imposing punishment in a form or manner that
disrupts the competitive process that provides benefits to society as a whole.'
Posner supports fines as the optimal penalty for deterring corporate crime positing
that,
'In a social cost-benefit analysis of the choice between fining and
imprisoning the white collar criminal, the cost side of the analysis
favours fining because... the cost of collecting the fine from one who
can pay it is lower than the cost of imprisonment. On the benefit side,
there is no difference in principle between the sanctions. The fine for a
white collar criminal can be set at whatever level imposes the same
disutility on the defendant, and thus yield the same deterrence, as the
prison sentence that would have been imposed instead. Hence fining
the affluent offender is preferable to imprisoning him from society's
standpoint because it is less costly and no less efficacious'... 'In a
social cost-benefit analysis of the choice between fining and
imprisoning the white collar criminal, the cost side of the analysis
favours fining because..the cost of collecting a fine from one who can
pay it..is lower than the cost of imprisonment' and 'because the dollars
collected from the criminal as a fine show up on the benefit side of the
social ledger, the net social cost is limited to the costs of collecting the
fine.'168
Posner recognises the limitation of his view particularly, if one perceives that no
fine can be calibrated to equate to imprisonment. However, he argues that the
reality is that white-collar criminals simply don't get long sentences. Posner
believes that the argument that imprisonment by definition is more punitive than a
fine is 'fallacious.'169 Once a crime has been committed these costs to society
170become sunk costs lost forever. However, corporations are in a unique position
171
to repay society and as such those 'sunk 'costs can be internalised. It is in all
senses a rampant free marketeering philosophy. Parker is supportive of the
lft&
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economic analysis of penalties on the basis that the 'provide a sound basis for a
realistic and effective organizational sentencing policy that furthers the traditional
purposes of criminal punishment.'172 The 'Free Market' theory specifies an
optimal penalty equal to the total external harm or loss caused by an offence
(including the enforcement costs) divided by the probability that the offence would
173
be detected and punished. Coffee offers a less than veiled critique of the
economic intervention into penology claiming,
'Among economists, the tide of academic imperialism has reached full
flood. No longer content to focus the tools of their profession on the
traditional problems of economics, over the last dozen years they have
begun to analyse aspects of human behaviour not characterized by
market transactions. In so doing, economists have applied their central
premise that individuals engage in utility maximising behaviour to such
diverse fields as family planning, political participation, altruism and
Because organisations are mostly motivated by monetary considerations there is a
175belief that they are therefore likely to most responsive to monetary sanctions.
Lederman contends that non-economic sanctions are inappropriate for the
corporation.176 She defines economic sanctions as 'fines and supplementary
economic measures (which include forfeiture of profits, temporary or permanent
restraining orders, withdrawal of licences). Lederman contends that fines are the
most appropriate sanction because 'The purpose of corporations is economic profit
and business operations almost always benefit, directly or indirectly, from the
177criminal activity undertaken within the corporate framework.' However, she
rather extravagantly extrapolates that fines therefore appear to act as deterrents for
criminal negligence. Lederman herself accepts the paucity of this argument and
accepts that imposing fines on corporations does not always advance the goals of
178
punishment. This is so because pecuniary penalties are relatively low or because
Parker, n. 2 at p. 516
173
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174
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fines are an inappropriate sanction. Moreover, as suggested earlier fines may
simply result in a transference of the burden to the consumer.
The fine has major limitations if it is accepted that corporations can commit the full
gamut of offences.179 Acceptance of economic sanctions as the only possible
punishment inevitably limits the scope of corporate criminal liability. Of course,
the problem may be circumnavigated by there substitution of economic penalties
for other penalties where the offender is a corporation. This approach has limited
intellectual appeal. As Lederman points out as an approach it 'expresses a lack of
sensitivity to the real significance of the corporal punishment imposed by criminal
law in cases of severe offenses which recognizes and emphasizes that such
180violations cannot be absolved by monetary sanctions alone.'
Yoder argues that in order to equitable fines should reflect the magnitude of the
181harm and the size of the corporation. He suggests fixed percentages of corporate
profits as basis of imposition. Fisse notes the possibility of linking fines to
corporate profits but equally notes that amongst other things any enquiry into ill-
182
gotten profits would be fraught with accounting difficulties. Indeed there are a
183number of difficulties in scaling fines for corporations. According to Iseman the
• 184
structure and size of the corporate fines are often 'impotent and unjust.' Yoder
• • 185 | .
similarly claims that fines lack credibility because they are too low. They are
• 186
incapable of diminishing profits or damaging goodwill. In short they represent
(• • 187 • 188
'just another cost of doing business.' Moderate fines simply do not deter;
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larger fines will undoubtedly enhance deterrence. According to Kennedy, that
deterrence is achieved not through fear of the sanction or stigma, but by
withdrawing the motive.190 Some commentators argue that corporations should be
fined in proportion to their financial capacity.191 Bergman's view is that,
'Increasing fines- with the aid of corporate enquiry reports and 'unit fines' which
reflect more closely the wealth of the company is a much needed reform, but not
1Q?
the complete answer.' However, Gruner believes that simply elevating fines is
i no
unlikely to achieve the desired objective, not least because a deterrence trap may
ensue where the fine necessary is too big for corporation to pay.194 It is often a
cruel irony that the largest harm is usually caused by the firms that can least afford
to pay for it.195 Bixby notes that options include linking the fine of the corporation
either on the loss or gained occasioned by the illegality.196 Alternatively, one
might base a fine on the severity of the crime with a multiplier of the number of
executives involved or the size of the gain in the illegality. However, Glasbeek is
critical of using a multiplier of the illegal gain as a basis of calculating fines
claiming that, 'If used, this calculus would lead to the imposition of enormous
197
penalties, frequently in excess of the assets of the deviant corporation.'
Nonetheless as Hills argues, 'If the only legitimate consideration is corporate
profitability ..the use of cost benefit analysis provides an impersonal and
198
economically rational tool to help shape corporate decision-making.'
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Fisse expresses unease at the usage of the fine as the sole sanction in punishing
corporate crime on the basis that it is 'flat earth 'thinking to suppose that the range
of options begins and ends with fines.199 His principle concerns about fines are
that they convey an impression of ability to purchase crime at a price;200 their
•
• 201
incongruence with deterrence; and his believe that they cannot bring about
catalytic deterrence.202 There is no guarantee that the company will take self-
regulatory or internal action.203 The courts are unwilling to set fines high enough
and, even if they did, some companies could not pay is they were set high enough
to deter.204 Fines are 'a monetary threat which is not well tuned to the non-
205
financial values that partly govern organizational decision-making.'
Importantly, sub-unit goals and personnel goals may differ from the organisational
goal of profit-making 206 As we have noted earlier in this chapter, fines may also
create an overspill problem.207 Coffee claims 'when the corporation catches a cold,
someone else sneezes.'
Coffee's principal criticism is that the 'cash fine system chiefly functions in the
case of corporations as a kind of public morality tax, but not a deterrent threat.
Alternative sanctions are desperately required.'208 The search for those alternatives
should not obscure the fact that in appropriate circumstances the fine is an
extremely useful sanction.
Equity Fines
As an alternative, and in response to some of the more serious criticisms of fines as
a sanction, Coffee proffers the equity fine where the response is to issue more
shares in the corporation either to those harmed by the corporation's wrongdoing,
Fisse, n. 116 at p. 1243
200
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to the State, or to some other organisation.209 His rationale is inter alia that this
reduces (1) the overspill problem (2) the nullification problem may be reduced as
the latent threat of fines to the employees and the community dependant on the
corporation is no longer present (3) much higher penalties can be imposed (4) the
manager's interest is better aligned with the corporation. Coffee notes the impact
that equity fines have on the unjust enrichment of the corporation but no matter
how much the corporation gains from its illegal activities they flow to the new
stockholders pro rata210 This might be of double importance in respect of a new
211
fledgling corporation because the equity fine targets future earnings. The equity
fine might also permit the appointment of new directors but Coffee expresses some
212
scepticism as to the particular benefits of this.
Kennedy supports Coffee's idea of equity fines arguing that 'Even a small equity
fine could in some circumstances significantly alter the balance of control within
213
an enterprise.' The infusion of new blood into the ownership of the company
may reap significant rewards. One of the beneficial features of the equity fine is
that it will dilute the stock options held by directors. Another option discussed by
Kennedy is the pass through fine where each shareholder pays a pro-rata proportion
of any fine levied against the corporation. Shareholders could sell part of their
holding to raise their part of the fine.214 The great advantage is the lack of damage
to the corporation and its workforce; there is no loss of jobs and no diminution of
the share value. Such a sanction can be applied to fall on shareholders at the time
of the violation rather than the existing shareholders who pay cash or equity
215fines. Kennedy perceives that disgruntled shareholders are likely to exert
influence on managers thus promoting private policing of corporate crime. Of
course, such a system has significant logistical problems especially amongst small
shareholders. Corporate managers may try to mollify shareholders by declaring
Coffee, n. 68; see also Glasbeek, n. 59 at p. 136
210
Coffee, n. 68 at p. 419
211
Coffee, n. 68 at p. 420
212
Coffee, n. 68 at p. 421
213
Kennedy, n. 51 at p. 466
214
Kennedy, n. 51 at pp. 468-9
215
Kennedy, n. 51 at p. 470
195
216
special dividend to cover losses. Kennedy's final suggestion is for superadded
liability which breaks through the wealth barrier of the corporation. If the
corporation cannot pay the fine then the shareholders pay in proportion to their
shareholding the difference. Kennedy argues that,
'Limited liability operates very differently in the context of criminal
fines. The criminal fine is not fundamentally a compensatory payment.
It is rather a mechanism for the prevention of undesirable conduct.
Where limited liability blocks the operation of fine, there is no
217
reallocation of a compensatory insurance burden.'
Superadded liability would naturally prove more significant for institutional and
larger shareholders. Would this approach inhibit investment ? Kennedy suggests
an insurance scheme for those investors who do not participate in management of
218
the company.
All of these schemes suffer from the basic problem that allocation of a penalty via
... 219
corporate equity is problematic because corporate equity is manipulable.
However, the benefit is that this type of fine could be tuned to create a statutory list
220 •of beneficiaries. Its single greatest advantage is that it raises the upper limit of
the punishment and could prove,
'Useful as punitive stock dilution orders would be as a means of
outflanking the deterrence trap, standing alone they could not be
expected to overcome the other major limitations of fines or monetary
penalties against corporations (namely circumvention of individual
accountability, lack of congruence with non-financial values in
organizational decision-making, and non-assurance of organizational
reform).'221
4.6 Imprisonment
One of the oft quoted reasons for a denial of the efficacy and propriety of corporate
criminal liability is the inability to punish the corporation in the way that an
individual can be punished. No where is this more evident than in the context of
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217
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the sanction of imprisonment. There are those theorists who believe that even
were imprisonment possible it is neither the most appropriate or efficacious
sanction to impose upon the corporation. Conversely, there are those who believe
that the corporations' liberty may be infringed in a way that imprisonment imposes
223
an analogous burden on the individual. As outlined earlier Posner expounds a
free market economist perspective which supports the imposition of fines as the
optimum penalty for corporate crime.224 Deterrence in Coffee's view is only
225
achieved where the 'expected punishment cost' exceeds the 'expected gain.'
Coffee is hostile to Posner's approach arguing that imprisonment is a greater
deterrent than a fine in absolute terms and that no amount of adjustment of the
226
penalty can offset the threat of going to jail. Spiegelhoff represents the schism
between Coffee and Posner as illustrating the need for a mixed system of sanctions
which calls for individual sanctions for individuals and corporate sanctions for the
227
corporation.
One solution might be to replicate the essence of imprisonment of the individual
and seek to apply that to the corporation. That replication may come in the form of
civil restraint. Frankel suggests that civil restraint is likely to be a sanction of ever
228
increasing importance. Whether that will be so in respect of corporations
remains debatable. There is the fundamental problem of balancing the need for
corporate freedom with the needs of society to prevent the corporations from
engaging in certain harmful activities. Where they prove incapable of doing so,
some form of restraint may prove to be a suitable and appropriate penalty. That
222
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restraint may have geographic, or temporal dimension or simply be related to
activities hitherto engaged in by the corporation. Certain other sanctions discussed
under para 4.8 below might, because of the restrictions they place on the
corporation, also be analogous to imprisonment. Our motivation should be to
develop efficient and effective sanctions applicable to the corporate form. Civil
restraint might well be part of such a framework. Its resemblance to imprisonment
of the individual is, in that context, merely coincidental.
4.7 Corporation Dissolution
Whilst it smacks of the preoccupation with individualism noted by many
commentators, there has been an attempt to equate other individual sanctions with
practical possibilities for the corporate form. One imagines that the death penalty,
possible for individuals, may have eluded such attempts. However, in many
respects it remains one of the easier punishments to replicate in respect of the
corporate form; corporate dissolution readily stands comparison. Lederman offers
support for the concept of corporate liquidation arguing that 'There is no
justification for the existence of a corporation which operates and advances its
229business goals by way of regular and frequent criminal activity.' However, she
sees such a step being taken after individual perpetrators have been prosecuted.
Lederman describes dissolution as the 'most extreme preventative measure
230available.' Dissolution may of course be problematic in that shareholders may
231
reconstitute the company under a different guise following dissolution. It may
not be nearly as effective as preventing the company and its officers from carrying
232
on illegal activities. One way round the problem of reconstitution is might be to
disqualify shareholders form reconstituting but this inevitably would be fraught
233with difficulties. Rafalko proposes 'corporate beheading' entailing a complete
reorganisation of the corporate decision making apparatus and the dissolution of
shareholders stock for all shareholders who possess more than one percent of the
Lederman, n. 42 at p. 323
230
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231
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stock with this stock turned over to the employees.234 Dissolution therefore has
considerable appeal as the ultimate sanction. We must reserve the right to dissolve
the corporation where its conduct is so reprehensible or its structures prove
incapable of reform. We do no less for less serious reasons in the realms of
company law and indeed, voluntary reconstruction or reconstitution are often
resorted to. Any system of State induced dissolution must entail the safeguard
against reconstitution under a different guise. Perhaps one solution is to impose
individual criminal liability on anyone who attempts to reconstitute a dissolved
corporation in an attempt to circumvent the court ordered dissolution.
4.8 Forfeiture And Other Sanctions
Forfeiture is another potential sanction against corporate criminals. Lederman
argues for supplementary sanctions against the corporation including forfeiture of
profits. She describes this as a convergence of the criminal law and the law of torts
235and justifiable on the principle of 'restoration.' One note of caution is that 'In
using forfeiture as an instrument to abrogate illegal profits care should be taken not
to affect the rights of the parties from whom the profits or goods were illegally
acquired. The power of forfeiture should be constrained in circumstances where
the original owner requests return of what has been appropriated from him, or its
equivalent.'236
Stone groups certain sanctions under the heading of other 'authoritative
deprivations'-ineligibility to receive public funds, the loss of accreditation, licence,
237
or charter. These strategies naturally operate ex-post facto. Yoder also
canvasses other corporate punishments including corporate quarantine. One
problem with that is that it fails to protect contractual and other obligations to
238 239
innocent third parties. Fisse offers the idea of corporate preventive orders.
Such an order is known in health and safety law but not as a widespread general
234
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order. An order would be akin to an injunction or interdict. He envisages
preventive reports being laid before the courts before the order is made and the
order to be the subject of regulatory enforcement. Fisse also argues for publication
of the making of such orders.240 A corporation would be the subject of a
preventive order when there was a likelihood of the offence being committed in the
future. According to Fisse, likelihood implies no fixed degree of risk. It will be a
variable factor according to the magnitude of potential harm. Breach of preventive
orders would attach individual and corporate criminal responsibility.241 However,
restricting a corporation's sphere of activity is in the view of Lederman 'a drastic
measure that should be used rarely.'242
Divestiture is another possibility in the search for new innovative sanctions.243
Public ownership might be yet another means of controlling corporate crime.
However, corporate crime might be as prevalent in public enterprises as it is in
private enterprises. It would simply be fallacious to believe that public ownership
would ensure social responsibility.
The utilisation of such non-legal 'sanctions' has been emphasised by Charny.244
Coffee also believes that a mixed system of legal and non-legal sanctions is to be
preferred.245 Coffee's suggestion is an arbitrage capacity in the Free Market
approach to sentencing. Coffee's model suggests that the convicted offender might
be asked prior to sentencing as to his monetary trade off against particular periods
of imprisonment or alternatively, once sentence is revealed be invited to make a bid
against that jail sentence. Coffee responds to the argument that his suggestion
smacks of purchasing justice by saying that fines could be paid in instalments and
as such no offender would be excluded from the system on the basis of wealth.
Additional information might be available to the court on the corporations wealth
and liabilities and verified in a pre-sentence report. The level of the buy-sell price
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of incarceration might be set by a wealthy corporation ensuring that wealthier
convicts evade jail more often. The courts could be instructed to incarcerate in a
specified number of cases for each crime category to create a competitive market
motivating offenders to bid higher to realise greater sums which in turn could fund
compensation schemes.246
All of the foregoing ideas do not exhaust the possible options. Confiscation orders
may also be viewed as an individual or general deterrent.247 In addition there is
support for turning company operations over to a court appointed trustee to sell or
248
reorganise company assets as necessary. Paehlke offers various tools to lessen
environmental crime- taxes, subsidies, removal of subsidies, governmental
procurement, bans on substances, and nationalisation.249 Whilst Geis offers the
suggestion that large companies should have public ombudsman placed in their
250offices. Further possibilities include court ordered community medical care,
• 251
depositing of money in employee benefits plan and community service. Such
charitable contributions might be viewed as a means of restitution to the
community. Many of these ideas are not just imaginative possibilities;
252
occasionally the American courts have been prepared to adopt such strategies.
According to Simpson and Koper, white-collar offenders are believed to be more
• • 253 _| •sensitive to informal sanctions than conventional offenders. The downside
might be the taxable gain and enhancement of prestige of the corporation. There is
also the possibility of the punitive injunction which 'could be used not only to
require a corporate defendant to revamp its internal controls but also to do so in
246
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some punitively demanding way. Instead of requiring a defendant merely to
remedy the situation by introducing state of the art preventative equipment or
procedures, it would be possible to insist on the development of innovative
techniques. The punitive injunction could thus serve as both punishment and
super-remedy.'254
Many believe (usually those hostile to corporate criminal liability) that
corporations can be adequately punished by means of civil penalties. The reasons
for adoption of such a position are various. In respect of certain of the economic
• • 255crimes there is the perceived problem of moral neutrality. The viewpoint is not
just confined to executives; it may also be endemic in the judiciary and of course
Sutherland himself viewed the public's moral neutrality as predicated on the
complexity of the crimes being committed, their novelty and their diffuse
256
effects. Because of the absence of a moral consensus viewpoint many question
257whether the criminal law is the correct vehicle for social change. The overuse of
criminal sanctions may 'dull any moral stigma' of the penalty and at the same time
258have a detrimental effect on public indignation of the conduct. Sutherland
asserts that while civil penalties may be severe they do not carry the stigma that
259criminal penalties do. Yoder identifies five advantages to civil penalties -
pleading requirements are simpler, no delay in process because of failure to appear,
a relaxation of the burden of proof, the right ofjury trial is avoided and the right of
260
state appeal if the case is lost. Yoder argues that it is in part the credibility of the
sanction itself which is the factor which explains the continued rise in corporate
261crime despite the potential of sanctions to deter such wrongdoing. That
credibility is undermined by the absence of belief of the likelihood that the
corporate offender will be detected and apprehended and moreover, if he is
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255
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apprehended, there is an absence of belief that the punishment will be serious. In
this way both specific and general deterrence are undermined. The designation of
something criminal can develop common consciousness and morality.262 Also of
importance is the fact that criminal liability may be significant in establishing civil
• 263
liability. Correspondingly, Yoder claims that the media 'de-emphasise' white
collar crime and as such the educational theory of criminal punishment is
undermined. Attempts to instil a greater sense of morality from publicised
prosecutions depends on the approach of the media.264 There has also been
criticism of enforcement in the development of attitudes. Freiberg, for example,
offers extensive criticism of civil regulation of taxation violations in Australia. She
says that,
'the non-enforcement of the law, together with the use of civil rather
than criminal penalties has, until recently, allowed the taxation system
to decay and fall into disrepute. Further by allowing major illegalities
to go unsanctioned, enforcement authorities allowed the development
of an endemic cynicism and general disrespect for the law that may
take years to dispel.'265
One of the advantages in imposing civil penalties is the reduction of the burden of
proof266 and the consequently smaller amount of resources required for successful
• • 267
litigation. It has been suggested that administrative enforcement 'takes place
partly because criminal sanctions drag with them all the traditional safeguards
surrounding the defendant.'268 Braithwaite also expresses frustration at the
exacting standards of criminal punishment.269 Khanna has suggested an
• • 970
intermediate standard might be appropriate. In the view of the writer to move
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towards differential standards of criminal proof would occasion some violence to
the principled basis on which the case for corporate criminal liability exists.
• • • 271Criminal prosecution is often seen as the pinnacle of enforcement, whereas
regulatory laws are not primarily concerned with values but are predicated on
272results and compliance. Sentencing of regulatory offences can often destroy the
deterrent effect of the law; courts uniformly impose small fines; employers view
the fine as cheaper than undertaking remedial action. So much so that one
commentator has been moved to describe the prosecution of regulatory crime as
273'needlessly wasting taxpayer money in an expensive charade.' However the
non-utilisation of the criminal sanction calls into question the credibility of the
criminal law.274 My thesis does not seek to undermine criminal sanctions by
arguing for civil penalties. That simply smacks of an exercise in minimalisation of
the significance of the criminality. Many of the interesting alternative sanctions
canvassed within this section illustrate that we can develop a more varied strategy
without lessening the import of corporate crime.
4.9 Publicity As A Sanction
Publicity may have an important role not only in the detection and deterrence of
crime but, also in the punishment of it. One can 'utilize the visual and media
capabilities of the society to heighten the awareness in the offending individual or
corporation as well as the community at large, of a serious discrepancy between
276actual behaviour and the identity or image thought to be possessed or projected.'
However, to effectively use publicity as a sanction there must be corporate ideal
Smith, n. 68 at p. 13
272
See chapter 1 of this thesis
E. R. Schachter, Enforcing Air Pollution Controls, (1974), at p. 48
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See Kovel, n. 87 at p. 154
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In US v Hospital Monteflores Inc. 575 F 2d 332 at 335 (1st Cir 1978), Judge Coffin argued that,
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277models. Pulitzer has argued that, 'Publicity may not be the only thing that is
• 278needed but it is the one thing without which all other agencies will fail.'
Publicity has long been recognised as a potential sanction against the corporate
wrongdoer. Khanna contends stigma is the most powerful sanction that society can
• 279
impose on a corporation. Fisse and Braithwaite claim that 'it is fanciful to
suggest that corporate entities inherently lack the capacity to be stigmatised
because they are fictitious beings.'280 Image is at the heart of modern corporate
281life. Corporations it seems are more likely to respond positively to repair their
images than individuals.282 Formal publicity sanctions have the prestige of law and
on that basis have more credibility.283 Reputational sanctions as applied to the
284
corporation are two dimensional- loss of business and sense of shame. However,
there is a view that reputational sanctions may be inaccurate and affect only firms
with good reputations.285
Conviction itself often may result in adverse publicity286 and that may be a penalty
in itself.287 That form of publicity is however haphazard and inconsistent;
arguably limited press coverage of corporate crime generally justifies publicity as a
988
formal sanction. Publicity may be used as advice to inflict monetary loss or to
restrict capital acquisition to prevent expansion289 but, as Fisse himself recognises,
277
French, in Fisse and French (Eds.), n. 4 at p. 165
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French (Eds.), n. 4 at p. 162).
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'there is much more to the notions of prestige and respect than financial standing.
Even the wealthy may wilt from social disapproval.'290 Ancillary benefits of
publicity as a sanction may be many. Publicity may prompt government
intervention in the form of formal enquiries, regulatory investigation, black listing
for government grants or contracts. Publicity may be used to warn consumers,
291
investors, public and employees. Publicity may exert 'pressures which thrust in
the direction of reformation or restructuring,' though such a consequence may be
• 292 • nfortuitous. One incidental benefit of greater exposure is the acclimatisation of
• • 293
juries (and the public generally) to this type of crime.
Fisse and Braithwaite categorise the various doubts over using publicity as a
sanction against corporations as (1) corporations cannot be stigmatised (2) there are
formidable problems in relation to formulation, transmission and influence of the
message (3) there may be resort to counter-publicity or other self-protective tactics
(4) serious offences will attract publicity anyway (5) it may be more effective to
rely on preventative orders and other interventionist orders (6) it is better to tackle
individuals within corporation (7) inducing non-purchase is difficult (8) adverse




French offers the idea of the 'Hester Prynne Sanction' as a formalised publicity
sanction described as consisting,
'largely of an institutionalized psychological punishment administered
to a corporation found guilty of wrongdoing. It takes the form of a
court ordered adverse publication of the corporation the cost of which
is paid by the guilty corporation. The aim of the sanction is to create a
psychological disposition of shame within the corporation for that of
which it is guilty.'296
Fisse, n. 289 at p. 118
291
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A major criticism by Corlett of the Hester Prynne Sanction is that it fails to
adequately respond to serious infractions of the criminal law. According to
Corlett, the sanction is only effective in respect of minor corporate offences.297
One of the obvious problems is that the loss of status may lead to the failure of the
298
enterprise thus causing damage to the workforce. Corlett criticises French's
assertion that the workforce should not be of concern and argues that to support
such a viewpoint there would need to be 'a genuine and significant causal
connection between the untoward event and the workforce of the corporation.'299
Another problem is that the corporation may be able to evade such a sanction by
passing on the costs to the consumer or by reconstituting itself. A further problem
is a practical one and that is that the sanction relies very heavily on the media.
There are obvious defects in such a system particularly given the relationship
between the media and many corporations. French's idea of coupling publicity
sanctions with community service is similarly criticised by Corlett who offers
cynicism at how the corporation might turn the community service to its advantage
(utilising research reports for future gain, good publicity derived from the good
works).300 Coffee's doubts on the Hester Prynne sanction can be summarised on
the basis that the Government is a poor propagandist;301 the message may be lost
in the myriad of other adverse corporate criticism; the dilution of the sanction
through counter publicity; that the publicity sanction may produce the same
302externalities as corporate fines; and concern about civil liberties. Moreover, the
303adverse publicity might be shifted to individual officers. In broader terms Fisse
and Braithwaite see it as a mistake to think in terms of broadcasting rather than
narrowcasting. Publicity sanctions should be focused and targeted. There is also
the problem of 'saturated media unable to offer clear and coherent information.'304
The overall level of 'anti-corporate noise' might prove problematical in imposing
29'
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305
publicity sanctions. Fisse and Braithwaite contend that, 'If a publicity sanction
is used for the purpose of lowering prestige or inducing governmental
intervention..the relevant targets are persons particularly capable of distinguishing
a deep hiss from a light crackle or pop.'306
French's idea is, of course, predicated on the notion that the corporation can feel
shame. In response Corlett poses the question,
'what if it has little or no capacity for such a feeling under any
circumstance ? What if, moreover, the corporation is perfectly willing
to delude the courts, media and public into thinking that it is shameful
about doing a wrongful deed, but in fact places more emphasis on
profit -making than on moral practices in business? What if a guilty
corporation is perfectly willing to undergo the Flester Prynne sanction
so long as it does not interfere with significant profit making
?....'nothing in French's view of the use of the Hester Prynne Sanction
against guilty corporations ensures against the following (1) The unjust
immiseration of the guilty corporation's work force;(2) The ability of
the guilty corporation to escape the financial penalty of the sanction by
raising its prices fro the consumer;(3) The ability of the guilty
corporation to reorganize itself and thereby escape the public shame of
the sanction;(4) The possibility of the media's ineffectiveness in
carrying out the sanction;(5) The limited scope of the sanction on those
corporations guilty of gross forms of wrongdoing;(6) The guilty
corporation's ability to control the findings and operations of its court
appointed research facility;(7) The hypocritical nature of the
sanction;(8) The possibility that some corporations will not feel
307shameful about their wrongful deeds.'
Risser also recognises one of the problems of publicity sanctions is that they are
not preventive in nature and the 'Hester Prynne Sanction' 'does not provide for
cases in which corporations are not able or willing to voluntarily make the
308structural changes necessary to improve their behaviour.' However, Fisse and
Braithwaite are clear that publicity sanctions must be remedial as well as
punitive.309 Another major problem with publicity sanctions is the fact that they
310
can be costly with no guarantee of success.
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Like much of the debate on corporate criminal liability, there is a division of
opinion as to whether publicity as a formal sanction actually works. Leigh is
against publicity sanctions other than for regulatory offences.311 Renfrew similarly
312
opposes sanctions purely based on publicity. Stoner meanwhile believes the
313deterrent effect of negative publicity is highly questionable. According to
Wragg, stigmatisation falls upon individuals within the corporation, not the
corporation itself.314 Fisse in contrast views publicity sanctions as an added
weapon. According to him, publicity may offer some hope for improving the array
315of sanctions available against corporate offenders. Overspill of the sanction
from the corporation to employees may of course be beneficial and present one
method of reforming individual conduct where prosecution of the individual proves
316difficult. Fisse almost countenances a differential publicity sanction aimed at
the educated audience -corporate executives and a special form of sanction for the
317
general public. The supposition is that there is a need to create a culture where
• •318
corporate crime is not tolerated and that this may be achieved through publicity.
Fisse makes three suggestions as to how publicity sanctions may be effected- mass
media adverts, compulsory notification to shareholders and others through the
319annual report or, a temporary ban on advertising. The sanction would only be
operative following determination by a court or administrative body. In other
•390
words it would be a formal sanction. Account should be taken of the informal
• • 321
publicity sanction in determining the formal sanction.
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Much of the modern media is owned by large corporations so it will be difficult to
322galvanise them against corporations If not owned by large corporations, they
nonetheless depend on advertising revenue from them. Other problems in utilising
private media is that they do not view moderate transgressions of the law as
important news. For the media a greater danger of defamation actions exist and
this may influence their approach. Publication in official newspapers is
323
problematic because of their anodyne format and limited audience.
Fisse foresees that publicity as a formal sanction is more likely to be directed at the
large endocratic organisation.324 Publicity may target individuals in the company
or it may target products. However, a general attack may be unfair. Publicity
sanctions will require to be measured and proportionate. What about companies
325
associated with one brand ? e.g. Marks and Spencer's. Where the publicity
sanction serves as a warning to consumers, it should closely relate to the matters of
the offence. Where publicity attempts to persuade the consumer to inflict a
monetary sanction on the offender corporation it may be difficult to control. There
may be counter-publicity; and it may be difficult to dislodge the high esteem of the
product. Moreover, corporations may seek to redefine their conduct in more
327 • •
benign terms. Persuasion may prove problematic because it is confronted with
328
problems of understanding amongst the general populace. A ban on responsive
advertising reduces a product or company's competitive influence and diminishes
329the problem of favourable characteristics of that product or corporation.
Moreover, adverse publicity may be counter-productive where the coiporation has
in the eyes of the public made attempts to avert the incident; many offences are
330
simply not of popular concern to the public. The formal publicity sanction may
be avoided by dissolution change of location, name change, change of name of
Snider, n. 87 at p. 160
323
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products, product diversification, take-over, or counter-publicity.331 In respect of
counter-publicity corporations have an advantage over State agencies in that their
332methods of persuasion may be stronger. They may use simple emotive
slogans.333 There might also be advance counter-publicity,334 though the formal
publicity sanction may seek to prevent such counter-publicity (for example an
advertising ban). For these reasons and others, publicity as a sanction may also be
criticised on the grounds of uncertainty because 'sentence is determined by the
335
capricious jury of public or governmental opinion.' Moreover the publicity
336 •
sanction may not have the desired punitive effect. It is also the case that
publicity sanctions do not generate funds for official purposes. In addition it may
337
produce anxiety amongst the workforce or the wider community. Other
problems associated with publicity as a sanction are the commonly held belief that
338the impact of publicity is temporary. Widespread use of publicity sanctions may
T-1Q
create weariness in the minds of the public on the issue of corporate crime.
There is also the possibility that once a company gets into the public eye it may
become the target for adverse publicity or 'indiscriminate muckraking.'340 Indeed,
there is empirical evidence that many corporations do not run counter-publicity on
the basis of skeletons being uncovered. In addition there may be impacts upon
innocent associated entities, e.g. suppliers or innocent competitors in the same
field.341
331
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211
In a study by Fisse and Braithwaite there was evidence that many companies
introduced reforms following publicity.342 All companies introduced some reforms
which reduced the likelihood of recidivism.343 Some disciplined employees but not
many.344 One of the conclusions of that study was that 'short term narrow-focus
scandals can produce long-term broad reforms.'345 Some reforms were designed to
protect the company and individuals rather than the public.346 Moreover, small
companies, it was found, were likely to be more susceptible to publicity but also
capable of closing down and reforming.347 Fisse and Braithwaite's study revealed
several other interesting points. First, they noted the myth of aggressive corporate
348 • • •
fightback and, whilst there was the potential for exploitation by competitors
there was limited evidence of this happening. Indeed there were very few lost
sales. Publicity did encourage civil suites349 and a diminution of earnings was
350 , ,jevident in some cases but not in majority. There is a circuitous nature of good
publicity and good corporate behaviour. Just as prestige may attract good
personnel so bad publicity may deter them from joining an organisation that needs
an infusion of 'good' personnel. Importantly, they believe that 'good repute is
valued for more than its relevance to financial goals; it is valued for its own
351
sake.' Fisse and Braithwaite contend that a system of voluntary disclosure may
reduce cost of enforcement and allow corporation opportunity to indicate what they
352
propose to do about problem. There may be a need to offer incentives for
353
voluntary disclosure. Those incentives may take the form of negative
inducements; Fisse and Braithwaite offer a suggestion of issuing a league table of
worst records.354 Other suggestions by Fisse and Braithwaite are for independent
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343
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355
corporate crime and correction commissions, and social audit programmes
(compiling details of injury rates, effluent levels, environmental violations and
• 356 •
product complaints). There is also support for encouraging whistle-blowing on
the part of employees.357 More importantly, they argue for an expansion of the
scope of mandatory corporate disclosure.358 Because publicity is not an
• • • 359interventionist sanction, publicity and other sanctions ought to be used
conjointly to sanction corporate crime.360
Assessing the potential ofpublicity as a sanction may lead one to conclude that 'the
benefits of an activist participatory democracy, in which the powerful are forever
facing challenges over alleged abuse of power, as outweighing the costs of being
unfairly maligned from time to time.'361 For all the undoubted problems, there is
every reason for supposing that publicity as a formal sanction may, in the proper
form and circumstances, prove a useful addition to any system of corporate
criminal liability.
4.10 Corporate Probation
According to Braithwaite, 'rehabilitation is a more workable goal for corporate
criminal law than for individual criminal law because organisation charts and
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) can more easily be rearranged than human
personalities.362 Accepting that corporate criminal liability rather than individual
• 363 •
liability is more efficient as a mechanism of crime control, one might
countenance that individual liability may be delegated from the court to the
corporation. One such way this may be done is through corporate probation.364
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US v Murray 275 US 347 at 357-8 91928. Chief Justice Taft said 'probation is the attempted
saving of man who has taken one wrong step and whom the judge thinks to be a brand who can be
plucked from the burning at the time of imposition of sentence.' Probation was first considered in
US v Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO) 465 F 2d 58 (7th Cir, 1972) where company pled nolo
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Inevitably probation and other similar approaches to sentencing entail the court
becoming a corporate watchdog.365 Oversight could be taken on the court's behalf
by an experienced independent corporate lawyer, auditors, or a professional
366director. Whatever the logistical problems, Gruner feels able to assert that
'despite some difficult problems of judicial administration, probation conditions
requiring internal corporate changes will often be the most desirable sanction
• 367available to a sentencing court.' Fisse describes probation as 'a sanction capable
of pressing upon the nerve of corporate governance and thereby achieving more
effective deterrence and rehabilitation.'
The goals of corporate probation can be stated as rehabilitation-(evasion of harsh
punishments which might impede rehabilitation-regulation of conduct is likely to
promote rehabilitation),369 punishment-(viewed as less harsh sentence but punitive
nonetheless) and deterrence (it will be a condition of probation that there are no
370 • •
further offences). Probation's advantages are that the court can insist on
remedial action in response to the commission of the offence. That remedial action
may take the form of revision of operating procedures or, it may mean changes to
physical resources; probation emphasises that the conduct is unwanted. Probation
can also be used to target managers and others. Another advantage of corporate
probation is that as a sanction it is flexible enough not to damage corporations in
financially straightened circumstances.371 Further advantages include the
following (1) it shifts the economic burden of probation to company (2) it may
result in detection of more corporate violations because of greater access (3) there
is congruence with the nature and operations of the business (4) because constraints
contendere in an oil spillage case. The maximum punishment was small -$2500 and the court
wished to impose something more reflective of the damage. The sentence was that the court gave
the company 60 days in which to formulate and implement a programme for dealing with the
spillage. The fine was suspended. The company were successful on appeal but the concept of
probation under a Federal Statute was upheld, (see Gruner, n. 145 at pp. 14-15).
65
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/innovations come from senior management they are likely to be accepted by
employees more readily (5) reforms may be more innovative (6) internal
monitoring and discipline will be encouraged because of stakeholding. One
drawback is the corporation's opportunity to formulate proposals to ensure
• • 372technical compliance but evade the spirit of legal requirement. There is also the
fundamental problem identified by Parker who criticises the difficulty in scaling
non-monetary penalties while contending that business organisations are
• 373
unresponsive to any other form of penalty.
Probation provides a,
'means for sentencing courts to rehabilitate a corporate defendant by
forcing immediate changes in the defendant's decision making
processes, internal monitoring activities, and personnel incentive
practices. Second, probation conditions that bar a defendant form from
particular business practices likely to lead to further criminal behaviour
can achieve specific deterrence similar to that which partial or complete
imprisonment accomplishes for individuals. Third, given that top
corporate executives have deep seated fears about their loss of control
over aspects of corporate management, the threat of possible probation
sanctions which require or limit business practices (along with
associated reporting and monitoring requirements) might serve as a
very effective general deterrent to illegal behaviour by large firms.
Finally, corporate probation terms requiring social service by managers
and employees of convicted firms can be punitive. The extraordinary
efforts and expense involved in such service is a symbolic way for
firms to compensate society for their crimes and serves as a constant
reminder of the seriousness of those crimes.'374
It can be used to fill gaps in sentencing strategy375 and if utilised properly can
prove more efficacious than fines. Orders can be utilised to induce modifications
in corporate activities and operations; fines offer no corresponding benefit. The
376
possibility of transferring the penalty will undoubtedly be more difficult.
Corporate probation can be utilised as a substitute for economic sanctions or in
addition to them. The conditions that the probation imposes need not be limited to
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rehabilitative ends but may be utilised for specific deterrence and general
377deterrence or purely punitively. The flexibility of the sanction means that it can
be matched to particular defendants. Probation also offers an opportunity for
• • 378
monitoring and visits. According to Gruner,
'corporate probation is a flexible vehicle for imposing a wide range of
sanctions having the common feature of continued judicial control over
aspects of corporate conduct. Through the proper tailoring of these
conduct restrictions, corporate probation can be used to punish, deter,
incapacitate, or rehabilitate corporate offenders.'379
Hesitation about imposing corporate probation 'may stem from a number of
concerns, including doubts on the parts of sentencing courts about their ability to
fashion probation conditions requiring meaningful changes in corporate practices
or expectation that, since probation terms need to be voluntarily accepted....a firm
faced with a burdensome set of probation terms would simply reject probation and
380
agree to a maximum alternative fine.'
Coffee, Gruner and Stone drafted proposals for the US Sentencing Commission
which authorised corporate probation for serious offences for the following
purposes-
'(1) To improve management policies or practices including
inadequate internal controls, found by sentencing courts to have
substantially contributed to illegal behaviour or delayed its detection
(2) To require factual reports on a defendant corporations criminal,
behaviour (prepared by outside counsel or such other parties as the
sentencing court shall appoint) where a sentencing court finds that the
circumstances surrounding the defendant's offense have not been
adequately clarified to insure accountability of corporate personnel to
shareholders
(3) To force convicted organizations to provide restitution to victims in
all circumstances where promulgation of a restitution order is
reasonable in the light of both the needs of victims for restitution and
the likely complication or prolongation of the sentencing process if
restitution is ordered
Gruner, n. 145 at p. 7
378
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Toshiba deed whereby proceedings were not pursued in return of the corporation reaching a
negotiated agreement to undertook compliance obligations.
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(4) To obligate organizational defendants to provide essential
community service or interim relief for the benefit of the victims of
crime where an order for restitution is either infeasible or an adequate
substitute; and
(5) To require an organization already sentenced to pay a fine, make
restitution, comply with an order for notice to its victims or perform
community service to take steps necessary to ensure its deferred
performance where these obligations will not be fully performed within
SO days ofsentencing. '381
In these proposals one can see the interventionist scope of the sanction of probation
and, its relationship with other sanctions. Self-regulation and community service
382
(discussed infra) may be enforced through probation. The costs of imposing
probation are justifiably borne by the courts but internal changes effected to a
383
corporation are borne by the company. Corporate personnel could be designated
to ensure compliance. What things might be changed ?-organization design;
personnel practices; greater employee guidance on lawful behaviour; increased
information handling and monitoring capabilities; improving lower level lawful
behaviour; changes in corporate planning; and ultimately, personnel. There must
384be monitoring of probation. As a sanction it has much to commend it not least
385
because it may be a convenient base for other sanctions. The successful
operation of corporate probation in America, and its underlying objectives, offer
every reason for supposing it might be a useful addition to our own system.
4.11 Community Service
Fisse argues that there is a need to develop alternatives to the fine and that 'given
the skills and resources generated by corporate power, the idea of community
386service has an intuitive appeal.' Despite this appeal it has been suggested that
'To be workable, any sentence devised along these lines would need to avoid
anthropomorphic preoccupation with the principles and practice of community
381
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387
service orders as applied to human offenders.' According to Cohen, community
• • ..... 388
service is not in widespread use in any of the Anglo-American jurisdictions
though there are examples in America of community service being imposed on
corporate offenders as a condition of probation, as a condition of mitigation, and as
389
a condition of non-prosecution. Fisse cites the conflict of concepts of
rehabilitation and supervisory prevention versus deterrence and retribution
operative in Community Service Orders (CSOs). In respect of community service
as mitigation, Fisse asserts 'Desirable as it is to develop additional sentencing
options in corporate criminal law, to impose community service as a condition of
mitigation of sentence is to introduce a new type of sanction without adequate
direction.' Community service would be tax deductible unlike the traditional
penalty of the fine. Moreover 'if community service is cast so wide that any kind
of project will suffice in mitigation, corporate resources can be allocated by judges
more or less at whim.'390 The discretion which such an approach will confer on
judges is self evident. Fisse suggests that one way of restricting the community
service would be to link it to a project which prevents repetition of the
391 •
occurrence. It is important that the corporation performs the community service
rather than simply sponsors a particular project. As Fisse argues 'where a
corporation performs a program of community service, the effect is to internalize
the punishment within an organization; much more is involved than simply writing
a check.'392
As a sanction applicable to corporations, both America and Australia have
considered community service. In USA it has been considered as part of the
proposals for the revised Federal Criminal Code as part of the probation provisions;
In Australia it has been considered by the Criminal Law Reform Committee as an
387
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additional sanction. The basic paradigm of community service suggested by Fisse
stipulates that,
'Where a corporation is convicted of an offence the court may make a
punitive order (here referred to as a 'community service order')
sentencing the offender to undertake a project of community service in
393accordance with the subsequent provisions of this section.'
Fisse's scheme is modelled on the UK scheme for individual offenders.
Community service is to be available for all offences except those offences where
the punishment is prescribed. Fisse argues for this expansive application on the
basis that 'community service orders are capable of being used as a substitute as
well as direct punitive redress. Since the range of substitute redress is infinite, no
offense is beyond potential redress by means of community service.'394 Fisse
argues that it is important that community service be seen as a punishment and
accordingly not tax-deductible or, subject to intellectual property rights for any
product of such service. Fisse opposes a voluntary arrangement giving the
corporation the option of community service on the basis that this would allow
395
corporations simply to take the alternative of a fine.
The second element to Fisse's model of community service relates to its
quantitative and temporal limits. His model states
'(a) The amount ofcommunity service required to be performed shall
be quantified in terms of the actual net cost ofmaterials, equipment
and labor to be usedfor the project.
(b) Unless provided otherwise the maximum cost of community
service under a community service order shall be the same as the
maximum amount of the fine or monetary penalty applicable to the
offense for which the order is made
(c) A project of community service shall be performed within two
years of the date ofsentence unless the court orders otherwise'
In the UK the existing scheme for individual offenders details hours of service
which is clearly inappropriate in respect of the corporate offender. In respect of the
duration, Fisse says 'Delaying the application of a sanction is likely to detract from
Fisse, n. 386 at p. 979
394
Fisse, n. 386 at p. 979
395
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the force of its deterrent, instructive, retributive or other impact. Moreover,
specifying a time limit is one means of discouraging stalling tactics.'396 The issue
of corporate insolvency also seems pertinent in this context. The demise of the
corporation may be one method deliberate or otherwise of evading the sanction.
The third element of Fisse's model outlines the particular projects acceptable as
community service
(a) A project of community service shall be either a project proposed
by the offender and agreed to by the court or a project specified by the
court
(b) A project ofcommunity service shall have as its object the redress
of the social harm occasioned by the offense subject to sentence, and
the redress sought shall take one or more ofthe followingforms
(i) direct redress by restoration, specific or approximate, of what has
been harmed by the offense;
(ii) substitutionary redress by development or introduction ofmeasures
designed to provide better means ofpreventing or redressing harm of
the type proscribed by the offense; or
(Hi) substitutionary redress by participation in a program of social
action authorized by regulation
(c) A project of community service shall be performed by personnel
employed by the offender except where the court is satisfied that the
assistance of an independent contractor is necessary to make the best
use ofthe offender's own skills and resources
(d) The personnel by whom a project of community service is to be
performed shall include representatives from managerial, executive
and subordinate ranks of an offender's organization whether or not
persons in all these ranks were implicated in the offense subject to
sentence
(e) An offender subject to a community service order shall specify what
persons are to undertake the required project of community service
and, in the case of employees, shall indicate their rank within the
organization. 397
The fourth element of Fisse's model concerns pre-service and compliance reports.
'(a) An offender subject to a community service order shall be required
by the court to submit within a specified time one or more reports
setting out the measures which the offender has taken or proposes to
take in order to comply with the order and, for the purposes of
Fisse, n. 386 at p. 982
397
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compliance [under section 5], a report shall be submitted setting out
the grounds andfactual basis upon which the discharge is sought.
(b) An adviser shall be appointed by the court to report upon the
feasibility, costing, progress and discharge of a project of community
service unless the court is satisfied that, by reason of the
trustworthiness of the defendant and the adequacy of its proposed
reporting procedures, it is unnecessary to seek information from an
additional source.
(c) For the purposes of this subsection an adviser shall be a person
qualified to practice as a lawyer, accountant or business consultant, a
probation officer or any other person agreed upon by the prosecution,
the defendant and the court.
(d) The fees of an adviser appointed under this subsection shall be
payable by the defendant as party costs unless the court orders
otherwise
(e) An adviser appointed under this subsection shall have the powers of
a special master. '398
The final element ofFisse's model concerns compliance. It states,
fa) A community service order shall be discharged upon proof by the
offender ofsatisfactory compliance.
(b) A conviction resulting in a community service order shall be
recorded as no conviction upon proof by the offender of compliance
which is exemplary by reason ofa quality or quantity ofperformance
substantially in excess of that requiredfor the purposes ofsatisfactory
discharge
(c) A recording of no conviction under this subsection shall not affect
any pleas of issue estoppel, res judicata or double jeopardy otherwise
available
(d) If the offender fails to comply with any requirement imposed by or
in connection with a community service order the court may
(i) continue the sentence of community service and require additional
pre-service or compliance reports; or
(ii) revoke the sentence of community service and, subject to crediting
any allowable costs incurred in performing service under that
sentence, impose a fine in the same amount as to the costs specified in
the community service order or, in the case ofa suspendedfine, in an
amount that might originally have been imposed
(e) Proceedings for contempt may be taken against any person in
breach ofa community service order, or an order ancillary thereto.'
Fisse himself suggests numerous worthwhile endeavours which may form part of a
community service programme. He lists inter alia programs for unemployed
persons, research into relieving tedium on production lines, participation in urban
398
Fisse, n. 386 at p. 986
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renewal, development of safer conditions of industrial work, improvement of
methods of cleaning up after spills of noxious or toxic substances, monitoring of
advertisements or other retail practices in aid of consumer protection, review of
environmental or clinical impact statements issued by public agencies or private
enterprise, investigation into the effects of enforcement of debt legislation, and
involvement in the design of product safety standards.399 According to Fisse,
'community service orders would provide a stronger catalyst to internal
discipline.'400 He also claims that community service orders would be better than
fines in achieving what he calls the five goals of corporate criminal liability-
deterrence, direction, instruction, retribution and redress.401 Moreover, in Fisse's
view community service more directly hits the various targets of corporate criminal
liability whereas fines only hit the surface entity.402 The third major advantage
proffered in the context of community service orders is the 'promotion of good by
stimulation of constructive corporate reactions.'403 In this sense the corporation
could utilise its benevolent force coupling it with ingenuity and innovation.
Irrespective of attributes of community service orders there are, as Fisse accepts, a
number of disadvantages. Significantly there are what might be termed logistical
and practical difficulties. Fisse contends that 'The critical issue is whether
punishing corporations by means of community service orders is open to
fundamental attack on grounds of inefficacy, inefficiency, injustice or
uncertainty.'404 Fisse himself admits that some of these issues are impossible to
predict and that 'the efficacy of community service orders may be challenged on
grounds of leniency, counter-productivity and susceptibility to corporate
intransigence and subterfuge.'405 Corporation may use CSOs to enhance their
image but there may be nothing intrinsically wrong with that.406 Community
service orders clearly have resource implications which may impact on regulation
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400
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and enforcement elsewhere. One way round this might be to have CSOs ordinarily
running concurrent with probation orders. A further issue is the preparation of
reports under the scheme - would corporations properly comply ? Fisse concludes,
'from a corporate, as opposed to anthropomorphic perspective,
community service orders would provide a versatile sanction against
corporations, a sanction superior in many ways to fines. Undoubtedly,
there is fear of uncertainty, and ethical reluctance to experiment, but
these factors seem of secondary concern. The main explanation
appears to be that corporate crime is misconceived as morally neutral
or insignificant, so that little point is seen in developing sanctions
which have a stronger impact than fines. However, as long as fines
remain the sanction used almost invariably against corporations, that
misconception is likely to be reinforced, for fines tend to reduce even
the most serious corporate offenses to a matter of price. Were
community service orders available, serious offenses might well be
exposed for what they are because by indicating the need for offenders
to provide countervailing good, community service would help to show
up what is bad and unwanted about the particular corporate offense
subject to punishment. At the same time, any risk of crucifying
corporations could be minimized by making satisfactory compliance a
basis of resurrection, and exemplary compliance a means of
,407
ascension.
Community service may be useful where it necessitates unpleasant or embarrassing
service on the part of company personnel; such an approach internalises the
punishment and prevents passing on the penalty. It will be particularly efficacious
if it involves top management. Not only is the argument for CSO convincing, the
model offered by Fisse, based on CSO orders operating for individual offenders in
this country, appears readily transplantable into our own jurisprudence.
4.12 SelfRegulation
One of the key questions in the policing of corporate crime is whether regulation of
corporations should properly be undertaking by external agencies (prosecuting
authorities included) or, might it be more effectively done by participants in the
business itself.408 Put simply, rather than punishing offenders vigorously one
might introduce incentives for corporations to regulate themselves.409 Stone
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408
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409
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suggests there is a need for 'a way of modifying corporate conduct that contrasts
with, and is defined against a backdrop of, the generally prevailing techniques
employed for modifying corporate behaviour.'410 Coffee similarly claims that
there is 'an incoherent conflict between 'moralistic' legal responses, which seek to
maximise the public reprobation and symbolic denunciation of the conduct in
question, and 'pragmatic' legal responses, which focus instead on prevention and
therefore seek to optimize whatever conditions within the system most inhibit the
disapproved conduct.'411 There are several writers only too willing to extol the
virtues of corporate self-regulation and endorse the view that 'The inculcation of
ethical principles forms the very basis of all crime prevention and control.'412
Fisse suggests that self regulation may appeal to the corporation's rational self
interest.413 Fisse's alternative view is that its modern relevance is 'simply
expediency and efficiency.'414
Generally, there is greater interest in corporate compliance mechanisms primarily
because of the perceived failure of traditional enforcement.415 For all that, Clinard
suggests that so far self-regulation has only been modestly successful.416 Whilst
there is considerable support for the concept, there are those who are sceptical.
Baysinger for example argues that,
'Simply transferring the responsibility for controlling criminal
behaviour to the private sector may not provide the solution. Common
experience suggests that the forces resisting change in organizations are
typically much stronger than the forces promoting change.'417
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There are four principal arguments in favour of self regulation. The corporation
can bring greater expertise and technical know-how to detection and enforcement;
secondly, the costs of detection and enforcement are lower; thirdly, these costs are
internalised; and fourthly, self regulation is less formalised in nature to other forms
418 •of external regulation. Other tangible advantages of internal policing are that
'Private justice systems have a superior capacity to finger the culpable.'419
Naturally, any strategy to compel the corporation to identify the individual
wrongdoer is important.420 Though corporate organisational reform may prove far
better than traditional legal means of dealing with corporate wrongdoers,421 there
are those who believe that criminal punishment must be retained to underpin self-
regulation 422 According to Coffee, there is efficacy in providing positive and
negative incentives to corporations.423 All of this strikes a resonant cord but the
real issue is how sentencing can encourage internal control ?424 Self-policing
requires to inspire confidence. To have any credence self-regulation requires
accountability.425 Only as a voluntarist code detached from the system of criminal
sanction or, as part of another sanction (perhaps probation or community service)
can it have any legitimacy. In respect of the latter perhaps enforced self-regulation
may be the preferred approach. A system of enforced self-regulation permits
corporations to prepare and lodge compliance plans with regulatory bodies for
approval. Thereafter, it will be necessary for larger companies to establish their
own inspectorial group. State agencies would continue to audit the effectiveness of
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the internal compliance group and, to punish any violation of the law.426 Such a
system attempts to balance private justice with public ratification.427 Violation of
such privately written and publicly ratified rules would continue to be punished by
428the State. However, it is imagined that the sense of ownership which the
corporation would derive from having written its own code of conduct would
inculcate a greater sense of social responsibility 429 There is however a down side;
there would be considerable resource implications for State authorities in
approving company schemes but more importantly, there is the fear that privately
written standards could allow the corporation to frame the law in such a way as to
allow to evade the spirit of the law.430 Braithwaite's model was devised as a free
standing scheme and as such it fails. The conception and theory is solid enough
but its practical implementation has not proven to be a major success. There were
attempts in the mid-1980s to introduce such ideas into health and safety matters.
They were unsuccessful because spectacular failings led to the approach falling
into disrepute. The public simply do not like the idea of the regulated devising the
standards by which they will be regulated. Public faith in the system is central to
criminal liability code and the public are not yet convinced that the corporation can
play 'poacher and gamekeeper.' There is nonetheless merit in directing scarce
regulatory resources away from corporations which self regulate towards those that
'play fast and loose.'431 It is more likely that this will be brought about by
regulatory discretion rather than any other means.
What form might that self-policing take ? Fisse notes the establishment of review
committees.(e.g. Gulf Oil Corporation) as one possible solution.432 Companies
must maintain open policies to encourage employee whistle blowing and of course
to provide exemplary leadership.433 Some companies have created ombudsman
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systems.434 Donaldson suggests that they should alter corporate boards to include
employee and consumer directors, develop employee reward systems which
motivate moral behaviour, and establish corporate constitutions which specify
moral goals.435 Identifying particular internal business practices that may help
prevent further misconduct might also be a useful feature.436 Clinard and Yeager
call for more effective general corporate business codes437 perhaps though industry
associations 438 or through business schools.439 They also support publicly
appointed board members440 and chartering controls.441 Their support is premised
on the fact that the sheer resource issue make the ability of government to
investigate and litigate on equal terms difficult.442 Another suggestion has been
that of a second chamber as a means of monitoring board performance.443 Yet
another has been the appointment of corporate officers responsible for compliance
with criminal law.444 Braithwaite offers examples of executives with a criminal
responsibility duty445 which thereby create a structure to deflect liability away from
the corporation. According to McVisk, what is needed is clear delineation of the
expectations of all personnel within the company outlining their role in ensuring
compliance with the law. He says 'in this way individual responsibility can be
incorporated into every case where criminal liability is based upon corporate
See Westin, n. 433 at p. 144
435
Donaldson, n. 19 at pp. 166-7
436
Gruner, n. 145 at p. 49 op cit. Internal discipline orders suggested by Mitchell Committee in
South Australia 'Essentially, internal discipline orders would require a corporation to investigate an
offence committed on its behalf, undertake appropriate disciplinary proceedings, and return a
detailed and satisfactory compliance report to the court issuing the particular order. In the event of
unreasonable non-compliance corporate criminal responsibility would be necessary in some cases,
but usually it would be sufficient to impose individual criminal responsibility on those personnel
specified in the order as responsible for securing compliance. Unlike the system of Frankpledge,
the object of internal discipline orders thus would be not be to produce guilty individuals to the
prosecuting authorities, but to cast part of the burden of enforcement squarely upon the enterprise
on whose behalf an offence has been committed' (South Australia Criminal law and Penal Methods
Reform Committee Fourth Report The Substantive Criminal Law (1977) at pp. 361-62).
437
Clinard and Yeager, n. 18 at p. 303
438
Clinard and Yeager, n. 18 at p. 304
410 '
Clinard and Yeager, n. 18 at p. 304
440
Clinard and Yeager, n. 18 at p. 309
441
Clinard and Yeager, n. 18 at p. 311
442
Clinard and Yeager, n. 18 at p. 313
443
See Rostow in Mason (Ed.), The Corporation In Modern Society (1961) at p. 8.
444
W. McVisk, ' Toward A Rational Theory Of Criminal Liability For The Corporate Executive'
1978 69 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 75 at p. 89.
445
See Braithwaite, n. 7 at p. 308.
227
acts.'446 The expectation is that corporate management would identify these
individuals. The advantage of the system according to McVisk is that the
organisation can be utilised as a benevolent force in favour of the law and it would
avoid abrogating 'traditional requirement of the criminal law.'447
Specific prevention may ensue where the enforcement agencies insist of specific
measures as a condition of non-prosecution; where it is a condition of probation or
conditional discharge, where it is a condition of deferment or reduction in sentence,
where it is required by mandatory injunction or preventory order, and finally,
where offence prevention is promoted by specifying lines of individual
accountability within a corporation.448 Preventative practices suggested by
Clinard,449 include strong controls over corporate ethics on the part of top
management;450 frequent guidelines on regulations from top management;
quarterly staff meetings for middle management; open door policy for middle
managers; middle-management discussions with legal officers; frequent visits to
subsidiaries and plants; specific training in ethics and regulation; signature of
statement (yearly) to confirm familiarity with regulations; signature confirming
that middle managers know they will face the sack if they violate; and penalties
such as dismissal for violations. The supposition is that internal corporate
discipline has a higher probability of application.451
Notwithstanding these positive attributes, there are problems with self-regulation as
a control mechanism. As we have already noted, disciplinary programmes may be
to disruptive, too embarrassing or too dangerous a stimulant to whistle blowing or
too fertile a source of civil litigation.452 Moreover, suspicion surrounds any State
sponsorship of self-regulation as an alternative to direct regulation because of the
conflict between the State's role as custodian of the public interest and the
McVisk, n. 444 at p. 90.
447
McVisk, n. 444 at p. 91.
448
Fisse, n. 66 at p. 387
449
Clinard, n. 68 at p. 159
450
See Cressey and Moore quoted in Clinard and Yeager, n. 18 at p. 302
451
Coffee, n. 68 at p. 410
452
Fisse and Braithwaite in Findlay and Hogg (Eds.), n. 419 at p. 101.
228
perceived denial of responsibility453 Clinard expresses some doubt about
corporation's capacity to self-regulate claiming that while profits remain bottom
line self-regulation will remain nothing more than a platitude. Unless enforcement
is contained within ethical codes they are nothing more than public relations
gimmicks;454 industry wide codes are a useful development.455 Coffee offers
another cautionary note suggesting that 'reliance on private enforcement may
require us to abandon the advantages of prosecutorial discretion.'456 Although
internal policing by corporations can be effective it has been suggested that
'evidence of internal discipline within large corporations is conspicuously absent at
senior corporate levels.'457 Though there is evidence of consciousness raising
amongst some executives, success in reducing corporate crime has been elusive.458
• • 459
Risser's suggestion is to concentrate on corporations internal decision structure.
In his view structural flaws can lead to wrong and harm and by focusing in on these
one can avert that harm. Adopting Goodpaster's model for organisational decision
making (moral perception, moral reasoning, co-ordination and sensitivity to
implementation),460 he suggests that one can proactively assess each component
with a view to identifying whether a corporation is both capable and likely to
commit wrongdoing. For example, the absence of mechanisms to gather
information is a key indicator that the corporation does not have the capacity 'to
assess the potential impact that alternative course of action are likely to have on
others.'461 Flaws in training programmes will point to a failure in co-ordination.462
The absence of a code of ethics might indicate an absence of proper reasoning. In
Risser's model 'A corporation found to have an IDS which is flawed in a way
which prevents it from performing well at one or more of the stages would be
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misconduct, and suggesting possible structural reforms.'463 Failure to take action
would lead to the corporation having difficulty in defending itself in any
subsequent proceedings. Risser suggests that regulatory authorities would have
responsibility for issuing warnings.464 He also envisages a system whereby
warnings would be published in the media and made available to the wider
business community. Risser himself recognises an obvious flaw with his proposal;
the sheer impracticability based on resourcing.465 The warnings in themselves
would not be punishments but could be integrated into an approach for punishing
corporations. They may form part of a post hoc punishment on the corporation
whereby the court look at the warning issued to the corporation, utilising it to
impose an alternative sanction such as reforming the internal decision structure of
the company perhaps, imposing new directors or the formal creation of special
committees. Risser's approach is three staged- warnings, adverse publicity, and
formal re-structuring.
Braithwaite suggests that when assessing whether a company is effectively self-
regulating one should ignore the corporate code of ethics along with any social
audit from the annual report. Instead one should ask the following questions- Is the
Chief Executive officer actively involved in setting compliance and social
responsibility goals for the corporation ? Do Standard Operating Procedures(SOPs)
establish controls which make violation of the law difficult ? Are there compliance
groups with organisational muscle ? Can the corporation demonstrate a history of
effectively sanctioning employees who violate SOPs designed to prevent crime ?
Does the corporation write down only good news ? Are unspoken understandings
the basis on which sensitive decisions are made ? Does the corporate case law
which can be abstracted embody scrupulous commitment to the letter and the spirit
of the law ?466 Braithwaite's suggestion is that the company writes down the
approach taken to an ethical dilemma which it has previously confronted and in
this way develops corporate case law. These can be spread to lower level
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employees. Senior management can exercise a tight control on corporate case
law.467 In the opinion of Fisse and Braithwaite good internal policing will have
five traits -(1) lots of clout given to compliance personnel (2) defined
accountability of line managers (3) monitoring of performance and mechanisms for
feed back to line managers (4) effective communication will be left to those
468
knowledgeable and (5) no neglect of training and supervision.
Whilst compliance strategies may be a good idea, one of the dangers of a company
spelling out it perceived risks of legal liability is that it may encourage enforcement
agencies to intervene.469 A further drawback or impediment of self-regulation
might be oppressive management.470 Fisse suggests that internal compliance
programmes should be built on the management of risk.471 The standard elements
should include -(1) clearly stated compliance policies reinforced by top an middle
managers; (2) systematic identification and management of risks created by
company operations; (3) clear allocation of responsibility for compliance functions;
(4) Segregation and rostering of functions in high risk areas to restrict opportunities
for non compliance; (5) readable compliance manuals setting out relevant
standards, operating procedures and examples; (6) routine controls and monitoring
and enforcement of compliance; (7) education and training of personnel; (8)
interaction with enforcement agencies; (9) action plans in event of discovery of
illegality; (10) investigative and reporting procedures.472
It seems a self-evident expression of common-sense that there should be attempts
to have the corporation take regulatory or disciplinary steps rather than have
criminal proceedings. However, as Fisse notes, one of the flaws with the notion
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that corporate liability will ensure an organisational response against individual
wrongdoers is that 'the law now makes little or no attempt to ensure that such a
reaction occurs.'473 Fisse points out that there is little evidence of company
disciplinary responses to the imposition of corporate criminal liability. He
concludes that,
'It is readily apparent ..that companies have strong incentives not to
undertake extensive disciplinary action. In particular a disciplinary
program may be disruptive, embarrassing for those exercising
managerial control, encouraging for whistle-blowers or hazardous in
the event of civil litigation against the company or its officers.
Sometimes these incentives may be veiled by the claim that the
problem has been sufficiently investigated and resolved by public
enforcement action.'474
One method of encouraging private policing is to make punishment on the
corporation conditional partially on the failure to achieve internal accountability.475
The failure to take disciplinary measures post hoc the violation would result in the
corporation being sanctioned.(see para 4.13 below) An alternative is Coffee's
proposal that internal corporate discipline be a condition of corporate probation.
These approaches to individual accountability would address what has been
described as a 'pandemic' problem of non-prosecution of corporate officials.476
What is being proposed is private justice being monitored by public justice
designed to ensure effective monitoring and to, protect against scapegoating.
These private justice systems would be paid for by the corporations (a not
unreasonable expectation).477 Some of the sanctions available to private justice
systems may be less potent than public justice systems; however dismissal and
professional disbarment may be as significant a sanction as any. Can we rely on
corporations to police themselves ? Fisse and Braithwaite expound considerable
• • • 478faith in commercial concerns which is not endorsed by the present writer. It
appears to be a leap of faith not supported by past reflection.
Fisse, n. 65 at p. 469.
474
Fisse, n. 65 at p. 472.
475
Fisse and Braithwaite in Findlay and Hogg (Eds.), n. 419 at p.l 11.
476
Fisse and Braithwaite in Findlay and Hogg (Eds.), n. 419 at p.l 12.
477
Fisse and Braithwaite in Findlay and Hogg (Eds.), n. 419
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An alternative approach proffered as a solution to corporate criminal liability is one
based on the reasonableness of the corporation's practices and procedures to avert
illegal conduct which would better reflect the blameworthiness of the corporations
an entity.479 (essentially the defence of due diligence). The basics of such a system
would be that the conduct had been 'clearly and convincingly forbidden' and 'that
reasonable safeguards designed to prevent corporate crimes had been developed
and implemented including regular procedures for evaluating, detection and
remedy.'480
Several of these self regulation ideas could contribute much to an overall approach
to corporate crime. They are not, of their own, panaceas for the control of
corporate misconduct. The corporation as a social actor has not shown itself
capable of self regulating. Nor is there any real justification for offering a
differential penal system. Private justice must not be arraigned against public
justice.481 Any system of corporate criminal liability must however recognise the
possible contribution of self regulation as offering a long term contribution to
diminution of illegal activity. It would be naive in the extreme to envisage a
strategy solely based on self regulation. One simply cannot place too much
482 •reliance on private justice systems, but a system of criminal sanction which
integrates with and activates the internal mechanisms of the corporation has much
to commend it. Assessment of the internal conduct could undoubtedly contribute
to the post hoc assessment of the sanction. Moreover any strategic sanctioning
approach which encourages self compliance must be beneficial. Fisse and
Braithwaite argue that, 'Instead of treating the corporation's inner pressures as a
'black box' to be influenced only indirectly through threats laid about the
environment like traps, we need more straightforward 'intrusions' into the
• • 483
corporation's decision structure and processes than society has yet undertaken.'
Developments, n. 114 at p. 1257.
480
Developments, n. 114 at p. 1258.
481
Fisse and Braithwaite, n. 468 at pp. 38-40
482
Fisse and Braithwaite in Findlay and Hogg (Eds.), n. 419 at p 94
483
See Fisse and Braithwaite, n. 278 at p. 300
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4.13 Reactive Corporate Fault/Reactive Self Regulation
A further proposal advanced as a basis and mode of punishment is that of reactive
corporate fault defined as a 'corporation's fault in failing to undertake satisfactory
preventive or corrective measures in response to the commission of the actus reus
of an offence by personnel acing on behalf of the organisation.'484 Reactive
corporate fault may be defined as the 'unreasonable corporate failure to devise and
undertake satisfactory preventive or corrective measures in response to the
commission of the actus reus of an offense by personnel acting on behalf of the
organizations.'485 Fisse argues that 'The challenge ahead is not so much to
improve the application of individual criminal liability as it is to harness the police
486
power of corporations.' By adopting the reactive fault model suggested by Fisse
the company could be required to conduct an inquiry as to who was responsible for
the wrongdoing; to take internal disciplinary action; and to report detailing the
action taken. Fisse concedes that,
'The strategy here is to rely on the good faith of corporations while at
the same time to make it plain that the lack of good faith will be
severely punished. When the law imposes obligations on corporations,
most will feel obliged to comply; the model of good corporate citizen is
not merely an artefact displayed for public relations. If, on the other
hand, the law treats corporations as unworthy of trust, then resentment
is inevitable and non-compliance is likely to be a self-fulfilling
prophecy.'487
It is believed that 'Corporations, through their standard operating procedures, may
488
actually have a greater capacity of reactive adaptation than do human beings.'
As a concept it would display strategic mens rea on a post hoc basis.489 Ashworth
explains the idea of utilising company policies or their absence for the basis of
liability on a reactive fault basis. He explains it in the following terms -
'rather than expending prosecutorial energy and court time trying to
disentangle the often convoluted internal structures and policies of
corporations, the law should require a company which has caused or
484
Fisse, n. 116 at p. 1197; People v Albany and Vermont Railroad 12 Abb. Pr 171 (NY Sup Ct
1860); see also US v Olin Corporation (Criminal NO 78-30 (June 1 1978)
485
Fisse and French (Eds.), n. 4 at p. 187
486
Fisse, n. 65 at pp. 510-11.
487
Fisse, n. 65 at p 513.
488
French, Corporate And Collective Responsibility, (1979) at p. 162
489
Fisse, n. 116 at p. 1198
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threatened a proscribed harm to take its own disciplinary and
rectificatory measures. A court would then assess the adequacy of the
measures taken. The concept of faith would thus be a post hoc
phenomenon. Rather than struggling to establish some antecedent fault
within the corporation, the prosecution would invite the court to infer
fault from the nature and effectiveness of the company's remedial
measures after it had been established that it was the author of a harm-
causing or harm-threatening act or omission. The court would not find
fault if it was persuaded that the company had taken realistic measures
to prevent recurrence, had ensured compensation for any victims, and
had taken the event seriously in other respects.'490
In implementing the scheme, there would be a need to define the concept, offences
it would apply to and the specified reactive duties.491 Fisse proposes the following
scheme of reactive non-compliance
7. A serious offense ofreactive non-compliance would require proofof
strategic mens rea- an express ofimplied corporate policy ofdeliberate
or reckless non-compliance with a legal duty to undertake preventive
or corrective reactive measures
2. A less serious offense of reactive non-compliance would require a
failure to comply with a legally imposed duty, subject to an affirmative
defense that the corporation exercised due diligence in attempting to
comply. 492
This would be applicable to ordinary serious offences and one could create a
general offense of reactive non-compliance 493 Fisse's scheme proposes the
following formulation
7 Occasionfor reaction
(a) commission ofthe actus reus ofa criminal offence or civil violation
by one or more agents acting on behalfofthe corporation; and
(b) receipt ofnotice ofreactive obligation through a compliance order,
containing one or more of the alternatives below, issued by a court or
administrative agency and served upon corporation through one or
more of its officers
2. Type ofreaction required- as specified by a compliance order issued
pursuant to the above procedure and within the following authorized
range
(a) initiation and completion of an effective program of internal
disciplinary action
A. Ashworth, Principles OfCriminal Law, (2nd Ed., 1995) at pp. 116-7
491
Fisse, n. 116 at p. 1201
492
Fisse, n. 116 at p. 1202; see also Developments, n 114 at p. 1257
493
Fisse, n. 116 at p. 1204
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(b) modification of compliance policies or standard operating
procedures which, if left in place, would be likely to occasion further
violations;
(c) redress by means ofcompensation, restitution or rectification and
(d) facilitation of the redress of corporate harm-doing by providing
public notice of likely rights ofaction, impact assessment studies, and
other means ofremedial assistance
3 Time frame for compliance- as specified by a compliance order
issued pursuant to the above procedure, subject to guidelines or
maximum limits prescribed for each of the reactive requirements
authorized under (2)
(4) Persons subject to the obligation- as specified by a compliance
order issuedpursuant to the above procedure, but always including as
primary obligors
(a) the corporation on whose behalf the threshold actus reus has been
committed and
(b) members ofa managerial taskforce charged with the responsibility
of initiating andmonitoring aprogram ofreactive compliance. 494
An obvious concern is whether companies will resort to delaying tactics.495 Due
diligence will require to show that the illegal conduct has been convincingly
forbidden and that safeguards have been designed to prevent corporate crimes has
been developed.496 In response, Fisse calls for a duty of reactive due diligence.497
All of this poses the question 'why should 'corporations be given a free bite at the
apple of crime'?'498 The perceived benefit of the scheme is that
'Although few corporations operate under policies of non-compliance,
all can be placed on notice that they are expected, as matter of specific
reactive policy, to respond to an actus reus by formulating and
implementing a satisfactory program of preventive or corrective
,499
reaction.
One can deduce merit in the contention that 'corporate responsibility should be also
be assessed on the basis of a defendant's responses to prohibited harm-causing or
risk taking.'500 Where the proposal is unconvincing is that it conflicts with the
notion of the egalitarian application of the criminal law to corporations and
Fisse, n. 116 at p. 1206
495
Fisse, n. 116 at p. 1207
496
Fisse, n. 116 at p. 1207; Developments, n. 114 at pp. 1257-8
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Fisse, n. 116 at p. 1208
498
Fisse, n. 116 at p. 1209
499
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500
Fisse and French (Eds.), n. 4 at p. 187
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individuals alike. Corporations can just as easily be placed on notice that if they
violate the criminal law they will be prosecuted and punished appropriately.
Obviously reactive corporate fault is a promising way of avoiding contentious
attribution of criminal intentionality to a corporation501 but that is almost a negative
rationale for its existence rather than an inherently positive one.
Reactive corporate fault requires both non-interventionist and interventionist
502 • •sanctions. Stone's view is that 'the more intrusive the intervention, the more it
should be reserved for a relatively narrow class of situations in which the warrant
• 503 • •for doing so appears sufficiently strong.' Fisse and Braithwaite suggest that a
denunciatory report should only be used selectively in sentencing where there had
been an inadequate corporate reaction.504 Their recommendation is that court
ordered sentence against corporate offenders should be publicised and that pre¬
sentence probation reports should be used to require disclosure of organisational
reforms and disciplinary action as a result of the offence.505 Sullivan criticises the
reactive fault model suggested by Fisse and Braithwaite as one that would require
'much in the way of expert scrutiny and investigation.'506 Fisse himself recognised
that corporate fault could prove to be the 'blackest hole in theory of corporate
• • 507 • • •criminal law.' The 'glaring theoretical deficiency in managerial mens rea is that
508
no necessary connection to corporate blameworthiness.' Ashworth in something
of an understatement says that 'The unusual features of 'reactive fault' may make
Fisse and French (Eds.), n. 4 at p. 188
502
Braithwaite in Fisse and French (Eds.), n. 4 at p. 206
503
Stone, n. 6 at Ch 2; Under American ABA proposal a sentence of continuing judicial supervision
cannot be imposed unless the criminal behaviour was serious, repetitive and facilitated by
inadequate internal accounting or monitoring controls or that a clear and present danger exist to the
public health or safety (Fisse and French (Eds.), n. 4 at p. 190).
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Fisse and Braithwaite, n. 278 at p. 307
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the concept slow to gain acceptance.'509 Despite this, the English Law
Commission paper offers tentative support for the post hoc assessment of corporate
conduct.510 For the reasons advanced earlier, the universal application of the
concept of reactive corporate fault is at the present time insupportable. The post
hoc assessment of liability negates the intellectual rationale of equanimity and
offers little in the way of strategic deterrence.
Enforced Self-Reaction
Enforced self-reaction is an extension of Braithwaite's enforced self-regulation
(discussed supra) and has similar features to reactive corporate fault. It requires a
two stage hearing.511 The first hearing establishes if actus reus has been
committed by the corporate defendant thereafter the defendant would need to
prepare a report indicating what compliance measures they had taken including
future proposals and restitution proposals. The second hearing would decide
whether the reaction had been sufficient. If there is a suitable response the
corporate defendant would be acquitted and if not it would be convicted. As such
intervention in the corporation would be contingent on the failure of company to
512make responsive adjustment as required. Enforced self reaction would preserve
513
managerial freedom as long as there was a suitable responsive adjustment This
contrasts with Braithwaite's original model which has greater State intervention in
the actual response. It seeks to strike a balance requiring a response without being
overly interventionist.514 Intervention would be confined to requiring preparation
of a report with subsequent assessment of that report. Naturally, there are problems
in setting legal standards of corporate behaviour.515 If one specifies standards in
advance this gives a chance for corporations to find loopholes.516 Moreover, there
Ashworth, n. 490 at p. 117
510
Law Commission Consultation Paper see para 5.57-5. 58
511
Fisse and French (Eds.), n 4 at p. 191
512
Fisse and French (Eds.), n. 4 at p. 191
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514
Fisse and French (Eds.), n. 4 at p. 192
515
1 rules or general application are universalistic
2 rules must be clear and precise
3 rules cannot reach the high standards possible on a moral plane but are minimalistic
4 rules promote conformity and stability not dynamism (Fisse and French (Eds.), n. 4 at p. 193).
516
Fisse and French (Eds.), n. 4 at p. 194
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is a fear that by imposing standards will depress moral expectations in society.317
Enforced self-reaction is a shame based system (for those who have been given a
5 j 8 ..
chance) geared to promotion of higher standards which gives fair notice of
prohibitions without imposing precise rules.519 There are those who believe it will
520
help develop exemplars for other industries In addition it will be possible to
pursue a policy of maximisation of individual accountability by sentencing for
521
unsatisfactory reaction report. One possible side benefit is that enforced self
reaction would provide a framework for administrative development of
522 • • •
prosecutorial guidelines and discretion. Whilst it is an interesting proposition it
suffers from the same deficiencies outlined in respect of reactive corporate fault.
The criminal law and criminal sanction must retain some in terrorem impact. A
post occurrence evaluation for corporate violations is only likely to fuel further the
perception of double standards within our criminal law. Nevertheless, whilst
rejecting such post hoc assessment as basis for sanction they may offer something
more in respect of quantification of sanction. The willingness of the corporation to
make modification or restitution may well be a factor in mitigation.
4.14 Conclusion
Despite the inevitable complications in applying traditional sanctions to the
corporate entity, it is apparent from a sweeping survey of the Anglo-American
jurisprudence that a number of possibilities can be entertained. Many of the
traditional sanctions are wholly appropriate to the corporate form and in addition,
there are a number of new interesting possibilities. The task must be to achieve the
523
optimal use of criminal sanctions. That optimum contains three components- the
preferred form of sanction, the appropriate cost bearer, and the certainty-severity
trade off.524 Fisse's call for new invigorated entity sanctions should not obscure
the fact that certain traditional sanctions might in the proper context be
<17
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518
Fisse and French (Eds.), n. 4 at p. 198
ciq
Fisse and French (Eds.), n. 4 at p. 197
520
Fisse and French (Eds.), n. 4 at p. 197
521
Fisse and French (Eds.), n. 4 at p. 202
522
Fisse and French (Eds.), n. 4 at p. 202
523
Coffee, n. 68 at p. 421
524
Coffee, n. 68 at p. 421
239
525
appropriate. It seems relatively obvious that there is a need for a diversified
526
strategy for prevention of corporate misconduct. Kennedy explains that 'it is the
very diversity of its application that makes the corporate form a formidable barrier
< • 527
to effective social control. No single weapon is ideal in every situation.' Stone
suggests that we adopt a three-tiered approach to controlling corporations- the
528
discipline of the markets, the discipline of the law, and thereafter punishment.
Certainly, there is a need for greater consumer pressure and wider information
529about corporate criminal activity generally. In respect of sanctions an altogether
a more holistic approach to controlling corporate crime is called for. Sentencing
the corporation is no easy task. Mann, Wheeler and Sarat recognise that 'judges
deal in the real world of sentencing, and may face considerations unperceived and
530
unattended by whose concerns are dictated by current academic theorizing'; for
all that, there is concern that corporate crime sentencing is not proportionate to the
531 •harm inflicted. Geis argues that 'The first prerequisite for imposing heavier
sanctions on corporate criminals involves the development of a deepening sense of
532 •moral outrage on the part of the public.' For some the real problem is not the
533
leniency of punishment but the failure to convict the true policy formulators.
There is a need to look beyond the power of criminal sanction on the basis that 'No
system of law can flourish that relies solely on the fiat and the naked power of the
State. The law must in general be compatible with what men and women perceive
as sensible and just, and hence capable of attracting the spontaneous and un¬
coerced compliance of the great majority of persons to whom it applies.'534
535 •Punishment should be catalytic as well as inhibitory. Corporations need to do
more that simply engage in self restraint or exert inhibition. Punishment should
See Fisse, n. 289 at p. 108
526
Kennedy, n. 51 at p. 444
527
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528
Kennedy, n. 51 at p. 481
529
Clinard, n. 68 at p. 225
530
Mann, Wheeler and Sarat, 'Sentencing The White-Collar Offender' 1980 17 American Criminal
L. R. 479-500
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catalyse compliance policies and disciplinary controls. Interventionism should be
exercised with restraint but it should nonetheless be available as a weapon against
536
the corporate criminal." Rather than adopting the inertia and belief of
invincibility of many corporate crime theorists and commentators, Cullen and
Dubeck contend that ' A more realistic and encouraging agenda is not to diminish
hopes by concentrating solely on the real constraints that exist, but rather to
show...the possibilities of meaningfully attacking corporate crime within present
537 .... . . .
arrangements.' The international dimension must also be considered. Whilst it
is easy to concede the necessity of international sanctioning methods 'to control
activities which either fall between the cracks of national laws or spread one
538offence across a patchwork of national jurisdictions,' developing such an
approach will be extremely difficult. As a stop gap measure, the adoption of
sanctioning methods reasonably congruent with those operating in other
jurisdictions is a useful preliminary step in that process. Finally, in everything we
do we must be alert to the unique structural dimensions to the issues of sanctioning
539the corporate criminal. Those unique structural features should not however be
allowed to defeat the proper sanctioning of the errant corporation.
536
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537
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538
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The development of a greater understanding of corporate dynamics and demand for
greater corporate social responsibility have conspired to promote a body of
jurisprudence aimed at attaching criminal liability under homicide laws to the
corporate entity where death ensues from their culpable actions.1 Corporate crime
which results in death or serious physical injury is particularly evocative. So much
so that Wells claims that corporate killing now has cultural meaning. Hills
describes corporate violence as,
'actual harm and risk of harm inflicted on consumers, workers and the
general public as a result of decisions by corporate executives or managers,
from corporate negligence, the quest for profits at any cost, and wilful
• • • 3
violations of health, safety and environmental laws.'
Irrespective of how one seeks to define corporate killing, the extinction of life
attacks the public psyche in a way that no other consequence does. Deaths arising
from corporate wrongdoing have heightened interest in the subject of corporate
crime so much so that 'a concrete instance of harm brings home the realities of risk
in a way abstract information in the form of probabilities cannot do..Accidents create
expectations and demands for action. Not only must some response be made: it
must be seen to be made.'4 Rose has suggested that the adverse perception of this
form of criminal activity is rooted in the community rather than simply in the legal
community. Large-scale disasters have been particularly important in developing
public consciousness.5 Significantly, there has been widespread recognition that it is
only very rarely that 'the emergence of a disaster can be fully attributed to the
1
'Issues of social responsibility, both towards employees in a company and to the community at
large, have rightly come mush to the fore in public discussion, and there is a need to consider how far
it is desirable and practicable to take further account of these by statutory means.' (DTI White Paper
Company Law Reform (1973 Cmnd 5391 HMSO para 5); see also, M V Herald ofFree Enterprise,
Report OfThe Court, No 8074 Dept of Transport 1987 para 14
2
Wells 'Cry In The Dark- Corporate Manslaughter And Cultural Meaning', in Loveland (Ed.),
Frontiers OfCriminality (1995) pp. 109-125
3
S. L. Hills (Ed.), Corporate Violence: Injury And Death For Profit, (1987), Chapter vii
4
B. M. Hutter and Lloyd -Bostock, 'The Power OfAccidents: The Social And Psychological Impact
OfAccidents And The Enforcement OfSafety Regulations' 1990 30 British Journal of Criminology
409-412
5
L. Dunford and A. Ridley,'Corporate Manslaughter- Time For Reform' 1996 Paper at p. 1
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blunders, errors or, misunderstandings of a single individual; invariably one needs to
assess the contributory behaviour of several individuals but also the manner in which
behaviour of these individuals is shaped by the institutions and organisations within
which they act.'6 Hutter and Lloyd Bostock have noted that accidents and disasters
can have 'a powerful social and psychological impact' which create expectations and
n
demands for action. The correlation between the sense of outrage and the demand
for the attachment of criminal liability is also recognised by Dunford and Ridley
who contend 'a prosecution[following disaster] is 'symbolic', representative of the
public outrage which inevitably follows the incident.' Though 'symbolic' and
important, '[t]he extension of corporate liability to personal crimes of violence such
as homicide does, however, pose serious theoretical, philosophical and practical
difficulties.'9 So much so that, according to Wells, there is a 'clash between the
popular invocation of corporate manslaughter and the legal barriers frustrating its
application.'10
In modern times, prosecution of corporations under homicide crimes has been both
11 12
rare and controversial. One of the reasons for controversy is that there has been a
traditional view,
'that the law fails to satisfy victims' relatives when it seeks to deal with
death which is brought about by gross negligence in the exercise of a lawful
pursuit such as commerce and industry....where death is caused by an
agency which consists ofmultiple persons, the law does not have a vehicle
by which guilt may be properly recognised and attributed. Corporate
wrongs will generally not be dealt with by the mainstream criminal justice
6
B. Turner, Manmade Disasters, (1978) at p. 160
7
Hutter and Lloyd Bostock, n. 4 at p. 409
8
Dunford and Ridley, n. 5 at p. 8
9
P. B. Rodella, 'Corporate Criminal Liability For Homicide: Has the Fiction Been Extended Too
Far' 1984 4 J. of Law and Commerce 95-126 op cit. at p. 95
Wells, 'Corporate Manslaughter: A Cultural And Legal Form'
http://comlaw.rutgers.edu/crimlawforum/wellsAAxrA at p. 4. Sentencing in fatality cases causes the
courts some anxiety, see Dunford and Ridley, n. 5 at p. 6; Steyn J in R v Kite reported in The Daily
Telegraph, Feb. 9th 1996, p. 3
"
N. Reville, 'Corporate Manslaughter', 1989 Law Society's Gazette 17; see also D. Bergman,
Deaths At Work: Accidents Or Corporate Crime - The Failures OfInquests And The Criminal Justice
System, (1991) at p. 4
G. A. Clark, 'Corporate Homicide: A New Assault On Corporate Decision-Making' 1979 54 Notre
Dame Lawyer 911-924 at p. 912 describes corporate criminal liability for homicide as 'an enigmatic
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system which is seen as a system for upholding social order and protecting
individual rights.'13
The failure to prosecute has, unfortunately perpetuated the social perception that
these crimes are not serious.14 The danger is that, as Solzhenitsyn somewhat
colourfully contends, 'When we neither punish nor reproach evildoers..we are
ripping the foundations of justice from beneath new generations.'15 According to
Leigh, whilst there is nothing in theory to prevent a corporation from being held
liable for an offense of violence such as murder..'The incongruity, if any, in
convicting a corporation for an act of violence reflects an inarticulable premise that
conditions of policy, especially deterrence, require the prosecution of natural
persons.'16 Corns suggests that there is a cultural and linguistic resistance to
• 17
construing artificial persons, such as corporations, as "killers." One of the
inhibiting factors has been the reluctance to engage the real criminal law against the
18
corporation. Wells talks of an 'unconscious disquiet' at the attempt to frame a
company and its officers as homicidal criminals.19 However, Corns suggests that it
takes sensational fatalities or large-scale disaster to engage public indignation that
the corporation ought to be punished accepting that 'the role of the media in
• 20
formulating and changing socio-legal perceptions in this context is critical.'
Notwithstanding the difficulties, there is a real need to reinforce the symbolic
21
message of the criminal law.
The dichotomy between the primary objective of the corporation as an entity and the
possible damaging results of pursuit of that objective have noted by many
13
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commentators. The progress engendered by corporations has not been without its
social costs; it is obvious that 'Such simultaneous beneficial and detrimental aspects
of corporate conduct present lawmakers with the challenge of curtailing socially
harmful activity without stifling the industrial processes.'23 Glasbeek and Rowland
argue in respect ofworkplaces that,
'As all employment creates inherent risk to eliminate all risk of injury is
injury, logically, one ought to eliminate all enterprise. This is obviously an
unacceptable means of approaching the problem. But it is put forward
because it characterizes what is at issue: it is the fact of enterprise which
creates the risk. The focus of any scheme which hopes to better conditions
for workers has to be the nature of and control over the enterprise.'24
In responding to the activities of the modem corporation '[a] clear case can be made
for imputing to such corporations social duties including the duty not to offend all
relevant parts of the criminal law.'25 Given the inherent dangers in the industrial
process, it seems only fitting that corporations should have social responsibility for
their actions. Perceptible development of such a concept is a relatively recent
phenomenon.26
Not all commentators are convinced that utilisation of the ordinary criminal law is
appropriate where death ensues from corporate activity. Whilst there are those who
are sceptical of the deployment of the ordinary criminal law of homicide against
97
corporations on the basis of efficacy, there are those who simply oppose its
application on doctrinaire grounds. Rodella, for example, argues that 'Although
there may be select occasions where the use of criminal sanctions against
corporations for violation of person crimes is justified either because the individual
responsible for the commission of the offense cannot be pin-pointed or where the
inner-circle of the corporation has intentionally, or knowingly consented to
22
A. L. Helverson, 'Can A Corporation CommitMurder' 1986 64 Washington University L. Q. 967-
989 at p. 976
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commission of such a crime, the use of criminal sanctions for personal crimes such
as homicide or involuntary manslaughter should be severely limited.'28 Reilly
argues that corporate criminal liability for homicide is a 'non-sequitur' and that
focus should be on individual liability despite its evident difficulties.29 Others have
been at pains to point out that utilisation of the criminal law should not stifle
corporate innovation and enterprise.30 The free-marketeers see the law as a means of
regulating economic activity more concerned with constraining abuses of the
economic system than protecting human lives. Posner, for example, argues that
'only a fanatic refuses to trade lives for property, although the difficulty of valuing
lives is a legitimate reason for weighing them heavily in the balance when only
31
property values are in the other pan.' Such a view fails because it lacks
compassion. Not evocative emotional compassion but rather a sympathetic
understanding of the real values we wish to enshrine within our laws. The law is not
simply a body of rules designed to offer a formulaire approach to the way we
conduct ourselves, but rather a code designed to create a better society. In failing to
recognise the fundamental sanctity of life, Posner makes a fatal calculation that life
has a monetary price. Posner is not alone in defending the free-market economy.
According to Glasbeek, 'The essence of the capitalist system does not require that
congruence of [individual and corporate harm] exist, that is, that corporate activity
should be deemed criminal. The very relations of production, which is the law's role
to protect and encourage..inhibit such an approach.'32
Notwithstanding the recent suggestion in Anglo-American law that the crime of
33
manslaughter might be appropriate where death ensues from corporate
28
Rodella, n. 9 at p. 122
?Q
D. J. Reilly, 'Murder Inc.: The Criminal Liability Of Corporations For Murder' 1988 18 Seton
Hall L. R. 378-404 at p. 403
30
In the Ford Pinto case in America the prosecution said that the utilisation of ordinary criminal
homicide laws does 'not desire to chill manufacturing generally, it does desire to deter outrageous
decisions to sacrifice human life for private profit.' quoted in D. S. Anderson, 'Corporate Homicide:
The Stark Realities OfArtificial Beings And Legal Fictions' 1981 8 Pepperdine L. R. 367-417 at p.
369
31
Posner (1981,83-4) quoted in Glasbeek, n. 27
32
Glasbeek, n. 27 at p. 131
33
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wrongdoing, it was previously believed such crimes could not be committed by a
corporation.34 Up until the early 1990s there had only been three prosecutions of
• 35
corporations for manslaughter in England. Corresponding prosecutions in
America had been more prevalent. There have been no such prosecutions in
Scotland. The reluctance to prosecute under traditional homicide law can be
explained by the absence of criminal intent, the inability to suitably punish the
36 •
corporation and, ultimately, on the basis of public policy. It was growing concern
about fatalities ensuing from corporate activities that prompted attempts in England
to deploy the crime ofmanslaughter against corporations. Reilly contends that 'The
criminal law has followed an erratic and often unreasoned path from the proposition
that a corporation could not commit any crime, to the modern notion that a
•37
corporation is capable ofmanslaughter.' In England it was believed the cases of R
38
v Sullman, R v Prentice, R v Adomako and R v Holloway opened up new
dimensions to the crime ofmanslaughter on the basis that someone may be guilty of
39
gross negligence in the absence of an indifference to an obvious and serious risk.
Long foresaw the possibility where a new offence and 'less cumbersome' offence of
manslaughter might be aimed at companies who negligently cause death. He
concluded that 'after years of stagnation the law of corporate manslaughter is in the
process of rapid and radical change.'40 Irrespective of this, the current position is
that prosecutions are still to be considered last resort actions. Inevitably, cases are
likely to be complex and, hotly contested.41
34
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One of the principal reasons why there has been increasing focus on traditional
homicide laws has been the perceived inadequacy of existing statutory health and
safety laws. These statutory crimes are framed in a particular way which takes no
cognisance of the fact that death has ensued. This stands in marked contrast to
common criminal offences42 One of the other unfortunate features of Health And
Safety At Work Act 1974 (hereinafter HASAWA) is that criminally negligent
conduct which results in death is only punishable by a fine whilst certain non¬
compliance duties are punishable by imprisonment.43 Bergman wants all
prosecutions for workplace deaths to be triable on indictment and he calls for the
creation of a number of new statutory offences which focus of causing injury or
death through criminal negligence. Interestingly, he demands that their should be a
dual operation of the law so that liability falls on the company and the company
officer.44 He also calls for an intermediate offence of recklessly causing the death of
a person45 applicable to corporations and triable on indictment, and responsibility
attribution not to be based on the need to attribute fault to individuals within the
corporate form. He also foresees a need for a change in prosecutorial attitudes.46
Bergman is not alone in adopting the view that public indignation is not satisfied by
punishing the breach rather than the consequences of the breach of the health and
safety provision.47 According to Geis, 'corporate criminals deal death not
deliberately but through inadvertence, omission and indifference because their
overriding interest is self-interest' and importantly '[Sjince the public cannot be
armed adequately to protect itself against corporate crime, those law enforcement
agencies acting its behalf should take measures sufficient to protect it.'48 Despite
prosecutorial policy in respect of corporate manslaughter being rooted in the
economic structure and operating precepts of the commercial system,49 there has
been growing pressure to apply ordinary homicide laws to corporations or at least to
42
Bergman, n. 11 at p. 31
43
Bergman, n. 11 at p. 31
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Bergman, n. 11 at p. 32
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Bergman, n. 11 at p. 33
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Bergman, n. 11 at p. 34
47
See Dunford and Ridley, n. 5 at p. 6
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Slapper, n. 14 at p. 440
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apply an offence equally opprobrious to corporations where death ensues from their
wrongdoings. Somewhat infortuitously, as this thesis neared completion, the British
Government announced proposals to introduce a new offence of corporate killing. It
is not known whether the offence, founded on proposals of the English Law
Commission, is to be extended to Scotland.50 Whilst such an offence may draw
much of the thunder from the calls for reform they do not defeat the essential
premise on which this thesis is predicated. A new offence of corporate killing
applicable in Scotland represents only a small reform when what is argued for in this
thesis is a complete overhaul of corporate criminal liability. The danger is that they
will deflect attention from the general issue and the patch and paste reform will
impede the wholesale reform which I believe is both necessary and overdue.
Woolfson chides Scottish legal academics for displaying a 'patrician disdain' for
growing public concern on the issue and for a failure to call for reform in Scotland.51
His are legitimate concerns. Cultural lag must not however give way to slavish
imitation. The supposed genius of our law and our lawyers can ensure an altogether
more complete solution.
5.1 The Nature And Extent OfCorporate Killing
Those who argue for greater intervention by the criminal law into the activities of
corporation can point to a wealth of statistical information which illustrates the sheer
magnitude of the physical damage occasioned by corporations. For example, it is
estimated that the solitary instance of the disaster at Bhopal alone resulted in 2,500
52
to 10,000 deaths. Boden and Wegman estimate workplace deaths in America at
roughly 14,000 per annum, with 2 million injuries and deaths from job related
illnesses at 200,000. The President's Report on Occupational Safety and Health
1972 estimates deaths from work related diseases at 100,000.54 Spurgeon and Fagan
50
See Woolfson 'Rising Toll Of Deaths In The Workplace' The Herald 27th November 1997;
Vaughan 'Courts Get Tough With The Corporate Killers' The Herald 15th November 1997
51
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249
have also made an attempt to catalogue the horrendous workplace death figures.55 It
is a fact that more Americans are killed each year in the workplace than were killed
in Vietnam.56 Caudhill estimates that by 1968 there were nearly 250,000 respiratory
victims of coal mining in America and that there had been 100,000 deaths since the
57 • 58
beginning of mining." He claims that 'accidents occur with numbing frequency.'
Tobacco manufacturers have also been heavily criticised in the USA; Clinard
estimates that there have been 395,000 deaths per annum in America from tobacco
related diseases.59 Clinard also catalogues a heavy toll of consumer fatalities in the
United States60 The statistics reveal a simple truth- corporations kill far more people
than individuals.61
Here in the United Kingdom statistics for 1989/90 record that 426 people died from
workplace incidents. 21,000 suffered non-fatal major injuries and 16,000 suffered
62
serious injuries. The HSE estimate that 70 % of those incidents were preventable.
63
Some 572 people were killed at work or in commerce related matters in 1990/91.
Infamous disasters such as Zeebrugge and King's Cross 'represent the fluorescent tip
of a submerged but ever present iceberg.'64 Slapper estimates that 600 persons each
year are killed in work related incidents.65 Since 1965 (the first case of corporate
manslaughter) some 19,000 have been killed. Slapper notes that, of the few cases a
year referred by the HSE to the Crown prosecution Service, very few proceed for
want of evidence.66 He estimates that accidents at work and the impact of resulting
health bills cost industry and the state up to £15 billion pounds a year. The most
55
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recent statistics nonetheless reveal that workplace fatalities fell in 1995; with 190
employees killed in year to April 1995 (expected to increase to 203). There was also
67
a decrease in the number of prosecutions from 1,793 to 1,789. One can almost
deduce a hierarchy of dangerous industries. Coke ovens, open cast coal, coal, and
railways are particularly hazardous. Construction ranks as the 15th most dangerous,
• 68
whilst extraction of minerals oils and gas rank 22nd. Looking at fatalities alone,
extraction of minerals oil and gas ranks highest with 25 deaths per 100,000.69 There
70
has been a particularly heavy death toll in North Sea. The frontier image of early
71
offshore exploration cultivated an image of necessary sacrifice. The Ocean
Odyssey Fatal Accident Inquiry and the Cullen Inquiry into Piper Alpha revealed an
'industry where huge financial outlays in the exploration for oil had generated a
routinely reckless culture of risk taking in which shutting- down of operations was
72
almost unthinkable. Whilst it is true that the 'mere recital of damning figures does
not justify dubbing corporations criminals',73 the statistics go some way to
explaining and endorsing public and academic concern about the issue of corporate
homicide.
5.2 Corporate Homicide, Perceptions Of Real Crime And The Response Of
Corporations
Radin has claimed that 'The criminal label traditionally attaches itself only to
conduct that is judged particularly worthy of the moral condemnation of the
community. A formal statement of guilt manifests this condemnation, and a moral
stigma attaches itself to the guilty. Criminal law is thus the law's "most powerful
weapon" and should be reserved for behaviour which 'excites the sense of
indignation and outrage.'74 One of the major problems in tackling corporate
67
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68
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homicide is the perception that it is not 'real crime' and as such not worthy of true
condemnation. Fatalities are often couched in euphemistic and misleading
75 •
terminology and this serves to reinforce the notion that such deaths are not on a par
76
with other homicides. Whilst it is true that in a modern technological society,
some risk of death is unavoidable or may not be practically avoided,77 it remains the
case many fatalities can be avoided. Simply to define workplace and other fatalities
ensuing from the industrial process as 'accidents' is, as one commentator contends, a
78denial of injury. McColgan explains that
'The very use of the word "accident" in the context of workplace and
transport deaths itself functions as a block to the perception of those deaths
as criminally caused...Without substantial change in the institutional
reaction to workplace and transport deaths, the [European] Commission's
proposals for changes to corporate liability will be of little consequence.'79
Long claims that even safety representatives and experienced safety practitioners do
80
not regard breaches of health and safety law as 'real crime.' Bergman meanwhile
81
talks of the 'decriminalisation' of workplace deaths. Bergman's view is that 'this
'violence' is rarely defined in the vocabulary of the criminal justice system. No
criminals are caught; workers are never considered the victims of assault, battery or
manslaughter, but simply 'accidents.' There are no police investigations, no Crown
court trials, and no sentences of imprisonment in such cases. Companies only have
to face an inspector from the HSE, a half hour hearing in the magistrates court...and
82
a fine of a few hundred pounds, such prosecutions are scarce in any case.' One of
the ways in England in which the perception of death is altered from 'acceptable' to
'unacceptable' revolves round the clear correlation between inquests and
75
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manslaughter charges. It remains the case that findings of unlawful killing are more
83
likely to lead to the bringing of a manslaughter charge in England.
Though there does appear on the face of things to be State tolerance to certain
84
fatalities, there is a palpable and understandable need that corporate homicide is
punished appropriately. That need arises because,
'There are indisputably some cases where a corporation's wrongful intent
combines with the seriousness of its conduct to create the degree of moral
culpability required for criminal sanctions. Under such circumstances,
there is a genuine social need for the imposition of the stigma of
criminality.'85
There are commentators who perceive that the deaths which ensue from corporate
activities are qualitatively different from other killings and that we should
86 •
accordingly deal with corporate killers differently. Corporations play their own
part in shaping the perception of crime. Some writers are extremely critical of the
corporate response to fatalities arising out of their activities. Many cite examples of
over-zealous corporate defensiveness and open hostility to accusers. Jones for
example in assessing Union Carbide's reaction to the horrendous tragedy of Bhopal
claims,
'in the ensuing macabre dance of death, the dead and the walking wounded
were left by the wayside, while the main protagonists acted to minimise
87
damage to their own interests.' 'UCC responded to Bhopal with lies, half
truths, misinformation and publicity gestures; attempted to shift the blame
to its employees and its subsidiary company; and overall showed itself
more concerned with protecting its continued existence and profitability
oo
than with ameliorating the damage it had caused.'
Jones notes UCC's approach was to manage the crisis in the metropolitan countries
more so than in India itself. There were a number of gestures to control public
• 89
opinion. As the crisis developed, UCC distanced itself from its subsidiary.
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Moreover, the Chief Executive sought to blame the workforce and individuals as
primarily responsible as opposed to the officers of the company.90 There are many
instances where the corporation's initial response when confronted with the
consequences of their conduct is to seek to blame the victim.91
One is left then with a situation where the statistics are horrendous and at the same
time elements within society downplay the significance of the problem. The
conspiracy that ensues ensures that the crime is not adequately prosecuted or
punished. However, the growing consensus that something requires to be done
blows apart when one turns to what should be done and how. England appears to be
heading a system where corporate killing is recognised as a specific offence and that
certainly is one plausible solution. Alternatively, there might have been an attempt
to develop the law to more readily apply traditional homicide offences to
corporations. Ironically, of the offences against the person, these remain best suited
for adaptation and application to the corporate form. The failure to apply them is
both political and practical rather than theoretical. The application of homicide
crimes to corporation applying a new mechanism of corporate fault attribution
92without any modification to the actus reus of the crimes is eminently possible.
5.3 Corporate Homicide - A Brief International Perspective
The limited genealogy of the utilisation of homicide offences against corporations in
the UK is not replicated in other common law jurisdictions. In America, in
particular, there is extensive jurisprudence on the subject. The development of that
jurisprudence has nonetheless faced similar difficulties as those now being
encountered in England. Maakestad suggests two reasons for the sporadic and
almost haphazard prosecution for homicide cases in the American State courts
explaining that 'few States were developing a cohesive theory of corporate criminal
liability. As a result there lingered in State courts a variety of conceptual,
definitional and constitutional issues that made most corporate prosecutions-
90
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91
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• • • . 93
especially for serious intent crimes like homicide- legal obstacle courses.' In
addition to this, there was less enthusiasm for diverting scarce resources away from
the prosecution of 'street crime.' In America the situation is determined principally
by whether manslaughter is defined in common law or in statute.94 Swigert and
Farrell suggest that the 'failure to sustain indictments against corporations lies less
in the logic of corporations as potential offenders and more in the language of
particular State or federal statutes. Most typically, homicide is defined in these
codes as the criminal slaying of "another human being" with "another" referring to
the same class of beings as the victim.'95 Moreover, homicide statutes in most
jurisdictions are construed strictly,96 'Despite courts' willingness to hold a
corporation criminally accountable for homicide, corporations still avoid criminal
accountability because of narrowly written vague and ambiguous homicide
97
statutes.' The debate surrounding the efficacy of using ordinary homicide laws in
situations involving corporations in the United States, as in the UK, is intertwined
with the enforcement of regulatory health and safety laws. There is a view that
deregulation of enforcement, and the failure of regulation generally, has led to
98utilisation of ordinary criminal law in America.
Not everyone is enamoured of most States endorsement of the application of
ordinary homicide laws to American corporations. Reilly notes what he describes as
the American courts preoccupation with the ability to hold corporations liable for
manslaughter without addressing the policy issue as to whether they should be
93
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liable." Wragg bemoans the attachment of corporate liability for homicide claiming
that,
'In the space of eighty years, the state of our criminal law has grown to
accept, as basic doctrine, that the corporate entity may be liable for an act
of homicide. Liability has been imposed without recognising the
limitations of the 'corporate fiction' tool and without analysing the
effectiveness of a conviction in achieving the ends sought. The better
course of action would be to encourage prosecutors to charge, and judges
and juries to convict, individuals within the corporation whose wrongful
conduct results in a homicide.'100
According to Hickey, the position in America is that '[A] crime so grievous as
criminal homicide, once thought to be incapable of commission by a business
corporation is now something that corporate directors, officers and agents must be
aware of in their business life.'101
The Model Penal Code has acted as catalyst in the creation of a much more
102
consistent approach in the various American States. Nonetheless, there are still
variations from State to State and not all commentators express satisfaction with the
contribution of the Model Penal Code. Clark for example argues that,
'the Model Penal Code, like most criminal codes, fails, by its language
alone, to resolve the ambiguity surrounding corporate criminal liability for
homicide. The absence of substantial case law adds further confusion.
Although some commentators endorse compatibility of homicide and
corporate criminal liability, the courts are bound to resolve the inherent
statutory ambiguities in terms of legislative intent. Paradoxically, the
ambiguity found in the penal codes subjects the issue to judicial resolution
without legislative guidance.'103
In America, the first corporate criminal indictment for homicide offences occurred in
Commonwealth v Punxsutawny Street Passenger Railway Company104 albeit that the
court in this particular case held that a corporation could not be indicted for crimes
go
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of violence which required criminal intent. A contrary opinion on corporate criminal
intent was reached in People v Rochester Railway and Light Company,'05 but the
first case where an indictment for homicide was sustained was State v Lehigh Valley
Railroad.106 In America, Van Schaick held that the absence of appropriate
punishment did not preclude the conviction for manslaughter.107 In Lehigh Valley
the court said 'we do not consider whether the modification of the common law by
our decisions is to be justified by logical argument; it is confessedly a departure at
least form the broad language in which the earlier definitions were stated, and a
departure made necessary by changed conditions if the criminal law was not to be
set at naught in many cases, by contriving that the criminal act should be in law the
108
act of the corporation.' This it has been argued represented a refusal to recognise
conceptual barriers to corporate criminal liability.109
The American case of People v Film Recovery Systems in 1985 offers a further
illustration of a corporation being prosecuted for manslaughter.110 A Polish
immigrant worker collapsed and died from cyanide poisoning. His job in common
with other employees was to recover silver from x-ray film. Thus was done by way
of cutting the film and dissolving it in large vats of sodium cyanide. The company
had failed to institute improvements in respiratory equipment or indeed to
ventilation generally. There was evidence that warning signs had been deliberately
removed from chemical containers. The failures were against a backdrop of ongoing
complaints from employees. The company president, safety manager and foreman
were convicted of murder while the corporation was convicted of manslaughter.
One of the executives remained in Utah and the State Governor refused extradition.
The case was widely reported in America and resulted in analogous prosecutions in
105
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other American States.111 Bixby claims that the prosecution was brought because of
a perception of failure on the part of the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration to aggressively enforce its rules and regulations.112 Moreover, he
cites one District Attorney as saying 'if mercury can put holes in someone's brain,
that's not much different from a gun putting a hole in someone's brain.' The case is
symbolic and importantly that symbolism is not,
'as clearly communicated through modern, specialized laws that deal with
health and safety problems in technical terms. Though criminal penalties
may attach to many of these specialized crimes against health and safety,
the stigma associated with those charges is not the same as the stigma that
attaches to a conviction for manslaughter, murder, or reckless homicide.'113
Another interesting American illustration occurred in the Warner -Lambert case. In
a factory owned by the Warner Lambert Corporation more than 50 employees were
injured and there were 6 fatalities. Corporate decisions as to the level of explosive
dust were blamed. The incident took place during the final eight hour shift of six
day week working. The company was making $400,000 a day from its Freshen Up
gum product. The company's insurers inspected the plant some months earlier and
recommended various measures to reduce the dust generated by the manufacturing
process. The dust was often as thick as fog.114 In 1981 the corporation and four
officials were indicted for manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide
following the death of six workers in a dust explosion and fire. For both crimes
there was a requirement that there is a risk which is both substantial and
unjustifiable. The essence ofmanslaughter is an awareness of the risk coupled with
a disregard of that risk whereas failure to perceive the risk is implicit in criminal
negligence.115 In Warner Lambert the indictments were dismissed because,
although there was a broad risk of explosion from substances used in the workplace,
the court was not prepared to hold that evidence justified forseeability of the actual
explosion. It would appear that in America following Warner Lambert that before
indictments will be upheld, there is a need to prove that the accused actually foresaw
111
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or should have foreseen the cause of death.116 This level of forseeability creates
substantial problems in respect of causation. Following Warner Lambert
forseeability is now a distinct and important factor in the element of causation.117
Such an approach clearly pushes individual liability to the lower echelons of the
organisation. Ironically these individuals may have least power to prevent the harm
occurring. In Weinfeld's view,
'Any standard used to determine this level of personal accountability
should further the purposes behind imposing penal sanctions in the
corporate sector. These sanctions must deter individual misconduct and
encourage affirmative action by responsible corporate agents who are aware
of the harmful conditions and have sufficient power and responsibility to
118
prevent or correct those.'
In the now infamous Ford Pinto case, the Ford Motor Corporation were charged with
reckless homicide following the deaths of three teenagers travelling in a Ford Pinto
which was hit in the rear by a speeding van. The initiation of proceedings against
the corporation itself caused some surprise.119 Ford had prepared a cost-benefit
analysis of the hazard in their Pinto vehicle which disclosed that an $ 11 fuel tank
120 •shield would have prevented the problem. Their cost-benefit analysis also
disclosed that this was likely to be more expensive than compensation payable for
the inevitable fatalities. The case represented a remarkable departure in that the
121
company was not charged with a regulatory infraction. Clark conceived that the
Ford Pinto case might mark the 'beginning of a new assault on corporate decision-
122
making.' Following the Ford Pinto case there has been a growing number of
123
cases accusing corporations of violent crimes in America.
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Another notorious case of corporate wrongdoing in the United States concerned the
marketing of the lethal Dalkon contraceptive diaphragm shield.124 Mintz claims
'The shield created a disaster of global proportions because a few men with little on
their minds except the pursuit of megabucks made decisions, in the interests of
profit, that exposed millions of women to serious infection, sterility, and even
125death.' She estimates that the Dalkon Shield killed hundreds and possibly
126thousands of women outside the USA. In condemning the company A H Robins
she says they,
'knowingly and wilfully put corporate greed before human welfare;
suppressed scientific studies that would ascertain safety and effectiveness;
concealed hazards from consumers, the medical profession, and
government; assigned a lower value to foreign lives than to American lives;
behaved ruthlessly towards victims who sued; and hired outside experts
who would give accommodating testimony. Yet almost every other major
drug company has done one or more of these things, some have done the
127
repeatedly or routinely, and some continue to still to do so.'
Canada is similar to USA in that where crimes of violence are involved the
128 • •
prosecuting authorities prosecute individuals rather than corporations. Indicative
of this approach are two case illustrations. First in Canada Regina v Great Western
129
Laundry Co. the court declined to hold a corporation criminally liable for
manslaughter when a female employee was killed when her skirt became entangled
on a rotating machine shaft. The court dismissed the case on the absence of
precedent and drew sustenance from the fact that a corporation could not be
130
appropriately punished. In Regina V Union Colliery Co. it was held that a
corporation could be criminally negligent but not be guilty of manslaughter where
131
negligence resulted in death.
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In the State of Victoria (Australia) murder is a common law offence defined as
occurring where a person of sound mind and discretion unlawfully kills any
reasonable creature in being and under Queen's peace with intent to kill or cause
grievous bodily harm and the death following within a year and a day.132 Like most
jurisdictions recklessness has redefined the common law definition. In Crabbe it
was said,
'If an accused knows when he does an act that death or grievous bodily
harm is a probable consequence, he does the act expecting that death or
grievous bodily harm will be the likely result, for the word 'probable'
means likely to happen. The state of mind is comparable with an intention
133
to kill or to do grievous bodily harm'
The penalty for murder in Victoria is dictated by section 3 of the Crimes Act 1958
which dictates that the penalty shall be imprisonment for life or such other term as
the court may decide. There is no scope for the imposition of a fine or other non¬
custodial disposition. Such an approach impedes prosecution for murder134 Corns
suggests the adoption of section 4b of the Commonwealth Crimes Act 1914 which
provides,
'(2A) Where a natural person is convicted of an offence against a law of
the Commonwealth in respect of which a court may impose a penalty of
imprisonment for life, the court may, if the contrary intention does not
appear and the court thinks it appropriate in all the circumstances of the
case, impose, instead of, or in addition to, a penalty of imprisonment, a
pecuniarypenalty not exceeding $200,000
(3) Where a body corporate is convicted ofan offence against a law of the
Commonwealth, the court may, if the contrary intention does not appear
and the court thinks fit, impose a pecuniary penalty not exceeding an
amount equal to 5 times the amount ofthe maximum pecuniary penalty that
could be imposed by the court on a natural person convicted of the same
rr ,135
offence.
In Australian Federal law involuntary manslaughter arises where there is an absence
of intent but death ensues from negligence or some unlawful and dangerous act or
136
the intention to inflict bodily harm. Although a maximum term of imprisonment
134
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of 15 years is proscribed by the Crimes Act 1958 section 5 there is the possibility of
a fine as an alternative. Clearly, the logistical problem of punishing the corporation
does not pertain to this particular crime and as such Corns asserts that there is no
137
legal barrier to prosecuting a corporation for manslaughter. In support of this he
cites Fisse who argues that,
'intention, recklessness or negligence can be attributed to a body corporate.
Moreover, it is well established at common law that unlawful homicide
does not necessarily require a killing by a human being; it is sufficient that
138
the entity causing death is a legal person, whether human or corporate.'
The Anglo-American jurisdiction experience points the way to how we might
approach the development of the full application of existing homicide laws to
corporations. It is possible to conclude that corporations can be tried under existing
laws whether they be statutory or common law based. Our own homicide laws are
contained in the common law crimes of murder and culpable homicide. Ultimately,
we must decide whether the common law crimes should be applicable to
corporations. Given the experience in England, America and elsewhere, there seems
no substantial theoretical reason why these crimes should not be applied. Culpable
homicide does not confront the barrier of the mandatory penalty which attaches to
murder. Intellectually and practically it is a crime which fits the circumstances of
corporate homicide. Prima facie the only impediment to murder would appear to be
the issue of sanction. It may simply 'boil down' to a question of choice; are we so
wedded to the attachment of life imprisonment for murder that we consequentially
exclude it from consideration, or are we determined to apply criminal law to
corporations in an effort to deter and sanction their criminality.
5.4 Prosecution Of Corporate Homicide
The principled objections to corporate liability per se, and corporate liability under
homicide laws, have already been noted. There is a considerable body of opinion
whose concern derives from the practical problems which inevitably arise in
attempting to both attach liability and prosecute the corporation. That there is
Corns, n. 17 at p. 356
138
Fisse, in Howard's Criminal Law, (5th Ed., 1990) at p. 610
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evidence in the Anglo-American jurisdictions of an increasing utilisation of ordinary
homicide laws is, in the view of Maakestad, evidence of growing public intolerance
where companies knowingly and recklessly endanger lives.139 For all that, there is
undoubted difficulty in prosecuting corporate homicide.140 Field and Jorg argue that
whilst enforcement has given concern one cannot ignore the form that the law takes
because that shapes the way it is enforced.141 Corns rather simplistically reaffirms
the need to ensure that there is sustainable admissible evidence and that prosecution
is in the public interest.142 The problems of prosecution are however more complex
than this.
Commentators identify problems much earlier on in the investigative process.
Bergman, for example, offers a caricature of police involvement in workplace health
and safety deaths claiming '[ajfter every death at work a police officer will come to
the scene- but this is only to determine whether the deceased worker was pushed
from scaffolding or into dangerous machinery by a angry workmate, in which case a
formal murder inquiry would be appropriate. There is only cursory investigation to
rule out foul play, and to take details of the deceased to inform relatives.'143
According to Wells, it is because there are separate enforcement agencies that death
are marginalised from criminal enforcement.144 Bergman suggests that corporate
manslaughter falls between agencies because the police excuse their continuing
involvement by pointing to the HSE investigation of the incident. In turn the Health
and Safety Executive are only interested in regulatory offences. This involvement of
the HSE is viewed as a preliminary step in the process of decriminalisation.145
Carson has argued that inspectors were originally committed to enforcing the law
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140
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141
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but that the courts ineffectual sanctioning of those prosecuted diverted the approach
towards compliance rather prosecution which was to be utilised as a shock tactic.146
Whilst disasters help focus attention there is a downside; resources may have to be
diverted from the mainstream pro-active work of those agencies.147
In the period 1991 up to April 1994 there have been 20 prosecutions in Scotland
under the HASAWA for workplace fatalities. Though there may be a greater
propensity to prosecute, the level of fine is dropping. According to Woolfson et al.
'fines must be assessed in terms of the deterrence effect which they exert on a
company. Only when this is done can there be any realistic notion of economic
deterrence and any proper expectation of corporate compliance.'148 Despite the
appointment of dedicated prosecutors in Scotland there is no evidence of a more pro¬
active prosecutorial strategy.149 Conversely, in England, Harrison detects an
increased willingness (induced by high profile disasters and ensuing public outcry)
on the part of the Crown Prosecution Service to prosecute for manslaughter.150
More commonly where death ensues from workplace incidents, prosecutors usually
invoke the provisions of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 rather than
English, or Scottish common law. There are several recent illustrations of
prosecutions under the regulatory regime of HASAWA. For example, Guinness
Brewing Worldwide Ltd pled guilty to an offence under section 3(1) of HASAWA
following the death by electrocution of subcontractors foreman. The company were
fined £75,000.151 The HSE also sought prosecution of BRB and Tilbury Douglas
Construction Ltd following death of two employees when a bridge under demolition
collapsed on top of them. However, there was a failure to prosecute in 1994
Tarbsport Company after 6 persons killed by one of their lorries at Sowerby Bridge
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152
in September 1993. Unfavourable comparisons can be drawn between the
treatment of individual employees and employers;153 because they are the hands of
the corporation, employees are particularly vulnerable to individual manslaughter
154
prosecutions.
5.5 Mens Rea And Corporate Homicide
It has been claimed that mens rea represents the embodiment of protection of the
individual from criminal liability.155 However, not all commentators see it as a
prerequisite of a fair criminal justice system. According to Seney,
'Another irrational objection to giving up mens rea claims that criminal law
exists to express community moral outrage, to attach moral stigma, and
thereby to further community solidarity. This is simply out of place in any
reasonably enlightened society. The process of serving up scapegoats as
smoking sacrificial victims to be assumed public moral bloodthirstiness
hardly commends itself to civilised decision making.'156
In assessing corporate criminal liability for homicide offences one is drawn to
consider the mens rea applicable to individuals-intent, recklessness and negligence.
Intention is viewed by many as the ultimate criminal mind and often crucial in the
criminality equation. Ashworth, for example, claims intention should be more
157
defining than outcomes. Whereas in comparison, Box argues, 'evil should not be
unrecognised merely because it is as banal as indifference; indifference rather than
intent may well be the greater cause of avoidable human suffering, particularly in the
158
case of corporate crime.' One of the primary objections to the imputation of
corporate criminal liability for homicide offences undoubtedly relates to the absence
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153
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of intent. Byam explains 'An individual's intent is usually not distinguished from
his knowledge; if someone is aware of his own actions and their likely
consequences, it is logical to presume his intent to engage in conduct and cause its
probable effects.' Such an approach is clearly more problematic with
corporations.159 There are those that argue that intention is a uniquely personalised
state of mind and that intention is integral to human action.160 We normally
presuppose that those who intend are rational agents161 and that 'intention is the
162
central or paradigm determinant of moral culpability.' Interestingly, English law
or Scots law, has never required an actual intention to kill as the sole basis upon
163which murder may be established. Criminal law recognises generally, but to
varying degrees, both recklessness and negligence. Intention and recklessness are
advertant states of mind; negligence is arguably inadvertent.164 Because negligence
represents the lowest form of the criminal mind its utilisation is greeted with 'violent
antipathy' believing it to be 'incompatible with the deterrent nature of criminal
punishment.'165 In the English case of Doulton166 it was argued that negligent
behaviour should be excluded from penal liability. The recognition of negligence as
...... 167 •
a form of criminal liability is nonetheless of some antiquity. Jacobs explains why
negligence is recognised as a form of liability defining it as, 'an acknowledgement
of a moral rule requiring the exercise of due care in social relations.' In England it is
168
suggested that there is no separate test for gross negligence. Even if there is,
Sullivan claims there are inevitable and appropriate limitations to deploying the term
'gross negligence' in relation to activities which are intrinsically lawful. His view is
that 'Denunciatory notions such as 'gross negligence' can only operate fairly within
159
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the requirements of regulatory law and current patterns of accepted risks.'169
Nevertheless, Sullivan recognises that corporate manslaughter may have a useful
residual role in providing an incentive to companies to do all that they reasonably
• • 170
can in preventing grossly negligent conduct on the part of officers and employees.
In England, the R v Kite /OLL Ltd prosecution was successful partially because of an
intervening resurrection of the law of gross negligence in England. The Court of
Appeal in R v Prentice and Others171 had suggested that gross negligence could be
displayed by
'(a) an indifference to an obvious risk of injury and health;(b) actual
foresight of the risk coupled with the determination to run it;(c) an
appreciation of the risk coupled with an intention to avoid it but also
coupled with such a high degree of negligence in the attempted avoidance
as the jury considers justifies conviction;(d) inattention or failure to advert
to a serious risk which goes beyond "mere inadvertence" in respect of an
obvious and important matter which the defendant's duty demanded he
should address.' 72
McColgan argues that at the present time it is impossible to say whether reckless or
173
gross negligence manslaughter are one and the same thing. The Prentice case
continued gross negligence as a basis of manslaughter and in the process modified
what had thought to be the settled position of Caldwell,174 but the matter has now
been modified again by the House of Lords in Adomako'75 which imposes a singular
test for manslaughter by gross negligence.176 That test can be stated as 'was there a
breach of duty of care ?', -'did the breach cause the victims death ?' and 'did that
breach of duty amount to gross negligence ?' Clearly, this can apply where
employers have a duty to ensure safety177 or where someone creates a hazardous
178
situation. In Adomako, Lord Mackay said gross negligence depended,
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'on the seriousness of the breach of duty committed by the defendant in all
the circumstances in which he was placed when it occurred and whether,
having regard to the risk of death involved, the conduct of the defendant
was so bad in all the circumstances as to amount in the jury's judgment to a
criminal act or omission.'179
Though there is a body of opinion that contends that a corporation can exhibit
intention, there is a suggestion that an altogether more fertile basis for the attribution
of criminal liability to corporations for homicide crimes is the mental state of
recklessness. Whilst 'the distinction between reckless conduct and criminal
180 •
negligence is often muddled', all the common law jurisdictions recognise
recklessness as a culpable state of mind. The English Code 1989 Clause 18(c) for
example states,
'
a person acts .. 'recklessly' with respect to -
(i) a circumstance when he is aware ofa risk that it exists or will exist
(ii) a result when he is aware of risk that it will occur; and it is, in the
circumstances known to him, unreasonable to take that risk'
Such an approach presupposes an -awareness of risk and that the risk taking is
objectively 'unreasonable.' The unreasonableness depends not on just the degree of
risk but on relative disvalue as compared with positive value of action which creates
it. Brickey claims,
'The line of demarcation between acceptable and unacceptable risks
obviously cannot be drawn solely with reference to the degree of risk
involved. It must accommodate, instead, both the utility and morality of
risk taking under a given set of circumstances. Thus, to ascribe criminal
culpability requires more than a finding that a risk is substantial. It must be
181both substantial and justified.'
Recklessness operates in two forms- objective recklessness and subjective
182recklessness. Subjective recklessness is determined by individuals mind whereas
183
objective recklessness is based on the standard of the 'reasonable man.' Norrie
explains that 'recklessness..is ultimately in its very essence a matter of socio-
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180
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political construction and judgment, not an abstract, apolitical, juridical concept of
individual responsibility as maintained by both the law and the liberal political
philosophy which underpins it...All the subjectivists ...are committed to a set of
social values in addition to, and independent of, the perception of the reckless
individual..This evaluation is a matter of objective reasonableness decided on a
'general' criteria of social utility, and does not concern the subjective perception of
the individual.'184 In England following the passage of the Criminal Justice Act
1967 there is no longer an objective dimension to recklessness. Scotland still has an
185
objective element. According to Ross, 'The recklessness required for culpable
homicide is a form of criminal negligence which, although not so total in its
indifference to whether the victim of the reckless behaviour lives or dies as is the
case with wicked recklessness in murder, indicates by a gross want of care an
indifference to the consequences of the action in its effect on the health, safety and
186life of the individual or of the public.' Objectivism in criminal liability is
anathema to many commentators who argue that it requires a guilty state of mind.
187
Objective liability requires a developed reasonableness of beliefs and it is that
reference to an accepted standard rather than the accused's own state of mind which
gives rise to concern. However, that concern may be misplaced; Duff argues that the
question of individual psychological orientation to an offence is also a matter
entailing objective consideration in the shape of the interpretative audience's
• 188
perception of the accused's attitude. Norrie rejects the Duff approach arguing that
'One can judge conduct either as it appears to the individual, or as it appears to the
general standard of reasonableness. The two may coincide in individual cases, but
as principled standpoints for the general evaluation of human conduct, they are in
opposition to each other. Therefore, their combination in a particular area of the law
189
presents the possibility of contradiction and incoherence within doctrine.'
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Increasingly, as I have noted, negligence is being viewed as an appropriate platform
on which to base corporate criminal liability.190 In determining the duty incumbent
on the employer guidance may be derived from the common law duty of care;191 the
failure to comply with certain duties could conceivably be equated with criminal
192
negligence. In the Canadian case ofMcCarthy v The King Duff J argued that,
'Where the accused having brought into operation a dangerous agency
which he has under his control..fails to take those precautions, which a man
of ordinary humanity and reasonable competent understanding would take
in the given circumstances for the purposes of avoiding or neutralising risk,
his conduct in itself implies a degree of recklessness justifying the
193
description "gross negligence".'
Glasbeek and Rowland advise that despite criticism, an objective test might be
applicable in criminal negligence cases.194 They depict a scenario where the contrast
between subjectivism and objectivism might not be that great. They explain
'Since the proponents of the necessity of a subjective intent might be using
the Hart approach, while using the language of mens rea, they might
seldom reach results which differ from those reached by the "objective test"
proponents. Thus, they would be setting an objective standard first, and
then deciding whether the deviation from it was sufficient to merit the
attachment of criminal responsibility. If they set the objective standards as
low as they would in a civil case to establish criminal responsibility, the
emphasis will be on the nature of the deviation from the standard so set. A
semblance of subjective intent searching will thus appear. But clearly, the
"objective test" proponents may set their standard so high that, in order to
find a breach of it, the court would have to find the same kind of conduct as
that which constituted a gross deviation from a lower "civil" standard. The
difference between the subjective intent proponents and their objective
standard antagonists would, if this analysis of what they actually do is
correct, be ofminor significance.'
In Scots law we recognise intention and wicked recklessness for murder, and
intention, wicked recklessness and criminal negligence as the basis of culpable
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homicide. Nevertheless it is possible to frame a scheme of corporate criminal
liability without reference to these existing mens rea. In chapter 2 a model of
corporate fault was advanced which could be utilised to access the common law
crimes of Scotland including the common law homicide offences. All this is not to
denigrate many of the thoughtful themes brought out into play by the Anglo-
American literature. It is true that many corporate homicides arise through the
negligent or reckless rather than intentional acts of corporations and their agents.
The question here may not just be what mens rea should corporations exhibit but
how they exhibit it. The temptation will be that whilst we rely on derivative models
of liability prosecutors will be deflected towards a zealous pursuit of the individual
wrongdoer where the offence represents one of those considered at the very apex of
the criminal scale. In recognising that in homicide situations the standards of
behaviour of the corporation are equatable to the similarly culpable individual, we
should be determined to visit our most opprobrious crimes upon them. Corporate
fault perhaps offers the best route to that objective. The very conception of
corporate fault implies a culpable failing in the same way that intention,
recklessness, and negligence convey an unacceptable state of mind. Corporate fault
is generic enough to embrace all three conceptions of the criminal mind though I
concede that it may have closer approximation with negligence and recklessness
than intent. In moving towards a system of corporate fault we can nonetheless retain
the integrity of the values and standards we have already set for traditional homicide
crimes. The instruction we may derive from jurisprudence on existing mens rea may
well help refine our conception ofwhat we mean by 'corporate fault.'
5.6 Recent Developments In Corporate Homicide In England
Of all the common law jurisdictions, England has engendered the greatest debate
about corporate homicide. Recently, The Law Commission in its report Legislating
the Criminal Code : Involuntary Manslaughter195 recommended the adoption of the
offence of corporate killing. Their arguments have, in the past few weeks, been
endorsed by a Government announcement of an intention to legislate to bring about
195
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(1996)
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such an offence. However, to simply focus on this latest development would be to
ignore a number of influential developments over the past twenty years or more
which have contributed to the burgeoning debate on corporate homicide.
In 1970 a Working Party assisting the English Law Commission produced a working
paper which contained inter alia several propositions relative to corporate crime.
The first was that every statutory offence created should delineate that, 'the fault
required is a mental intent consisting of intention, knowledge or recklessness..in
respect of all the other elements of the offence, unless the requirement is expressly
excluded.' Moreover, where intention knowledge or recklessness are excluded then
the offence will require negligence unless it is a strict liability offence. Where there
is no existing degree of fault then negligence should be required. The cummulo
effect of these propositions is that in future all offences should require mens rea. It
seeks to ensure that interpretation is not left to the courts and compels Parliament
would require to address the issue ofmens rea in respect of all statutory offences.196
One of the reasons why the Working Party did not advocate the dispensation of
intention was that it is the 'apt term to describe the element of fault in crimes in
197which the result is not separable from the accused's conduct.' The Working Party
adopted an approach to knowledge which determines that a person is said to have
knowledge of circumstance not only when he knows they exist but also when he has
198
no substantial doubt they exist or, he knows they probably exist. The Working
Party's definition of recklessness was that a person is reckless when 'knowing there
is a risk that an event may result from his conduct or that a circumstance may exist,
he takes the risk, and it is reasonable for him to take it having regard to the degree
and nature of the risk which he knows to be present.' According to Gordon, this
amounted to conscious negligence.199 There is no requirement of gross deviation
from the reasonable man for guilt to ensue.200 This model might well have had
application to corporation and might have provided a route through which
See Gordon, ' The Mental Element OfCrimen. 185 at p. 282
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corporations could have been prosecuted in similar fashion to individuals without
encountering prosecutorial reluctance to brand corporations as killers. It would
however still require the issue of attribution ofmens rea to be resolved. In any event
the proposal was not proceeded with.
The Law Commission in 1994 produced a consultation paper Legislating the
Criminal Code: Involuntary Manslaughter No 135 which argued that
'we should not ignore what appears to be a widespread feeling among the
public that in cases where death has been caused by the acts or omissions of
comparatively junior employees of a large organisation, such as the crew of
a ferry boat owned by a leading public company, it would be wrong if the
criminal law placed all the blame on those junior employees and did not fix
responsibility in appropriate cases on their employers who are operating,
201 "
and profiting from, the service being provided to the public.'
This Consultation Paper also called for the abolition of unlawful act manslaughter on
the basis that
'a fortiori, it cannot be rational or just to use the very wide rules of
unlawful act manslaughter to impose criminal liability on the corporation in
whose operations a death has been caused on the basis that these operations
involved an illegality of some kind or another. Such a basis for fixing
serious criminal liability would be likely to have effects which would be
wholly random and erratic in their nature. On the other hand, when
properly handled, the rules of gross negligence can be used to elicit and
apply the policy considerations which would be involved in imposing
202criminal liability on corporations for causing death.'
Adherents of the Latin maxim Versanti in re illicita imputantor omnia quae
sequuntur ex delicto (a person engaged in an illegal activity is answerable for all its
consequences) would undoubtedly support the notion that where the corporation is
engaged in an activity which proves to be unlawful- perhaps a contravention of a
regulatory offence- and arising out of that illegal act a fatality ensues, then, that
corporations should be liable under the laws of homicide for that death. Unlawful
203
act manslaughter is recognised in several of the common law jurisdictions. It has
nonetheless proved controversial. Wells suggests that unlawful act manslaughter
Law Commission, n. 34 Para 4.2 at p. 89
202
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could be used in some cases.204 In an earlier writing she recognises that unlawful act
205
manslaughter encompasses a broad spectrum of non-accidental deaths. In
England the decision of R v Dalby206 argues that for unlawful act manslaughter to
occur the act must be directed at the victim. Unlawful act manslaughter, according
the Law Commission 'is founded not on the supportable principle or policy but has
survived from the insupportable doctrine of constructive liability, whereby liability
207
for a serious crime is constructed out of liability for a lesser crime.' In Scotland,
208
this approach was not ruled out by Lord Advocates Reference (Nol of 1994).
Ross has however called for the abolition of the unlawful act culpable homicide in
Scotland. In her view,
'The concept of recklessness which combines a description of behaviour
and an inference of a mental element from that behaviour (indifference to
consequences) is surely sufficient to identify those homicides which should
be subject to criminal penalty.'209
At the time the Law Commission took the view that the imposition of liability for
210
inadvertent killing was neither truly 'erratic or capricious.' That view had been
211
substantially formulated in the wake of several high profile disasters. The
212
Commission's position was a departure from the decision in Cunningham.
Cunningham sets out that an intention to cause really serious injury is sufficient for
murder without any proof that that the defendant intended, or even contemplated, the
213
possibility that death would result. The Law Commission had argued for two
types of manslaughter; one based on subjective recklessness as to whether death or
serious injury would ensue214 and the other based on inadvertent risk taking. The
latter was to be founded on gross negligence. Liability would arise where the
accused 'ought to have been aware of as significant risk that his conduct would
204
Wells in Lacey et al., Reconstructing Criminal Law (1990), at p. 243
205
Wells, n. 21 at p. 789
206
[1982] 1 All ER 916
207




Ross, n. 186 at pp. 79-80
210
Law Commission, n. 34 at Para 1.20
211
McColgan, n. 79 at p. 549
2,2
[1982] AC 566; See McColgan, n. 79 at p. 549
213
Ashworth, op cit. n. 176 at p. 260
214
Law Commission, n. 34 paras 5.16-5.21
274
result in death or serious injury' and where his 'conduct fell seriously and
significantly below what could reasonably have been demanded of him in preventing
that risk from occurring or in preventing the risk, once in being, from resulting in the
t f ^ j c
prohibited harm.' McColgan notes the Law Commission's recognition that the
objective recklessness in their proposals is not enough to bring corporations under its
• • 216ambit particularly given the problems of corporate mens rea. According to
McColgan,
'The culpability of corporations would be established according to whether
the corporation should have been aware of the significant risk that its
conduct would have resulted in death or serious injury, and whether the
corporations conduct fell seriously and substantially below what could
217
reasonably have been demanded of it in dealing with that risk.'
The Commission recognised that liability would not simply ensue from the fact that
the corporation had engaged in an operation which gives rise to risk but rather
determination would be had by recourse to its decision making structures.
According to the Law Commission,
'The question..simply is whether those responsible for taking decisions
should have been (not actually were) aware of a significant risk that these
operations, either at their commencement or during their continued pursuit,
could result in death or serious injury...Once there is evidence that
employees have perceived a risk, even a small one, of serious consequence,
it will then be appropriate to look critically at the company's system for
transmitting that knowledge to the appropriate level ofmanagement, and for
acting on the knowledge received..reference to the company's organisation,attitude and concern for safety in general will be relevant.'2 8
McColgan contends that the Law Commission's proposal on subjective recklessness
'is to be welcomed as striking a balance between the evils of constructive liability
and the social protection arguments in favour of penalising those who take risks
219which result in other people's deaths' whereas the Law Commission concept of
manslaughter by inadvertent risk taking would 'By virtue of its separation from
subjectively reckless manslaughter..allow differential sentencing regimes to operate
Law Commission, n. 34 para 5.57
216
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in respect of cases where the defendant deliberately took risks and where he or she
did so unwittingly.' The Commission insisted that its proposed law of corporate
220
manslaughter had to 'work within the present system.' McColgan concludes that
the refusal by the Law Commission,
'to consider the possibility that different approaches might properly be
applied in respect of individual and corporate manslaughter liability results
in its across-the- board espousal of the objective test. Its application of that
test in the corporate context should render the imposition of liability for
manslaughter easier than it is at present. Nevertheless, the Commission's
failure to extend consideration to corporate liability in general, rather than
221
solely in the context ofmanslaughter, is to be regretted.'
In summary, the Law Commission's Consultation Paper argues that manslaughter
• • 222should be confined to situations where accused consciously risks death or injury.
They argued for the creation of a unified approach to manslaughter and envisage that
corporations will be subject to that unified law. One possibility canvassed by Law
Commission was a new offence of 'causing death.'223 The Law Commission also
argued for the retention of subjective reckless manslaughter where the accused was
aware of the risk that death or serious injury would occur, and unreasonably took
that risk.224 Their general law of manslaughter determines that there should be a
significant risk of death or personal injury. There is no need for the risk to be
obvious; the jury will determine this objectively.225 They suggest that the accused
ought reasonably to have been aware of the significant risk that his conduct could
result in death or his conduct fell seriously and significantly below what could
reasonably have been expected in preventing that risk. In applying the law of
manslaughter the question will be whether the corporation should have been aware
of the significant risk that his death could result in death or serious injury. Liability
220
Law Commission, n. 34 para 5.91
221
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will only arise when a corporation chooses to operate a particular enterprise with
inherent dangers.
The Law Commission's Report Legislating the Criminal Code; Involuntary
Manslaughter, in a volte face from the earlier proposals contained in the
Consultation Paper, suggested a new offence of corporate killing which was
nevertheless modelled on the original proposal.226 The Report proposes three
offences to replace manslaughter including a separate offence of corporate killing
where (a) management failure by the corporation is the cause or one of the causes of
a person's death; and (b) that failure constitutes conduct falling far below what can
227 •
reasonably be expected of the corporation in the circumstances. There is
management failure by the company if the way in which its activities are managed or
organised fails to ensure the health and safety of persons employed in or so affected
228
by those activities. There are also two offences suggested of reckless killing and
killing by gross carelessness. For both these offences the identification route would
be retained. In respect of the offence of killing by gross carelessness there would be
three elements. First, the defendant would have had to have caused the death of the
victim. Second, the defendant ought to have been reasonably aware of significant
risk that their conduct could result in death or serious injury. Third, their conduct
• 229
fell seriously below what could have reasonably been demanded from him.
Individuals will be liable as secondary parties to corporate killing whilst
corporations will be liable for all three offences. There is a suggestion that the
prosecutorial approach might be deflected to simply pursuing a charge of corporate
killing. Wells expresses concern that the new proposals through the vague concept
of 'managerial failure' will allow prosecutors to target individual directors rather
230than the corporation itself. The Law Commission itself was concerned that it
should not develop proposals which essentially resulted in strict liability for
Dunford and Ridley, n. 5 at p. 11
227
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231
corporations. By the same token they also sought to develop a formulation which
did not involve the identification theory.232 Their eventual formulation of
'managerial failure' as the test of corporate fault ensure that the factors considered
are managerial and organisational rather than purely operational. By so doing it
• • 233
'reinvigorates the hierarchy' in a similar fashion to Natrass. Despite the novelty
of 'managerial failure', Ridley and Dunford still believe that assessment of the
corporations conduct will be analogous to the assessment of recklessness in that it
will be necessary to show that the corporation's conduct fell far below what could
reasonably be expected balancing an equation involving harm, utility and the cost of
prevention.234 The real change is that the requirement that the risk of death or
serious injury would have been obvious to a reasonable person in the accused's
position is removed. It will still be necessary to show that the defendant's conduct
fell far below what could reasonably have been expected in the circumstances. The
jury on the balance of likelihood of harm, the utility of conduct and the cost of
precautions which would have eliminated the risk of death or serious injury, will
235 • •determine this issue. One fear is that juries will have unrealistic expectations as to
236what systems and protections should have been in place. The Law Commission
also suggest an adaptation of the law of causation for corporations. What needs to
be examined is the kind of conduct rather than the status of the person responsible
237
for it. Here the common law of health and safety may be instructive. Individuals
238
may continue to be liable within corporations found guilty of corporate killing.
Causation would be established on the basis that 'the death would not otherwise
have occurred if it had not been for the management failure. If the management
failure consists of a failure to ensure that some potentially dangerous operation was
properly supervised, a jury would be unlikely to conclude that this failure caused the
death if the immediate cause was the deliberate act by an employee rather than a
231
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merely careless one- even if that act would probably not have occurred had a
supervisor been present.' The Commission claims that the company will not be able
to rely on the fact that the immediate cause of the accident was the negligence of the
employee. The company's failure will lie in the failure to anticipate the foreseeable
negligence of its employee, and the consequence of that is the company's fault.239
The original 1994 proposals recommended retention of the fine as a sanction. In the
1996 proposal, the suggestion is that the court will have power to order remedial
action to 'remedy any matter which appears to the court to have resulted from the
failure and been the cause of death.'240 The prosecution will require to be proactive
in seeking such an order.
As volatile as the debate in England has been, it does nonetheless illustrate a
willingness to explore possibilities. Some of those possibilities are generic reforms
of homicide laws which incidentally have ramifications for corporate homicide.
Others are specifically geared towards developing a new offence of corporate killing
outside the confines of general homicide laws. With the new Government
announcing in the last few days of their intention to legislate for a new offence of
corporate killing it now seems clear that, the latter proposition has prevailed in
England, and that some time soon there will be a bifurcation of approach. Those
who had hoped that by modifying the law of homicide generally that they might find
the right formulation to apply the law equally to individuals and corporations, have
in the process been disappointed. In Scotland there has been no such debate and no
such assessment of the best way forward. The application of any new offence can
only serve to block any attempt to use ordinary criminal laws to deal with corporate
homicide. It seems inconceivable that prosecutors will look at traditional homicide
laws if they have a tailored alternative. For that reason, the proposals for a new
offence of corporate killing may not be the panacea its supporters hope.
5.7 Some Problems OfCorporate Liability Under Homicide Laws
Liability Attribution
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The identification doctrine applicable in corporate crimes in the United Kingdom
presents special problems in respect of corporate homicide.241 Following the
decision in R v Coroner for Kent and Sussex ex p Spooner (supra), it became
apparent that 'deficiencies of corporate organisation themselves prevent any
individual "controlling officer" from having sufficient information to be personally
liable, conviction of the corporation is not possible.'242 Identification, as a method
of attribution, appears too restrictive as a method of applying manslaughter to the
corporation.243 The current willingness to utilise more conventional crime
classification necessitates a review of how best to make corporations criminally
accountable.244 Corns suggests that 'In the context of a homicide prosecution, there
is a strong argument that as a matter of social policy, a narrow class of individuals,
representing the company, should be construed. The negligent conduct of any
employee would not suffice: the relevant individual should be in a position to
determine high corporate policy and possess autonomy of decision making.'245
Corns' suggestion represents a cul de sac in legal thinking. One supposes, without
direct evidence, that his thinking is that because homicide prosecution represents the
pinnacle of seriousness in law enforcement, that it should only be entertained in the
most narrow of circumstances. One can support that line of thinking without
accepting restriction based on particular personnel; this is simply the poverty of
identification revisited. As a radical alternative, Australian commentators have
argued that the search for the criminal mind in such cases is unnecessary. Brown et
al have argued that,
'ifmanslaughter by criminal negligence rests on an objective standard, why
is the search for the mind and will of the company relevant ? Why should
we not conclude in particular circumstances, for example, that in failing to
set up effective channels of communication to ensure that senior
management does become aware of knowledge spread throughout the
company, a particular company has fallen considerably short of the standard
which a reasonable company would have exercised, in circumstances where
the reasonable company would have realised the probability that serious
harm would result ?'246
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In these few comments we begin to appreciate the case in favour of corporate fault.
If intention in the human actor can be deduced from the quality of his or her actions
why can the same not be so for the corporation. The outline model I seek to develop
in chapter 6 rejects the notion of liability of traditional mens rea located through
identification of one or more human agents operating within the body corporate.
Irrespective of whether the common law homicide crimes are retained or a new
offence of corporate killing is introduced corporate fault should be the preferred
basis of liability.
Liability For Omission/Commission In Corporate Homicides
A further complexity in the vexed question of corporate liability for homicide is
whether there should only be liability for acts of commission or, whether it should
be extended to acts of omission. The jurisprudence betrays a general reluctance to
impose liability for omissions247 on the basis that 'ex hypothesi the defendant does
nothing, the evil result would necessarily occur in precisely the same way if, at the
• 248
moment of the alleged omission, he did not exist.' Gross claims there is no such
thing as liability of pure omission.249 However, Braithwaite argues, 'While the law
is generally reluctant to impose criminal liability for knowing of a crime and failing
to prevent it, this principle should not be carried over to the context of the
corporation. When the Chief Executive officer knows of (or is wilfully blind to) a
crime and fails to stop it, s/he lends his or her authority tacitly to approve the crime.
Command differs from authorisation only in terms of which party- the superior or
250the subordinate-initiates the crime.' According to Hughes, the criminal law has
never been exclusively prohibitive and that there may in certain circumstances be a
251 252 253
duty to act. The duty to act may arise from a relationship, based on contract
or be based on the creation of the peril.254 It has also been suggested in another
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major jurisprudential contribution on the subject that acquiescence may be
tantamount to silent authorisation since the employee can reasonably construe his
255
superiors silence as encouragement to continue his unlawful acts. In English law
••••• •• 256there is reluctant recognition of criminal liability for omissions. In the Miller case
it appears the House of Lords determined that the defendant came under the duty
recognised by the criminal law only when he was aware of what he had done and, of
the consequences ofwhat he had done. Smith suggests that as a general principle
'whenever the defendant's act, though without his knowledge, imperils the
person, liberty or property of another, or any other interest protected by the
criminal law, and the defendant becomes aware of the events creating the
peril, he has a duty to take reasonable steps to prevent the resulting peril
from resulting in the harm in question. He will, however, be guilty of a
crime only if two further conditions are satisfied. The first is the existence
of an offence which is capable of being committed by omission. In the case
of statutory offences, this will depend on the precise wording of the
definition. The second condition is that the defendant must have omitted to
257
act with the fault required for the particular crime.'
Smith also suggests that no question of omission arises because the mens rea is
258deemed to have been formed during the course of the act. One difficulty is that,
'in an offense of commission, the mind of the actor is almost always to
some extent addressed to the prohibited conduct even though he may be
unaware of the legal prohibition. In these offenses, mens rea can quite
usefully be generalized as an intention to bring about the prohibited
consequences or, at least recklessness with regard to the consequences.
With omissions the great difficulty is that the mind may not be addressed at
• 259all to the enjoined conduct, if he is unaware of the duty to act.'
According to Hughes, conventional attitudes to mens rea impede the development of
jurisprudence on omissions. In his opinion reformation of the law of ommissions is
long overdue.260
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Any offence defined in terms of an omission invariably carries with it a duty to
261
act. However, offences defined in terms of affirmative conduct may nonetheless
be completed where there is an omission. In Scotland, murder and culpable
homicide are but two examples where one can substitute the failure to perform a
legal duty (not a moral one) for the affirmative actus reus. In America, the Model
Penal Code asserts that liability for omission unaccompanied by action cannot exist
262unless there is a duty to act. In respect of omissions a further problem of
causation will be encountered. The Model Penal Code states causation occurs where
(1) the conduct is an antecedent but for which the result in question would
not have occurred and
(2) the result is not too remote or accidental in its occurrence to have a just
y 263
bearing on the actor's liability or on the gravity ofthe offense.
Robinson's alternative proposal is that
'A person is not guilty of an offense upon omission to perform an act (1) if
he is physically incapable or otherwise could not reasonably be expected
under the circumstances, to perform the act, (2) if his failure to act is not of
his effort or determination, or (3) if he would be denied a justification
defense to criminal liability resulting from the act he failed to perform.'264
Glasbeek and Rowland argue that the distinction between commission and omission
• 265 .. ,j • •
is unattractive; they are essentially two sides of the same coin. The imposition of
a specific duty might assist the prosecution in establishing guilt but it is likely that
the mental state of the accused will be the more problematic hurdle. The Canadian
Law Commission encapsulate the problem in arguing that 'It seems reasonable, in
our view, that if criminal responsibility is to be placed on corporations, the harm
resulting from the action or inaction on the part of the people within the corporation
should be related to the policies that are adopted by the corporation to achieve its
objectives, the practices that may become accepted within the corporation, or the
• 266
failure by corporate policy-makers to take steps to prevent its occurrence.' On the
face of things, corporations can legitimately be liable for omissions where the law
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currently so provides. There is no need to extend the law to make any special
accommodations. In accepting that position, we must accept the slightly
unsatisfactory position in Scotland that liability will only ensue where but for the
omission events may have taken a different course. As Gordon explains 'recourse to
267
"but for " causation is not very satisfactory.
The Issue OfResultant Harm And Endangerment
In most criminal law systems there is a full scale application of the maxim primum
non nocere- (the main thing is not harm). Harm is a predominant issues affecting
268
both liability and punishment. Whilst it is true that not all harm is crime, it is
supposed that there are two dimensions to legal, and moral, guilt- seriousness of
harm and the agent's responsibility for the relevant harm. However, to attach
criminal liability on the basis of infliction of harm is also problematic. Harm may
ensue from mere chance rather than culpable design. Many commentators are
critical of liability based on mere chance. According to Ashworth, 'it is more
justifiable to criminalise a negligent attempt if the potential danger is to life and
limb, possibly ofmany people, whereas there may be little or no social justification
269
for penalising reckless attempts to violate less central interests.' In respect of
harm there is a consequentialist and non-consequentialist positioning of
commentators. Consequentialists view rightness, or wrongness, of actions as
270
depending solely on the goodness or badness of consequences; non-
271
consequentialists find intrinsic significance in the intended action. In resolving
the dilemma of criminalising negligent or reckless conduct without harm perhaps a
272
compromise can be reached by focusing purely on offences against the person.
273Ashworth concedes that resultant harm still dominates the law of manslaughter.
Contesting the current position, Katz has claimed that 'In the criminal law
'dangerousness' should operate as a fundamental criterion in the formulation,
Gordon, Criminal Law (2nd Ed) n. 185 at p. 128
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application and execution of legal norms.'274 Recognising that 'almost all men and
women are potentially dangerous under certain circumstances' should not occasion
275
concern for those who wish to penalise the creation of danger. Despite the
importance of harm, there is a suggestion by Seney that 'In practice we have
scrupulously avoided including "harm" in the definition of particular crimes. With
the partial exception of murder, our substantive criminal law consistently prohibits
276
specified conduct rather than specific harm.'
Ashworth notes the harm plus culpability paradigm of criminal liability. Robinson
however suggests a more expansive threefold approach underpinning criminal law-
777
harm, unlawfulness and culpability. Where harm is thought sufficiently
dangerous perhaps the proper role is for the regulatory/enforcement intervention
278before the harm is caused. Ashworth expresses concern about the law abounding
with inchoate offences which penalise not the actual doing of harm but doing an act
279with the intent to do harm or even acts likely to cause a particular harm.
However, acts preliminary which manifest a clear intention to inflict harm should be
punished. It is true that in addressing harm the criminal law considers threatened
harm as well as actual harm, and in respect of incomplete or unsuccessful crimes the
law responds with the creation of a number of inchoate crimes and the punishment
280of preparatory offences. The inchoate mode is characterised by a style of defining
criminal offences which proscribes the doing of certain acts in order to produce a
281certain outcome. One advantage of defining an offence in inchoate mode is that it
provides for offences of negligent or reckless conduct. Smith expressed himself in
favour of 'result-orientated definitions as a normal mode of definition, arguing that
the wider adoption of a mode of definition which did not incorporate the results of
conduct would have the demerit of extending the criminal law without yielding any
274
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* . p. 282significant benefit in terms of general deterrence.' Nonetheless, there are clear
difficulties in reconciling desert retributivism with incomplete harm attempts.283 If
there is less than purposive intention there is no general inchoate crime. The laws
'approach is contextual in the sense that liability is created for particular cases where
a person (advertently or otherwise) generates the risk of criminal harm occurring. If
the prevention of harm is the true objective why has there been no assessment of a
284
general endangerment as an offence in UK ?' One reason offered for the failure to
create an endangerment offence is,
'the practical demonstration of the need for and value of a more general
prohibition of unjustifiable risk taking is inherently problematic. The
difficulty lies in the very limited visibility of the 'endangerment' involved,
it being often transient and either unwitnessed or lacking residual probative
evidence. It is frequently only anticipatory observation or inspection of
particularly intrinsically hazardous activities..by designated bodies..that
produces the evidence of endangerment which would otherwise probably
• • 285
continue until actual harm materialises.'
There is a suggestion that an endangerment offence should be limited to concurrence
• to/:
with a violation of a regulatory statute. The calls for an endangerment offence are
designed to move us away from a harm-based system. Given that the modem thrust
of criminal law has been towards prevention, an endangerment offence may rest
easier with that strategy and, with what has been described as our move towards a
more systems based approach. The idea behind endangerment rather than resultant
harm is that that corporations should not benefit from the fortuity of consequence. If
they create unnecessary risks they should be prosecuted for endangering life rather
than waiting for the law to 'kick in' once a fatality ensues. It is an argument with
powerful force. Ashworth argues that there is scope for an increase in risk-creation
crimes with consequent due diligence defences to illustrate risk avoidance. This
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notion is rooted in the belief that 'prevention of future harm is of greater social
importance than any abstract notion of 'justice' based on past events.' The aim
according to Ashworth should be to ensure that corporations are punished
proportionate to their culpability rather than simply the consequences of their
287 •
crimes. In supporting the rationale for a general endangerment offence it is
perhaps worth noting that we have the rudiments of one already.
288
Health and safety laws are often criticised as vague and exhortiary. Moreover,
'safety laws tend to be regarded in the academy and amongst the judiciary as a
• 289 •
typical and somewhat separate from "real" criminal laws.' For all that, there is
the basis of an endangerment offence in the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974.
The Robens Report recommended that 'special attention must be given to the need
to protect the public as well as workers, from the large scale hazards which
sometimes accompany modem industrial operations.'290 In response to this section
3(1) was enacted in the HASAWA which sought to regulate the exposure to risks.
The concept of 'exposure to risk' was considered in R v Board of Trustees of the
291Science Museum. The prosecution had argued that the mere existence of risk was
sufficient to sustain the offence and that it was not necessary to show that the victim
suffered harmful exposure (in this case to Legionnaire's bacterium). The judge
directed the jury that 'risk' meant possible source of danger. The case of R v
Associated Octet Co. Ltd defines what is to be considered the employer's
undertaking. The Court of Appeal rejected the idea that control played any part in
determining what's was one's undertaking though it might be relevant in the
context of reasonable practicability. In the contest of the statute undertaking meant
business or enterprise. The engagement of an independent contractor might lead to
an employer escaping liability on the basis that he had no control and that it was
reasonably practicable to rely on the contractor's expertise. Whilst that might be a
Ashworth, n. 176 at p. 118
288
Wells, n 10 at p. 6
289
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reasonably practical step especially for a small organisation, following Associated
Octel there can be no question of it being considered 'outwith the employer's
293 294
undertaking.' In R v British Steel PLC the defendant company sought to argue
that they satisfied the reasonably practicable requirement by delegating from the
controlling mind to a competent employee engineer. The engineer in question was
supervising the movement of part of a large steel platform. The labour for the task
was provided by a subcontractor. Against the instructions of the engineer the sub¬
contractors cut the supports and the platform collapsed killing one of the men. The
Court ofAppeal held that the Natrass doctrine was not available in Health and safety
cases; to allow it to be so would drive a 'juggernaut through the legislative scheme.'
Controlling minds could not delegate supervision, not even in a large organisation.
According to Dunford and Ridley, the British Steel case highlights one of the
weaknesses at the heart of the regulatory framework: the adversarial criminal
procedure, linked as it is with punishment on conviction, encourages a combative
approach to resisting prosecution, which is at odds with the conciliatory methods
9QS
preferred by the HSE. Following Octel and British Steel the defence of
reasonable practicability in relation to section 3 appears 'only available where it is
established that there is no assumption of control by the organisation of the work
carried out and where the organisation is able to prove, on the balance of
probabilities, that it would not have been reasonably practicable for the employer to
296do other than rely on the expertise of the independent contractor'. Mackay
highlights the inconsistency in allowing delegation of supervision to independent
contractors but not employee's and in the process argues that the offence is now one
• 297of strict liability. Section 3 of HASAWA prima facie seems more cognisant of
298risk rather than proven harm, and in that sense is an extremely useful offence. In
calling for the utilisation of homicide laws in respect of corporate killings, it is
See Mackay, n. 231 at p. 440
294
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important to recognise that our over-riding concern must be to stop such fatalities
arising in the first place.
5.8 Corporate Homicide And Health And Safety Regulation
One of the principal reasons advocated by proponents of using homicide laws
against corporations for so doing, is the failure of the existing regulatory regime.
However as Lacey et al. note that 'it is not always easy to say which comes first- the
reluctance to use criminal law which leads to specific regulation, or the existence of
specific regulation which diverts attention from the possibility of prosecution for
offences such as manslaughter, murder or assault.'299 De Vos contends that there
must be serious question about regulations' authenticity and effectiveness.300
According to him, it is likely that, 'both academic scrutiny and legal regulation of
socially costly corporate behaviour is probably going to remain sporadic and of
rather limited effect for some time to come..Waves of commitment to regulation will
301
come and go.' Somewhat ironically, there is a conflicting pressure within society
302
to reduce and increase regulation. Certainly, the statistics make interesting
reading. In 1995 the conviction rate fell to 1490 from 1507; the average fine was
£2,447 excluding exceptional fines and the number of inspectors fell from 1572.5 to
303 304
1470. In only 35% of health and safety cases are prosecutions brought.
Furthermore, in 1985/6 only 10% of inspectors' time was devoted to accident
305
investigation. Clearly there is both a legal reason and a symbolic reason for
accident investigation. In respect of the latter the inspectorate displays its activity
and that the matter is taken seriously. Moreover, investigation creates enforcement
opportunities.306 However, it would appear that prosecution is the exception rather
Lacey et al., n. 204
300
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301
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307than the norm. Approximately 1% of investigations lead to prosecution, though
• • 308
prosecution is more likely following an accident than at any other time.
Notwithstanding the difficulties and pressures faced by enforcement authorities,
many are critical of the attitude and approach of regulators to corporate crime.
Glasbeek, for example, asserts that it is a,
'fact that policing of regulatory statutes is lax. The politicians do not
provide sufficient funding; inspectors are amiable conciliators more than
they are purposeful enforcers; the standards to be enforced are set with too
much regard for alleged economic efficiency; the administrative agencies
have no clear-cut policies, not knowing whether they should promote
capital accumulation..or to legitimate political liberalism by showing that
they are not willing to trade olives for property.'309
Carson offers support for the approach of regulators claiming that 'belief in the
efficacy ofmaintaining consistent pressure upon employers has been endemic in the
• •• 310
inspectorate since its inception.' Prosecution is often simply viewed as a tool of
• • 311
inspection. However, other writers suggest that the dual role of the HSE as an
• •312adviser and prosecutor militates against real effectiveness in either role. So much
so that some argue for the transference to the police of the role of investigation of all
workplace fatalities. There is a belief that if the police investigate there is more
313 •likelihood that prosecution will ensue. Freiberg claims that 'The major difference
between the police force and regulatory agencies is that the latter do not see their
task as catching 'criminals' but as containing deviance. They do not seek to
stigmatise their subjects but rather to obtain compliance through negotiation. Most
crucially for non-police bodies, the criminal law is regarded as a last resort.'314
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Many have criticised the 'cosy' relationship between the regulators and the
315
regulated. Carson, for example, talks of a classic symbiotic relationship between
multinational oil companies and United Kingdom State.316 The HSC/HSE 1988-9
Annual Report states 'HSE inspectors do not approach their task with a view to
seeking out legal violations and prosecuting error. They seek to promote reasonable
compliance with good standards.' However, the adoption of this compliance
317
strategy is the subject of widespread criticism. Hawkins explains that,
'Compliance strategy seeks to prevent a harm rather than punish an evil. Its
conception of enforcement centres upon the attainment of the broad aims of
legislation, rather than sanctioning its breach. Recourse to the legal process
here is rare, a matter of last resort, since compliance strategy is concerned
318with repair and results, not retribution.'
Kagan describes compliance strategy as 'retreatist',319 and indeed it has been
320
suggested that compliance only works if the threat of prosecution remains.
However, James argues that compliance strategy should not be lightly dismissed on
the basis that,
'Significant improvements in health and safety standards are consequently
unlikely to be achieved unless steps are taken to raise the status and
importance accorded to those responsible for its management. This cannot
be achieved simply through a process of propaganda. What is needed is the
development of a legal framework that not only more clearly outlines the
obligations of employers in respect of health and safety but ensures that
there are adequate pressures exerted both internally and externally to ensure
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Braithwaite also contends that inspectors' educative role, is more important than
322their enforcement role. Most regulatory bodies utilise a degree of formal and
public punishment to maintain habit forming value of law and deterrence.
Baldwin argues that,
'Consensual regulation, as well as assuming that optimal; safety conditions
coincide with optimal profit-maximising conditions, is aimed at the well
informed, well- intentioned and well organised employer, who would
present few problems if left wholly to self regulate. But many hazards
relate to the ill-informed, ill-intentioned, and ill-organised employer who is
left untouched by consensual regulation.'324
Fitzgerald and Hadden in their research paper for the English Law Commission
indicate that the inspectorate has always preferred to secure standards in health and
safety by encouragement and persuasion 'rather than rigid enforcement of the letter
325of the law in all cases.' Enforcement appears to be of the spirit of the law with
• 326 • •education and correction taking primacy over prosecution. According to Dickens,
Inspectors 'are aware of being judged practically and politically by the efficiency
with which they secure the purposes of the law, and so a minor offence or technical
infringement will be taken to indicate where they must apply their energies rather
327than from where they must withdraw by referring the matter to the courts.' Their
attitudes to the nature of crime are usually significant. For others the real solution
• 329
is an optimal mix between punishment and persuasion.
The adversarial process between corporations and enforcers can be transformed into
a negotiation exercise. Whilst 'negotiation is not the normal way for a sovereign
state to control private units, given the power of corporations (see Chap. 1) it
322
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331
appears to many commentators a sensible way to proceed. There is an initial
assumption that all employers are keen to meet their legal obligations and that it is
.... . TT9
virtually impossible to run a business without violating the strict letter of the law.
Prosecution and conviction does not necessarily ensure compliance though it might
333
spur on recalcitrant employers to do better. In addition prosecution might not be
considered appropriate or necessary; the decision to prosecute involves a multiplicity
of factors.334 The past record of the company and prior dealing may be as instructive
as the nature of the incident. Irrespective of this, it seems clear that prosecution is
'seriously considered' where serious injury or death ensues from a serious breach of
the relevant law, and as Fitzgerald and Hadden recognise, 'the unlucky chance of a
serious accident rather than the degree of fault of the firm in question may thus
335become a decisive factor.'
There is a view that utilising regulation may put control of corporate criminal
liability on a more sound footing than if only the criminal approach were
336available. In one study 57.2 % executives thought that regulation was needed and
that industry could not police itself. The reasons they gave were the unethical
behaviour of top management, the greed of some corporations and that self
regulatory measures cannot be enforced. Those who thought it could police itself did
so on the basis that the market helps industry police itself and that associations can
337
help regulate corporations.
Blaikie recognises that 'accident prevention is not achieved solely by legal rules, but
by a combination of extra-legal disciplines' all of which must operate within the
338confines of the law.' Regardless of the problems, there are those who defend the
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process of regulation. They argue that regulation is necessary because 'the
unhindered play of market forces can create serious liabilities for society.'339
Thomas describes the regulatory ethos by saying 'The received wisdom of
traditional administrative law has been that regulatory agencies are capable of
implementing clearly definable, objective goals requiring technical expertise. Today
however, it is widely recognized that such a "rational actor" model is misplaced; the
regulatory process is more properly conceived as essentially political- a balance of
the competing demands of interests affected by agency decisions.'340 This of course
must be considered in the context of the fact that enforcement priorities are
frequently determined at the field level.341 Ranged against this is the view that
regulation may be seen as the soft option as a 'path of least resistance' rather than
reconstructing existing criminal laws.342 Indeed, Robens himself thought there was
limits on the extent to which external regulation could influence progressively better
standards.343
One of the primary difficulties in addressing the problem of corporate liability for
homicide revolves round the overlapping and co-existing scheme of regulatory
offences found in such statutes as the HASAWA. There are those who believe that
prosecution should only take place under regulatory schemes and that homicide
crimes should be utilised against culpable individuals only. However, Corns argues
that 'There is growing evidence that alternative civil regulation by way of enhanced
factory and site inspections has failed to ensure adequate work conditions and
accordingly, the criminal law should be deployed. Homicide prosecutions could act
as a specific and general deterrent, forcing corporations to implement more rigorous
safety procedures to prevent accident s and deaths occurring in the first place.'344
However, there is a danger in such an approach identified by one Australian study
which said,
339
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'plucking out a few egregiously offensive cases to be subjected to the
rigours of 'real' criminal law would only serve to advance a structurally
underpinned historical process whereby the rest of occupational health and
safety crime, what was left behind so to speak, would come to be perceived
as even less criminal than it already is. The proponents of the case for
manslaughter charges.,were unwittingly colluding in a further
decriminalization of occupational health and safety cases, and for that
reason we proposed that, instead, a new offence of causing death by
violation of OHSA, or its associated regulations, should be incorporated
into the Act itself. Alternatively, an offence of industrial homicide should
be inserted into the Act itself.'345
Would a rare sensational manslaughter or culpable homicide case really undermine
health and safety law ? Corns thinks not.346 He argues that manslaughter
prosecutions are likely to enhance the profile of health and safety violations.347
Corns concludes by arguing that if corporations are not to be included within the
current ambit of traditional common law offences then new statutory homicide
• 348violations should be created. Roben's view was that 'traditional concepts of
criminal law are not readily applicable to the majority of infringements which arise
under this type of legislation..[Few offences] arise from reckless indifference to the
possibility of causing injury.'349 But how true is this ? Whilst intentional infliction
of injury may be rare, the same cannot be said of recklessness or negligence. The
co-existence of a regulatory health and safety regime and the applicability of the
general criminal law does create certain tensions within the system. There is nothing
illogical or inconsistent in their co-existence. The situation can be rationalised on a
simple 'horses for courses' basis. The compliance strategy inherent in regulation
should remain central to any system of criminal law. The application of traditional
homicide laws should be reserved for particularly evocative and egregious instances.
In circumstances where the strategy is to develop an offence of corporate killing as
an alternative to traditional homicide laws, it will be imperative that corporate
killing is not downgraded to being merely a regulatory infraction. Corporate killing
must attract the same stigma that those traditional crimes currently have. Essential
345
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to the way the crime will be viewed is the way it will be policed, enforced, and
punished. It will be a crime which will attract the highest of penalties and invoke
public outrage. In my outline model I make provision for the retention of existing
regulatory offences relative to health and safety which may be libelled as alternative
charges against corporations facing a homicide charge.
5.9 Scots Law And Corporate Homicide
Homicide law in Scotland enshrines the individualistic drive of Scots criminal
350law. But while it has never been used against the corporation it nevertheless
contains interesting possibilities. In Scotland the crime of culpable homicide is not
unitary; there is a distinction made between situations where death ensues from an
351
intrinsically lawful act and those deaths arising from an unlawful act. In two
particular authorities there is tacit approval for the doctrine of lawful act culpable
homicide. In Lord Advocate's Reference (No 1 of 1994)352, the High Court of
Justiciary following its earlier decisions of Khaliq v HMA353; Ulhaq v HMA354
decided that the decision of someone to consume drugs supplied by the accused did
not break the chain of causation between the death and the supply of drugs where
that person died following the drug abuse. The tacit approval arrives in the form that
the prosecution did not pursue this as unlawful act homicide and proceeded on the
basis that recklessness was necessary. In Sutherland v HMA355 the accused with the
assistance of another had set fire to his own property in an attempt to defraud
insurers. In the course of the act, the person assisting him was burned to death.
Setting fire to one's property was considered a lawful act and as such the court
expressly deliberated on the issue of criminal negligence or recklessness. As a
consequence of these decisions, corporations cannot seek to shield behind any claim
that what they were doing was intrinsically lawful. The lawfulness of their conduct
will not preclude criminal liability for homicide.
Farmer, Crime Tradition And Legal Order (1997) at p. 166
351
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Culpable homicide is defined by Macdonald as occurring 'where death is caused by
• • 356
improper conduct and where the guilt is less than murder.' Gordon sub-classifies
culpable homicide into voluntary culpable homicide and involuntary homicide.357
The first occurs where there is mitigation by way of provocation or diminished
responsibility. The latter arises where the mental element is less than the mens rea
of intention required by murder. Ross notes that there is the potential for confusion
358
between murder caused recklessly and culpable homicide caused recklessly. Her
359 9solution is to utilise the phrase wicked recklessness for murder. Macdonald's own
formulation is that of 'total recklessness' which Ross suggests might be considered
'to amount to the displaying of complete indifference, not just to foreseeable
360
consequences but to the question of whether someone lives or dies.' Hume
describes it as 'utter indifference about the safety of the sufferer' and intent to do
361 • •
any 'great and outrageous bodily harm.' Jones and Christie describe this
362 •recklessness as an objective assessment of intent. Generally speaking, the
criminal state of mind is always difficult to tell and is usually inferred from
conduct.363
Involuntary culpable homicide can be further divided into two categories; those
committed in the course of a lawful act and those committed in the course of an
unlawful act. According to Ross, the Scottish courts have moved away from the
position that death caused by negligence or "rash performance" or by "great
heedlessness and indiscretion" or "want of due caution and circumspection" amounts
to culpable homicide to the modern position which requires a higher level ofmental
element.'364 In respect of lawful act culpable homicide, Lord Justice Clerk
Aitchison in Paton v HMA365 submits that 'it is now necessary to show gross, or
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wicked, or criminal negligence, something amounting, or at any rate analogous, to a
criminal indifference to consequences.'366 Recklessness was omitted from Lord
Aitchison's formulation though Ross points out that in subsequent years the word
"wicked" has become equiperated with "gross" and that "gross negligence" has
367become analogous to recklessness. In the Sutherland case supra the trial judge
attempted to distinguish between the gross negligence required for culpable
homicide and a reckless disregard for safety. Such an approach may have significant
consequences for the accused corporation. However, the appeal court was
dismissive arguing that 'that these are all rather broad expressions the meaning of
T/-O
which tends to merge one with the other.' Gordon's view is that if a charge of
lawful act culpable homicide were brought in today's Scottish courts there would be
a need to establish a high degree of negligence such that it was 'gross, palpable and
wicked negligence.'369
The discussion surrounding lawful act culpable homicide is therefore principally one
370 .
concerning recklessness. Unlawful act culpable homicide is somewhat different;
Hume argued that any death which arose from 'wrongful purpose to do any bodily
371
harm' or from 'wrong and unlawful' act amounted to culpable homicide.
Macdonald contended that 'doing an unlawful act, where death could not reasonably
be foreseen as a probable consequence of the act' could nonetheless amount to
372
culpable homicide. There has been an absence of redefinition by cases subsequent
373 j
to these writings. Gordon's view is that unlawful act culpable homicide should be
restricted to cases where there is intent to do physical harm.374 In assault cases are
366
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375
essentially dealt with on the basis of causation and not on basis of mens rea.
Interestingly, Ross asserts that,
'It is no means clear that the same straight forward, if harsh, approach is
applied to death caused by doing any other unlawful act than that of assault,
nor is it clear which unlawful acts may found the rule. Hume did not
restrict the rule to assault, referring to any wrongful purpose to do any
bodily harm, or to unlawful acts with such a purpose, but included any
wrong and unlawful act.'376
Ross notes one further problem and that is that 'lawful act' and unlawful act' are not
377determined by recourse to ordinary language but by reference to law. What are
the implications of this for health and safety? Ross argues that,
'The failure of the High Court to clarify the status of the unlawful act
culpable homicide rule, and the tendency to discuss recklessness without
clarifying whether the recklessness is in relation to the mental element of
the basic crime or of the culpable homicide, means there is a lack of clarity
not only about the unlawful act rule but also about the nature of the mental
element for culpable homicide. The recklessness required for culpable
homicide is not so great as the recklessness required for murder. It is the
gross negligence amounting to criminal indifference as asserted by Lord
Aitchison in Paton V HMA.'378
The admission that there is some confusion regarding culpable homicide in Scotland
need not deter the application of that crime to the corporation. On the one hand the
distinction between lawful act and unlawful whilst instructive does not preclude the
operation of culpable homicide to the body corporate and on the other, by moving to
corporate fault as the basis of liability, the confusion as to mens rea of culpable
homicide is rendered superfluous.(see para 5.5 above) As I have alluded to
elsewhere, the real merit in understanding the existing mens rea is in the assistance it
gives us in determining the standards applicable to corporate failing. The essence of
the gross negligence and recklessness which Ross talks of must be carried forward
into our conception of corporate fault.
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Because culpable homicide is the offence in Scotland which most readily equates
with manslaughter in the Anglo-American tradition, there might be a tendency to
discuss it to the exclusion of the other, more serious, homicide offence of murder.
Yet on a deeper analysis of the law there appears no theoretical reason why such a
charge cannot be laid against a corporation. The murder/culpable homicide
distinction is based on the quality of the wickedness attributed by the jury.379 In
Scotland the classical charge to juries in murder trials is extracted from Macdonald's
Criminal Law where he defines it as 'any wilful act causing the destruction of life,
whether intended to kill, or displaying such wicked recklessness as to imply a
disposition depraved enough to be regardless of the consequences.'350 The
suggestion is that it is possible to commit murder in the absence of intention.
Gordon's view is that 'It may not be logically indefensible to talk of objectively
reckless conduct as evidence of intention, but it is logically indefensible to suggest
objective recklessness can never be such that it gives rise at most to an inference of
381
recklessness and not to one of intention.' There is support in Cawthorne v
382
HMA for the proposition that recklessness is evidentiary support for the finding of
383
intention, but that said, the case is not authority for that view.
It is important to note that like culpable homicide, murder can also be sub-divided
into voluntary murder and involuntary murder. Voluntary murder is murder
TR4
committed intentionally. The intention may be inferred from the accused actings.
• • 385
Involuntary murder can be committed unintentionally. Recklessness akin to gross
negligence nor foresight combined with acceptance of risk are not sufficient
• 386standards of recklessness to constitute the crime. It appears that it will be
387
necessary to exhibit that the accused intended to cause personal injury. Whilst the
technical possibility of corporations behaving in such a way must be conceded, it is
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380
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somewhat fanciful to suppose that these sort of circumstances offer useful exemplars
of the way in which corporations behave. It will be a unique and almost
unconscionable situation which gives rise to a situation where a corporation
deliberately set out to cause injury to a victim. Such a recognition however, offers
no rationale for the exclusion of the crime from consideration if the causative and
mental elements exist.
Both common law homicide offences by definition do not specifically exclude
corporations. If one accepts that corporations can exhibit the necessary mens rea for
the commission of the crime then it is but a short step to conceding that corporations
can commit these common law crimes. However, matters are not that simple; in
respect of murder the issue of the mandatory punishment is problematic and, if
corporations are in exceptional circumstances to face a charge of murder then, a
concession on the issue of sentencing will be required. The options canvassed in
chapter 4 (and another in this chapter) provide several alternatives not least corporate
dissolution, or some of the other inhibitory sanctions, which readily can be
equiperated with life imprisonment for the individual. If any new framework is to
activate common law offences against corporations it will need to do so in the light
of the punishment problem associated with murder charges. Specific exclusion of
murder would at least clarify the situation. Culpable homicide has no such attendant
problems. Whatever the eventual approach, it is axiomatic that our system of
criminal law conveys a requisite level of distaste for the actions of the corporation
which have resulted in fatality in an analogous way to how one would convey this to
an individual perpetrator in similar circumstances of culpability.
5.10 Conclusion
Gobert is critical of the application of conventional criminal law to corporations in
that it attaches liability on the basis of outcome whereas greater consideration should
be made of the grossly negligent or reckless company which by mere fortuity avoids
occasioning harm. According to Gobert the 'solution may lie in defining crimes in
terms of acts (or failures to act) and mental state without regard to results.
Defendants, including corporate defendants, should be liable for the harms which
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their actions or inactions risk causing.'388 Risk has an obvious link to recklessness.
Wells suggest a two-fold test of 'did the defendant create an obvious and serious
risk' and secondly, 'did the defendant give any thought to this risk.' She contends
that recklessness based on practical indifference to risk might prove apt for corporate
accountability. Wells further argues that corporations are different from individuals
389and that the contours of culpability should reflect those differences. Others too
have called for jurisprudential re-examination of the basis of liability. Some have
called for intentionality to be exhibited through corporate policy. Others have
sought redefinition of the criminal law to a system which either prompts appraisal of
certain standards of behaviour or which attaches liability to the creation of risk rather
than harm. Duff argues that recklessness could be equated with indifference
claiming that 'The indifference which constitutes recklessness is a matter, not of
feeling as distinct from action, but of the practical attitude which the action itself
displays.'390
Examination of the law in Scotland and the experiences of the Anglo-American
jurisdictions provides powerful persuasion (recognising that problems require to be
overcome) of the view that posits 'all that should be required to make the
corporation criminally liable is that the material elements of the offense occurred,
that positive features of the corporate culture caused or encouraged their occurrence,
and that the measure of corporate culpability fits the level of culpability prescribed
for the offense.'391 It is a recipe for retention of the common law homicide crimes,
and their full application to the corporation on the basis of a new fault attribution
model. Under our existing system of sanctions we are unable to sanction the
corporation in the way that we punish individuals for the crime of murder. In
chapter 4 some interesting suggestions might overcome this impediment. However,
the real objection to the application of murder to corporations lies in the notion that
it is instinctively a crime we have come to associate solely with the individual.
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There may be an intuitive preference for the crime of murder to be applicable to
corporations to cater for the almost inconceivable circumstances where the
corporation behaves in a extraordinarily culpable manner akin to intending to kill or
evincing a wickedly reckless mentality. Naturally, retention of the offence as a
weapon against the corporation would require a revisitation to the issue of sanctions
for the law of murder. Reluctantly, I have opted for exclusion of murder from my
outline proposal in the belief that pragmatism dictates that widespread endorsement
of any new system requires it. Whatever reservations there may be about including
murder in any scheme, there can be no such reservations about culpable homicide.
Its very terminology resonates with the concept we are trying to enshrine. Its core
components of culpability and fatality are instantly applicable to the body corporate.
In recognising corporate fault as a new mens rea to be added to those that already
exist for individual offenders, the crime of culpable homicide may be readily applied
where the corporate homicide is considered particularly egregious.
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CHAPTER 6
CORPORA TE CRIMINAL LIABILITYAND SCOTS LA W-
THE LESSONS OFANGLO-AMERICANJURISPRUDENCE
6.0 Introduction
In the foregoing chapters I have attempted to identify several crucial issues
germane to an effective system of corporate criminal liability. This concluding
chapter attempts to draw these together and offer some analysis in a Scottish
context. The central theme of this thesis has been that Scotland should develop a
comprehensive system of corporate criminal liability and that this system should
contain certain features either currently applied in the Anglo-American
jurisdictions or propositions not yet tried but suggested by writers in those
jurisdictions.
It has been claimed that,
'the Scottish legal system of criminal law, is a system of common law-
even more so than the English criminal law. To this extent, then, [it is] a
common law system that has developed with a distinctive character on the
margins ofAnglo-American criminal law.'1
It is not just the relationship that the Scottish legal system has with Anglo-
American systems which underpins the rationale for the application of their
jurisprudence to our system. An altogether more satisfactory reason lies in the
strength of the principles they have evolved, and in the depth of the experience of
corporate criminal liability within those jurisdictions. Drawing from the Anglo-
American jurisprudence offers the opportunity to develop a properly constructed
system of corporate criminal liability and to fill an obvious void in our own legal
system.
Any proposed system of corporate criminal liability should be both pragmatic and
pluralist; such a framework can most readily be developed by way of statutory
enactment overlapping, without disturbing, existing statutory crimes and activating
where appropriate certain common law crimes. In dealing with corporate criminal
'
Farmer, Crime Tradition And Legal Order (1997) at p. 19
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liability de novo it will be imperative that the language is both accurate and
coherent. The Anglo-American jurisprudence adequately illustrates the difficulty
in framing principles. Fortunately, because of the availability of so many ideas, we
do not start with a blank canvas. The task is nevertheless a considerable challenge.
It is to take some of those ideas and fashion them in our own way, and in that way
to develop a framework which engenders broad support. My proposal in outline is
that there should be a statutory enactment which takes the important step of
clarifying the various issues of corporate criminal liability within the Scottish legal
system. The enactment would not seek to overrule those other statutes which exist
(primarily in the regulatory field) where the basis of attribution may be strict or
vicarious liability. It would maintain dual reliance on regulatory and 'true'
criminality. It would, accordingly, not alter the imposition of individual liability
on key agents within the organisation where statutory enactments so provided. Nor
would it impede the imposition of individual criminal liability for common law
crimes. Because it would be important that corporations did not face double
jeopardy at every turn, there may be a need to re-appraise those regulatory offences
in the light of the application of certain common law crimes; some regulatory
offences may require to be repealed. Some common law crimes would be excluded
from corporate criminal liability. In particular, given my concluding remarks in
Chapter 5 of this thesis murder would be excluded. The new framework legislation
would make clear those common law crimes attributable to the corporate form and
would also provide for a basis of the attribution of fault on the basis of corporate
fault. The new provisions would provide for a pluralist approach to both liability
and sanctions. Punishments would be potentially more sanguine and varied than
those currently in use. However, before addressing these proposals for a future
framework, it is perhaps worth considering the existing Scots law pertaining to
corporate criminal liability in an effort to both substantiate my premise that Scots
law on corporate criminal liability is under-developed, at times incoherent and
relatively ineffective and also with a view to showing the poor base upon which we
may operate. It is in my opinion one that requires wholesale reformation and
elucidation. To date inertia as well as scepticism has blocked reform. It is time
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that both were placed to one side and a proper framework of corporate criminal
liability constructed.
6.1 Scots Law And Corporate Criminal Liability
The jurisprudence in Scotland on the subject of corporate criminal liability is very
limited. In all of the major criminal law textbooks it justifies no more than a few
paragraphs. In the indigenous legal journals, there are only three scholarly
contributions on the subject. Despite the supposed historic insularity of our
system Scots criminal law is not uniquely Scottish. Whilst a case can be made for
claiming that our common law retains its own integrity, no such case can be made
in respect of statutory crime. Many statutory enactments which impose criminal
liability on corporations have generic application across the United Kingdom. The
principle criminal procedure statute - Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995-
does recognise that corporations may be criminally liable but regrettably offers no
real illumination of the subject. Section 70 of the 1995 Act recognises the ability
of prosecutors proceeding against a 'body corporate' alone in summary criminal
proceedings. The section also provides that where a corporation is sentenced to a
fine, then that fine may be recovered by civil diligence. There is no mention of the
possibility of any other sanction. In respect ofmore serious crimes, section 143(2)
of the 1995 Act states that 'Proceedings may be taken against the...body corporate
(b) in the case of [a] body corporate, the managing director or the secretary or other
person in charge, or locally in charge, of its affairs may be dealt with as if he was
the person offending, and the offence shall be deemed to be the offence of the
...body corporate.' No statistics are available on how often the prosecutors elect to
proceed against individuals rather than the corporation. No guidance is offered by
the statute and it is, accordingly, a matter of prosecutorial discretion. The language
in both sections is not exclusionary. Nevertheless it is a somewhat unsatisfactory
foundation on which to base a claim that Scots law unreservedly embraces the
concept of corporate criminal liability. By specifically flagging up the possibility
of proceeding against the corporate agent, there is almost a presumption that is to
2
See Ross, 'Corporate Liability For Crime' 1990 Scot Law Times 265-270; See Whyte 'Corporate
Criminal Liability' 1987 SLT (News) 348-350; Stuart, 'The Case OfA Shameless Company' 1980
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be the preferred option where it is at all possible. The limitations of these statutory
provisions immediately instil a sense of dissatisfaction at their lack of clarity.
Inevitably, one looks to case law to provide elucidation, but it is here we find the
source of further frustrations.
In respect of common law offences, Tesco Supermarkets v Natrass, being a
decision of the House of Lords, is not binding on Scottish criminal courts. Here
the leading cases are Dean v John Menzies Ltd and Purcell Meats (Scotland) Ltd.
v McLeod4 In Dean v John Menzies the accused company was charged with
shameless indecency in that they 'did sell, expose for sale and have for sale 64
indecent and obscene magazines..which magazines were likely to deprave and
corrupt the morals of the lieges and to create in their minds inordinate and lustful
desires.' Indicative of the limitations of our legal base is the fact that the case
represented the first occasion in which a company had been charged with a
common law offence in Scotland. The company successfully argued before the
sheriff that the charge was incompetent. The Crown consequently took the matter
to the Scottish Court of Criminal Appeal. In their appeal submissions, the Crown
sought to found on the 'controlling mind theory' advanced in the English case of
Tesco Supermarkets v Natrass. In response to the Crown's arguments the company
offered various responses. First, there was no known case where a company had
been charged with a common law offence and as such this was indicative that no
such charge could lie against a company. Secondly, that as a limited company was
a creature of statute, criminal liability could only be imposed by statute. Thirdly,
that the offence of shameless indecency required the imputation of personal
characteristics to the corporate form which a company was incapable of exhibiting.
The High Court of Justiciary dismissed the appeal (Lord Cameron dissenting) and
held the charge incompetent. However, analysis of the case is problematic due to
the inconsistent approach adopted by all three judges. Lord Stott was prepared to
concede that a company could be guilty of certain crimes and indeed that it could
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not be imputed to a company. He was also rather unflattering as to the concept of
identification theory describing it as a 'somewhat nebulous doctrine.' He also
expressed some doubt as to its applicability in Scots law. His view was that if the
Crown could identify the controlling minds they should proceed against them
individually. Lord Stott did not seem concerned that incorporation may act as a
shelter for criminal conduct.. Stuart suggests that Lord Stott misunderstood the
public policy issue before him and that he had failed to see that individual
booksellers would be attracted to incorporation on the basis that it would afford
protection from criminal prosecution.5 Arguably though, in such an enterprise the
small bookseller would be more readily identified as the controlling mind and
continue in Lord Stott's reasoning to be liable for prosecution.
The second of the majority opinion judges, Lord Maxwell, also took the view that
shameless indecency involved doing something 'which is defined by reference to a
type of behaviour of which human beings alone are capable.' His dictum
nonetheless did not firmly close the door on the ordinary criminal law being
applied to corporations.6
Lord Maxwell also exhibited some scepticism of the controlling mind theory on the
basis that the English decisions were not conclusive and that there was not 'one
clear and precise fiction.' His conclusion was that,
'in the light of the authorities cited to us, I am not satisfied that the
common law of Scotland recognises any clear single fiction which would
for the purposes of criminal responsibility in all matters attribute to a
company the kind of human characteristics and conduct alleged in this
complaint. It appears to me unrealistic to suggest that the accused
company will be guilty if, but only if, some individuals or individuals
whose status is not precisely defined but must be vaguely at or near
director level had knowledge of the contents of the magazines in question
and acted in a shameless and indecent manner in deciding to sell them.
That, however, seems to be the result of applying the controlling mind
fiction. If some other fiction is to be applied, I do not know what it is....It
may be that the criminal law of England would reach a different result. If
so it would not be for the first time.'7
5
Stuart, n. 2 at p. 177
6
See Dean v John Menzies (Holdings) Ltd., n. 3 at pp. 60-65
7
Dean v John Menzies (Holdings) Ltd., n. 3 at p. 64
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The dissenting judge, Lord Cameron, identified the question before him as
'whether a limited company acting in the course of its ordinary and legitimate
business, can be prosecuted for a common law offence, where its action in its
specific facts would in the case of an individual render him liable to prosecution for
a contravention of the common law.' Lord Cameron dismissed any suggestion of
applicability of the doctrine of ultra vires in this case on the basis that the
company were clearly selling magazines in conformity with the objects of the
company. Moreover, Lord Cameron recognised that corporations could be liable
under statute for criminal acts. Indeed the then section 333 of the Criminal
Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975 permitted proceedings against a company as well as
the individual representatives of the company. Lord Cameron said,
'Section 333... makes no distinction between statutory crimes and
common law offences and in particular contains nothing to indicate that its
provisions only relate to breaches of statutes or regulations. If Parliament
had intended that a company in its individual capacity should not be liable
to prosecution in respect of common law offences, it could have said so
and, at the same time, prescribed where and on what natural persons
within the structure of the company, responsibility and consequent
criminal liability should fall...If therefore a limited company has the
capacity to form an intention to decide on a course of action to act in
accordance with that deliberate intent within the scope and limit of its
articles it is difficult to see on what general principle it should not be
8
Woods 'Lifting The Corporate Veil In Canada' 35 Can Bar Rev 1176 (1957) argues that where
the corporate form is dominated by a single person 'the distinct social reality of the corporate
personality may be non-existent.'; Welsh 'The Criminal Liability Of Corporations' 1946 62 Law
Quarterly Review 345-365 rejects the notions of ultra vires as a basis for excluding criminal
liability of corporations. In Welsh's view at p. 347 such an approach 'clearly rests on the fallacious
supposition that civil capacity and criminal responsibility are governed by the same considerations.'
In respect of ultra vires doctrine Smith and Hogan, Criminal Law (1992) contend that it has only
been utilised in the law of contract and property and not in respect of tort and crime at p. 105;
Burrows ' The Responsibility OfCorporations Under Criminal Law' 1948 Criminal Science 1-19, at
p.l explains the ultras vires argument thus 'As the law does not countenance the formation of
corporations for unlawful purposes..it would be a simple and logical deduction to say that no
corporation can do or authorise an unlawful act.'; Edgerton 'Corporate Criminal Responsibility'
1927 36 Yale Law Journal 827-844, at p. 839 exposes the poverty of the ultra vires argument. He
says the 'ultra vires character [of the act] furnishes no logical reason for relieving the corporation
form responsibility of the crime. Its ultra vires character ..means no more than that the corporation
was not authorised by the state to commit any crime; but obviously no one is authorized by the state
to commit any crime. Incorporation was a means to escape liability and as a means of insulation;
see also Hallis, Corporate Personality- A Study In Jurisprudence (1978) at p. 8; Leigh, The
Criminal Liability OfCorporations In English Law (1969), at pp. 8-9).
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susceptible to prosecution where the action offends against the common
law.'
Accepting that companies could be criminally liable for statutory crimes involving
knowledge and intent, Lord Cameron concluded that,
'If a company can by law- by legal fiction if you will- be endowed with
mind and will exercisable by natural persons acting within the confines of
the company's competence and be held responsible for actings in
pursuance of the exercise of that mind and will, then if those actings are
contrary to the common criminal law, I find it difficult to see upon what
basis of principle it can be said that the company is free of criminal
liability however this may be enforced.'10
Lord Cameron also offered the argument that mens rea could be inferred or
presumed in all acts which were criminal at common law. He said 'The wicked
intent in all common law crimes is the intent to perform the criminal act. The
motive or moral depravity of the actor are alike irrelevant to the quality of the act
in the eye of the law. Therefore, if the act is intentional the criminal intent is
presumed whatever the motive which inspired the actor.' This conception offers
interesting possibilities as to the application of common law crimes to corporations
in Scotland. Rather than seek to locate the necessary criminal mind within the
confines of the corporation or its actors, we can, it is submitted, make a qualitative
assessment as to intention from the proven facts and circumstances on an almost
post hoc basis. Such an approach offers the prospect of adoption of the corporate
fault method of assessment of the corporation's mens rea canvassed in chapter 2
(and to which I will subsequently return).
Though Dean v John Menzies represented the first time in a common law criminal
case where the issue of locating the criminal mind of the corporation was
discussed, there had been several interesting earlier pronouncements in some
Scottish civil cases and some cases involving breaches of criminal statutes. One
such civil case is Gordon v British and Foreign Metaline Co.11 where the pursuer,
who had hitherto worked for the defenders, had raised an action against the
9
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defender company for inter alia judicial slander following a breakdown in relations
between the parties. The Lord Justice Clerk stated,
'It may be quite true in one sense that the company cannot be guilty of
moral wrong. It is said that a company has no animus. Nor has it. It has
no will, it has no memory, it has no conscience. But withstanding all that,
the supposed or imaginary persona which constitutes a company may
contract obligations although it has no will, memory, or conscience, and
may be compelled to fulfil the obligations so undertaken. It is a mere
metaphysical subtlety to say that a company cannot be guilty of malice
where the very nature of the proceeding in which the plea is taken
necessarily implies that the persona has a power of action and a power of
12
judgment.'
As Stuart points out the Lord Justice Clerk did not offer any guidance on whether
the exercise of these physical characteristics were undertaken by individuals who
for these purposes are considered the company or whether some other legal fiction
13
required to be used.
Another case altogether more significant is that of Clydebank Co-operative Society
v Binnie14 where the accused company was charged with permitting a motor
vehicle to be used as an express carriage without a Public Service Vehicle Licence
as required by the Road Traffic Act. To succeed the Crown had to establish
knowledge on the part of the accused. The Lord Justice-General found that the
knowledge could be attributed from the knowledge of the transport manager and
the driver. No indication is offered in the case as to the basis on which this
attribution of knowledge was to take place. The inference of the driver's
knowledge suggested to Stuart that the basis must have been vicarious liability as
the driver could not be considered a controlling mind of the company in conformity
with the dicta in Natrass.15
In McNab v Alexanders ofGreenock Ltd 16 Lord Justice-Clerk Grant indicated that
it was only through officers and servants actings that the company could be liable.
12
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Again we are left 'in the dark' as to the imputation of the criminal mind. The
concession that the actions of servants can create liability is nonetheless interesting
and alludes to a concession that lower order human agents may exhibit the
corporation's mens rea.
17
A further case worthy of note is that ofMackay Bros, v Gibb where a partnership
was charged with permitting a vehicle to be used where the tread was so low as to
be considered illegal. In order for the charge to be sustained it was necessary
impute knowledge of the defect to the firm. In imputing the garage controller's
knowledge to the firm the Lord Justice-Clerk considered that the controller had
constructive notice of the defect based on his wilful blindness to the possibility that
the tyre may be defective. This is not a controlling mind theory approach on the
basis ofNatrass but there is nonetheless the imputation of knowledge albeit from a
lower order employee. Lords Wheatley and Milligan in this case offered vicarious
liability as the basis of imputation of liability to the firm but purely on a purposive
approach to the statute. Lord Milligan in particular noted the absurdity of the
situation when he said that the law would be 'completely ineffective in a case
where the car was own by a limited company and I cannot think that Parliament
18
ever intended this.'
Where the statutory offence is one of permitting, it is recognised that the
imputation of liability is vicarious. In Noble v Heatley'9 a licence holder was
charged under section 131 of the Licensing (Scotland) Act 1959 with knowingly
permitting drunkenness on his premises. Two people had been found drunk on the
premises; supervision of the premises had been delegated by the licence holder to a
manager who was in sole charge of the premises. It was accepted that the
necessary knowledge of the statute could be vicarious. The court accepted that a








authority. However, such a case only offers guidance in respect of certain
statutory crimes and offers little in respect of common law crimes. In Readers
Digest Association Ltd v Pirie2' the company was charged with an offence under
section 2(1) of the Unsolicited Goods and Services Act 1971 which provides that,
'a person who not having reasonable cause to believe there is a right to payment in
the course of any trade or business, makes a demand for payment., for what he
knows are unsolicited goods sent then...to another person with a view to his
acquiring them shall be guilty of an offence.' Sheriff Mclnnes, before whom the
case called, found that it was company policy not to demand money for goods
which had not been ordered and to cancel instructions when so requested by
customers. The company's systems should ensure that improper demands for
payment were not being made, but mistakes by junior employees led to demands
for payment being made. Lord Justice-Clerk Wheatley claimed that,
'The facts...clearly show that there was no mens rea on the part of the
company, or anyone who could be said to be the "the mind" of the
company in relation to the despatch of the demand for payment.'22
In the same case, Lord Kissen also reflected upon Natrass and said in respect of the
reasonable belief of entitlement to payment that there was 'no basis...for excluding
errors of employees of a company as a circumstance or for holding that a company
cannot have a reasonable cause for belief when information could have been
obtained from records which would have altered that belief.' This statement is
clearly interesting is respect of corporate omissions, corporate failure to supervise,
and the nature of the knowledge to be imputed to the company. It also shows a
willingness to look to the corporation as an entity for the necessary mental state
rather than individuals within it. It is difficult to assess whether Lord Kissen truly
saw the corporation as a collective entity capable of holding a 'belief or whether
his dictum was simply carefree use of language to which no deeper significance can
be attached.
20
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23In Smith of Maddiston Ltd v McNab a company was charged with causing or
permitting the use of a vehicle with an insecure load. Here again the court did not
feel compelled to state the basis on which liability could attach to the corporation.
However, Lord Justice General Emslie did say that that the company 'through their
responsible officials' knew that certain precautions were required to be taken in
order to secure the load. They did not specifically instruct the employee to secure
the load in that way. Importantly, Lord Emslie said that knowledge in respect of a
contravention of a statute includes a state ofmind where the accused shuts his eyes
to the obvious in circumstances where something is likely to happen. He claimed
'it [knowledge] may be inferred when the permittor has given no thought to his
statutory obligations at all.' In McPhail v Allan and Dey Ltd24 the accused
company was charged with a contravention of si 12 of the Road Traffic Act 1972
with causing and permitting one of their employees to drive a heavy goods vehicle
when he was not appropriately licensed to do so. Following the ratio of Smith of
Maddison v McNab Sheriff Scott considered that to be guilty of the offence actual
or constructive knowledge was required to prove permitting on the part of the
company. In this case he held that the state of knowledge of the company's
transport manager was to be considered the state of knowledge of the company.
Again no reference was made in the case to the controlling mind theory but it
seems clear that the imputation of knowledge to the company is analogous to that
approach albeit that this employee was not the controlling mind in the Natrass
ethos. Sheriff Scott in this case said ' [imputed knowledge] can be inferred where
some one allows another to do something when a contravention is likely or where
he gives no thought to the statutory obligations at all or where he has good reason
• • 25
to suppose that a prohibited thing is happening and does nothing to prevent it.'
In summarising these cases it was evident that Scots law had not (until the advent
ofPurcell Meats v McLeod) explicitly adopted any clear approach to the attribution
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contention that judges had been applying the identification theory as a model of
fault attribution. Implicit support for the controlling mind theory was offered by
Lord Wheatley and Milligan in Readers Digest, Sheriff Scott in McPhail, arguably
in the case ofSmith ofMaddison, and perhaps less obliquely the decision in Dean v
John Menzies Ltd. The attribution of guilt is often premised on the presumed
intention of Parliament behind the statutory provisions but as Stuart points out,
'in the case of a common law crime or offence..there is no such factor as
Parliament's presumed intention to justify the use, where required, of an
appropriate fiction-..to enable corporate guilt to be proved by the
attributing of human characteristics to the corporate body. With a
common law offence, one simply has the relevant conduct and mens rea
required to constitute the offence, all as laid down by authority.'26
Lord Maxwell in Dean v John Menzies was of the opinion that there was no clear
fiction for the attribution of human characteristics and conduct to a company.
However, the decision in Purcell Meats now affords credence to the view that the
27
'controlling mind' theory is operational in Scotland. In Purcell Meats Ltd v
McLeod28 there was certainly a closer approximation to the approach taken in
Natrass in England. It was suggested that it would be necessary for the Crown to
show that,
'the persons by whose hands the particular acts were performed were of
such a status and at such a level in the company's employment that it
would be open to the sheriff to draw the conclusion that the acts fell to be
29
regarded as acts of the company rather than acts of the individual.'
The court itself offered no clear statement as to how such status should be
30determined. However, Purcell Meats is significant on two principal counts. It
represented the first occasion on which a company was successfully prosecuted for
a common law crime and one requiring intent at that. Secondly, by the clear
enunciation of part of the Natrass test in the judgment there was a clear signal that
the controlling mind test was to be applied in common law crimes in Scotland in
considering the liability of the corporation.
26
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Subsequent to the decision in Dean but before the pronouncements in Purcell
Meats, Stuart argued that 'What is required is a fiction which unambiguously
indicates to a body corporate..the means by which human characteristics are to be
• 31attributed to it such that it might be guilty of the alleged crime.' Stuart adopted a
truculent view in dismissing Lord Cameron's suggestion in Dean arguing that,
'With respect, it is not satisfactory to introduce a fiction into Scots law with such
radical consequences for criminal responsibility on the basis that there is
uniformity of legal rules between Scotland and England in other areas of corporate
law. If the liability of corporate bodies in civil and statutory criminal matters
where human characteristics must be attributed to the body corporate is not based
on the application of the controlling mind fiction, then the means by which such
liability is established is unlikely to be relevant as regards liability for common law
offences where the 'controlling mind' is considered the appropriate fiction. As far
as statutory offences involving intention, knowledge etc. are concerned, it has been
shown that there is little distinct support for the fiction in Scots Law and it has
never been unequivocally applied. Further, it has been suggested that the use of the
fiction in English cases has essentially been determined by the relevant statutory
provisions. In any case, the controlling mind fiction may be considered as too
imprecise to be a means of attributing human characteristics such as intention or
knowledge to a company in order to render it responsible for a common law
offence.' 2
Despite the frequency of prosecutions under statute law, there remains reluctance
33
on the part of prosecutors to prosecute corporations for common law crimes. The
provisions of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1995 permit the prosecution of
corporations for common law crimes but offer no guidance on the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion as to when and in what circumstances those prosecutions
will take place. In Scots law (like many of the common law jurisdictions) there can
be no vicarious criminal liability for crime in the absence of clear statutory
provisions.34 The absence of extensive discussion as to the nature of liability has
led to a clear lacuna in the law. Various cases accept the imputation of knowledge
and other mental attributes to the corporation; some of them do so on the basis of
imputation of knowledge from agents or from employees of the company. Ross
31
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argues that 'It appears that in these cases there was something more than simple
vicarious liability on the part of the company..for an employee's actions in the
35 36
course of employment.' Readers Digest Association v Pirie offers little in the
way of insight as to High Court's perception of the requisite status of the employee
before imputation of knowledge will accrue. Lord Justice Wheatley argues that the
secretary to Head of Information and a subordinate of a supervisor could not be
considered the mind of the company. A more recent case adds further to the
confusion. In Brown v Burns Tractors Ltd,37 the accused company was charged
with causing and permitting their employee to drive in breach of the regulations on
the usage of tachograph and rest periods. The arrangements within the firm were
that the drivers were under the supervision of a clerical assistant who reported to
one of the directors of the firm. The Scottish Court of Criminal Appeal held that
the clerical assistant was to be considered important within the administration of
the organisation because that person had delegated authority and control.
If the basis of liability is uncertain, so too is the extent of the applicability of the
common criminal law to corporations. Ross asserts 'It seems to be widely accepted
that, even if it is competent to prosecute the fiction of a corporation, there is a limit
TO
to how far the fiction can be pursued.' Lord Stott in Dean v John Menzies
claimed that it was 'self-evident that there are certain crimes and offences which
cannot be committed by a corporate body. Murder is such a crime, not only
..because a company cannot be imprisoned but because it is incapable of having the
wicked intent or recklessness of mind necessary to constitute the crime of murder.
Other example which come to mind are reset and perjury. In my opinion the
offence of conducting oneself in a shameless indecent manner falls into the same
39
category.' Lord Stott's dictum can be criticised on several counts- the ability to
sanction the corporation, the ability of the corporation to exhibit intent and
recklessness and the ability of the corporation to commit certain crimes. At various
35
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points throughout this thesis all of these issues have been addressed; I have pointed
to alternative perspectives on all of these issues. Ross suggests that Lord Stott's
view and Lord Cameron's in Dean v John Menzies Ltd exhibits a 'reluctance to
stretch beyond the bounds of ordinary language or common-sense the idea of a
fictional entity with no existence outside the law performing physical acts and
having mental attitudes.'40
One of the major problems of the Scottish jurisprudence lies in the that fact that the
essence of corporate liability is rarely properly addressed. As Ross points out
'Objections to particular crimes are stated rather than argued.'41 Ross is also
critical of the confusion between liability and sanction. Just because the
corporation cannot be imprisoned should not impinge upon the technicality of
liability.42 The position in Scotland as extrapolated from the existing case law, is
that the court clearly feels there are some common law crimes which cannot be
imputed to the corporation, but as Ross asserts 'no logical basis has been developed
for distinguishing those crimes which a company is capable of committing from
those which it is not.'
In the light of modern trends towards different models of attribution of corporate
fault the debate as to the applicability of the alter ego doctrine in Scots criminal
law seems rather stale. Ross is supportive of the aggregation theory of attribution
but her comments must be read in the context of the prevailing knowledge at the
time; jurisprudence has moved on apace in the past 7 years. Whatever may be the
model of attribution, Ross is of the opinion that 'there is no logical limit to the
crimes with which a company can be potentially charged.'43 Whyte appears to be
of a similar mind.44 Ross claims 'the issue of corporate liability has arisen because
of the desire to prosecute the "right" person. It can be argued that the company can
be the appropriate person where those who control it take decisions which lead
40
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directly to the commission of a crime; or where the company's ethics or
organisation are perceived as making criminal activity likely.'45 Importantly, she
contends that,
'prosecuting the company need not necessarily detract from the pursuit of
the directors who have taken the decisions or the employees who have
committed the wrongful acts...Prosecuting a corporation may in certain
cases be the best way of ensuring that an organisation takes the position
seriously and remedies whatever had led to the breach. Corporate
criminal responsibility however needs to be given a less vague and more
realistic basis.'46
Stuart's call for the development of a fiction which better attributes human
characteristics to the corporations is, in the opinion of the writer, limited on the
basis of its constraint. The search for a fiction whereby mens rea can be attributed
to the corporation from the minds of individual actors within it suffers from a
fundamental flaw which misses the real essence of corporate liability. For
intellectual credence, corporate liability requires a corporate basis of attributing
liability. Those writers in the Anglo-American jurisdictions who have sought to
develop such a model have captured the essence of corporate criminal liability. In
the process they have sought to transcend the strictures of individualising corporate
crime. The decision in Dean is regrettable in that it offers no clear analysis of the
basis on which a corporation can be found liable. It was thought that the outcome
of Dean was that prosecutors are likely to prosecute individual managers rather
than their corporations.47 The absence of empiricism in Scotland ensures that it is
difficult to test this thesis. What is beyond doubt is that there has been a dearth of
reported decisions relative to prosecutions of corporations. Unlike Stuart who
argues for the development of an unambiguous model which attributes human
characteristics to the corporation my own preferred option is to adopt a corporate
fault model. If nothing else, one of the key lessons from Anglo-American
jurisprudence is that anthropomorphism has engendered more complexity and
confusion than it has solved. Any new system of fault must attempt to transcend
that approach as a basis of liability attribution. The three atomistic concepts
45
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discussed in chapter 2 all have major failings. My outline proposal envisages the
retention of vicarious liability and strict liability for those statutory offences where
it already exists as part of the framework of corporate criminal liability.
Identification can be rejected as an overly restricted basis on which to attempt to
limit the corporate personnel through whom liability can flow. Aggregation is
interesting but unnecessary; moreover, it has no genealogy in United Kingdom
courts. The retention of vicarious and strict liability for certain statutory offences
can be justified on the basis of continuity and on the existing public policy
consideration which currently justifies their existence. For the common law
offences to be retained, it will be necessary to exhibit corporate fault. Any
framework will require to indicate how that corporate fault may be exhibited. The
most obvious method of so doing is for an ex post facto assessment of the
corporations policies, practices, systems and procedures. It is a formulation which
I believe puts corporate criminal liability, as Ross infra has called for, on a more
realistic and coherent basis.
6.2 Legislating For Corporate Criminal Liability
I have suggested that the most logical method of developing a coherent framework
is through legislation. Several Anglo-American law jurisdictions have attempted to
legislate for corporate criminal liability. Others have attempted to interpret
existing statutes, particularly in the field ofhomicide, in the context of corporations
being equated with a person/5 The latter approach in many instances leads to
unsatisfactory results. Invariably, the word 'person' requires definition.
Magnuson and Leviton claim that person means an 'individual, public or private
corporation, government partnership or unincorporated association.'49 Not
48
E.g. Illinois Ann Stat Ch. 38 para 9-1 states (a) A person who kills an individual without lawful
justification commits murder if in performing the acts which cause death:
(1) He either intends to kill or do great bodily harm to that individual or another, or knows that
such acts will cause death to that individual or another; or
(2) He knows that such actors create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to that
individual or another; or
(3) He is attempting or committing aforciblefelony other than voluntary manslaughter
49
Magnuson and Leviton, 'Policy Considerations In Corporate Criminal Prosecutions After People
v Film Recovery Systems Inc.' 1987 62 Notre Dame L. R. 913-939 at p. 916; Article 2 of the Code;
Model Penal Code has essentially the same definition Article 5-4 permits corporate criminal
liability for homicide where (1) the offence is a misdemeanour (2) there is legislative intent that the
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everyone agrees with such anthropomorphic conceptualisation. Indeed as we have
seen in chapters 1 and 3 the idea of corporate personhood is quite frequently
challenged. Clearly in any statutory scheme, there will be no criminal liability of
corporations where the statute unambiguously exempts them from criminal
liability. Precision will be imperative in the linguistic construction of any statute.50
Before proffering my own outline model it is perhaps worth looking at similar
attempts to devise statutory schemes of corporate criminal liability.
Hamilton has offered a proposal for a code for the American State of Texas which
has historically resisted an expansive formulation of corporate criminal liability.51
The proposals were rejected by the State Bar of Texas and the State Bar Committee
on Revision of the Penal Code but are nonetheless worthy of consideration. His
provisions are as follows
Sec 2.072 Liability ofCorporations
(a) Ifconduct constituting the offense is performed by an agent acting in behalfof
a corporation and within the scope of his office or employment, the corporation
may be convictedof
(1) apetty misdemeanour [as defined]
(2) an offense defined by a statute other than this code in which a legislative
intention to impose liability on corporations plainly appears; or
(3) an offense defined by a statute other than this code for which absolute liability
is imposed, unless a legislative purpose not to impose liability on corporation
plainly appears;
(b) A corporation may be convicted of an offense other than those described in
Subsection (a) only if its commission was authorized, requested, commanded,
performed or recklessly tolerated by
(1) a majority ofthe board ofdirectors acting in behalfofthe corporation; or
(2) a high managerial agent acting in behalf of the corporation and within the
scope ofhis office or employment
2.074 Defense to liability ofcorporations andAssociations
(a) In a prosecution ofa corporation or association for an offense included within
the terms ofSections 2.072 (a) (I) and (2) or 2.073, it is an affirmative defense that
the high managerial agent having supervisory responsibility over the subject
matter ofthe offense employed due diligence to prevent its commission
(b) Subsection (a) does not apply if it is plainly inconsistent with the legislative
purpose expressed in the statute defining the particular offense'
Sec 2.075 Liability ofpersons for conduct in behalfofcorporations or associations
offence apply to corporations or (3) that the offence is approved of by the Board of Directors or a
high managerial agent;
50
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51
R. Hamilton,'Corporate Criminal Liability in Texas' 1968 47 Texas L. R. 62-85 at p. 77 ff.
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(a) A person is liable for conduct which he performs or causes to be performed in
the name ofor in behalfofa corporation or association to the same extent as if the
conduct were performed in his own name or behalf
(b) An agent having primary responsibility for the discharge of a duty to act
imposed by law on a corporation or association is liable for the intentional,
known, or reckless omission to discharge the duty to the same extent as if the duty
were imposed by law directly on him
(c) When a person is convicted by reason of his ability for conduct performed in
the name of or in behalf of a corporation or association, he is subject to the
sentence authorised by law when a naturalperson is convicted ofan offense of the
dame grade and degree involved without regard to the sentence authorized by law
r ■ 5 52
jor a corporation or association.
This type of formulation is interesting; in my model an important feature would be
to delineate the 'true' crimes the corporation could commit and how it could
exhibit the necessary mens rea for those offences. Hamilton's approach is different
from my own in that he appears wedded to the notion of formulating corporate
guilt through individual managerial actors within the corporate form. There may
nonetheless be some merit in offering corporations a defence to any criminal
prosecution they face. Herein, one faces a further dilemma. Should corporations
be able to exhibit their own unique defences to criminal charges or should they be
confined to those already conceded by Scots criminal law ? This presents itself as
a problem only in respect of common law offences. Existing statutory offences
will maintain their own formulations and defences. In considering corporate fault
through the body corporate's policies, procedures and practices a qualitative
assessment will, of necessity, take place as to the culpability of the corporation.




In Sections 2.071 -2.075, unless the context requires a different definition,
(1) "agent" means a director, officer, employee, or other person authorized to act in behalf of a
corporation or association
(2) "association " means a government or government al subdivision or agency, trust, partnership,
or two or more person having ajoint or common economic interest; and
(3) "high managerial agent" means
(A) a partner in a partnership
(B) an officer ofa corporation or association; or
(C) an agent ofa corporation or association who has duties ofsuch responsibility that his conduct
reasonably may be assumed to represent the policy ofthe corporation or association
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Leigh suggests a fundamental analysis ofwhat corporations should be liable forand
in what circumstances. The foundation of many modern crimes is to be found in
the placing of social duties upon natural persons. In respect of the crimes which
may be committed by a corporation Leigh argues 'there seems to be no single
principle of a non-arbitrary character which will identify the offences that ought
and the offences that ought not to be capable of commission by corporations and
other bodies. The only imperative principle of exclusion would be derived from
the definition of certain offences, making their commission by corporations legally
53 • i J
impossible.' My own proposal is that for clarity's sake that those crimes should
be identified and excluded from consideration of corporate guilt. I am also
prepared to recognise that those exclusions should not only relate to those offences
thought incapable of commission by the corporation but also those excluded on
policy grounds. There was a suggestion in the aftermath of Purcell Meats that
there was no limit conceptually to those common law crimes capable of
commission by the corporation.54 Lord Cameron in Dean had suggested two
limitations- Crimes for which a custodial sentence was necessary and those which
required the human body for commission of the offence. On the face of matters
there is much force in this assertion. However, we have seen in chapter 4 that
custodial sentences might well be replicated and for the sake of completeness we
should not simply utilise sanctions as a means of delimiting our criminal liability.
Nonetheless, it makes good sense to retain an element of realism in our system.
Concession that the corporation cannot commit every crime offers no offence. A
coherent and supportable basis on which to proceed is to exclude those offences it
is impossible, in law, for the corporation to commit.(/e:x: non cogit ad
impossibilia).55 Alternatively, one could leave the ambit of liability unlimited and
place reliance on prosecutorial discretion. That approach is a recipe for
inconsistency and eventual anarchy. My own instinctive preference is for the
delineation of those crimes relevantly applicable to corporations. On the basis of
what I have said, I envisage only a few crimes being excluded from application to
53
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the corporation. The list will include murder for the reasons I have outlined in
chapter 5. Clarity in respect of those offences a corporation can commit will
represent a substantial advancement in our legal system for its citizens and for
corporations themselves.
In Australia, the Gibbs Committee proposed a new section 4B(A) of the Crimes
Act which sought to set down the basis of corporate criminal liability. It states
'(1) For the purposes of a proceeding against a body corporate for an offence
against a law of the Commonwealth not involving any fault element, being an
offence;
(a) constituted by conduct of a director, servant or agent of the body corporate
acting within the scope ofhis or her office, employment or engagement; and
(b) that is stated in terms that are capable of applying to the body corporate as
well as to the director, servant or agent;
the conduct of the director, servant or agent and, where relevant, the state ofmind
of that person in relation to that conduct, are to be attributed to the body
corporate,
(2) In relation to any other offence against a law of the Commonwealth subsection
(3) applies unless the law creating the offence indicates that subsection (4) is to
apply
(3) For the purposes of a proceeding against a body corporate for an offence
against a law ofthe Commonwealth:
(a) conduct engaged in by a controlling officer ofthe body corporate acting within
the scope ofhis or her office, employment or engagement and. where relevant, the
state ofmind of that person in relation to that conduct, are to be attributed to the
body corporate; and
(b) conduct engaged in by a director, servant or agent of the body corporate,
acting within the scope ofhis or her office, employment or engagement and, where
relevant, the state of mind of that person in relation to the conduct, are to be
attributed to the body corporate if the body corporate failed to take measures that,
in the circumstances, were appropriate to prevent, or reduce the likelihood of, the
commission ofthe offence
(4) For the purposes of a proceeding against a body corporate for an offence
against a law of the Commonwealth, conduct engaged in by a director, servant or
agent of the body corporate acting within the scope of his or her office,
employment or engagement and, where relevant, the state ofmind ofthatperson in
relation to the conduct, are to be attribute to the body corporate
(5) Where a body corporate is charged with an offence against a law of the
Commonwealth and subsection (4) applies for the purposes ofa proceedingfor the
offence, it is a defence to the charge if the body corporate establishes that it had
taken measures that in the circumstances, were appropriate to prevent, or reduce
the likelihood of, the commission ofthe offence
(6) Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this section, for the purposes ofa
proceeding against a body corporate for any offence against a body corporate for
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any offence against a law of the Commonwealth, conduct by way ofcommunication
in relation to a matter engaged in by a person who is an authorised agent of the
body corporate in relation to that matter and, where relevant, the state ofmind of
the agent in relation to that communication, are to be attributed to the body
corporate.
(7) A reference in this section to a person acting within the scope of his or her
office, employment or engagement in relation to a body corporate does not include
a case where the person acts with the intention ofdoing harm, or concealing harm
done by him or her or by another person, to the body corporate.'56
Major criticisms of this scheme are that there is no organisational basis of fault; the
Natrass principle is retained in 4(3)(a); the communication basis of liability is
capricious; and there is imprecision of the terms 'intention to harm' or 'conceal
harm.' The Gibbs Committee's approach only has the merit of defining how
liability might ensue. It offers clarity over the existing Scottish position but does
not enshrine the sort of values and provisions I envisage for Scotland. A Scottish
framework should move away from identification and also offer new provisions on
the sanction of corporations. Fisse claims the Australian Ozone Protection Act
1989 has a better provision in section 65 which states that
'(1) Where, in proceedings for an offence ..,it is necessary to establish the state of
mind ofa body corporate in relation to particular conduct, it is sufficient to show;
(a) that the conduct was engaged in by a director, servant or agent of the body
corporate within the scope ofhis or her actual employment or apparent authority;
and
(b) the director, servant or agent had the state ofmind
(2) Any conduct engaged in on behalfof the body corporate by a director, servant
or agent of the body corporate within the scope of his or her actual or apparent
authority shall be taken, for the purposes of a prosecution for an offence against
this Act, to have been engaged in also by the body corporate unless the body
corporate establishes that the body corporate took reasonable precautions and
exercised due diligence to avoid the conduct. '57
Even this provision is not complete but Fisse suggests that it might act as
exemplar, modification of which might produce the requisite conception of
corporate fault. His variation would require that the external elements of the
offence have been committed by a person for whose conduct the corporation is
vicariously liable and the corporation would be at fault on the basis that it had a
56
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policy that expressly, or impliedly, authorises or permits the commission of the
offence or an offence of the same type; or by failing to take reasonable precautions
or to exercise due precautions to prevent the commission of an offence or an
offence of the same type; or by failing to have a policy or failing to comply with a
reactive duty to take preventive measures in response to having committed the
external features of the offence; or by failing to take reasonable precautions or to
exercise due diligence to comply with a reactive duty to take preventive measures
58 •
in response to having committed the external elements of the offence. It is this
variation that I have sought to develop into my own outline proposal below. I have
excluded the notion of reactive corporate fault, explicit in Fisse's model for the
reasons I have already stated in chapter 4.
In 1974 the new Texas Penal Code included some new provisions relative to
corporate criminal liability
Section 7.22
(a) Ifconduct constituting an offense is performed by an agent acting in behalfof
a corporation or association and within the scope ofhis office or employment, the
corporation or association is criminally responsible for the offence defined
(1) In this code where corporations and associations are made subject thereto
(2) By law other than this code in which a legislative purpose to impose criminal
responsibility on corporations or associationsplainly appears; or
(3) By law other than this code for which strict liability is imposed, unless a
legislative purpose not to impose criminal responsibility on corporations or
associationsplainly appears
(b) A corporation is criminally responsible for a felony offense only if its
commission was authorized, requested, commanded, performed or recklessly
tolerated by:
(1) a majority of the board of directors acting in behalf of the corporation or
association; or
(2) a high managerial agent acting in behalfof the corporation or association and
within the scope ofhis office or employment'
This formulation suffers from the same problems as certain other attempts. The
continued allegiance to liability deduced from corporate actors rather than the
corporation is fallacious. It does, however, offer an indication as to how statute
CO
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might point to a retention of strict and vicarious liability statutory offences whilst
at the same time activates accessibility to common law crimes.
Should there be consideration of the different types of corporations ? Should
smaller companies face less onerous burdens than the larger corporations ? If an
integral part of the social obligation is to privately police should the greater
resources of the larger corporation be a factor ? There is undoubtedly difficulty in
fault attribution on this basis. As Leigh argues 'the difficulty with formulating rules
by reference to the characteristics of the corporations as these are reflected in
company legislation is that the classifications generally relate to closeness of
control by an ultimate person or group, and, therefore, contemplate dispersal of
shareholding, rather than the varying sizes of companies or the diversity of their
activities which are the key factors.'59 According to Leigh, the size question
should be best left to prosecutorial discretion.60 My own preference is that it
should have no bearing on the issue of liability but may have some bearing on the
sanction imposed. What about the Crown or public corporations ? Should these be
differentiated on the basis that punishment of a public body is merely a punishment
on society or the State. What about the privatised utilities ? Again for egalitarian
reasons, I cannot foresee any concession to public or quasi-public corporations.
One of the key issues in fault attribution identified by some commentators is
whether a fixed model of attribution should be defeasible ?61 Should it be possible
for example to show that the shareholders disapproved of the directors actions or
should it be the case that the executive organ having acted in such a way the
company is liable irrespective of what the shareholders' views ? Should there be a
defence whereby if an individual acted without the intention to benefit the
corporation and perhaps an intention to harm the corporation, the corporation
• 62 • •would not be liable ? By adopting a corporate fault model of liability such a
problem would not materialise. Emphasis would be on the corporation's actions,
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policies procedures and practices rather than the individual's actions and mental
state. Reasonable application of precautions and due diligence would be the
requisite defences.
Leigh claims that the issues of corporate criminal liability 'have never been
squarely faced either by Parliament or by the courts. Perhaps it is better that they
should not be. The common law rules concerning corporate liability represent a
rough, and perhaps arbitrary, response to the enforcement problems posed by group
activities and the characteristics of groups. It may be that any response must be a
rough and in some measure arbitrary; perhaps fundamental problems about the
functions of criminal law, the moral bases for the attribution of guilt and the like
cannot be perfectly resolved. Certainly there seems no single neat solution to
63
problems of corporate and group liability.' Such an approach appears defeatist in
attitude. There are tangible problems in attaching criminal liability to
collectivities. The magnitude of the task should not however, deflect attempts at
seeking solutions. It is true that corporate criminal liability does not fit a neat
formulation. This should not however, constrain our willingness to attempt the
unconventional. My own formulation is not imbued with neatness; it suggests
liability for some 'true' crimes and statutory crimes, it recognises liability for
individuals within the corporate form where the law currently permits that, and it
envisages a more diversified strategy of sanctions than has hitherto been the case.
Its hybrid amalgamation is conceded. Neatness of solution should not be our
objective; rather we should seek a pragmatic, workable and ultimately sustainable
system of corporate criminal liability. It is my view that our knowledge is
sufficiently expansive now to develop such a system and confront what hitherto
seemed an impossible task.
There is a view expressed in Anglo-American jurisprudence that there should be no
distinction between 'regulatory' and 'true' crime and that we should attempt to
universally apply criminal offences through one basis of fault. My own model
rejects this as lacking in pragmatism. The Law Reform Commission of Canada's
63
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principal approach was to differentiate real crimes from regulatory crimes.64 They
considered that real crimes had relativity to values whereas regulatory offences
were more concerned with results. Leigh was critical of this; he saw part of the
role of criminal law as that of moulding values and that many regulatory offences
were major in their import and effect. Moreover, some regulatory offences were
not bereft of moral fault and as such the distinction between regulatory offences
and real crimes was not as stark as the Canadian Law Commission suggested.65
The suggestion in Canada was that officers of corporations should be liable for real
crimes where there is recklessness or intention and additionally there would be
officer liability for regulatory offences on the basis of negligence. Leigh suggests
that 'A clear articulation of a negligence standard in the case of regulatory offences
might be of real value in helping to set general standards of care and skill for
directors. It is entirely to be welcomed that the onus should lie on an accused to
show that he exercised due diligence.'66 The Canadian Law Commission adopted a
doctrine ofprima facie imputability and in the process abandoned the identification
theory. They did not however seek to supplant corporate criminal liability with
personal liability. In Canada the Law Commission concluded that the role of 'true'
criminal law in controlling the activities of corporations was limited. Leigh
referring to the application of the common criminal law to corporations argues that,
'It is difficult and expensive to enforce, and the lack of enforcement
resources in the face of the sheer size of the problem leads to its being
invoked at best only sporadically. Moreover, the courts are not suitable
forums for re-organizing a corporation's structure or reforming its
business practices. The criminal trial simply provides a medium through
which selective responses can be made to proven deviant acts; it is not a
regulatory device...Even if the criminal trial were not so limited a device
some situations might well be too large or too politically charged to allow
for adequate resolution through criminal law.'6
This is not a view with which I concur. I do concede the difficulties but the case
for the attachment of corporate criminal liability is in my opinion, overwhelming.
To then deny the application of developed common law crimes, appears on the face
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of things to be 'tying one hand behind one's back.' Many of these existing crimes
are both relevant and appropriate to the corporate form. Some are not, but that
does not justify the abandonment wholesale of common law crimes.
Though not an integral part of this thesis, I also seek to lend support for the
development of some criminal law offences premised on the creation of harm
rather than the fortuity of consequence. In chapter 5 I have covered this area in
some detail. Gobert succinctly states that 'fortuity has significant ramifications for
68the actor's criminal liability.' Gobert seeks to address the problem engendered
by criminal causation and concludes that 'it may well be that the most practical
approach to questions of causation lies in the frank recognition that the true issue is
not causation at all but attribution-whether, under all the circumstances, it is fair
and just to attribute the harmful result to the defendant...the best way to reach this
end point is not to manipulate notions of causation but to base liability forthrightly
on acts and mental state, regardless of consequence.' Such a notion is not alien to
any of the criminal law systems; it is to be found in certain offences (dangerous
driving, perjury) and also in the law of attempts.69 One can posit that such an
approach is right given that both situations are equally morally blameworthy.
There must of course be recognition that attempts are treated less strictly and that
unlike in respect of substantive crimes the court may have a greater range of
70 •
flexibility in the disposal. Gobert offers the view that 'neither causation, attempt,
71
nor sentencing is adequate to escape the fortuity of consequence.' According to
Gobert, 'What is needed is amore coherent approach, and the starting point may be
to ask what it is that the criminal law is trying to accomplish.' Gobert asserts that
two issues arise from the notion of moral blameworthiness; the first is that only
those who are blameworthy should suffer criminal sanction; secondly punishment
should bear a relationship to the actor's degree ofmoral fault. It follows that some
conduct may result in harm which is not morally blameworthy and therefore
Gobert, 'The Fortuity OfConsequence' 1993 3 Criminal Law Forum 1-46 at p. 3
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beyond the criminal sanction. More importantly, moral blameworthiness may
occur in conduct where no harm ensues. According to Gobert, 'passively to accept
79
consequences as indicative of blameworthiness is to suspend critical judgment.'
What Gobert and others assert is that 'voluntary acts capable of inflicting harm on
others- done with either the intent to cause that harm or reckless of the potential for
that harm- are, absent excuse or justification, deserving ofmoral condemnation and
criminal sanction without regard to the harm actually resulting. Crimes should be
defined not in terms of result but in terms of acts and mental state. To do otherwise
7T
is to risk draining the law of its moral imperative.' One of the consequences of
Gobert's (and others) view of the criminal law is that some crimes may have to be
redefined. One of the most obvious areas for reform would be that of criminal
homicide which may be revised to include endangerment.74 Gobert recognises that
strict liability offences may need to be reconsidered. His approach is that if such
conduct merits punishment without a mens rea requirement then such activity
should simply be unlawful per se without the need for 'chance' result arising out of
75 •the activity. Even in Gobert's Utopia harm continues to be of significance. It will
remain central to what is defined as a crime. The legislators/jurists 'must decide
whether the potential for harm involved in a course of conduct is of sufficient
72
Gobert, n. 68 at p. 28
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Gobert, n. 68 at p. 29
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Such an approach was contemplated in New Zealand in the Crimes Bill of 1989 clause 130
"130 Endangering with intent to cause serious bodily harm
(1) Every person is liable to imprisonmentfor 14 years who-
(a) Does an act, or omits without lawful excuse to perform or observe any legal duty, with intent to
cause serious bodily harm to any otherperson; or
(b) With reckless disregardfor the safety ofothers, does any act, or omits without lawful excuse to
perform or observe any legal duty, knowing that the act or omission is likely to cause serious bodily
harm to any otherperson
(2) This section applies whether or not the act or omission results in death or bodily harm to any
other person
132 Endangering with intent to injure etc.
(1) Everyperson is liable to imprisonmentfor 5 years who -
(a) Does any act, or omits without lawful excuse to perform or observe any legal duty, with intent to
inure any other person; or
(b) With reckless disregardfor the safety of others, or heedlessly, does any act, or omits without
lawful excuse to perform or observe any legal duty, the act or omission being likely to cause injury
to anyperson or to endanger the safety or health ofany otherperson
(2) Every person is liable to imprisonment for two years who negligently does any act, or omits
without lawful excuse to perform or observe any legal duty, the act or omission being likely to
cause injury.' see Brown,'Culpable Homicide, Endangerment And Aggravated Violence' 1989 NZ
Recent L Rev 299; France, 'Reforming Criminal Law -New Zealand's 1989 Code' 1990 Crim L
Rev 827
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gravity and of sufficient likelihood that the creation of risk should warrant a
criminal sanction...the inherent danger in a criminal law scheme that contains
crimes of risk creation is over-criminalization.'76 Harm would be significant in
determining the sentence, not necessarily just the resultant harm but the qualitative
nature of the harm threatened, the likelihood of the harm occurring and the extent
of the potential for harm.77 Harm would also be a factor in the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion and resultant harm would be significant as evidence. What
about public reaction to such offences? Gobert fails to satisfactorily address this
issue simply suggesting education and enlightenment as a solution to public
ignorance. As attractive as such an answer may appear academically, the practical
realities are somewhat different. According to Smith, a person's criminal liability
should not depend on matters of chance or on events which do affect his
78
dangerousness to society or his moral blameworthiness. Smith does not support
the idea that crime should become an entirely mental affair; there must be the
• 79criminal act. Stephen supported differential punishment based on harm and
thought it pedantic to call both instances (one where harm ensues and another
where it does not) the same offence. He did so on the basis that 'it gratifies a
natural public feeling to choose out for punishment the one who actually has
caused great harm, and the effect in the way of preventing a repetition of the
• 80offence is much the same as if both were punished.' Smith says we should only
81
create a new criminal law where the need for one is proved. In this case, there are
strong reasons for supposing that the need is apparent.
In Australia there has recently been promulgated the Australian Criminal Code Act
82
1995. The emphasis in Australia has been on developing strong corporate
governance; the Code is an attempt to make governance of the corporation more
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Gobert, n. 68 at p. 33
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77
Gobert, n. 68 at p. 36
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• 83
expansive developing as it does accountability to the wider community. Unlike
the Draft English Criminal Code Bill of 1989 is does not seek to restrict corporate
criminal liability to offences punishable by fine. Specifically mentioned are crimes
84
punishable by imprisonment. The Australian Code Committee 'wanted to stress
the importance ofmaking corporations responsible for the acts of all their officers,
85
even acts that involve offences against the person.' Criminal liability will be
ascribed to the corporation where the board of directors or other high managerial
agent intentionally, knowingly or recklessly carried out the relevant conduct or
where the corporate 'culture' encourages situations that lead to the commission of
an offence. Companies will accordingly be responsible for their practices and
policies. High managerial agent is someone with duties of such responsibility that
86his conduct may fairly assumed to represent the policy of the company. It may
occur in a specific individualised occasion where for that particular event the
person was a high managerial agent. Acquiescence in particular practices may
result in liability. The company may invoke the defence of due diligence where the
infraction represents the actions of a high managerial agent but such a defence will
not be available where the alleged offence arises from the actings or omissions of
87the board of directors. The attribution of corporate criminal liability does not
under the Act deflect from individual liability. The important new concept of
'corporate culture' is defined as attitude, policy, rule, course of conduct, or practice
existing within the body corporate generally or in the part of the body corporate
88where the offence occurred. Rose notes that it will also cover situations where
the employee acts on implicit authorisation- either the act has been sanctioned
previously or the employee has reasonable cause to believe it would be
89
sanctioned. The Code substantially redresses the deficiencies in Natrass. It will
as Rose contends 'catch situations where non-compliance was expected, despite
documents appearing to require compliance. Corporate negligence is establishable
against the corporation as an entirety. It may be established by the failure to ensure
83
Rose, n. 82 at p. 132
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adequate organisational communications. If negligence cannot be attributed to an
appropriate individual within the corporation the court may form a view of the
corporation's conduct as a whole.90 In essence this is done by aggregating the acts
of the corporate actors together. Corporate negligence may also be exhibited where
the prohibited conduct is substantially attributable to inadequate corporate
management, control or supervision of the conduct of one or more employees,
agents or officers.91 Under the Code corporations may escape strict liability
offences on the basis of due diligence, and that the corporate actor acted under a
• 92mistaken but reasonable belief of fact. A failure to exercise due diligence may be
evidenced by the fact that the prohibited conduct was substantially attributable to
inadequate corporate management, control or supervision of corporate actors or
93
through the failure to provide adequate information systems. What is interesting
about this recent Australian formulation is the attempt to develop the idea of
corporate blameworthiness through assessment of its 'culture.' What I argue for is
the radical formulation of such an approach as a stand alone basis of corporate
liability for common law crimes and statutory crime where no mens rea is
specifically formulated, and not, as part of some wider articulation of the
identification model through managerial failing or some other device.
Is it realistic to draw upon approaches in other countries to devise our own system
? Davis claims 'Systems of criminal law are not available..through laboratory
systems. We cannot even come close to laying two such systems side by side...we
are not likely to get two systems with procedures or statutes with more than a
family resemblance.'94 Davis talks of the 'fallacy of omnipotent science' as being
the 'vanity of intellect.'95 For all that there are enough similarities to be able to
predict with some certainty how well particular approaches may work within our
own jurisdiction. Anderson argues that 'all the legal hurdles..are conceptual in
OQ
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nature, and while the law often becomes engrossed in the conceptual problems of
legal history, such a focus tends to address more the interests of theoretical
integrity rather than the interests of practicality.'96 History can teach us much, but
any system must be practical and there can be no doubt that what is needed in
Scotland is not intellectual theorising but practical solutions to an identified
problem.
Need new laws be created or can existing laws be developed ? Friedman argues for
the utilisation of existing laws. He contends 'Laws that make use of the culture
and draw on its strength can be tremendously effective. When a legal system
97contrives to cut with the grain it multiplies its strength.' I have adopted this view
in developing my own model. The pragmatist in me believes that by evolving and
utilising as best we can our existing system the less likely it is that the new
framework will meet extensive resistance. Of course, it is necessary to effect the
best system; the purists would settle for nothing less. However, the search for the
Utopian ideal may not only ultimately prove elusive but, offer opponents of
corporate criminal liability a device to filibuster change. In a spirit of realism we
should take what we can now and search for Utopia tomorrow. Fisse and
Braithwaite have argued that it is important that the forces for change mobilise
98
against those who prefer a continuing crisis. They also contend that 'In the
environment of growing crisis experimentation with new legal models becomes
possible, and when experiments are seen to solve problems which paralysed the old
law, then the new legal model may be institutionalised throughout the society and
incorporated in fundamental legal structures.'99 In the spirit of their promptings,
and with some trepidation I offer the following outline proposition designed to
embrace the features I have outlined throughout this thesis and which I believe to
be consistent with the key lessons of Anglo-American jurisprudence.
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Corporate Criminal Liability In Scotland - A Proposal
1. Common law crimes
(1) Notwithstanding any existing rule of the common law, and subject to the
provisions of subsection 2, a body corporate will be liable for common law crimes
from time to time recognised by the criminal law of Scotland.
(2) Irrespective of the provisions of subsection 1 of this section, a body corporate
will not be liable, as a principal though they may be liable art and part, for the
common law crimes of Scotland listed in Schedule 1 hereto.
(3) In determining the guilt or otherwise of a body corporate charged with a
common law offence, the court will apply the conventional test of locating the
actus reus of the offence. Any conduct engaged in or on behalf of the body
corporate by a director, servant or agent of the body corporate within the scope of
his or her actual or apparent authority shall be taken for the purposes of a
prosecution to have been engaged in also by the body corporate. The body
corporate shall only be criminally liable where, having due regard to its policies,
procedures, practices, and systems the court considers that it has exhibited
corporate fault.
(4) (1) A body corporate will be held to have exhibited corporate fault where
(a) its policies, or procedures, or practices, or systems ( or any combination
thereof) are considered to have expressly or impliedly authorised or permitted the
commission of an offence or,
(b) it has failed to take reasonable precautions or to exercise due diligence to
prevent the commission of the offence
(2) For the avoidance of doubt it shall be a defence to any prosecution for a body
corporate to establish that, having regard to all the circumstances, the body
corporate took reasonable precautions and exercised due diligence to avoid the
criminal act.
(5) Nothing in this section shall be taken to preclude the prosecution for a common
law offence of any individual wrongdoer operating within the body corporate for
conduct engaged in or on behalf of the body corporate. For the avoidance of doubt
conventional rules of the common law criminal liability will apply to such
prosecutions of the individual.
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(6) Nothing in this section shall be taken to preclude the prosecution of both the
body corporate and any individual wrongdoer jointly for any criminal offence
arising from the same occurrence.
2 Statutory Crimes
(1) No provision of this proposal, other than section 3 below, alters any existing or
to be enacted rule of statutory criminal law. Bodies Corporate and their officers
will remain liable under all existing provisions and those to be enacted henceforth
(2) For the avoidance of doubt, where any statutory enactment containing a crime
capable of commission by a body corporate does not make clear provision of the
requisite mens rea applicable to any crime within that statute, then the requisite
mental element shall be corporate fault as defined in section 1 (4) above.
3 Punishment ofCorporations
In respect of all crimes, statutory or common law, unless the statute expressly
provides otherwise, a court shall have the power to impose the following sanctions
on a body corporate- a fine, dissolution of the company, forfeiture, a formal
publicity sanction, community service, probation, a regulatory order compelling
some restraint on behalf of the corporation or some restriction on its sphere of
activity or operation, or any other sanction referred to in clause 7 of the
Recommendation of the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers No R 88 /
18.(see Appendix A of this thesis)
Schedule 1









Indecent Exposure (as part of shameless indecency)
Assault
Lewd and Libidinous Conduct
As I have argued, a new framework which sets down clear principles offers
optimism that judicial and prosecutorial inertia and inconsistency can prove to be a
phenomenon we only accord historical significance to. The outline proposal of
corporate fault owes much to the concept of duty of care.100 This should occasion
little surprise. The desire to utilise the criminal law as a means of controlling
corporations is not an exercise in semantics; it is of the very essence that
corporations do have such a duty of carc to the rest of society. They should have,
what I describe elsewhere in this thesis as a social responsibility. The outline
proposal does not fully flesh out the proposals on sanctions. The constraints of
space dictate that this is not possible. Chapter 4 offers illustration as to how some
of the proposals may be effected. The sub-thesis is that we need a more diversified
strategy on sanctions and that the judiciary should be given greater discretion.
6.3 Conclusion- The Lessons From Anglo-American Jurisprudence
Society finds itself in an ironic paradox where 'the technological advancement with
its concomitant effect of inducing ever-increasing expectations, has simultaneously
produced material affluence and environmental destruction and furthermore
generated the leisure time that has resulted in an awareness of the value of the
natural world and added to its burden of carrying man.'101 It is a paradox which
heightens our sense of awareness and at the same time increases the perils we face
from corporate crime. The paradox implores us to take some action to ameliorate
102
the consequences of our success. Despite the limitations of our empiricism, we
can nonetheless make several generalisations about corporate criminal liability
some of which may attract universal support. These generalisations implore
reconstruction of our law. As a basic starting point, we need to be relatively novel
Cf. Phillips 'Beyond The Limits OfAssault' 1995 SLT (News) 115 - 120
101
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And Powerful, (1978) at p. 133
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Clinard, Illegal Corporate Behaviour (1979), at p. 229-230
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in our approach without necessarily being revolutionary. Nor should there be any
'sacred cows' in developing an appropriate framework. One of our major problems
has been that 'We often go on discussing problems in terms of old idea when the
solution of the problem depends on getting rid of old idea, and putting in their
• • 101
place concepts more in accord with the present state of ideas and knowledge.'
We must be true to the adage that 'each age has to begin anew its legal thinking.'104
As one writer has suggested 'We would base our legal decisions not on the facts of
yesterday, but on the possibilities of tomorrow. We would seek the welfare of
society in the principles we enunciate.'105
There is a need to educate the public about the problems of corporate crime on the
basis that 'until there is a public sensibility that provokes moral outrage at this
corporate indifference, the far reaching structural reforms that could make a major
and lasting difference are unlikely to occur.'106 Moreover, and as a concomitant to
107
the above, it is necessary to develop stronger business ethics; the failure of
• • • • • 108 •
business ethics is the basis of much corporate crime. Corporate failure to self-
regulate necessitates government intervention but as we have seen in chapter 4 self-
regulation remains an important dimension of strategy.109 In arguing for a properly
developed framework, the need to look beyond the criminal law is conceded.110
Accordingly, the law needs not only be reformed but harmonised to marshal
private policing with public policing. Corporate power must mean corporate
responsibility111 and, 'Corporations must realize that, as a long term proposition,
what is good for society is also good for the corporation. They must put aside the
purely economic basis on which they make many of their decisions and give
103
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something back to the Society that permits their existence. Failure to do so may
lead to more dire consequences as society searches for a means to control corporate
112
illegality.' Despite the historic perception of incorporation as public service, in
the modern era, there is no legal reflection that the corporation has a positive
obligation to serve the public at large. Indeed the corporation is simply held to a
• 113*
minimum standard of not violating the law. Accordingly, there must be an
aspiration on their part to extend beyond this minimalist position. I do not argue
for stand alone self-regulation or any of the models of reactive fault suggested in
chapter 4. As things stand society is along way from having the necessary element
of trust such a system entails. The successful operation of a system of corporate
criminal liability would seem a prerequisite foundation upon which ideas,
including self policing, would operate. They are perhaps therefore concepts for
tomorrow.
I have argued in chapter 2, and in this chapter, for liability to based on corporate
fault rather than anthropomorphic attribution through individual mens rea within
the organisation. In surveying the literature it is apparent, as Wells argues, that
'cultural selection' dictates views of liability.114 One of my own cultural
'selections' (outlined in chapter 3), like that ofmany commentators, is to reject the
imperialism of methodological individualism in favour of a dual strategy of
corporate liability and individual liability because,
'That ancient but tenacious individualism is in truth the coronation of
anarchy; and the time comes when a spirit of community supersedes it.'115
'We have a legal system which is incapable of dealing with institutional
violence because it is limited to holding individuals responsible for
individual crime; and to a much lesser extent, to holding collectivities
(mainly companies) responsible for collective crime. What we need is a
legal system which places more emphasis on the latter, but which in
addition, holds individuals responsible for individual crime. We need a
"2
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legal order based less on neatly defined categories of guilt, and more on
the dialectics of group and individual responsibility.'116
There must also be a simple recognition of the international dimension of corporate
117
crime. According to Braithwaite, 'it is geocentricism which makes possible the
• 118*
international law-evasion strategies.' It is apparent that the law has so far failed
119
to recognise the impact of this internationalisation. Any new system must seek
international co-operation as part of the strategy to combat corporate crime but, as
a first step Scotland needs to develop its own properly constituted domestic system
of liability.
The issue of punishment has been fully addressed in chapter 4. For many
commentators this has been a pragmatic reason for the rejection or limitation of
corporate criminal liability. The issue of punishment is one which is easily
dismissed on the basis that it is simply a logistical one; there are numerous options
available to punish the errant corporation. With a little more imagination, we can
travel beyond the limitations of fines and develop a multi-faceted penological
system suited to the corporate form and not dominated by our understandings of
individual punishment. It is necessary to devise and implement collective
punishment in the same way as I have argued for collectivisation of liability.
Ultimately,
'Challenging as the task of reconstruction is, hope should not be dashed
by the ancient catchcry that corporations have neither bodies to kick or
souls to damn. Presence or absence of these human features has little or
no rational bearing upon the development of sanctions or concepts of fault
in the corporate sphere. Indeed when kicks do need to be administered, a
lack of sentient body and soul might come to be seen as an ideal condition
for their infliction.'120
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In preparing any reforms it will naturally be necessary to pay heed to popular
• • 121
opinion but, that will not be the primary driver. Importantly, 'we must be
satisfied that this is the product of careful and principled choice rather than [just]
122
tradition and happenstance.' The approach will be one which engenders
formalised State control but also one which unleashes the internal private policing
mechanisms within the corporation itself. There is a fear that adoption of more
formalised legal control simply permits the corporation to utilise its power to
circumvent any new regime and that 'the paradox is that this very proliferation of
law, regardless of its content, will tend to confirm existing inequalities. The more
formal and complex the body of law becomes, the more it will operate in favour of
123
formal, rational and bureaucratic groups such as corporations.' However, this
need not necessarily be so; by providing for a new scheme of corporate liability we
will simply be focusing the law's energies against the corporate form. The
collective power of corporations inevitably provides added power to them but not
sufficient to threaten the whole apparatus of law that we require to be fixated by the
corporate power of circumvention. Some will slip through the net of liability but,
then some individuals slip through the net of criminal liability. It is an inevitable
consequence of the criminal process. It will only become threatening at the point
that large numbers of corporations are able to circumvent any system of criminal
liability. It is therefor necessary that any system recognises problems identified
elsewhere and attempts to avoid them.
It remains true that 'Legal culture is far more open textured and open to influence
from any number of sources than is often supposed.'124 Because of this we are able
to draw upon material beyond the confines of the criminal law to develop a proper
system to control a problematic topic. Reconstruction of corporate criminal
liability will be difficult and must as a prelude contain an assessment of core
values. It seems to me to be true that,
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'any attempt to reconstruct the criminal law has at face at least two basic
problems :1 We have to make up our minds as to what we regard as the
most important values in a reconstructed world;
2 We have to decide whether these values should be protected by the
means at the disposal of the criminal law, or whether their protection
should be left to the agencies of a different character
Each successive generation should realize the duty to work afresh its view
on the problem of crime...instead of retaining unchanged, as a matter of
125
course, the law inherited from its predecessors.'
There are those who would sweep away all reference to corporate liability but such
a view, in my opinion, has been largely discredited. It flies in the face of the clear
shift in favour of developing corporate criminal liability. As a consequence,
'Decriminalisation would be premature without considering what might be done to
reconstruct criminal law in all aspects ...our efforts should be to rebuild, not
dismantle corporate criminal law. In an area of law so obviously beset by
uncertainty and delicate problems of balance such as this, legislatures tend to defer
• 126
to the method of case by case judicial and administrative evolution.' In
developing a statutory framework we will be making a break with the abdication of
the past. The judges that interpret and make the law and, the public that obey it,
have a right to clear guidance as to what that law is and, how it is to be applied.
• 127The law of corporate liability for offences stands at a cross-roads. It might be
128
going too far to say that at stake also is the capitalist system itself. A borrowed
approach may not on its own be enough or, indeed a valid approach. It certainly
represents a useful starting point. An infusion of peculiarities to Scottish criminal
law may be relevant but, all the while, it is important to recognise that corporate
crime is a universal concept. What is called for is an imaginative co-ordination of
a range ofmatters. The secret lies in blending what is possible, effective, and just.
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Comparative legal analysis opens up countless options. In addition internal
129
structures of the legal system must be plumbed. The outline proposal supra
seeks to do all of these things.
Corporations hold the future and will retain a central role in the twenty first
century. There is simply no promising alternative way of organizing and carrying
130
out most of the tasks of production. It is therefore appropriate that there should
be efforts to control their harmful capacity by applying criminal law to them. The
modern capitalist system seeks to promote the corporate form as the optimum
means of wealth creation. It is inevitable that there will be laws which favour and
promote the interests of corporation ? Woods asserts that 'the corporate concept is
a legal device. Rules for its use must be developed and applied. But such rules
must not become the masters. No such device should be allowed to defeat the
• 131
more important values of the law.' We must convince corporations that crime is
132shameful and irresponsible.
If one does accept the rationale for the application of the criminal law to
corporations, inevitably one turns to the question of how best that can be achieved.
Do we apply existing precepts and concepts to the corporate form, or is it necessary
to develop a new framework of law particular to corporations ? According to
Webster, 'White collar crime is prevalent enough, significant enough, and complex
enough to compel a realignment of the thinking and methodology of the criminal
133
justice system.' That willingness to challenge the existing order of things is
doubly important in the Scottish context. The Scottish 'tradition has revealed a
relentless nostalgia. Legal practices have been fitted into a relentless vision of
political and legal order that, ironically, owes a greater debt to the English common
law than has ever been acknowledged. Many Scots lawyers are uncomfortable
with questions of change or reform. The attitude we have uncovered is the belief
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that to meddle with the law is to invite disaster for, after all there have been no
complaints about the way it works.'134
Whatever approach is taken, one is confronted with complexity, inconsistency and
at times incoherence. Corporate criminal liability is not a concept imbued with
simplicity. All the more reason why we should adopt a dynamic and diversified
135 .,,
strategy to combat it. Machiavelli claimed that 'There is nothing more difficult
to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to
136
take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things.' Whilst this is
undoubtedly true, it is equally true that the 'modern society is an open, adaptive,
137
learning, innovative system' and, in the words of Gabor, 'Man cannot predict the
138
future; he can invent it.' We have the capacity to confront the problems and
devise an appropriate system in the way that Anglo-American jurists have
attempted to do so. It is their literature that is replete with ideas, some workable
and some not. It is my view that Scots lawyers can learn much from these common
law jurisdictions. Leigh believes that 'there is a community of interest and a
sufficient similarity among fundamental ideas for each system to learn from the
other, and, from a European point of view, there is every reason to believe that we
139 •
can achieve a useful measure of harmonization as well.' However, as Levi notes
that 'The problem of international co-operation is not..a purely legal problem; it is
also a problem of culture, attitudes and language- and of interests.'140
Important too, will be the gathering of more information about the nature and
extent of corporate crime. Leigh has argued,
'In the present state of criminological research we know enough to be sure
that much further research is required. We do not know what number of
offences are committed in the name of corporations. We do not know
whether the large corporation is primarily responsible or whether
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difficulties arise primarily with respect to smaller firms, or whether there
is any distinction worth drawing.'141
Leigh naturally, was writing about the situation prevailing in jurisdictions other
than Scotland. In Scotland no attempt has been made to gather any information
about the corporate crime. One may suppose that therefor there is a flaw in my
thesis in that before the law can be reformed one should know more about
corporate crime within our own jurisdiction. I concede that it would be preferable
to have such information but my contention is that we know enough about
corporate crime both here and abroad to devise an effective system. Experience
and empirical data may assist the process of refinement but should not preclude the
introduction of a new framework.142 The availability of such rich jurisprudence
allows the debate to be informed and rationale. Though there are those like Pearce
who believe that in 'analysing crimes of corporations we are ultimately led to ask
fundamental questions about the nature of the world's 'free enterprise system'143,
in my view, such analysis is now sterile. The discrediting and demise of the Soviet
bloc has entrenched capitalism as the accepted credo of human existence.
Doubtless capitalism will face future crises and may itself, in turn, become
discredited but for the foreseeable future it is the system that will prevail.
Corporations though seen as the vanguard of the capitalist system may well survive
the demise of that system. The collective pooling of resources is not something
which requires the adoption of a free-market philosophy. On any assessment,
corporations are here to stay and consequentially corporate crime is a likely feature
of their operation. If we are to control corporate wrongdoing, a pluralist approach
is required. One which calls for a partnership between corporations themselves and
the State.144 We must evangelise corporations, the individuals who operate within
them and, the wider public against the acceptability of corporate wrongdoing and
we must attach liability where it is appropriate.145
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In concluding, it is imperative that one appreciates both the values and the perils of
the corporate form. The call for the imposition of corporate criminal liability is not
to be confused with anti-corporatism In developing an effective workable system
of corporate criminal liability,
'we look to the corporate system to continue as a throbbing, but it is to be
hoped uncongested, artery that will continue to route investment, labor
and management services to the end results of ample productivity, full
levels of employment, and equitable and efficacious distribution of
economic rewards.'146
In striking the balance between control and emancipation we can learn much from
the jurisprudence of the Anglo-American jurisdictions. They more than any other
have grappled with the complexity that confronts us in corporate criminal liability.
The solutions to the problem undoubtedly lie in the phalanx of literature which
emanates from those countries. Isolation borne of deference to the supposed genius
of our law is no longer tenable.147 It is to the lessons of Anglo-American
jurisprudence that we must look for the foundations of our new framework.
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On the 20th October 1988 the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers adopted a
Recommendation concerning liability of enterprises having legal personality for
offences committed in the exercise of their activities.
"Considering the increasing number ofcriminal offences committed in the exercise
of the activities of enterprises which cause considerable damage to both
individuals and the community
Considering the desirability ofplacing the responsibility where the benefit derived
from the illegal activity is obtained
Considering the difficulty, due to the often complex management structure in an
enterprise, of identifying the individuals responsible for the commission of an
offence;
Considering the difficulty, rooted in the legal traditions ofmany European States,
ofrendering enterprises which are corporate bodies criminally liable;
Desirous of overcoming these difficulties, with a view to making enterprises as
answerable, without exonerating from liability natural persons implicated in the
offence, and to providing appropriate sanctions and measures to apply to
enterprises, so to achieve the due punishment of illegal activities, the prevention of
further offences and the reparation ofthe damage caused;
Considering the introduction in national law ofthe principle ofcriminal liability of
enterprises having legal personality is not the only means of solving these
difficulties and does not exclude the adoption ofother solutions serving the same
purpose;
Having regard to resolution (77) 28 on the contribution of criminal law to the
protection of the environment, Recommendation No R (81) 12 on economic crime
and Recommendation No R (82) 15 on the role of criminal law in consumer
protection,
Recommends that the governments ofthe Member States be guided in their law and
practice by the principles set out in the appendix to this recommendation.'
"The following recommendations are designed to promote measures for rendering
enterprises liable for offences committed in the exercise of their activities, beyond
existing regimes of civil liability of enterprises to which these recommendations
apply.
They apply to enterprises whether they are public or private, provided they have
legal personality and to the extent that theypursue economic activities.
1 Liability
1. Enterprises should be able to be made liable for offences committed in exercise
oftheir activities, even where the offence is alien to the purposes ofthe enterprise.
2. The enterprise should be liable, whether a natural person who committed the
acts or omissions constituting the offence can be identified or not
3. To render enterprises liable, consideration should be given in particular to
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a. applying criminal liability and sanctions to enterprises, where the nature of the
offence, the degree offault on the part of the enterprise, the consequences for
society and the need to preventfurther offences so require;
b. applying other systems of liability and sanctions, for instance those imposed by
administrative authorities and subject to judicial control, in particular for illicit
behaviour which does not require treating the offender as a criminal.
4. The enterprise should be exoneratedfrom liability where its management is not
implicated in the offence and has taken all the necessary steps to prevent its
commission.
5. The imposition of liability upon the enterprise should not exonerate from
liability a natural person implicated in the offence. In particular, persons
performing managerial functions should be made liable for breaches of duties
which conduce to the commission ofan offence.
Sanctions
6. In providing for the appropriate sanctions which might be imposed against
enterprises, special attention should be rapid to objectives other than punishment
such as prevention offurther offences and the reparation of damage suffered by
victims ofthe offence.
7. Consideration should be given to the introduction of sanctions and measures
particularly suited to apply to enterprises. These may include thefollowing:
-warning, reprimand, recognisance;
-a decision declaratory ofresponsibility, but no sanction;
-fine or other pecuniary sanction;
-confiscation of property which was used in the commission of the offence or
represents the gains derivedform the illegal activity;
-prohibition ofcertain activities, in particular exclusions from doing business with
public authorities;
-exclusion fromfiscal advantages and subsidies;
-prohibition upon advertising goods or services;
-annulment oflicences;
-removal ofmanagers;
-appointment ofaprovisional caretaker management by the judicial authority;
-closure ofthe enterprise;
-winding-up of the enterprise;
-compensation and/or restitution to the victim;
-restoration oftheformer state;
-publication ofthe decision imposing a sanction or measure
These sanctions and measures may be taken alone or in combination, with or
without suspensive effect, as main or as subsidiary orders.
8. When determining what sanctions or measures to apply in a given case, in
particular those of a pecuniary nature, account should be taken of an economic
benefit the enterprise derived from its illegal activities, to be assessed, where
necessary, by estimation.
9. Where this is necessary for preventing the continuance of an offence or the
commission offurther offences, or for securing the enforcement of a sanction or
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measure, the competent authority should consider the application of interim
measures.
10. To enable the competent authority to take its decision with the full knowledge
of any sanctions or measures previously imposed against the enterprise,
consideration should be given to their inclusion in the criminal records or to the
establishment ofa register in which all such sanctions or measures are recorded"
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